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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines changing relations in the defence industry. The defence industry is
peculiar in important respects, not least because of the central role of the state in shaping the
structure of the industry. During the Cold War excess capacity was preserved intact to meet
state demands for armament technology and the defence industry was protected from the more
general decline ofmanufacturing in Britain. With attempts to restructure the arms complex in
Britain, the disturbance of decades of structural stasis allowed a study of industrial change in
concentrated form. A leading edge military electronics firm, Ferranti (now GEC-Marconi),
and a naval repair yard, Rosyth dockyard (now Babcock Rosyth Defence), were studied to
understand the precise forms industrial change took and its historically contingent nature.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key actors within the firms and primary and
secondary documentary sources, including Parliamentary papers, consulted.
The first part of the thesis sets out the general field of study, considering general questions of
restructuring and the nature of the defence industry. The historical pattern of defence industry
in Scotland is also discussed. Traditional warshipbuilding was joined by advanced electronics
capacity during the Cold War when Scotland became a strategic location for military support
and production activities. Part two contains the case study material. The historical
development of each firm in its external relation to the state and internal workplace relations is
set out. Experiences of restructuring are considered next, taking into account the impact of
privatisation, marketisation and changing products markets. Changing contours of the
workforce and worker resistance to and compliance with restructuring is discussed. Part three
then interprets the case studies within a wider Marxist political economy. Each attempted
"solution" contains the seeds of a new problem. First, state-capital relations continue to be
marked by the idea of 'strategic' capitals within a nationally-based industrial complex. After
forty years of Cold War stasis, which supported a capital-widening accumulation strategy,
restructuring marks a return to more frequent disturbances to industrial structures and a
capital-narrowing strategy as state capitals attempt to manage uncertainty in the mediation of
local-national-global tensions. Secondly, workplace 'citizenship' constrained management
autonomy during the permanent arms economy. Restructuring places renewed emphasis on
commodification as an impersonal disciplining force. Within this context firms are caught
between contradictory demands in commodifying work relations: to make living labour
redundant and also to enrol it, to make concrete labour abstract, to make absolute surplus
relative, to make formal subordination real. Labour's specialised versatility means that
capital's dependency on living labour cannot be eliminated by restructuring. Thirdly, shifts
towards Human Resource Management in personnel policies represent an indication of this
tension. Living labour possesses a structural capacity to subvert both market and production-
based subordination. However, historically-shaped workers' organisational capacities range
from militancy to moderation and the production and reproduction of workers" self-
organisation depends on social activity. A typology is suggested for understanding the
difference between dialogical and monological organisation within which issues of worker




'War has become the only method of accumulation, and by the orchestration of
patriotism's made opera that pace ofmanufacture which insists upon
diminishing may be resuscitated for its brief time'.
Macleod drew his breath.
'War is permanent and the last argument of the apologist is no better than the
first. If one bloc should vanquish the other, it will soon find itself almost totally
impoverished. Its impoverishment enormous, the winner will find it impossible
to set up the rational exploitation which could solve his problems. Instead, he
must exploit as extravagantly as he dares not only the vanquished but his former
allies as well. His demands must be so great in relation to what is left that a
new military situation develops before the last has ceased'.
'The war begins again with a new alignment of forces, and to the
accompaniment of famine and civil war, the deterioration continues until we are
faced with mankind in barbary'.
Norman Mailer, Barbary Shore, 1952.
Chapter 1
Restructuring the defence industry
In Joel Schumacher's film Falling Down the central character, D-Fens is made redundant from the
Califomian defence industry. A violent vigilante reaction follows to what Mike Davis (1987:303)
had earlier anticipated would be a closing frontier of income and status mobility1 for
increasingly marginalised 'Average White Males'. D-Fens' highly individualised behaviour, isolated
from the solidaristic identities of others, derives from the collapse of the structural stability and
relatively privileged position of white male workers at the core of the US military industry.
According to Davis (1987: 302) Reaganite 'military Keynesianism' temporarily attempted to
preserve the Cold War social bloc formed by the bourgeoisie, the middle strata and the more
privileged segments of the white working class as 'a popular front against the depreciation of
inefficient fixed capital With the Los Angeles area alone accounting for 17 percent of all US
military spending the loss of defence-related jobs was a major structural factor in the overall loss
of almost one million jobs in California between 1990 and 1992 (Comford, 1992). The 'shake-out'
of the military industry is compounded by a 'wall of separation' between military and civil
economies which prevents any straightforward civil assimilation of well-qualified, but narrowly
specialised, blue and white-collar defence workers like the D-Fens figure (Markusen and Yudken,
1992). As the character puts it: 'I lost my job. Actually I didn't lose it; it lost me. I'm overeducated
and underskilled - or maybe it's the other way around, I forget. I'm obsolete. I'm not "economically
viable'". (Clover, 1993:9)
Such a portrayal stands in marked contrast to the available representations of the industrial
working class in Scotland. The iconography of labour, for instance, in Ken Currie's Glasgow
History murals takes as its datum traditional heavy industries on Clydeside, the historic location of
the shipbuilding, steel, armaments and engineering sectors of military industrial activity in
Scotland. The murals are redolent of the labour traditions of collective struggle, working class




The structural differences between the military industry in Scotland and the US are just as striking
as are the cultural representations. Unlike the pervasive 'gunbelt' (Markusen et al. 1991) of the US
'military-industrial complex' the scale and scope of the Scottish component of the British 'defence
industrial base'1 is of a more modest order. Some of these contrasts are: that it is tied to the
interests of a second-level power; it is located in an old industrial 'rustbelt' region of mainly branch
plants in a period of spatially uneven ^industrialisation1; its workforce share w idespread social-
democratic political attitudes and are collectively self-organised into well-developed trade unions.
The break-up of the privileged US military industrial 'popular front' would seem then to be
incomparable to the situation confronting defence industry workers in Scotland. In short, the
restructuring of the defence industry in Scotland might have been expected to have occasioned a
collective response as defence firms both scrapped jobs and changed those remaining. As John
Lovering (1990:464) put it:
... the current restructuring of the defence industry is designed both to scrap jobs and to
change those remaining. As defence companies attempt to increase the flexibility with which
they can redeploy labour between tasks and projects, they have moved into the forefront of the
confrontation with organised labour.
This research seeks to examine Lovering's contention.
Methodology
The general aim of the research is to understand shifts in capital, state and labour relations in the
military industry in Scotland. Key to the uneven restructuring process are issues of resistance and
struggle and compliance and peace. This covers the broad topic areas of political economy and
industrial sociology. The subject area demands an historically informed inter-disciplinary
approach. Studies of the defence industry are often confined to economic, political or geographical
effects of distinctive and dependent labour markets, product markets, corporate structures,
technological innovation or the trade-off between preserving inefficient industrial capacity for
military purposes and the demands of national economic performance. Important though such
studies are they rarely take account of actual social conflicts and divisions between and within
state, capital and labour. Instead a realism of policy or capital 'logic' is imposed onto seemingly
1 Note the differences in characterising industrial activity for military purposes: military-industrial
complex, coined by Eisenhower in 1961, is concerned with the social relations and processes between
military, bureaucratic and business interests (Berghahn, 1981: 86-101) while defence industrial base is
more concerned with the technical and empirical questions of optimising national productive capacity
(Taylor and Hayward. 1989). Military, arms and defence industry will be used interchangeably.
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arbitrar\ sequences of events. Moreover, the role of political, business, bureaucratic and trade
union leaders is assumed to be of the highest moment in any restructuring process. Even where this
assumption has some obvious validity to it, 'leader-centric' perspectives still tend to belittle the
inconspicuous struggling that goes on within what Marx called the 'hidden abode' of production.
The main methodological issue for this research concerns the relationship between theory and
evidence. Where theory makes general abstractions from the object of study it isolates particular
aspects for analysis as a one-sided, closed system. Yet. if the continuities and changes in military-
industrial structures are to be adequately accounted for then the many-sided dimensions of
restructuring needs to be synthesised into a substantive theory. The possibility for this depends on
the way that the conceptual framework enables the specific dynamics of restructuring and shifting
levels of analysis to be coherently integrated. Conceptual clarity will be critical for selecting
criteria to represent the particular mediations of economic, social, political, technological and
spatial factors in the restructuring process.
Restructuring: a case for socio-historic critique
The notion of structure simply refers to the regular, patterned and relatively stable social processes
and relations. Yet if we want to explain how seemingly stable structures change over time we need
to find out how structural contradictions intensify over lengthy periods resulting in decisive turning
points or conjunctural 'situations'. Such conjunctures are contested situations where structural
contradictions forcefully pose a re-ordering of social relations over time, of 'cures within certain
limits' (Gramsci, 1971). Such shifts are always constrained within certain limits and occur
unevenly across space and time. This demands an analysis of particular mechanisms and multi-
causal relations. The insistence by the restructuring school on the local and particular means
paying attention to issues of how adequately theory and evidence 'fit' in accounting for the
seemingly episodic as well as longer term processes. As Massey (1984:119) puts it:
... local changes and characteristics are not just some simple 'reflection' of broader
processes: local areas are not just in passive receipt of changes handed down from some higher
national or international level. The vast variety of conditions already existing at local level also
affects how those processes themselves operate.
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Conceptualising military industry
The military industry is often discussed as a disembodied 'thing-in-itself. Neo-classical writers
begin from Adam Smith's dictum that 'defence is the first duty of the sovereign". Their central
concern is with the technical and empirical problems of optimising the national 'defence industrial
base' and it's contribution to military capability. In contrast, liberal writers in the United States
have focused on the concept of the 'military industrial complex' (MIC). Although more concerned
with political and economic relations and processes between military, bureaucratic, capitalist and
public interests, the MIC is treated as a relatively static, autonomous social bloc. For Melman
(1975) the military-industrial-complex, in pursuing its own overriding interests, deforms the
normal workings of the government and the economy. The military-industrial-complex also formed
a key component of JK Galbraith's (1967) 'technostructure' in which the specialised role of the
military industry defined the meaning and context as well as the technology embodied in weapons
production, with competitive obsolescence in weapon technology a nearly perfect substitute for
battlefield attrition. A further socio-technological trajectory was developed by Kaldor's (1981)
notion of the 'baroque arsenal' of sophisticated military technologies generated by a conservative
routinisation of innovation with diminishing technological returns for escalating costs.
In these varied approaches the distinctive activities around production for military purposes are
conceived in terms of empirically identifiable stable properties. This ahistorical reification of
military industrial structures has come under sustained critique (MacKenzie. 1983; Lovering.
1987a; 1990a; 1994a). Notions of seemingly autonomous, permanent social forms and inexorable
technological trajectories, immune from wider processes of change, are of limited use for
understanding the current restructuring of the military industry.
Military expenditure supported and protected military industries for over three decades but became
an economic burden on the states who bore the uneven incidence of escalating defence costs,
principally the US. the USSR and, to a lesser extent, the UK. eroding their competitive economic
position. Military industrial structural dominance was preserved until the mid-1980s largely
because symbiotic military bloc rivalry generated a technologicallv-driven arms race as a coherent
aim of supposedly self-sufficient national industrial capacity. By then the situation had long
matured for immanent restructuring.
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The first attempt at this in Britain was the 1957 Defence Review, describing itself as 'the biggest
change in military policy ever made in normal times' (cited in Chalmers, 1985:68). However, this
completely failed to significantly reduce defence spending as a proportion of gross domestic
product. Chalmers (1985:75) calculates that between the Sandys Review. 1957. and the last year
of the Conservative administration, 1963/4, real defence expenditure grew by almost 8 percent and
as a proportion of GDP it declined by a negligible 0.6 percent. Fifteen years later this had fallen to
4.4 percent of GDP in 1978/9 (Chalmers, 1985:100) but it returned to the level of the late 1960s
by the early 1980s at over 5 percent of GDP (Chalmers. 1985:136). This was boosted by the
Falklands War and the previous Labour government's commitment to NATO (including 3 percent
annual real increases in the defence budget) which the Conservatives inherited and continued until
1985/6. The real rises in defence spending need to be understood in the context of the so-called
'relative price effect' whereby the cost inflation of defence equipment, the rate of specifically
defence costs on top of the general rate of inflation in the economy, rose on average by some 2
percent while for major equipment prices rose by 6-10 percent faster (Smith and Smith. 1983:34).
The slow, episodic attempts at 'cures within certain limits' repeatedly failed in Britain during the
1960s and 70s. The main impediments to change were: the hegemony of US-led Cold War
Atlanticism; the relative, institutionalised strength of the labour movement; market rigidities; the
permanent condition of state bail-out for defence firms; political expediencies; and guaranteed
profitability of defence contracts. In all events a thoroughgoing treatment of structural crisis was
repeatedly postponed. In Britain repeated defence reviews and internal MOD reorganisations were
post hoc attempts to remedy imbalances between budgets, defence commitments and capacity
requirements.
By the 1980s the terms of the national congruence of state and capital military industrial staictures
were therefore beginning to be revised in the context of the limits to military spending imposed by
fiscal crisis, the high price inflation of weapons equipment and the development of advanced
technological capabilities, particularly in Japan and Germany, outside the military industry
(Harman. 1984; Lovering, 1990; 1993; 1994a). However, restructuring only really began in
earnest in the mid-1980s and was caught between the seemingly paradoxical demands of free
market solutions to improve competition and efficiency while the state retained a national
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commitment to a well-equipped nuclear defence posture. The accomplishments thus far are open to
dispute.
The restructuring of military industry
According to Lovering (1990a; 1991b) capital and labour in the arms industries formed discrete
class fractions because of their specific relation to the process of production and appropriation of
surplus. These relations converged with the Fordist model more closely than most of British
industry, as the institutionalisation of organised labour meant formalised internal labour markets,
including labour 'hoarding' by firms, and collective bargaining procedures '... generally ensuring
good pay. conditions and chances of advancement. For workers in defence plants, life tended to be
fairly easy' (Lovering, 1990a:457). On other counts, however, military industry diverged from
classical Fordism since small batch production of complex and innovatory products restricted the
potential for mass production and frustrated a Taylorist routinisation and deskilling of the labour
process. The need to perpetually innovate to order by the defence industry prevented precisely the
kind of technological diffusion and standardisation throughout the economy predicted for example
by the life-cycle model of military industry (Todd. 1988). and claimed a disproportionate share of
scientists and engineers (Lovering. 1990b). Such characteristics of a supposedly neo-Fordist
regime of accumulation were present in the military sector during the supposed height of the
Fordist regime.
The structure of military industry throughout the period of the cold war changed only within
certain narrow limits. Because the state system and the capitalist economy cannot be prised apart
into separate pristine structural forms, the precise nature of the interaction in reproducing military
industry requires distinct periodisation and concrete empirical analysis. The precise forms military
industrial relations take are 'contingent' on this wider framework. Viewing the MIC as contingent
has the advantage of focusing on the mechanisms for structural change instead of imposing a
limiting or partial conceptual schema on changed conjunctures.
Alert to the potentialities for structural change. Lovering in particular has paid particular attention
to how geographical, industrial and corporate shifts in the military industry connect historically to
the restructuring of capitalist production and the nation-state. During the 1930s and 1940s the
international arms industry collapsed, creating a new national nexus of private capital and state
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interests around military industry based on vehicles, aircraft and electronic engineering industries
(Lovering, 1986; 1993; 1995). Total war militarised the economy to an unprecedented level which
continued, at reduced levels, after the post-war economy was remilitarised in the late 1940s around
nuclear, aircraft, missiles and electronics. Wartime relocation had the effect of shifting defence
plants westwards although industries such as aircraft retained the previous southern bias. The cold
war not only rearranged the hierarchy of weapons technologies but ossified the geographical
distribution of its production preserving defence-dependent localities like Bristol (Lovering, 1985;
1988a; Boddy and Lovering, 1986), Derby, Manchester and Preston (Lovering. 1988b; 1991a). for
example, around aerospace. The cold war industry of large sites carrying out a range of activities,
from R&D to production and assembly, and dominating local labour markets, survived the
demdustrialisation of the early 1980s as sub-regional 'islands of prosperity' (Lovering, 1988b).
Although such 'islands' resisted a straightforward spatial division of labour by function, and during
the 1980s some 'lower' production functions relocated away from the South East, the cold war
'spatial-fix' was generally biased towards the south and west of England (Lovering, 1993; 1995).
The spatial 'layering' of the disproportionately large arms industry in Britain closely followed the
contours of the different phases of industrial development and capital formation because of the
state's special preserving input for built capital and regional coalitions in the military-industrial
nexus. And in drawing a contrast between the unevenness of military spending, infrastructure,
technological sectors and labour markets in Bristol and South Wales, Lovering (1985; Hall et al.
1987) argues that ideological images of place held by elites also partly influenced the allocation of
defence investments and contracts. In this account Bristol was advantaged by being seen by elite
groups as part of the 'English heartland' offering suitable life-style packages while the imagery of
South Wales differed as militantlv proletarian with an non-English, incomprehensibly foreign
culture.
By the early 1980s it was becoming increasingly apparent to government and industry that this
remarkable institutional stability could not be sustained. If the geo-political cold war ended in
1989. 1985 was the year when the corporatist cold war ended. Since then military expenditure has
fallen; competition introduced into procurement procedures; major, costly projects cancelled;
administrative procedures reformed; and traditional forms of government support become less
apparent. Lovering (1990a:458) argued that.
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Faced with over-capacity, and an inheritance of employment and production practices suited
to a more indulgent age. the British defence industry is currently engaged in a radical
restructuring, far more so, in general, than UK civilian industry.
Unlike autarchic cold war structures the emerging arms industry is gradually becoming
internationalised as a result of mergers, take-overs and amalgamations, and transnational
collaborations (Lovering. 1994a; 1994b). Capital is increasingly concentrated within and across
national boundaries, although there may be varying national limits to this process, making the
prospects for an integrated European MIC particularly baleftil. Yet it was precisely the limits
imposed on the technical and social division of labour by nationally-based arms production
compared to non-defence production that precipitated restructuring to begin with. Across-the-board
specialised capacity, constrained by national boundaries, brought with it cost penalties which the
fiscal crisis of the British state found increasingly difficult to endure. Paradoxically, the dominant
corporate strategy of the major arms companies in the early 1990s appears to mean further
retrenchment and even diversification within arms production while some non-defence products are
beginning to match the technological sophistication of defence components.
In the early 1990s the restructuring and contraction of the British arms industry seemed to be
giving rise to a new. more comprehensive spatial division of labour as single-site across-the-board
capacity fragmented by function (Lovering, 1991a). Control and conception functions were
generally consolidated in the South East, largely because of the inelastic supply and growing
demand for scientists and engineers, with production and assembly plants increasingly dispersed to
take into account local labour market conditions (Lovering, 1990b; 1991b; Saxenian. 1989;
Dickson. 1983). Cumulative causation effects were therefore being felt in the contraction and
rationalisation of capacity, reflecting current regional prosperity and previous rounds of arms-
induced investment. Yet this uneven development was also integrated as the Southern core of the
British economy benefits from the consolidation of high-level arms-related activities while regional
centres of'screwdriver' plants are more vulnerable from the continuing technological intensification
of weaponry and shrivelled demand. In employment terms Lovering (1991 a:291) suggested that a
quarter to a third of a million jobs would be lost by the late 1990s, concentrated among 'lower'




Within this broad framework the position ofmilitary industry in Scotland can be situated. Scotland
has been identified as a region suffering from chronic industrial restructuring of a longue duree
character. "Crisis" therefore becomes difficult to separate out from more general processes of
industrial change (Eldridge, et al, 1991). What makes military industry significant in this context is
that it was largely inoculated from the kind of job losses, plant closures, work reorganisations,
relocation, and declining plant size associated with "traditional" civilian manufacturing. The
historical evolution of the modern military industry will be traced as a guide to understanding its
peculiar position in the 1980s. Before rearmament in the late 1930s the military industry' in
Scotland barely existed, kept afloat by a trickle of warshipbuilding contracts on Clydeside. Yet.
after 1945 Scotland, increasingly placed at the centre of gobal military-bloc rivalries, was
transformed into a 'major place d'armes' (Erickson. 1969:72): An historical analysis will show that
Scotland repeatedly' developed military-industrial capital in response to heightened military
competition, the post-1889 arms race. 1905-14 rearmament. 1936-39 rearmament and the 1914-18
and 1939-45 wars, which contracted only with the disarmament of 1922-36. Even after 1945. and
especially after the Korean war. the permanence of military industrial capacity in Scotland seemed
assured. It is the terms of this military industrial formation which are in the process of dissolution
in Scotland. A more detailed discussion of arms industry restructuring in Scotland follows in
chapter 2. For now I want to indicate what the research set out to do and how it attempted to do
this.
The research
Since restructuring assumes that industrial change is historically conditioned two case studies were
selected for detailed historical study. These are the military' electronic firm, Ferranti in Edinburgh
and Rosvth Dockyard, naval ship repair yard in West Fife. Arguably these represent two of the
most important firms in Scotland in terms of employment and technological capabilities. One,
Ros\th. seems to be in a traditional sector, shiprepair. while the other, Ferranti. is in a "sunrise"
sector, electronics. Yet the object is not to make direct comparisons based on two cases. Instead the
point is that these firms are exceptional in important ways. Rosyth became a lead British dockyard
after centuries of domination of the naval-industrial complex by yards in the south of England.
~ The magnitude of the Scottish 'integrated defence establishment' was catalogued by Spaven in 1983 in a
directory listing some 219 military bases - and this did not include military-industrial capacity in
Scotland.
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Ferranti is a rare leading-edge military electronics firm outside of the M4 corridor. Privatisations,
competitive fixed-price contracts, diminishing naval and increased strategic nuclear and electronics
significance resulted in different impacts in different sectors. In ordnance, shipbuilding and
shiprepair firm strategy is geared towards surviving (Todd. 1991). In military electronics firm
strategy depends on intensified niche specialisation and the development of 'leading-edge'
technologies (Morgan and Saver, 1988). Labour and capital are sectorally segmented, with capital
becoming increasingly concentrated while labour is divided both by section and plant. In examining
Ros\th and Ferranti the dynamics of workplace relations will be contextualised within a political
economy of restructuring.
A serious problem for studying the restructuring thesis as it might apply to the arms industry is
access to source materials. The arms industry is notoriously secretive. Two main sources of
material were drawn upon: documentary and semi-structured interviews. Official Parliamentary
reports, such as Defence and the Public Accounts Committees, covered policy reforms and
implementation. The writings of (ex)senior civil servants in the MOD, Ministers and senior
military officers were useful sources for the intentions and attitudes behind often secretive
processes of policy formation. Minutes of meetings, departmental memoranda and reports,
workplace briefs, official trade union reports and circulars, campaign materials, consultants'
reports and the like allowed a picture to be built up of events and attitudes from the point of view
of actors at different places in the restructuring process.
Access was also negotiated to interview key actors in each workplace. Thirty-eight interviews were
carried out from 1994 to 1996, lasting between one and four hours, sometimes over two sessions as
in the case of the pilot interview. Interviews were conducted with Directors, senior, middle and
junior managers, Personnel, Planning, Human Resource and Industrial Relations managers,
supervisors, trade union conveners and shop stewards, and rank and file workers. Interviews were
semi-structured and covered topic areas relevant to the interviewees' particular vantage point
within the relations of production. Interview content covered respondents' own interpretations and
helped to establish events and their sequence. In one workplace audio recording was permitted,
allowing full transcriptions to be made and analysed. In the other one, recording equipment was
banned under the Official Secrets Act. Here copious interview notes were taken and returned to the
interviewee for comment and correction.
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Biographical note
In the early 1990s, therefore, a crisis was expected to visit defence industries everywhere. For some
in the industry it proved a short-run thing and they soon returned to business as usual. For most
defence sectors, firms and workplaces in Britain, however, the crisis came as a monumental shock
after four decades of industrial decadence. Barely perceptible processes long in gestation resulted
in an industrial structure all the more sensitive to the impact of a rapidly changing environment.
When it burst through the crisis was a problem to be cured by large, frequently administered doses
of restructuring, a polite term which disguised the social and personal wounds inflicted upon
thousands of defence workers, their dependents and their localities. Restructuring as a policy of
'necessary adjustment' was implacable in refocussing corporations on 'core activities', 'downsizing'
firms, 'streamlining' organisations, 're-engineering' productive processes, 'rationalising' space.
Protected by a military industrial divide from the forces working on civil industry over the previous
decade and a half, defence work represented a final resting point where industry was sealed off
from the sclerosis debilitating the rest of the national industrial body. The illusion that defence
production would remain immune from the wider shake-out and contraction of industry, only made
the audacity and intensity of it when it came seem all the more dramatic.
As a way of opening this up a bit further I want to offer a retelling ofmy own background. This is
for two reasons. First, it allows the reader to locate where the writer is coming from, socially,
geographically, politically and intellectually. Second, an autobiographical detour is suggestive of
what C Wright Mills (195 l:xx) in the early 1950s called the 'one great task of social studies'
... to describe the larger economic and political situation in terms of the meaning for the inner
life and the external career of the individual, and in doing this to take into account how the
individual becomes falsely conscious and blinded.
The stress on structure made by Mills was in response to the pervasiveness in American sociology
at that time of what he called elsewhere 'psychologism' (1959:67n). Psychologism explains any
social phenomenon in terms of assumptions about the psychological make-up of individuals. Mills
(1959:8) tried to overcome crude 'psychologism' by relating the 'personal troubles of milieu' to the
'public issues of social structure', although again Mills' formulation tended to remain schematic and
static, hypostatising milieu and structure. Nonetheless, and in line with Mills' own substantive
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work. I want to use the idea of milieu and structure, not as unchanging and distinct categories but
as mutually informed by a dialectic relationship. This will allow me to retrace an autobiography
connecting up milieu and staicture. personal troubles and public issues. Perhaps this will be closer
in spirit to Braverman's (1973:21) image of the threading ofhistory into a worked-up fabric
Social determinacv ... is a historic process. The concrete and determinate forms of society are
indeed 'determined' rather than accidental, but this is the determinacy of the thread-by-thread
w eaving of the fabric of history, not the imposition of external formulas.
In Scotland in 1979 some of the threads were being unpicked and re-woven, although the fabric
itself remained immediately recognisable. One such thread was the election of the first Thatcher
government. Another was that this coincided with, and further exacerbated, existing trends in
British manufacturing industry. In the first two years of the Thatcher government manufacturing,
and engineering in particular, went through the most severe slump in half a century. Between 1979
and 1981 manufacturing output in Britain fell by 17 per cent, employment by 1.2 million or 16 per
cent and capital investment by a third. In the west of Scotland the industrial stitching had been
awry for a much longer period. There the shake-out between 1979-81 came as only the latest
episode of a lengthier process of industrial dismantling (Aitken, 1991).
On the very same Friday in December 1979 all three male wage earners in our household in the
Tollcross area of Glasgow were made redundant. Each of us was a manual worker engaged in
metal working in some way: my dad was a burner, cutting up the metal skeletons of Scotland's
industrial infrastructure for scrap; John, younger brother by two years, was a welder tacking
railings and gates together; and I was in the third year of training as an apprentice mechanical
fitter. Manufacturing plants in the east end of Glasgow, such as British Steel's tubeworks in
Tollcross and United Glass1 bottle works in Shettleston were in terminal decline and even the once
mighty Parkhead Forge was destined to live on only as the name of a cluster of pyramidical
shopping outlets. Industrial workers had fewer and fewer choices after redundancy; for many the
choice was either to 'get on their bikes' or enter the 'service sector'. Or for older workers another
prospect loomed: that of long term or permanent unemployment. After spending most of his adult
life working in an insecure and dangerous industry, with the constant risk of burns from the gas
torch, falling from a redundant crane being scrapped, crushed by collapsing steel structures or
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breathing deadly toxic fumes from burning through lead-coated pipework, at the age of 45 in 1979
my father would never again get taken on for any kind of paid work. John, on the other hand, had
the advantages of y outh and re-trained locally as an engineer servicing domestic appliances, and so
combined engineering knowledge and skills in the setting of the so-called service sector.
Until redundancy 1 had worked at the Carntyne Works of NEI Thomson Cochrane Ltd. next door
to what was left by that time of Beardmore's Parkhead Forge. Thomsons specialised in
manufacturing oil, gas and coal-fired boilers but the cancellation of a major order to Iran after the
revolution unpicked yet another thread; Carntyne closed and the remaining orders were redirected
to NEI's plant at Annan in Dumfries. The Carntyne works had been strongly unionised and
disputes were a regular feature.
The main reason I started at Thomsons was because it was within daily walking distance from
Tollcross; yet in 1980 I ended up working 500 miles away on the south coast of England. In central
Scotland engineering workers who wished to continue at the trade would often find themselves
travelling northwards to the oil industry or southwards to the defence industry. By chance, I ended
up going south after Personnel Officers from Portsmouth dockyard arrived in Glasgow as part of a
nation-wide recruitment tour. Interviews were held at a hotel close to Central Station where they
agreed to let me finish my apprenticeship. At Portsmouth I soon came across a colony of west of
Scotland engineering workers as well as groups of workers from Sunderland, Newcastle, Liverpool
and Wales, trying to keep ahead of the desertification of the British engineering industry. But
Portsmouth proved to be another mirage. In 1981 large-scale redundancies were announced under
John Nott's defence review. Recent recruits who had already been assigned 'established' status were
give the chance to transfer to either Rosyth or Plymouth dockyards; non-established workers were
made redundant almost immediately. A similar process was going on at Chatham dockyard in
Kent. As an apprentice I was not established but the Chief Apprentice Training Officer took pity
on me and arranged for a transfer to Rosyth.
Although it lacked Portsmouth's historic traditions or architecture Rosyth was very recognisable as
a dockyard; the same forms, the same rules, the same pecking order, the same kind of managers,
the same ambivalent attitude among the workers to authority and work and, of course, the same old
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Navy. With my time just about out I was put in the machine shop of the factory as a turner on the
centre lathes and after a while became a shop steward.
This became increasingly important and serious. In this two books above all struck a chord, the
immediacy of Huw Beynon's Working for Ford and the analysis ofHarry Braverman's Labour and
Monopoly Capitalism, both informed by a deep understanding of work as a social activity, first
and foremost. Braverman's experience of working as a coppersmith in a naval shipyard, 'a type of
industrial enterprise which, at that time, was probably the most complete product of two centuries
of industrial revolution1 enabled him to recuperate the centrality and prescience of Marx's 'critical
analysis of capitalist production' (1974:5,8). Here milieu and structure are mediated at the point of
production, not counter-posed to each other, and social division and co-operation are
simultaneously re-threaded.
The structure of the rest of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 will touch on some of the salient
features of the arms industry in Scotland. This will give a context for what will be described for
Rosyth and Ferranti. Part 2 consists of the case study chapters. In both cases origins,
organisational structures, workplace relations and technical change will be presented. The first case
study, Rosyth, locates it within a context of traditional historic state dockyards with specific kinds
of organisation and employment relations. In Ferranti's case, a family firm founded on
technological innovation becomes transplanted to Edinburgh to emerge by the 1960s as one of the
leading manufacturing firms in Scotland. The chapters discuss relations within the workplace,
leading up to take-over by outside managers as the signal for restructuring. Trade unions and the
labour process are central to how this is understood. Part three attempts to place the case studies
within a wider explanatory framework to account for the restructuring of state, capital and labour.
A chapter is given over to first, the nature of ownership and control, second, changes in the nature
of management authority and control in the workplace, and third, the question of labour and self-
organisation within the restructuring process.
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Chapter 2
The arms industry in Scotland
Restructuring after the end of the Cold War was widely expected to consolidate the southern
regional grip on UK defence production. Behind this assumption lay a crude cumulative
causation model. Companies squeezed by spending cuts as the industry became concentrated in
still fewer hands meant impending rationalization and closure of remote divisions. The
resulting flight of the defence industry 'home' to its southern core would undo the minor
regional dispersal accomplished by the Second World War and consolidated by the Cold War.
Important sub-centres of the UK defence industry, such as central Scotland, thus faced a vista
of declining employment and plant closures in the 1990s. Indeed the decision to base nuclear
submarine refits at Devonport dockyard, Plymouth in June 1993 instead of Rosyth dockyard,
the largest single-site employer in Scotland, and the closure of the Rosyth naval base in July
1994 seemed to confirm such fears. Other events, such as the takeover of Ferranti, the biggest
electronics employer in Scotland (Peters, 1990), by GEC further contributed to the sense of
regional vulnerability to defence industry restructuring. A related expectation was that such
restructuring could well result in fierce resistance from workforces who had traditionally been
well-organized and used to relatively privileged bargaining and employment practices. Again,
Scotland, often imagined as a militantly proletarian community, was expected to be a leading
centre for contesting the logic of defence industry restructuring.
Spatial restructuring and labour resistance has and is taking place but in ways in which the
structural-logic model underlying these twin hypotheses fail to anticipate. What follows will
briefly put the defence industry in Scotland in historical context. A model consisting of four
broadly distinct rounds of arms production during the last century will be developed. Then I
will turn to some features underlying the current bout of restructuring. Some of the paradoxes
faced by the trade unions in the struggle for workplace survival within the restructuring
process will be outlined.
Whither the arms industry?
Finding out the extent of defence contracting done in Scotland is problematic. In some ways
the most detailed information has been best presented in the socio-economic impact studies of
individual workplaces, bases, towns or regions. In Scotland such studies have been conducted
into the key defence establishments: the Clyde Submarine Base in the 1970s and 1980s
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(Fleming. 1988); the Royal Ordnance Factory at Bishopton (Greenwood 1989; Ramsay.
1990); GEC-Yarrow in Glasgow (Cmd 2852. 1995); and the Rosyth dockyard and naval base
complex in Fife (FRC 1979; 1993; 1994a; 1994b). Such reports have been supplemented by
regional studies into the three major concentrations of defence employment in Scotland: Fife
(FRC 1991); Lothian (LRC, 1991); and Strathclyde (SRC 1992); although others regions
affected indirectly by cuts such as Central and Dumfries and Galloway (CRC, 1992; DGRC.
1993) have also produced reports. Nationally, the information becomes more unreliable. In
1992 Scotland was estimated to be more defence-dependent than the UK as a whole with Fife
the most dependent region in Scotland (SE, 1992) Yet such levels of defence-dependency in
Scotland do not show in the EC report on the socio-economic impact of reduced defence
spending (EC 1992), while the annual UK Defence Estimates (now Defence Statistics)
conceals the degree of local dependencies under Scotland as a single regional category. Only
recently have authoritative broad-based studies of the defence sector in Scotland emerged, such
as the research to support Scottish Enterprise's 'Scottish Defence Initiative' (BSL, 1992;
Meacham, 1993), although substantial independent research had earlier measured defence-
related employment in total for Scotland (Fleming and Smith, 1987) and sectorally for military
aerospace (TASS, 1984) and defence electronics (Peters, 1990).
Attempts to quantify the extent of the defence industry are, however, of limited utility since
there is no single static form which the defence industry takes. Moreover, what exactly counts
as the 'defence industry' has been subject to definitional dispute, the terms of which are often
presented rigidly and ahistorically. The defence industry is often discussed as a hypostatised
'thing-in-itself, formed through its relationship with the end user of military equipment - the
state. Orthodox writers thus take as their central concern the technical and empirical problems
of optimising the national defence industrial base and its contribution to military capability
(Kennedy, 1983; Taylor and Elayward, 1989). On the other hand, critics of the 'military-
industrial complex' treat it as a relatively stable, autonomous social bloc, deforming the normal
workings of democracy and capitalism (Melman, 1975). Beyond such generalities the precise
character of the industries which constitute the defence sector are difficult to grasp. This is
particularly so given the changed procurement environment, corporate structures and
ownership patterns since the mid-1980s. Instead of unhelpful catch-all definitions, I want to
chart briefly the different ways in which the UK defence industry was shaped historically.
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One approach to this is Todd's (1988) notion of the 'military industrial enterprise' (MIE) based
on ascending or descending weapons technologies. Key to Todd's MIE is a long term shift in
strategic importance from platform technologies such as ships or vehicles to system
technologies, such as electronics. Three main phases have been identified by Todd: first,
'traditional' MIEs based around mechanical engineering, armour and heavy ordnance,
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associated w ith warships; second, 'modem' MIEs based around electric power and the internal
combustion engine associated with military vehicles and aircraft; third, 'emergent' MIEs
developed around electronic systems, such as electronic warfare decoys, jammers and receivers
and missile guidance systems. These three phases of MIEs correspond roughly to Edgerton's
(1991b) notion of 'liberal militarism', whereby emerging weapons technologies alter strategic
thinking and. consequently, national industrial formations. Under 'liberal militarism' an
'indirect' approach to British militarism is preferred because of a constant struggle in the
military-bureaucratic apparatus between liberal demands for state economies and conservative
(and reformist) demands for a strong state (see Gamble, 1979). From around 1880 to 1914,
'navalism' was dominant, founded upon Todd's 'traditional' form of MIE. In the interwar
period, 'airforceism' based around 'modem' MIEs predominated. From the 1940s to the 1980s,
'nuclearism' became paradigmatic around 'emergent' MIEs.
Although, or because, Todd develops a life-cycle model of the firm to account for shifts in the
fortunes of MIEs, the end product, weapons technology, is accorded a central role in shaping
the defence industry. While building on the insights of Todd and Edgerton the focus can be
shifted away from the 'technological imperative' to one centred on the socio-economic
organisation of arms production. Crudely, four broad socio-economic phases of militarism are
outlined in figure one. The following section puts the defence industry in Scotland within this
broader context.
Arms production in Scotland
Until the late nineteenth century state demand for, and direct organization of, military
production in Scotland compared unfavourably with England. Yet, between the 1880s and
1920 and again after the 1940s, Scotland was placed at the centre of global military-bloc
rivalries. In the earlier period the west of Scotland was an integral part of the British naval-
industrial complex. The Clyde's importance as a military industrial area was based on
warshipbuilding. armour-plating, marine engineering, ordnance and guns. Leading firms such
as Beardmores, Napiers, Fairfield and John Brown, Weir, Barr and Stroud and Arthur Yarrow
became integrated into the international arms combine (Moss and Hume, 1977; Peebles, 1987;
Sampson, 1977; Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
Privately-based specialisation in the naval-industrial complex, an advantage in an earlier round
of arms production, during the interwar years no longer resulted in regional privilege falling to
Scotland. Instead a series of naval restriction policies, the 'ten-year ruling' in 1919, the
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Washington treaty in 1922 and the London treaty in 1930. and Treasury economies ensured a
low level of UK naval warshipbuilding (Peebles. 1987. ch8). Clydeside shares of a much
reduced total for UK w arship construction fell dramatically from a wartime high of 41 per cent
to 1.5 per cent in 1920 and 0.0 in 1924. with a small but erratic improvement in the early
1930s before rearmament eventually revived the Clyde shipyards' share of a growing naval
output (Todd. 1981:165). With the Armistice, the fortunes of firms locked into the naval-
industrial complex like Beardmores became entwined with the alternating prospects of w ar. In
the 1920s. many such firms went into chronic decline. If they managed to survive intact the
austere middle decade of the inter war years, feverish rearmament restored the profitability of
the steel-armour-heavy engineering-shipbuilding nexus as an attractive prospect for capital.
Meanwhile the latest addition to the naval-industrial complex in Scotland, Rosyth dockyard on
the River Forth, was closed under naval economies in 1925, a mere eight years after opening as
a functioning dockyard. While Rosyth was the most modern dockyard in Britain the Admiralty
decided to sacrifice it (and Pembroke in Wales) rather than any of the three older 'historic'
dockyards in the south of England (Ward, 1988:84-7).
By then a new national nexus of private capital and state interests had emerged, organised
around aircraft, vehicles and electronic engineering. Heavily concentrated in inner Britain by
the locational demands of the Air Ministry, a 'ring' of favoured aircraft companies were
nurtured. Traditional arms producers like Beardmore's, then attempting to transfer into aircraft
production, remained outside the 'ring'. No major firm left the industry for thirty years and no
new firms entered until the 1940s (Edgerton, 1991b). By the late 1930s the cumulative
locational advantages of Air Ministry preferment became strategic disadvantages as southern
and eastern parts of Britain were identified as particularly vulnerable to aerial bombardment.
The resulting air safety classification by the Air Council into 'safe', 'unsafe' and 'dangerous'
zones in 1934, became an important factor in the later dispersal of military industry across
Britain during rearmament (Hornby, 1958).
Although industry in Scotland did not recover the technological lag in aircraft capabilities
rearmament had the effect of both ossifying and modernising the traditional industrial structure
in Scotland. One estimate of the regional distribution of employment generated by rearmament
between 1935 and 1938 suggests that Scotland gained disproportionately (Thomas, 1983:569).
The wartime growth of firms planning and operating large branch plants making mass
standardised products in different locations around the country made it possible for the state to
act as a catalyst for the technical, managerial and spatial restructuring of capital. The
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government funded new 'shadow' factories and extended existing capacity to be managed by
traditional armament firms, and allocated 'educational' orders to induce outside firms into
armament production. By owning and equipping the privately managed agency factories for
munitions and aircraft production the state retained a formal policy commitment to laissez-
faire competition within industry while developing suitable industrial and managerial
structures for rearmament (Hornby, 1958:86). Although relatively few new government
factories were built in Scotland during the war the shadow scheme had important consequences
for the siting of industrial capacity in Scotland. Strategic policy often overlapped with
industrial and regional policy, particularly where high wage inflation for skilled labour and the
vulnerability to aerial bombardment in the South East and the Midlands made the Special
Areas containing unemployed labour more attractive locations (Peden. 1979:82-3; Saville
1985:17-18).
Crucially, wartime Scotland renewed its toehold in the military aircraft sector. New capacity
for aircraft production was added at Prestwick, managed by Scottish Aviation Limited (SAL)
but only after an Air Ministry official had insisted that a west of Scotland site would be
unsuitable and 'on no account' would aircraft or equipment orders be allocated to 'Red
Clydeside' (Robertson, 1986:26). By July 1944 SAL employed 6500 and was hoping to
become a 'senior player' in the UK aircraft industry, particularly after being admitted to the Air
Ministry 'ring' in 1942. However, the rapid cancellation of Ministry contracts with the end of
wartime demand resulted in an employment freefall, with just 1750 jobs remaining by 1948
(ibid: 100). Post-war, SAL declined erratically and was eventually swallowed up by British
Aerospace in the 1976 nationalisation of the industry. The image held by the Air Ministry
official of industrial Scotland as militantly proletarian made employers cautious about
relocating war production in Scotland. In the case of Rolls Royce. the official historian of
wartime factory and plant comments:
After an attempt to find the resources of labour and subcontracting capacity near the
factories at Crewe and Derby, the firm courageously decided to venture into Scotland and
chose a site near Glasgow. This was indeed a leap over the Border, with much uncertainty
as to the supply of labour; only a small fraction of the skilled labour was available and
extensive training schemes were necessary. The firm had some qualms whether a name that
was synonymous with luxury - Rolls Royce - might not arouse the antagonism of the
Clydeside workers.
(Hornby, 1958:290, my emphasis).
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Indeed this sense of unease seemed to be borne out by the wartime experiences of the Rolls
Royce management. Instead of dealing with traditional male craft workers, the dilution of the
20.000 workforce at Hillington meant that women composed 39 per cent of the workforce,
while only 4.5 per cent were skilled men (Croucher. 1982:285). As Croucher records, 'One
manager complained that the district 'is seething with communists and strikes and threats of
strikes occur the whole time', while another said: 'The Clydeside workers are the most difficult
in the world to handle. The fact that Hillington is a government factory they consider gives
them the right to criticise it from all angles' (ibid:286). Against official recommendations, in
1943 this mood of belligerence resulted in the first large-scale wartime strike by both men and
women on the question of women's wages.
A third aero-industry firm, Ferranti, joined Rolls Royce and SAL in Scotland. Arriving in
Edinburgh in 1943 to manufacture gyro-gun sights (GGS), the Scottish Group of Ferranti
emerged as one of the key UK military electronics companies in the 1950s (Wilson, 1980) and
became one of the largest and most innovative hi-tech firms in Scotland. Although Barr and
Stroud's factory at Anniesland in Glasgow manufactured range-finders for the Admiralty since
the 1890s (Sumida, 1990:73-6; Williams, 1993: 33-5), they had begun to produce bomb-
gunsights for the RAF in the mid-1930s and later supported the wartime production of
Ferranti's GGSs (Moss and Russell, 1988:140). With the shift into electro-optics in the 1950s
Barr and Stroud joined Ferranti among the emergent hi-tech arms producers in Scotland.
Nevertheless, while wartime relocation had the effect of selectively shifting UK defence plants
north and west, hi-tech arms industries such as aircraft retained a distinctly southern bias
(Lovering, 1993:124-6).
Most wartime industrial capacity added in Scotland was for more traditional basic industries: a
major new, modern propellant Royal Ordnance Factory (ROF), at Bishopton, near Glasgow;
an aluminum rolling mill at Falkirk; a ship-breaking depot at Garelochhead; a Ministry of
Supply clothing depot at Motherwell; as well as a range of infrastructural developments to
service military bases in the remote Highlands. (Cmd 7125, 1947). Traditional armaments
firms, such as the troubled Beardmore, expanded production mainly by managing relatively
risk-free state-owned shadow factories (Hornby, 1958:164). Such firms were part of a wider
industrial effort in Scotland, with the main industrial classifications doubling or trebling
employment during the war. Motor Vehicles, Cycles and Aircraft, for instance, expanded
employment to 52,260 in 1945, 285 percent of the 1939 total (Saville, 1985:31). Shipbuilding
and shiprepair also went through a renaissance with heightened wartime demand. Employment
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in this sector grew to 65.070 by 1945. 172 per cent of the 1939 level Clydeside. in particular,
benefited in relative and absolute terms from wartime demand, specializing in large warships
(John Brown. Fairfield. Scotts and Stephen) and destroyers (Yarrow and Denny), with non-
naval east coast yards on the Forth. Tay and Aberdeen temporarily building escorts and
smaller naval auxiliaries.
Arms production in ColdWar Scotland
Vigorous campaigns were organised in Scotland to prevent another rundown of industry at the
war's end. The main focus of these were publicly-owned plant: the Royal Ordnance Factories,
Prestwick Aerodrome and Rosyth dockyard. At least 46 other wartime government factories
were allocated to private industry after the war, including Rolls Royce at Hillington and
Ferranti in Edinburgh (Cmd 7125, 1947). By the 1960s Ferranti in Edinburgh, Rosyth
dockyard in Fife, Barr and Stroud, Rolls Royce and Yarrows in Clydeside had firmly
consolidated their positions as reliable centres of war-related production. While defence
production receipts were always under its proportionate share, military spending in Scotland
supported a range of emergent hi-tech activities in a way that civil industry failed to. Ferranti,
in particular, was fundamental to the establishment of an electronics industry in Scotland
(Bums and Stalker, 1961). Ferranti's role had four main aspects (Peters, 1990:256-7). First,
Ferranti developed and supported a local electronics labour market, especially training
electrical engineers. Second, a limited number of entrepreneurial spin-offs into the local
economy came out of Ferranti, such as Fortronic, MESL, Nuclear Enterprises, and local
electronic firms were supported, sometimes by direct stakeholdings such as the minority share
in Edinburgh Instruments. Third, a market for local subcontractors and component suppliers
was generated, although the extent of this was limited by the secretive nature of the industry
and Ferranti's vertically integrated structure. Finally, Ferranti personnel played leadership roles
in the Scottish institutional apparatus, such as the Scottish Council's Electronics Scheme, the
East of Scotland Engineering Employers Federation and the Toothill Report into the Scottish
economy (1961).
A separate trend saw multinational electronics companies locate some defence-related
production activities in Scotland (Peters, 1990). A near-market location and a favourable
political, institutional and policy-funding network encouraged both English and US companies
to locate in Scotland. Hughes Microelectronics Europa, a subsidiary of the US defence firm
Hughes Aircraft Company, opened a branch plant at Glenrothes, in Fife, to adapt US designs
to European markets (Hargreave, 1985:33-4), while Marconi located two manufacturing plants
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at Hillend and Donibristle in Fife, with some design and development functions. Ferranti's
activities in Scotland also induced a few spin-off firms such as MESL. which became part of
Racal in 1979. based at Newbridge near Edinburgh, and the two Dundee-based firms. Laser
Ecosse, formerly the Ferranti Laser Product Group, and Albacom, formerly, Ferranti Industrial
Electronics Group. Other emergent defence-related firms in Scotland included the anglo-French
advanced engineering consultancy company, BAeSEMA. based in Glasgow, which developed
out of the former Yarrow design unit, YARD.
Technocratic militarism during the Cold War produced a defence industry in Scotland which
was advantaged by state intervention in terms of contracts, technological capabilities, public
policy and bail-outs (Law, 1995). Against a contracting defence industry during the 1980s,
Scotland was one of the few regions where employment levels expanded. Yet, the outcome of
mergers, takeovers and inward investment during this period was that the defence industry in
Scotland, in common with industry more generally, came under even further external control.
External control, when combined with a changed political, institutional and procurement
environment, supposedly made the defence industry in Scotland particularly susceptible to
closure and relocation to the south of England. I want to turn next to examine that assumption
and the suggestion of immanent workplace resistance in the light of the evidence of recent
restructuring.
Paradoxes of the current restructuring
Although post-Cold War cuts in UK defence spending and job losses have hit Scotland harder
than most UK regions, the South East, albeit from a much higher base, has been the worst
affected region in the UK. In 1992 the south accounted for around half of the spending on
defence equipment and employment, the north and north west combined around one quarter;
Scotland received around a thirteenth (Defence Statistics, 1994:10). Such figures are limited
by the narrow indicators employed, accounting for around a third of total defence industry
employment (Lovering, 1993:126). Scotland has also been estimated by Scottish Enterprise to
be the most defence dependent region in the UK, with defence spending directly supporting
75,000 jobs, 3.2 per cent of the workforce in 1992, 55,000 of these in civilian employment (SE
1992). On this basis Scotland is clearly an important sub-centre of defence production,
particularly in electronics and shiprepair and shipbuilding. According to official figures, in the
five years between 1987-88 and 1992-93 over a third of direct defence equipment employment
was lost in Scotland (Defence Statistics, 1994:10). The percentage job loss in Scotland was the
second highest in Britain after the South East and well above the typical UK region job loss at
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around one fifth of 1987-88 employment levels. Further losses of around 9500 to 15.500 jobs
were predicted between 1992 and 1995.
Defence industry jobs are unevenly located within Scotland. Fife is the most dependent region
in Scotland, with four out of five defence jobs based in the Dunfermline district. In 1991 it was
estimated that just under 30.000 jobs in Fife, about one in every four, were either directly or
indirectly dependent on defence to some extent, with 14,000 civilian jobs dependent on the
Rosyth complex alone. These jobs are typically full-time, male and skilled, based mainly in a
handful of mechanical engineering and electronic and electrical engineering firms, owned and
controlled outwith Fife, indeed outside Scotland (FRC, 1991). Between 1991 and 1994 around
3,000 jobs had been lost in Fife, and the projection for a further 3,000 to go by 1997 may have
already been exceeded. In Lothian, where defence-related work has been the principal support
of manufacturing, some 23,450 jobs were estimated to be directly dependent on defence in
1993. These jobs accounted for about one in five of all jobs in manufacturing and 7 per cent of
all employment in the region (ELDDI 1995; Dabinett 1993).
The seemingly permanent expansion of fixed and variable capital in the defence industry in
Scotland over the previous forty years is now being reversed. Meanwhile, the relatively cosy
industrial relations associated with defence plants have been supplanted by a tough-minded
commercial 'realism'. There are three paradoxical effects of restructuring. One is that even as
privatisation and marketisation supposedly shift price risks from the state and onto private
capital the government continues to shape the national defence industrial base. As a
monopsonist customer it retains massive market power; it plays a central role in promoting
exports; it brokers contracts, for example over the Eurofighter 2000 project; it continues to
underwrite much of the military R&D effort; it acts as a catalyst for takeovers in the industry,
such as GEC's takeover of Ferranti in 1990 (Clark, 1994:274); and through the DTI and the
Monopoly and Mergers Commission determines merger policy in the industry. A second
paradox is that as each location comes into competition with each other to save local defence
jobs the victor continues to pay a heavy price in job losses and deteriorating working
conditions. While in Scotland this has been at least partly successful in preventing a series of
outright closures and relocations, employment in the defence industry has been positively
anorexic putting remaining capacity further at risk. A third paradox concerns the role of trade
unions in mediating the effects of restructuring. Routinised, secure and stable consensual
bargaining during the decades of capital widening in the defence industry disarmed the trade
unions of oppositional organisational capacities in the unstable and insecure conditions during
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capital narrowing. Union functionaries engaged in managing peacefully the terms of
restructuring rarely challenged its logic. Put starkly, by normalising restructuring the role of
the union bureaucracy may be acceptable, or even necessary , to pacify recalcitrant worker
opposition, but in doing so it strengthens managerial authority and further weakens the
organisational capacities of labour. I want to discuss the paradox of plant survival in Scotland
first. The nature ofworkplace unionism will be discussed in greater detail in the final chapter.
Despite the erosion of corporatism and massive job cuts, remoteness from the corporate centre
for firms in Scotland has not yet resulted in the expected flight of the industry 'home' to the
South and Western core of UK arms production. What seems to matter here is the high levels
of operational autonomy that defence firms are able to exercise locally, particularly in
research, development and design functions. External ownership needs to be separated from
decision-making and control functions. In terms of organisation and the structure of
production, little of the defence industry in Scotland performs pure and simple dependent
'screwdriver' functions. GEC Marconi, BAeSEMA and Barr and Stroud, and even Rosyth and
Yarrow, are well-established firms operating at the cutting edge of a number of sophisticated
technologies and enjoying a large degree of operational, if not financial autonomy. As Peters
(1990: 282) argues for electronics, 'It is precisely this defence research which helps
authenticate Scotland's claim to being something more than merely another peripheral branch
plant agglomeration'. While the twin pull between the corporate centre and the locality has
been largely replaced for managers by a 'placeless' obsession with the balance sheet, this does
not mean that defence companies have suddenly become mobile and can easily shift specialised
physical capital and trained labour acquired over many years. As one manager at GEC-
Marconi put it when asked about fears that GEC might transfer production of the EFA radar
from Edinburgh to new capacity in Milton Keynes, 'a possible transfer ... doesn't hold water. In
all its dealings GEC makes cost-efficiency decisive in allocating costs. It is therefore extremely
doubtful [that] EFA will move to Milton Keynes because of the cost burden of setting up
production from scratch when it makes far more economic sense to bed production into the site
where it was developed in the first place'.
In the defence market the 'follow-on imperative1 of securing the next substantial contract is
critical to survival. This means mobilising not simply technology and product credentials but
political resources. Firms in Scotland are backed by a vociferous media and the institutional
and political apparatus known collectively as the 'Scottish lobby'. In the civilian sector the
Scottish lobby has been increasingly incapable of influencing the litany of closure decisions
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during the 1980s: Chrystler at Linwood in 1981. Lee Jeans at Greenock in 1981. British
Aluminium at Invergordon. Plessey at Bathgate in 1982. Caterpillar at Uddingston. Singers at
Clydebank, British Steel at Gartcosh and Ravenscraig. Timex at Dundee. Yet even as civil
manufacturing was decimated in Scotland, particularly between 1979 and 1981 when 11 per
cent of output and 20 per cent of manufacturing jobs were lost (Aitken, 1991:237). defence
production flourished. As the pressures in the defence market became fiercer the Scottish lobby
rallied behind each bid to place major defence contracts in Scotland, successfully in the case of
Yarrow and the orders for the Type 23 frigates and the Eurofighter radar with Ferranti. Even
where political lobbying failed in its ultimate aim, most obviously with Rosyth's failure to
secure the Trident refits, it twice helped to prevent outright closure of the dockyard, although
not the naval base, and helped ensure that a substantial package of surface ship work was
allocated to Rosyth dockyard.
Plant closure is not the only option available to capital. Massey and Meegan (1982), for
example, identified three forms in an earlier round of industrial restructuring: rationalisation by
reducing the labour force; intensification by increasing labour effort in production;
technological change by automating the labour process. While automation has not been
implemented widely in a defence industry still largely based upon handicraft techniques,
rationalisation of labour and intensification of effort have taken place. Fixed capital has also
been rationalised quantitatively, 'capital narrowing', and qualitatively through redesigning the
labour process, 'capital deepening'. A renewed focus on 'core' activities by companies ensured
that ancillary and repeat-productive activities were externalised to outside suppliers of
materials, components and even labour. This vertical disintegration of productive processes
both externalises the risks of overcapacity endemic to defence production and increases
flexibility in the division of labour (Scott and Storper, 1987). Personnel and industrial relations
policies were further mobilised to support intensification strategies where previously their main
concern was to secure labour peace for uninterrupted absolute levels of output. Yet harsher
management regimes have not automatically led to confrontation. Trade union responses have
been tempered by fears over the actual survival of 'their' workplace in a hostile market climate.
Together, the spectre of losing defence contracts and plant closure, while not completely
eliminating industrial unrest, routinely conditioned collective bargaining. Numerical and
functional flexibility, mass redundancy, wage freezes, worsening conditions and benefits
contributed to a sense that the changed climate would not yield to organised labour. Yet,
despite sporadic industrial unrest and evidence of low worker morale throughout the industry
the restructuring process has been relatively peaceful with few serious or prolonged disputes.
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Where industrial action has been threatened or happened it took two inter-related forms: as a
lever to restore the organisational legitimacy of trade unions' role in the workplace or where
management over-reached themselves in what proved acceptable or permissible to the
workforce. This may explain the inconsistency in Gennard and Kelly's (1991) account of
managing change at Rosyth dockyard. They argue (1991:86. 88) that, on the one side, the trade
unions 'responded positively' to the changes under BTL 'within an acceptance of market
discipline', but, on the other side, manual unions retained 'traditional craft attitudes to job
control and an adversarial view of industrial relations'. Both union acceptance of and
adversarial attitudes to change are. however, aspects of a dynamic process bound up w ithin the
tension between union and workplace survival. In the first half of the 1990s, survival of'our'
workplace foregrounded union organisational capacities, hindering union action independent
from and opposed to the market restructuring actions of their 'own' companies. Where
industrial action has been taken, on the surface it appeared to be over routine bargaining
issues, usually pay. However, these disputes were also an expression of a deeper underlying
resentment and disenchantment among the workforce which the union bureaucracy were often
unwilling to give a voice to. Lacking official expression fatalism can set in, making
membership mobilisation at some later point against some worse fate an even more difficult
task.
Where technocratic militarism attempted to materially bind the enclaves of defence dependency
in Scotland to the UK state it was premised on the ideological certainties and strategic rationale
of a bi-polar Cold War world. The new defence industrial base in Britain is being forged
through the political 'pull' of a global system of still nationally prescribed states and the
economic 'push' of internationally organised production. Such 'market-based' restructuring
means the abandonment of technocratic militarism for a kind of marketised militarism. One
discernible trend is that the defence industry is beginning to resemble something of the pre-
1914 giant oligopolies and monopolies within an increasingly international arms market. Yet
within the emerging uneven geography of the arms industry the tendencies in the re-division of
labour have not all been in one direction. Scotland remains an important bastion of British
arms production while some regions in England are in terminal decline. Unlike the interwar
period when industry in Scotland was characterised above all by sectoral specialisation, a
legacy of advanced technological capabilities covering diverse product markets has been
inherited from the Cold War. In the case of the rationalization of warshipbuilding capacity, it
was partly the placing of three contracts in Scotland, the order for three Type 23 frigates
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placed at Yarrow, the collaboration between VSEL and Kvaerner's Govan yard to share work
on a helicopter carrier for the Royal Navy and the refit of RFA Sir Bedivere at Rosyth. which
finally ended shipbuilding at Swan Hunter on the Tyne. Moreover, the only Scottish-owned
player with a corporate interest in these end moves is the Weir Group, who have maintained a
stake in the management consortium at Devonport which, of course, eclipsed Rosyth for the
nuclear submarine refits. Thus the defence industry in Scotland is deeply integrated,
corporately and politically, at the British level, the level of the nation-state. This makes further
dislocation of the industry in Scotland fraught with political dangers for whichever government
is in office. This also means that the logic of further restructuring may be resistible after all.
Part Two of this thesis examines two case studies to shed further light on the historically-
conditioned nature of the processes involved in restructuring. This involves a detailed
discussion in each case of the relations between state, capital and labour as they intersect in
particular places and at particular times. In this way a more total understanding can be arrived
at in Part Three, one which tries to avoid the one-sidedness of examining, say, state policies
and arms technology, or management strategy and structure, or labour, work and trade





Rosyth Dockyard: From State to Private Management
Beside the almost obsessive attentions of historians and social scientists to the managerial
structures, ownership patterns, product technologies, labour processes and trade unionism
associated with British shipbuilding, the naval dockyards have, in contrast, been almost
completely ignored (Lunn and Day, 1997a). Yet for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, and beyond into the twentieth, the Admiralty was one of the biggest industrial
employers in Britain (MacDougall, 1983; Ashworth, 1960:90, Haas, 1994). In 1907, for
example, the dockyards were the second largest employer in British manufacturing industry
(Shaw, 1983) and by 1914 employed over one quarter of all British shipbuilding workers
(Haas, 1994:3). The importance of the dockyards grew further between the wars as private
shipyards slumped. Dockyard employment fluctuated with war and threats of war, as Table
3.1 indicates. In the nineteenth century Britain's industrial lead had given it an advantage in
equipping its navy and establishing itself as a world imperialist power (Kennedy, 1988:151-
158). The dockyards were an indispensable part of the state-organised international enterprise.
The southern yards were connected to the nodal points of the British Empire, through
dockyards and bases at Gibraltar, Malta, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, South Africa, and
Bermuda, as well as a host of smaller facilities including Alexandria, Halifax and Jamaica.
Table 3 .1: Employment levels in British dockyards, 1687-1914
Year Employment Year EmDlovment
1687 1,185 1852 9,960
1711 6,399 1858 12,215
1714 8,500 1865 18,297
1814 14,000 1870 11,276
1822 10,400 1890 18,000
1830 7,700 1905 33,700
1833 6,000 1914 43,000
1848 11,722
Source: adapted from Haas, 1994
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Within this global network the southern English dockyards were pre-eminent. Scotland would
remain a peripheral location for the global royal dockyard complex until the First World War.
Although a small dockyard operated at Leith during the Napoleonic Wars its share of total
dockyard spending was negligible at 0.5 per cent in 1813 and 0.2 per cent in 1817 (Gunning.
1983: 55). Throughout the nineteenth century it was assumed that any danger to Britain would
come from France, largely explaining the geographical distribution of the dockyards (Hislam.
1908:91). Even when this view proved inadequate, as in the Crimean War when Russia
became the enemy, a proposal in 1855 to build a dockyard on the east coast of Scotland to
serve as a Baltic base was rejected because of cost and problems in recruiting sufficient
shipwrights to the existing yards (Hamilton, 1993: 200).
As Britain's youngest and Scotland's only naval dockyard Rosyth's development differed from
the historic English yards in significant ways. Although a dockyard had been proposed at
Rosyth as early as 1903, Admiralty prevarication delayed its opening until 1916 when the
Royal Navy limped into the still unfinished yard in the aftermath of the battle of Jutland. But
only nine years later Rosyth was abruptly closed under naval economies. By the mid-1920s
the model workers' housing scheme of Rosyth's 'Garden City' was transformed into 'the town
that was murdered', a full decade before the more famous case of Jarrow (Wilkinson, 1939).
However, after rearmament for World War Two reopened the dockyard Rosyth prospered,
eventually outlasting all but one of the traditional English dockyards into the 1990s. Alongside
this fitful historical development labour organisation at Rosyth represented a further contrast
to the English yards. Situated on the River Forth at the southern edge of the militant West Fife
coalfields, the newer workforce at Rosyth did not fully inherit the quiescent labour traditions
of the older southern dockyards. A seven week strike in 1972 and a rash of disputes between
1978 and 1981 certainly seemed to bear out Rosyth's reputation for strong workplace
organisation and labour combativeness. Yet in the late 1980s all this changed. Rosyth was
now presented as a model for co-operative labour relations under a new Human Resource
Management regime introduced by the yards' commercial managers, Babcock Thorn Ltd
(Gennard and Kelly, 1991).
This chapter is concerned with the historical context of Rosyth's development. Only within
this can more recent shifts in dockyard employment relations be understood. Three core
elements made up traditional dockyard employment relations at the historic yards. First,
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'Whitleyism' was a particular form for regulating industrial conflict: second, 'lobby polities'
prevailed as a form of political bargaining; and. finally, the 'service ethos' functioned as a
repertoire of accommodative symbolic and material resources. Whitleyism refers to the
routines and outlook derived from the Whitley system of centralised bargaining,
institutionalised in various committees locally and detailed procedures for grievances and
discipline. Dockyard lobby politics have their roots in centuries of deferential petitioning of
the Admiralty, employing the moral economy terms of loyalty and service. Modern lobby
politics, however, depend upon corporate appeals to the national interest with the overall aim
of exerting persuasive pressure on MPs and Parliament. The policy process is viewed as
rational, neutral and open to specific, defensive campaigns at moments of perceived danger to
the interests of dockyard workers. Historically, dockyard work cultures emphasised
'competitiveness, diligence, permanence, loyalty, localisation, relative relaxation with regard to
the pace of work' (Casey and Dunkerley, 1984: 149). Southern dockyard life fashioned
through inter-generational trade and kin continuities a hierarchical system of imposed and
informal rewards and penalties, centred around a permanent core of 'established' male workers
and a wider group of less secure 'hired' workers. A dockyard service ethos developed out of
this sense of employment continuity and a meritocratic dockyard promotion apparatus
functioned to reward seniority and sustained an ideology of service: to the Crown, dockyard
and workplace community.
As a way of showing the specificity of dockyard employment relations a contrast will be
drawn between the home-based historic dockyards and the overseas colonial ones. Between
these two basic models, historic and colonial, the case of Rosyth sits uneasily. Following that,
the historical trajectory of dockyard management and labour is set out. Only in this context
can the tensions at Rosyth be appreciated. Rosyth's origins and later development will then be
discussed. Various proposals to reform dockyard structures were made at regular intervals.
Until commercial management was introduced in the mid-1980s, thoroughgoing reform was
always surrendered to other, short-term expediencies. The introduction of commercial
management and the failed opposition to it will form the final part of this chapter.
Rosvth dockyard: between historic and colonial
Until the late 1950s a global network of overseas and home dockyards spanned the nodal
points of the British Empire. At the core of the imperial naval-industrial complex two basic
kinds of dockyard could be distinguished. On the one side were the micro-state colonial
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dockyards at Malta. Hong Kong. Singapore and Gibraltar and. on the other, the historic
metropolitan dockyards on the south and east coast of England: Portsmouth. Chatham.
Plymouth and Sheerness. Table 3.2 gives an indication of the scope and scale of the post-war
decline of the global dockyard network. Of the eleven yards operating at the start of 1950 only
two. Rosyth and Devonport. survived into the 1990s.
Table 3.2: Closure and employment levels at major British Dockyards world wide
Dockyard Opened Closed Employment levels
At peak 1980 1995
Portsmouth 1212 1983* 17.200 7,400 -
Devonport 1690 - 16.400 12,700 4,700
Chatham 1559 1984 14,500 6,000 -
Malta 1814 1959 10,800 - -
Rosyth 1916 1925** 7.000 5,900 3,300
Hong Kong 1856 1959 4,200 - -
Gibraltar 1740 1983 4.000 1,300 -
Pembroke 1809 1925 3,600 - -
Sheerness 1665 1960 3,300 - -
Singapore 1937 1969 3,200 - -
Haulbowline (Queenstown) 1806 1925 2,000 - -
Bermuda 1798 1950 1,200 - -
Simonstown 1861 1957 600 - -
Total 13 2 88,000 33,300 8,000
Source: adapted from Brown, 1983, p272.
Notes:
^Portsmouth was reduced from full dockyard status to Fleet Maintenance and Repair
Organisation status in 1983.
** Rosyth re-opened in 1938.
Within the international dockyard complex uneven combinations of social scale, ideology,
work cultures and organisation made for varied forms of organisational capacities. Yet,
Baldacchino (1990: 116) suggests that the high levels of group solidarity and militancy found
among dockyard workers in Malta might be a worldwide phenomenon. However, workers in
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the historic English dockyards this century earned a reputation for accommodative, dependent,
divisive and bureaucratic union organisation. Social scale, politics, employment relations and
ideology are important for organisational capacities: whether dockyard workers are in the
realm of Lilliput or at the metropolitan heart of Empire matters. While it has been noted that
some Maltese workers developed a positive anglophilia under the fortress economy, the
dependent, small-scale and concentrated nature of Maltese society magnified social, cultural
and class differences. Micro-state life gave colonial structures on the island, particularly the
dockyard, an all-pervasive presence over the economy, politics and even residential areas and
language. Employment security in the dockyard was all the more important since there was no
'physical hinterland for the indigenous Maltese to retreat to' (Sultana and Baldacchino, 1994:
15). Prevented by the Admiralty from occupying any post above supervisor Maltese workers
were cut off from the competitive promotion system. Moreover, union organisation at colonial
and historic yards differed quite markedly. In Britain fourteen shipbuilding and engineering
unions were represented on the various dockyard committees; at Malta there was only one, the
General Workers Union. Politically, the GWU were virtually indistinguishable from the left-
wing Maltese Labour Party, while dockyard unions in Britain policed the trench between
'economics' and 'politics' vigilantly, engaging only sporadically in defensive parliamentary
lobby politics.
In conditions quite different from Malta, Rosyth also stood apart from the historic southern
dockyards. From a virtually derelict site in 1938, abandoned thirteen years earlier under the
inter-war naval cuts, Rosyth remained open and even flourished during the long years of Cold
War 'normality'. Yet, initially, traditional dockyard forms of worker acquiescence in the
overall goals of the organisation had little purchase at Rosyth. First, closure in the 1920s had
given the lie to dockyard labour market traditions of service, security and stability. Second,
dockyard managers and workers often occupied quite alien national and class-bound cultures.
Third, redundancy or the threat of redundancy, in common with the southern yards, was a
recurring feature at Rosyth down to the 1960s. Until then Rosyth lived a precarious existence
employing a mere tenth of the total workforce in the four British dockyards; Portsmouth and
Devonport had around a one-third share each and Chatham about a fifth. Then, in 1963
Rosyth's fortunes were transformed when it became the refit yard for Polaris submarines. By
1980 Rosyth was the biggest single-site employer in Scotland; employment levels were over
one-third higher in 1980 than in 1950. In contrast, employment levels were halved over the
same period at Portsmouth while at Chatham they declined by a third (Speed, 1980: Vol.ILF-
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1). A further indication of the changing character of the work undertaken at Ros\th was that
the rising number of technical and professional non-industrial w orkers increased from one in
ten of the total w orkforce to around one in four by 1980.
The general character of the British dockyards before 1914
This section will describe something of the general character of the British dockyards,
focusing on dockyard organisational structures, management practices and labour relations.
An indication will be given of the powerful, centuries-old dockyard traditions into which
Rosyth was inserted when it opened in 1916. together with some of the organisational changes
introduced before 1914.
Dockyard organisation and management
Because the state, through the Admiralty, was both employer and customer dockyard
organisations were quite unlike those of privately-owned shipbuilders. As an early advanced
industrial formation, the dockyards continued to be organisationally marked by earlier forms
long after the conditions which first gave rise to them were by-passed elsewhere in private
industry. Employing some of the largest concentrations of skilled industrial workers in Britain
(and thus the world), the state had direct responsibility for managing advanced, complex ship
refits and construction. Management structures, labour markets, labour relations and labour
processes were a strange blend of dockyard peculiarities combined with more general
industrial practices. For nearly three centuries between the eighteenth century and 1985 the
dockyards were the subject of regular official and unofficial inquiries in an attempt to reform
dockyard structures and deep-seated customs; these mostly failed. In 1803. for example, the
attempt to reform 'the variegated deep-rooted abuses' of 'idleness, incompetence, waste and
embezzlement' by scrutinising the timber supplied to the dockyards antagonised the timber
merchants and precipitated an 'oak crisis' (Marcus, 1975:16, 163). It was not until after 1886
that a watershed in dockyard organisation was reached. Between the 1880s and 1914 the
dockyards began to be drastically modernised and organisation and management improved. It
is also towards the end of this period that Rosyth also gets constructed as a major dockyard.
Dockyards exist to equip, refit, repair and, until 1968, actually build ships for the fleet of the
Royal Navy. As Admiral Sir William Houston Stewart put it in 1881, 'Dockyards exist to
build and repair ships: first, efficiently - second, cheaply, if possible and third, quickly' (in
Hattendorf et al, 1993:673). It was repeatedly claimed by the Admiralty that it was cheaper
34
and quicker to have warships built by the dockyards than by private shipyards (Brown.
1983:275-6). In the heyday of British naval power the dockyards needed to keep up with the
latest technological innovations, then proceeding at a rapid rate - first, from sailing battleships
to steam batteries, through to screw-propulsion and the ironclads and, later. Dreadnoughts and
submarines (Brown. 1983: 11-80). A persistent motif was economy and rationalisation.
Admiral Fisher's declared policy of'rapid shipbuilding' was only repeating in 1900 what the
Admiralty position had been in the 1820s, 'Whatever type the French have, we must go one
better, and that is a principle which will always keep us safe, and if we build as quickly as we
ought to build, we ought to commence after they are well advanced and have the more
powerful vessel afloat beforehand' (in Mackay, 1973: 336-7, 342-3). Within this 'late build'
policy the dockyards were central.
Nineteenth century liberals simply assumed that state dockyards were inefficient compared to
private yards due to what Cobden in 1862 called 'dockyard profligacy'. The dockyards were
indeed encumbered by labyrinthine bureaucratic decision-making processes and centralisation.
Management in the dockyards was restricted by a centralised and depersonalised system of
'management by correspondence' (Haas, 1994). Instructions were received from naval
headquarters in London on a daily basis and a vast store of detailed standing orders was
accumulated. Dockyard organisation was doubly ineffectual with centralisation, leaving little
scope for management discretion, responsibility and flexibility, combined with a local
decentralisation and a lack of a unified management function within the dockyards.
Management was divided into seperate departments, the most important being the
Constructor's department under the master shipwright. This dual organisational deficiency
resulted in a '... very heavy correspondence occasioned by over-centralisation, and the
necessity of having to perform an oppressive number of ancillary duties which should have
been delegated, distracted the master shipwrights from the active management of operations'
(Haas, 1994:4). An inquiry in 1861, for instance, found that 'there had long been a lack of
unified control of the yards, inadequately defined responsibility, ill-organised subordinate
departments, and consequent duplicated effort and waste' (in Hamilton, 1993:215). Over-
centralisation of decision-making and excessive attention to detail resulted in a middle
management tier of professional officers 'cramped by the weight of clerical work1 imposed
1 Clerical work was only just becoming a lower status occupation, even though it mainly involved the
drudgery of longhand copying. Before the late Victorian period it was considered genteel and
'gentlemanly' and irregular hours seem to have been kept. Only after 1866 did a thorough division of
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upon them to the injury not only of their professional work but of the supervision of the labour
under their control' according to a Parliamentary report in 1881 (Hattendorf. et al. 1993:673).
In response, the Controller of the Navy urged the need for reform of the dockyard bureaucracy
but. typically, within limits:
While I depreciate any radical change in the present system of administration in the
dockyards which would probably be upset again if there were a change of government. I
think much real good may be done by consulting the views and opinions of the
superintendents and the professional officers, by freeing the working officers from the
hands of clericalism, placing more confidence in them, giving them more encouragement,
retiring the elderly, removing the obstructive and promoting rapidly those who have
proved themselves to be active, zealous and clever in their profession. (Hattendorf. et al.
1993:674).
Ashworth (1994) traces this excessive centralisation and bureaucracy to the early nineteenth
century 'culture of calculated precision' and shows how for the dockyard reformer Samuel
Bentham dockyard efficiency and economy needed to replicate the practices of private
industry through an ideology of self-interest, constant vigilance and duty." But with the Royal
Navy operating as both client and owner, poor accounting techniques made it difficult to
compare public and private shipbuilding costs. Moreover, wrong or misleading information
about costs or the progress of work made it difficult for the Admiralty, itself notoriously
inefficient, to have a clear idea about what was actually going on in the dockyards. Moreover,
the conservatism of the Admiralty and geographical isolation from the main shipbuilding-
engineering centres delayed the introduction of new materials and techniques. Compared to the
clerical labour begin to get established at the Admiralty, with the creation of a class of'writers' but it
was not until the First World War with large female typing pools, based on a rigid sex division of
labour, that tasks became thoroughly specialised (Hamilton. 1993:245).
~ Bentham's brother, Jeremy, is well known these days for the uses Foucault made of his image of the
panopticon as the paradigmatic disciplinary technology. In fact, in the late eighteenth century
Samuel Bentham planned a panopticon-type building for a factory in Russia with the supervisor's
office at the centre of the building to monitor the workers' efforts. Ashworth (1994) convincingly
shows that the panopticon principle of functional vigilance was central to Samuel's attempts to
reform dockyard management, in particular to establish accurate, standardised accounting
procedures to monitor waste and assist management. Central to the accountant's 'calculating eye' in
Samuel's reform of dockyard organisation was the need for labour visibility:
Assimilating the whole of the Dockyard business to a private manufacturing concern, the
Admiralty Board may be considered as the masters of it, giving orders as to effects to be
produced by their servants. But, being masters of several such establishments, they need at each
of them an eye\ that eye at a dockyard is the superintendent. But. that he may never be biased in
his judgment, he should not habitually interfere in any operative business, or in the arrangement
of any account, (quoted by Ashworth, 1994:409)
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world lead in metal working and engineering of individual private shipbuilders, the dockyards
have been charged with 'plodding and costly empiricism' (Hamilton. 1993:220). Until the
founding of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors in 1883. an emphasis on the 'practical
men' produced by hands-on dockyard apprenticeships repeatedly overcame the pressure for a
training in the theoretical principles of scientific naval architecture, represented by the three
successive dockyard Schools of Naval Architecture instituted in the nineteenth century
(Brown, 1983:26-50).3
Even for the most determined, reform of dockyard organisation always seemed to be elusive:
'[ojld ways and prejudices, mind-sets and bureaucratic inertia, reinforced by the antiquity of
dockyard organisation, were big obstacles to change of any kind' (Haas, 1994:5). As late as
the beginning of the twentieth century dockyard organisation continued to be plagued by the
organisational forms of the eighteenth century. Haas (1994:145) summed up the situation in
the late nineteenth century:
... the suffocating system of centralised management by correspondence was in no way
relaxed. The chief constructors continued to be so loaded down with non-professional
paperwork (mostly accounts) as to be left with too little time for enforcing work-
discipline, which remained as great a problem as ever. There was, moreover, no effective
means of controlling the cost of production, or even knowing what the cost was, despite
the number of accounts the compilation of which consumed so much time.
While some organisational reforms were realised after 1885, with clearer lines of
responsibility established between the dockyards and the Admiralty, it was not until after 1905
that anything approaching fundamental reform was carried out. The superintendent of
Devonport, Vice-Admiral Henderson, under the influence of American management theory,
introduced a range of innovations at his own yard and wanted the superintendent to exercise
managerial power 'without reference or interference' (in Haas, 1994:173). Yet the
decentralisation of authority proposed by the Fisher Committee removed the powers of
intervention of the superintendent and passed detailed managerial responsibility to civilian
departmental chiefs, now renamed Manager, Constructive Department and Manager,
Engineering Department, with a similar range of powers as managers in private industry.
Churchill, as First Sea Lord took decentralisation and civilianisation a stage further six years
3
Despite the unfavourable comparison, it should be noted that private British shipbuilders were also
inured in the traditions of crude empiricism, probably to an even greater extent than the dockyards
(Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
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later, although naval opposition ensured that a civilian general manager was still not
introduced. The Sea Lords at the Admiralty resented creeping civilianisation and. after 1916.
the belated all-out industrial mobilisation of the dockyards for total war restored in part the
centralising impulse and naval control (Haas. 1994:180-83).
Thus, unlike family-run private shipbuilding companies the dockyards were traditionally
headed by a senior naval officer as Director of Dockyards who. until the early 1960s, was
aided by civilian managers who oversaw the division of work into the specialised, professional
Departments: Constructive. Engineering and Electrical Engineering. Culturally, naval officers
were a world apart from their civilian counterparts in private shipbuilding. Senior officers
enjoyed a conspicuously privileged lifestyle ensconced in the grand old buildings in the historic
southern yards.
The more senior officers would be provided with an official residence in the Dockyard
where, in the days of cheap servants, they could live in some style, though in more recent
years these old-fashioned houses have become a nightmare to run without domestic help.
(Brown, 1983:272).
Elitism and autocratic high-handedness ran through the officer caste, a special arrogance
developed out of the naval ascendancy within Britain's Imperial 'splendid isolation'. Yet this
did not translate well to work-discipline. Until the 1880s work was supervised directly by
'leading men'. Coming from the same craft culture and social background as the men they
supervised and continued to work alongside, leading men were party to the ideology of craft
autonomy and the infonnal sanctions of workgroup solidarity. Attempts were made to draw
them closer to management notions of control by changing their title to 'inspector' and granting
them the privileges of salaried status (Haas, 1994: 130). Above inspector level was the
foreman who was provided with a writer for record keeping functions and a panopticon-like
portable office to oversee the general work area. Yet supervisory control remained weak to the
extent that plainclothes policemen cycled round the yard in an effort to crackdown on the 'open
scandal' of'malingering' (Haas, 1994:158). By the turn of the century inspectors were being
replaced by working chargemen, in a reversion to the old leading hand system of supervision.
But despite the meritorious promotion system first line supervision remained weak just as
craft autonomy on the job proved resilient.
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Dockyard labour
Just as dockyard management and organisation diverged from private shipbuilding so
dockyard workers stood apart from private shipyard workers in Britain. Until the mid-
nineteenth century, a system of nepotism, patronage and favouritism was encouraged by
dockyard officers, where service, family and craft identities freely intermingled. Such a
tradition had roots reaching into the seventeenth century. But for the many workers on the
margins of the favoured system it only increased resentment. Yet the outlets for labour
resentment were very narrowly channelled. Three forms of redress existed: the right of
petition, industrial action and parliamentary pressure. On the occasion of the annual
Admiralty dockyard visit, petitions could be submitted. The Admiralty dealt with these in a
high-handed fashion on a unilateral and arbitrary basis with no right of appeal. Petitions were
typically written in the reverential language of 'obedience1, 'loyalty', 'duty' and so on. Yet
petitioning had a resonance because the moral economy of established customs had deep
currency in the dockyards. Shipwrights at Chatham in 1756, for example, defended an
entitlement to 'chips', lengths of surplus wood, in defiance of an Admiralty order and a strike
of shipwrights in 1775 resisted 'taskwork', an early form of piecework, replacing fixed
payments (Hattendorf, et al, 1993:528-9; 533-5). In 1804 shipwrights from Portsmouth
petitioned the Admiralty after 'the sweet refreshment' of the one and a half hour dinner break
was abolished because it 'damps our spirits and exertions ... as it was an ancient custom for
us' (Hattendorf, et al, 1993:546-7). Putting pressure on MPs representing dockyard
constituencies was often a more successful approach, especially for resisting redundancies.
After an election riot in Devonport in 1835, for instance, the defeated candidate complained, 'it
is incredible how many men, who are eating the daily bread of government have taken an
active part against them and how little of the tradesmen of this town who depend altogether
upon government expenditure, are grateful for if (Hattendorf, et al, 1993:653-4). In 1893 the
Conservatives lost five dockyard seats in protest at poverty wages. This gave rise to the
charge that it was impossible to run the dockyards in the 'same satisfactory way as private
establishments' (in Haas, 1985:211). Above all, dockyard workers established a degree of
autonomy during working time which appears to be unique in British shipbuilding. What the
Admiralty in 1886 called 'idleness' seemed to be prevalent, 'the superior officers appear to be
powerless ..., and the inferior officers [i.e. supervisors] seem to be either apathetic or too
much in the hands of the men' (in Haas, 1985:211).
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Despite the move to iron ships after the 1860s the dockyards continued to be conditioned by
practices developed around wooden sailing shipbuilding. The main union in shipbuilding, the
Union Society of Boilermakers and Iron Ship builders, for instance, refused to organise in the
dockyards while the Associated Shipwrights' Society established a toehold. After a number of
boilermakers. recruited for their skill in working with iron plate, were summarily dismissed in
1861 after striking for higher pay. dockyard shipwrights, who traditionally worked in wood,
volunteered to replace them and learn new skills in ironworking (Brown, 1983:274, Haas.
1985). Thus, while the wood-working shipwrights were supplanted by metal workers
throughout private shipbuilding, dockyard shipwrights remained at the core of the dockyard
labour process by working in both wood and metal. This enabled the Admiralty to avoid the
demarcation disputes endemic to private shipbuilding, it kept wage rates for metal work low
and had the advantage of making shipwrights functionally flexible 'all round men'.
Dockyards operated dual internal labour hierarchies, segmented into 'established' men, who
were regarded as permanently employed and superannuated, and 'hired' men, whose
employment was untenured and regarded as temporary (even after thirty years of service).
Introduced formally in 1833 as a core labour market during peacetime, the permanent
establishment initially covered almost the entire workforce of 6,000. The establishment could
be supplemented by temporary labour when required, who could then apply to be included on
the more secure hired list. Table 3.3 shows how the establishment fluctuated down to 1915
swamped by the hired list during periods of employment growth. The unusual degree of job
security coupled with the relatively high degree of work autonomy for those on the
establishment among dockyard workers created particularly favourable conditions for the
development of a conservative 'labour aristocracy', a concept whose relevance is much
disputed for other groups of workers. The implications for labour organisation were obvious:
'Established workers could thus feel some real degree of security, and this inhibited trade
union organisation at the dockyards' (Crossick, 1978: 72). The same study contrasts the lack
of strikes in Kentish London dockyards, even though they were in close physical proximity to
the militant dockland area.
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Table 3.3: Dockyard establishment. 1833-1915
Year Number on establishment Establishment as a percentage










Figures are approximations where the data was incomplete for precise calculations.
Dockyard workers were thus internally divided by craft and labour market status. Casey and
Dunkerley (1984) have argued that dockyard management and organisation, workforce
heterogeneity and the political and ideological environments mutually combined to hinder trade
unionism down to the years before 1914. Directly coercive forms of control were rarely
employed by the Admiralty with overlapping systems of rewards and ideological
reinforcements sufficient to secure low union membership and political conservatism among
dockyard workers. A spirit of 'competitive individualism' was fostered through a meritorious
promotion system and the dominance of elitist, status-ridden shipwrights among the
workforce. After three years on establishment workers could sit an examination with the
prospect of rising to leading man or first-class status and beyond that to writer, foreman,
inspector, converter, measurer and even to master. As Crossick (1978: 71) argues,
'Opportunities for promotion allowed confirmation of that element in artisan ideology which
trusted in the possibility of progress for the disciplined and hard-working'. This was true,
above all, for shipwrights who exercised strong craft control over the labour process and
enjoyed a relatively relaxed work effort with economy and speed subordinate to quality and
finish. Craft patriotism went hand in hand with a bellicose British nationalism. Isolated from
the main centres of trade unionism and working class radicalism immediate prospects for
dockyard workers depended on the national threat of war. And, finally, the paternalism of the
establishment system usurped a role for trade unions in organising mutual insurance.
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petitioning institutionalised a deferential but customary channel for grievances and. ultimately,
the Admiralty refused point blank to engage in collective bargaining and responded with mass
dismissals to any industrial action. For such major industrial workplaces, trade unions were
only officially recognised as late as 1892.
Even those at the bottom of the heap, the large numbers of unskilled labourers, were
themselves divided by eleven different wage rates. Again political pressure on MPs seemed to
offer the best course of action. In 1894. the Tory opposition pushed the Admiralty to become
a model employer for the rest of British industry and subsequently raised dockyard wage rates,
albeit modestly, and introduced the eight hour day long before the rest of British industry or
the private yards (Haas, 1994:166). For a while the model employer approach seemed to work
as the dockyards boomed and dockyard worker grievances subsided for the two decades
immediately before the war. Yet pitifully low wages continued as the main source of labour
unrest in the dockyards. Wherever possible the Director of Dockyards looked to substitute
highly paid workers like mechanics for lower paid workers. Dockyard wages had always been
substantially lower than in private shipbuilding. Between 1873 and 1890, for example, there
was no wage increase. The Admiralty argued that dockyard wage levels were adequately
compensated by a range of benefits unheard of in the private sector, particularly continuous
employment, long term job security and pension rights.
Underlying resentment within the dockyards was re-ignited by the spread of militancy in
Britain during the years of the Great Labour Unrest. By 1913, the dockyards were affected by
external events as the Boilermakers threatened a national strike and employers a lock-out.
Dockyard workers were in an unusually strong position. As war loomed, the workforce was
eighty per cent bigger than it had been in 1906, the last year in which a wage rise had been
granted. The Admiralty took the threat of rising dockyard militancy seriously enough to fear
for 'the balance of Naval power and ... national safety1 (in Haas, 1985:221). The model
employer measures were now little more than a memory. Even the security of 'establishment'
status was threatened with abolition by the Treasury in 1906. The patronage-service-family
system threatened to fail to contain the militant mood. Instead the threat of dockyard strikes in
1913 resulted in an Admiralty proposal to increase the establishment, 'to provide that
steadying element which has so well operated to secure the Dockyards from Labour troubles
in the past' (in Haas, 1985:224); even the Treasury reluctantly accepted an increase in
establishment. It was continuous employment at steady wages which prevented outright
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dockyard rebellion in the quarter of century before 1914. the antithesis of which had made
private shipbuilders centres of w orker discontent.
By the time that Rosyth opened deep dockyard traditions were in the process of transition.
Organisationally, decentralisation and civilianisation of authority had begun to erode the
excessively bureaucratic command structure. However, many problems remained and the
1914-18 war postponed any consolidation of the reforms of the previous decade. In particular,
paternalism, establishment, rigid discipline codes, weak supervisory authority and strong craft
control continued to exert a powerful hold over British dockyards. Worse still for the
Admiralty was that the model employer stratagem failed to stem trade unionism from
increasing, albeit unevenly, among dockyard workers. As Lunn and Day (1997a) note,
external forces could permeate dockyard politics and culture, undermining the 'particularities
and peculiarities of the dockyard system and its distinctive ideological constructions'. With the
proposal for a new dockyard at Rosyth, a greenfield site, the Admiralty might have been
expected to learn the lessons from past organisational deficiencies and working practices from
the start. However, delays in commissioning Rosyth and the crisis ofwar ensured that many of
the old problems resurfaced but in a context of rapid growth and displacement.
Rosyth: dockyard and town
We are desirous in Scotland, ifpossible, to make
Rosyth a model town for the world
Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, 20 March 1909
On 5 March 1903 Balfour, the Prime Minister, announced to the House Of Commons that a
new permanent Naval Base was to be built on sound geological foundations at Rosyth.
Existing dockyard capacity was insufficient for an expanding fleet and the growing German
fleet made the construction of a naval base in the North Sea a priority (Hislam, 1908:93).
Under the Naval Works Act of 1903, 1248 acres of land, within site of Newhaven, where
James IV built his doomed Scottish navy in the 16th century, were acquired for conversion
into a naval base. The Admiralty predicted that Rosyth would become a 'second Portsmouth'
with the Base generating a local population of 30,000. Set in a rural backwater, Rosyth
consisted of a handful of farms with the biggest nearby town, Dunfermline, three miles away
to the north, and the nearest village, Inverkeithing, set one mile to the west. Local labour had
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no connection to shipbuilding and repair industries, with industry centred around the staples of
textiles, especially linen, paper and mining.
Although Ros\th was intended to be a major base and repair yard the precise details of the
Admiralty plans were vague. In December 1907 Lord Tweedmuir. First Lord of the
Admiralty, announced that construction was to go ahead, with enough docking facilities to
accommodate 22 warships. However, opposition against Rosyth was led within the Admiralty
by Lord Fisher, who was reluctant to switch resources from shipbuilding to repair and support
facilities. In 1909. things shifted with Jellicoe's support for a dockyard on the east coast. The
years of neglect now became 'a matter of the utmost gravity and open to much criticism' (in
Mackay, 1973:419). Fisher saw the coming dominance of the submarine as rendering North
Sea ports 'uninhabitable'. Against this Jellicoe argued, 'My fear is that this submarine question
may be used as an excuse to avoid spending - what appears to me essential money - on dock
accommodation on the East Coast ... I hope you will agree with me that nothing that can occur
in the next 8-10 years should lead us to abandon the provision of necessary docks on this
coast' (in Mackay 1973:417. 419). Fisher was compelled to relent, albeit reluctantly, having
successfully held up development for six years.
The 1908-9 Estimates stated that the work included the construction of a large basin, a dock
for Dreadnoughts, and numerous workshops. A completion date was fixed for 1918. Easton
Gibb and Son ofNewport, Monmouthshire, won the contract to construct the naval base in 13
February 1909. The project was a massive civil engineering task, to transform a vast expanse
ofmud and water into a large, integrated repair complex, with some of the biggest docks in the
world at that time (Harrison, 1950: 60). The contract was divided into two sections: the first
part, to build a submarine depot, boat slip, pumping station and an electric power-house, was
to be complete within four and a half years; the second stage, to build a large basin and
entrance lock, was to finish within seven years. Construction work began almost immediately
on 12 March 1909. Six thousand workers were employed on the 'engineering feat' at peak
times (Harrison, 1950: 66; Dunfermline Press, 13 February 1909). Arriving from parts of
rural Ireland and the southern half of the Outer Hebrides, many construction workers
encountered a hostile social, cultural and religious environment. In December 1910 it was
estimated that the majority of the 1686-strong workforce came from outside Scotland; 31 per
cent came from England, 28 per cent from Ireland and 41 per cent from Scotland (in Gleave,
1987:39).
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Conflict ensued between Gibb and Admiralty engineers over the construction of a sea wall and
the positioning of an entrance lock, with "official ineptitude and indifference" holding up the
building of the huge graving docks, quays and buildings (Harrison. 1950: 64). Despite later
hagiographic accounts that "Gibb's ideas on industrial welfare were well ahead of their time"
and a "pioneering spirit" pervaded Rosyth as workers got to 'like their employers and the
place' (Harrison, 1950: 67), struggles over wages, conditions and housing broke out. With
increasing pressure on Easton Gibb to complete the dockyard on time, work went on day and
night, seven days a week, working from 6am to 5.30pm on davshift and 6pm to 5.30am on
nightshift. In April 1912 this led to the dismissal of workers, mainly those from the Highlands
and the Hebrides, after they refused to work on the Sabbath. After further industrial action
Easton Gibb were forced to make concessions and take back the sacked workers. Navvies
successfully struck in September 1912 to secure a wage rise. Catholic workers were also
viewed suspiciously by the company, with around 25 per cent of the 3500 workers in June
1913 estimated to be Irish. A Catholic chapel was built in nearby Jamestown beside the
largest of the lodging houses and the local priest was reported to be 'a very strong supporter of
the Union, wore the Union badge in his coat, and instructed the Irish navvies that they must
become members' (IHS, 1982:89).
Bureaucratic, technical and political disputes ensured that Rosyth was only around two-thirds
complete at the outbreak ofwar and the war itself created labour and material shortages (ICE.
1927). Strategically. Rosyth proved highly significant, repairing ships damaged at Jutland in
1916 and acting as a base for Royal Navy access to the North Sea. The rapid influx of
workers transformed the locality surrounding the Naval Base, from a sparsely populated,
undeveloped rural backwater. While Rosyth never became a 'second Portsmouth' it was to be
the location for one of the first working class housing projects in Britain financed and
sponsored by the central state, with Garden City principles replacing the traditional Scottish
tenement style (Gleave, 1987: Rodger. 1989:16). And while the town became more of an
'industrial village' than a 'Garden City', it nevertheless represented a serious attempt by the
state to improve working class housing. As a radical departure from the usual style and source
of working class housing supply in Scotland the Rosyth project had to overcome the legacy of
nineteenth century state neglect. Uocal by-laws encouraged tenement housing for the working
class and the machinery of the state had little experience of planning, organising and executing
house-building, let alone an entire town. In 1910 the Admiralty accepted the Garden City idea
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for Rosyth after approaches by the Local Government Board for Scotland (LGBS) but were
equally determined that they would accept no direct responsibility for the scheme or that the
financing of the housing should not come from naval Votes.
Nevertheless, the exigencies ofwar created the conditions then for a radical departure for state
intervention in working class housing; developments at Rosyth were a harbinger of far-
reaching consequence. Despite competing demands on materials and labour and high wartime
inflation costs on building materials, between 1915 and 1919 1,872 houses were completed.
The first houses were occupied in May 1916 with a steadily rising rate of occupancy to 750
by December 1917; and a further 500 houses were built in each of the next two years. Rosyth
took shape quickly in the space of these few years: a railway station, Rosyth Halt, was opened
in 1917 and in 1918 the tramway between Dunfermline and Rosyth was opened; in 1918 the
first school in Rosyth was opened but quickly had to be extended to cope with the growing
population. A sense of the 'polyglot' character of Rosyth is indicated by the various places of
worship provided for the new population in 1917: Presbyterian. Episcopalian. Methodist and
Roman Catholic (Dunfermline Press, 1959:67-69).
Housing became a spark of unrest for the humanity thrown together at Rosyth. The Royal
Commission into labour unrest reported that housing, as a 'cause of unrest, as well as a danger
to public health', was 'specially acute' in 'the district of Rosyth dockyard' (Cd 8669, 1917:para
8). The Scottish Labour Housing Association blamed the Admiralty directly for the housing
crisis at Rosyth. In the summer of 1919 the agitation over rents culminated in a rent strike. A
public meeting of 2000 was held in May demanding a 50 per cent reduction in rents.
Following the example of the Glasgow rent strikes, street captains were appointed for each
street to organise immediate defiance by the strikers when the rent collector arrived. With a
blow of the street captain's whistle tenants would rush outdoors onto the street leaving the rent
collector unable to identify who lived where. As in Glasgow, women played a leading role in
the action, banging trays, pots and pans and harassing the collector, who despite police
presence on each street failed time after time to collect the rents. Mass meetings were
addressed by Patrick Dollan, the Glasgow ILP councillor and on 29 July Sylvia Pankhurst
advocated direct action to a 2-3,000 march to the courtroom in Dunfermline where rent
strikers were facing eviction notices. The following week women carried banners declaring
'Children's Boots Before Rent' to picket workers at the dockyard gates after the workers had
decided to take industrial action in support of the rent strikers. The picket seems to have been
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effective since the strike at the dockyard was supported 'overwhelmingly'. Despite all this
activity the Dunfermline Sheriff court upheld the eviction notices served on the rent strikers
and the strikers morale declined. On August 23 a mass meeting unanimously called off the
strike although the Admiralty refused to reduce the rents.
By 1920. 5.700 workers remained employed in the dockyard, with an additional 1.200
employed on continuing construction work. But the employment boom at Rosyth was to prove
short-lived. In 1921 short-time working was introduced and a year later large scale lay-offs of
non-established workers began. The construction of a great naval base to rival historic
Portsmouth and Plymouth was abandoned by the Admiralty in 1922. Worse news followed in
September 1925 when the government announced that Rosyth and Pembroke were to be put
on a 'care and maintenance' basis. Over 4,000 workers were discharged at Rosyth while
established men returned to the southern dockyards. Dunfermline Town Council, who had
made a large investment in infrastructure for Rosyth at the Admiralty's behest, local
politicians and dockyard trade unions lobbied to save Rosyth. But the Admiralty's decision
was already taken. Schemes to lease dockyard facilities to private shipbuilders were rejected
by the Colwyn Committee, which had been set up in 1919 to consider economies in the
dockyards. The argument prevailed that the Royal Navy required dockyard capacity to be
retained for its exclusive use.
The closures had two inter-related sources. First, an orthodox drive for economies in public
spending, known as the 'Geddes Axe', after the head of the cuts committee, Sir Eric Geddes,
and the limits on naval programmes imposed by the Washington conference of 1922.
Pembroke had already been singled out in 1921 for closure as 'the yard least adequately
equipped to meet modern naval requirements' (quoted by Lunn and Day, 1997b; Day, 1996:
83). Why was Rosyth, Britain's most modern dockyard, closed with this rationale in mind?
Ward (1988: 84-7) argues that Rosyth was sacrificed and the southern dockyards kept open in
a social, political and cultural context which tended to work against Rosyth and favoured the
more traditional yards. The 1925 closure was foregrounded against an Admiralty engaged in a
desperate struggle to resist proposals to commercialise dockyard operations, earlier industrial
unrest at Rosyth during the war, the wider management structures of the Admiralty, and local
workplace and community traditions and cultural attitudes towards the Navy. Rosyth's
closure was not based on technical grounds but on political and cultural ones.
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For the next dozen years Rosyth had an inglorious existence, from the 6.000 employed during
the war only a few hundred were retained on essential maintenance work. Rosyth was also
used as a Nav> strikebreaking centre during the General Strike to ship supplies across
Scotland. And. as at Pembroke, dockyard facilities were leased to private shipbreakers. Metal
Industries, for dismantling German and British battleships (Buxton. 1992: Day. 1996). Before
the Second World War then Rosyth had functioned as a dockyard for a mere nine years, from
1916 to 1925. with an interlude of fourteen years as a virtually derelict site, save the couple of
hundred engaged on shipbreaking. Rosyth town was emptied, as workers moved out to find
work, with some houses occupied by commuters from Edinburgh and surrounding towns. War
would once again transform Rosyth's fortunes, only this time its effects would prove more
long lasting.
Wartime labour organisation at Rosvth
Due to interwar neglect an entirely new workforce had to be created at Rosyth after 1939.
Recruited late into the rearmament drive industrial workers at Rosyth tended to be local and
traditional dockyard labour relations tended to be weak. Women workers and dilution were
introduced at Rosyth to a greater extent than for other dockyards and outside industry. By
1944, for example, 25 per cent of the Rosyth workforce was composed of women workers
compared to between 12 and 16 per cent at southern yards (Inman, 1957: 149). While many
workers were transferred from England these were mainly 'mobile' non-industrial civil
servants. Although pay was determined centrally, labour management functions in the
dockyards were decentralised to the level of autonomous professional departments,
(Constructive, Mechanical, Electrical). Such autonomy largely depended on labour continuity
and identification with organisational goals: at Rosyth, however, discontinuity was at a
premium. A critical 1941 report by the Ministry of Labour identified unusually high levels of
absenteeism, idleness and 'subversive elements' at Rosyth (Stewart, 1993: 151).
Experimentation with a participatory worker discipline regime failed because recalcitrant
workers 'treated it with contempt' and management resented trade union incursions into their
control prerogative (Inman, 1957: 287). Nevertheless, unions at Rosyth, including those
influenced by Fife Communists, were committed to the underlying principles of Whitleyism:
industrial peace through participative negotiating machinery. The role of Fife Communists at
Rosyth, after 1941, was one of balancing between support for uninterrupted war production
and defending workers' conditions (see Selkirk, 1967: 41-2; Docherty, 1992: 155-7).
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While Whitleyism developed by fits and starts at Rosyth. the tradition of lobby politics took
off rather more smoothly. Where lobbying had been tried, and failed, to prevent closure in the
1920s, the rhetoric of'national unity' during the Second World War structured the possibilities
for a renewed emphasis on lobby politics at Rosyth. As the unions argued, 'Today we are
stronger, more united as a result of our bitter experiences in the lean years. No longer can we
tolerate the irresponsibility which has in the past characterised the Admiralty's handling of
Rosyth' (Rosyth, nd: 3). In August 1944 Rosyth shop stewards initiated a campaign for
retention and extension of the dockyard. The Rosyth stewards demanded a modernisation
programme for the yard, government control of and a fairer distribution and planning of
industry in Britain, a fairer share of Admiralty work and facilities for the trade unions 'to
examine all aspects of production and a greater say in determining the programme of work at
all times' (Rosyth: nd: 7). Behind them the stewards drew in a veritable 'popular front' of
support across Scotland, ranging from landowner Lord Elgin to William Gallacher, the
Communist MP for West Fife. A range of arguments were made for the retention of Rosyth as
a major British dockyard: strategic, industrial, infrastructural and social (Rosyth, 1947).
Above all, however, it was argued repeatedly that Rosyth was the 'only real link which the
Scottish people have with the Royal Navy, and it is in the interests of the Nation [sic] that this
tie be strengthened rather than weakened or severed' (Rosyth, 1947: 8). Gallacher typified
such national-populist appeals when he argued at a meeting in Dunfermline that it was,
scandalous to suggest a country like Scotland, a country that pioneered naval construction
and training should be without a naval establishment ... Imagine closing Chatham and
Portsmouth and make Rosyth a fully developed naval base ... the English lads would not
stand for it. Rosyth must be built up into a fully developed naval establishment ... in the
name of Scotland. (Rosyth and Inverkeithing Journal, 26 December 1945).4
Within the workplace, however, the dockyard service ethos had little resonance among
industrial workers at Rosyth; until the 1950s few local Rosyth workers had acquired
established status. It was precisely the cleavage between established southern non-industrials
and non-established local industrials that made it difficult to implant the service ethos at
Rosyth. Non-industrials sold their labour power under advantageous terms: they started work
at 8.17 am while industrials began their shift at 7 am, they were better paid, had more
4 In fact when Chatham and Portsmouth were mndown in the early 1980s little resistance took place
beyond ritualised forms of token campaigning and lobbying.
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generous leave, superior working conditions, sick and pension entitlements and better
promotion and transfer opportunities. The gulf in employment conditions was exacerbated by
the wide cultural chasm between mainly local industrial labour and dockyard managers drawn
invariably from the south. By the 1950s, however, the range of dockyard promotion,
employment benefits and 'establishment' status were being opened up increasingly to locally-
recruited labour, a process largely accomplished by February 1969 when, as part of a trade¬
off for dockyard reductions, establishment was extended to all industrial employees with five
or more years service. As David Owen (1969:3), Under-Secretary of State for the Royal
Navy, put it in a message to dockyard workers, 'We want to work in the closest partnership
with the Trade Unions with the object not only of making the dockyards more productive and
efficient but. at the same time, seeing that those who work in them obtain a fair share of the
benefits which these improvements should bring'.
As the complex of benefits and promotional opportunities became available at Rosyth labour
relations lost much of their distinctiveness from southern dockyards. In short, inherited
dockyard traditions such as Whitleyism, lobby politics and the service ethos were reshaped,
adapted and modified to suit conditions at Rosyth.
Organisational reforms
This section discussed the ways in which organisational deficiencies were identified and
reforms of state management of the dockyards were variously proposed. When Admiralty
consent was eventually achieved for organisational reform two main approaches were taken:
an incremental approach centred upon change within the existing organisational set-up and,
from the 1970s, a structural approach centred upon transforming the overall organisational
status of management, culminating in the introduction of commercial management in 1987. A
more extensive role for the private sector models in the second Conservative term forms the
over-arching context for structural reform. Above all this context is marked by the hostile
attitude of the Conservative government to public sector trade unions. Finally, the consultation
process is briefly discussed.
Studies into dockyard organisation and efficiency were conducted in virtually every single
decade of the twentieth century. As we saw above, periodic investigations, from the nineteenth
and eighteenth centuries, indeed all the way back to Samuel Pepys, were part of an older
tradition of political regulation of the dockyards (Haas, 1994). Part of this tradition too was
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the organisational conservatism of the Admiralty. As early as the 1920s the Admiralty were
alerted to organisational shortcomings in the light of changes elsewhere in industry. Reformers
tried to grapple with the uniqueness of dockyard activities, on the one hand. but. on the other,
introduce modern organisational and work methods within the dockyard context.
As fewer ships got built in dockyards they increasingly specialised in refit and repair work.
Five basic types of work were performed:
i. Normal refits; routine refits and repairs carried out at regular specified time intervals.
ii. Long refits: longer, more comprehensive and detailed refits at roughly six yearly
intervals.
iii. Modernisations: major up-date and renewal of ship's systems and structures, ship's
function unchanged.
iv. Conversion: major alterations to ship's systems and structures changing a ship's
function.
v. Special refit: additional to normal-long refit cycle to carry out specified major
alterations and additions. (HC 263, 1962: 19-20).
Periodic normal and long refits were considered part of the 'natural' cycle of a ship's life,
whereas specific Treasury sanction was necessary for conversions, modernisations and special
refits estimated above a particular sum, (£250,000 in 1962). A range of factors affected the
amount and kind of work to be carried out when ships docked for refit including: a ship's age,
the nature of recent service, length of times at sea and between refits, standard of maintenance
while in commission, and the extent of previous refit. Thus no two refits were identical.
Furthermore, there was no general comparative standard upon which to directly judge
dockyard performance against private industry. Dockyard efficiency proved difficult to
measure. Where this was attempted, such as when private yards were used in 1905 to augment
dockyard repair capacity, the dockyards were usually judged to be more economical. Private
sector refit yards did not have the panoply of 'just-in-case' dockyard resources in terms of
labour, fixed capital, stores and support services, let alone the conspicuous dockyard
advantage of being an integral part of a close inter-personal service culture. During
rearmament in the 1930s it proved impossible to obtain a fixed price from private yards for a
given package of refit work, despite considerable time spent by dockyards drawing up detailed
specifications of work. Comparative measures for dockyard efficiency were thus always
elusive and. except in emergencies, when combined with the highly specialised nature of naval
refit w ork and the weight of organisational closure around the dockyards, market entry from
outsiders was precluded. Nevertheless, dockyards, as large industrial organisations employing
tens of thousands of industrial workers could not be relied upon to find 'optimum' levels of
efficiency. So where an absence of 'market pressures' failed to impose organisational change
on the dockyards political regulation substituted.
The first serious use of modem management methods for the dockyards was proposed in an
unpublished 1927 dockyard study chaired by the Deputy Chairman of Metropolitan Vickers
Electrical Company, RS Hilton. Hilton recommended changes to the accounting system and.
significantly, the structure of management (HC 245, 1950-1: viii, xx-xxi). Most of the
recommendations for an improved costing system were accepted and implemented by the
Admiralty. However, on dockyard organisation the committee were divided between a
majority wanting 'far-reaching' organisational change and a minority opposed to radical
restructuring. The majority argued that time spent in senior dockyard posts by naval officers
was too short to acquire a detailed knowledge of dockyard operations and that naval officers
anyway lacked appropriate industrial and commercial management experience for effective
control of the dockyards. To remedy this a civilian should be recruited as Director of
Dockyards and a civilian General Manager appointed to assist the Admiral Superintendent.
Should Admiralty objections to a civilian assistant to the Admiral Superintendent prove
'insuperable' the majority recommended that a civilian General Manager should directly
replace the Admiral Superintendent. A minority objected to the lack of knowledge a civilian
would have of service conditions and the needs of the Fleet, which were 'more important
qualities in the Director of the Dockyards than knowledge of industrial and commercial
management, and that a civilian would hinder close relations between the Fleet and the
Dockyards' (HC 245, 1950-1: xxi). Predictably the Admiralty accepted none of the majority's
recommendations and accepted only 'those sections of the minority report which recommended
the continuance of the status quo' (ibid ). Three command-based objections were made by the
Admiralty: first, an appointment to General Manager 'would cause jealousy among their
professional colleagues'; second, they would lack knowledge of Fleet operations; and third,
they would be 'prevented by regulation and tradition from giving orders to the executive
officers who command the ships in the port' (ibid.: xxviii).
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Evidence from the dockyards was taken next by a parliamentary committee in 1940-1.
although no report was made. Around the same time the Shaw committee reported in 1940 on
dockyard labour and. in 1941. a Lloyd's assessor reported to the Ministry of Labour, singling
Rosyth out for particular criticism (Stewart. 1993:250-1). In 1945 an Admiralty committee
compiled yet another unpublished report which recommended leaving the departmental basis
of the personnel function unchanged, that personnel staff and record-keeping should be
standardised and that internal and external welfare facilities should be improved. The 1945
committee opposed a personnel manager at each yard because 'the complexity and size of the
dockyards made it impracticable and undesirable to concentrate in one department all the
functions of labour management' (HC 245, 1950-1: xxiv). By 1951, the Select Committee on
Estimates could note that only the continuation of departmental personnel management had
been implemented by the Admiralty, i.e., no change. Of the remaining proposals: the
standardisation of personnel records was continually deferred because of financial restraints,
exacerbated by the demands of rearmament for the Korean war; the standardisation of
personnel staff was realised in the person of departmental Deputy Managers but personnel
duties were performed across the departments unevenly; little progress was made on outside
welfare activities such as sickness and housing, while internal welfare facilities such as
canteens, toilets and amenity centres did not even reach Factory Act standards. Under state
control the dockyard management enjoyed 'Crown Immunity' which exempted them from
prosecution under Factory Act legislation.
As the state balanced between the competing demands of warfare and welfare during and after
rearmament for the Korean war, dockyard activities came under more exacting parliamentary
scrutiny. Yet, while the total war economy of 1939-45 induced wider industrial, technological,
political and economic changes, in many ways cleaving the 1920s from the 1950s, the
Admiralty continued to blithely resist organisational reform: in the 1950s as in the 1850s. The
1951 Select Committee 'had to go about their task of examining the efficiency and economy of
HM Dockyards, not by examining figures, but by taking evidence on the pace of work in the
yards, the relations between management and men [sic], the structure of management, and the
provision of material, tools and buildings' (HC 245, 1950-1: ix; see also HC 259, 1951-2). In
taking this approach the committee were satisfied that 'the general level of work [effort]
remains very high and that there are no instances of gross inefficiency' (HC 245, 1950-1: ix).
Despite this, twenty one recommendations were proposed to improve 'the general efficiency of
the Yards and the spirit of management'. These were limited to specific internal reforms,
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including the setting up of a centralised personnel function, the appointment of a General
Manager and some limited financial control for dockyard Superintendents.
However, setting up a co-ordinated personnel function under the direction of a senior
personnel officer was once again opposed by the Admiralty as a 'retrograde step' on the
premise that 'Personnel management, important though it is. is but one aspect of management
as a whole'. Yet Admiralty appeals to a unitary system of management were seriously
misleading. For industrial organisations as large, complex and varied as dockyards, where as
many as 131 different trades and grades were engaged (HC 245, 1950-1: viii), co-ordination,
integration and forward planning of work, materials and labour were essential pre-requisites
for executing jobs effectively and on time. Meanwhile, managers in each of the three
departments. Constructive. Mechanical and Electrical, though technical specialists in their
own departmental discipline assumed direct responsibility for personnel, planning and
materials. Closely entwined with the navy, departmental managers had little contact with
wider developments in industry. All Engineering managers were serving naval officers.
Electrical managers could be either civilian or naval, while the Constructive managers, 'the
most senior among the managers' (HC 245, 1950-1: xxii), served the greater part of their
careers at the Admiralty or in the dockyards as members of the Royal Corps of Naval
Constructors (Brown, 1983). As a later report put it,
The disadvantage of the division of the Dockyard into three almost self-contained
'professional' departments was that each tended to concentrate on getting its own share
of the work done, without sufficient regard for the problems of others, there was over¬
lapping of responsibilities, and officers were confined to an unnecessarily narrow range
ofwork. (HC 263. 1961-2: vii).
At all costs, however, the power and authority ofmanagement by the autonomous professional
disciplines had to be preserved. A senior personnel officer, the Admiralty complained, would
either be 'ineffective or tend to undermine the responsibilities of the Departmental Managers
for the management of their own staffs and labour' (HC 91, 1952-3: 6-7). Moreover,
Admiralty objections were even more forthright in their opposition to a General Manager
being appointed. The Admiralty were
unable to overcome the doubt whether the change ... would be in the best interests of the
dockyard administration. The fundamental feature of Dockyard organisation has for long
been the large measure of autonomy left to each Departmental manager to conduct the
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affairs of his own Department in both technical and administrative matters. Any General
Manager superimposed on the Departmental structure must, if he is to exercise his
functions to the full, end by encroaching very largely on the responsibilities of the
Departmental Managers ... (HC 91. 1952-3: 8. my emphasis).
Thus, in keeping with Admiralty insularity, the fragmented Departmental structure itself was
never put in question. Instead the Admiralty accepted a need for some kind of managerial
overview by 'experimenting' with a Deputy Superintendent (Industrial) who would perform
planning, finance and personnel functions of a remarkably similar kind to those they dismissed
as over-centralising for the Senior Personnel Officer. And although the Admiralty conceded
some discretionary control locally over finance they reasoned that 'it would almost certainly be
wasteful to allocate resources to individual Superintendents for expenditure entirely at their
own discretion, and without any knowledge or control on the part of the Admiralty of the
objects to which Superintendents would devote these resources' (HC 259, 1951-2: 11, my
emphasis). In direct contrast to their reasoning for denying any role to either a General
Manager or Senior Personnel Officer for co-ordinating operational matters locally, only the
Admiralty could co-ordinate and determine expenditure because only they were sufficiently
removed to obtain an overall, strategic view of total dockyard activities. Thus even the mild
internal reforms proposed in the early 1950s were impeded by an Admiralty firmly entrenched
in traditional organisational structures, with authority and responsibility within the dockyards
based on narrow, fragmented technical specialisms and, outwith, on a thoroughgoing
centralisation of command at Admiralty headquarters (HC debates, 1952-3, 512: cc 1901-66).
Introduction of functional management
Just a few years later, however, the Admiralty's technicist view of internal dockyard
organisation began to change. By 1956 dockyard organisation was beginning to be recognised
as failing to reflect wider technological and organisational changes. After a visit that year by
'a top level team' to study dockyard organisation in the United States Navy Department,
followed by a ten day conference at Sundridge Park, senior dockyard managers became
increasingly convinced of the merits of advanced functional planning and production
management. An Admiralty working party produced a detailed report, never published, which
recommended a complete reorganisation. Functional reorganisation, it was argued, would
prevent unnecessary duplication of activities and the operational fragmentation caused by
professional departments. Three inter-related objectives were outlined: first, staff of the
professional departments were to be re-distributed according to the specialised function they
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performed - planning, production, personnel, maintenance and finance: second, a new planning
system was needed to integrate the diverse activities of the various trades and grades: and
third, arising from the previous objectives, and the introduction of civilian General Managers
(GM). 'the ability to formulate promptly single authoritative management policies, decisions
and action, i.e. the abandonment of co-ordination by consent' (Salisbury and Sutherby. cited
by Brown. 1983: 299. my emphasis). A civilian GM. who might be a retired naval officer,
was recommended by a separate sub-committee examining professional staffing in order to
differentiate the industrial management of the dockyards from the Naval administration of the
base, which came under the Port Admiral.
Chatham dockyard piloted functional reorganisation between 1958 and 1961. After a twelve
month delay it was introduced to Rosyth between 1961 and 1964. while at Devonport
implementation was delayed until 1967 because of a heavy workload in aircraft carrier
modernisations. Thus it was well over a decade since reorganisation was agreed before it
worked its way through to all the yards. Implementation was designed above all to avoid
upheaval within the dockyards: 'Disturbance was to be minimised, change made firmly but
gradually, and at all times the support and enthusiasm of the management and workforce was
to be obtained' (Brown, 1983: 298). Reorganisation also required investment in both fixed and
variable capital. An increase of 1,500 'non-productive' staff was planned for by the Admiralty
(HC 263, 1961-2: Q567) At Rosyth, delays in restructuring were caused by a shortage of
professional officers (HC 263, 1961-2: Q915, 925, 1042-5). and a lack of office space to
accommodate centralised management. As the GM, Mr Mann, complained, 'Before we were
scattered all over the place, and you cannot get a combined organisation until you can gather
the people under the same roof... I cannot get the three Managers under one roof or combine
the drawing office or really develop a combined set-up' (HC 263, 1961-2: Q914, 916). A large
Central Office Block was being built to resolve the accommodation problem of the combined
management structure. Attracting professional staff was even more difficult. The Admiral
Superintendent at Rosyth noted that 'Headquarters have been extremely embarrassed by the
inability to provide sufficient supervisory and professional officers to meet the increased
needs' (HC 263, 1961-2: Q1041). Salaries were thought too low to recruit staff from outside
industry while staff in the southern yards seemed reluctant to transfer to Rosyth:
There is a tendency for people from southern yards to object, if they can, to service in
Rosyth. As a measure towards improving that position I believe the Admiralty are
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considering a definite maximum tour of duty at Rosyth so they can say. 'If you go to
Rosyth you are not there for the rest of your life'. (HC 263. 1961-2: Q930)
The legacy of a discipline-specific organisation meant that there were few specialists for non¬
technical functions. For example, the new Personnel Superintendent at Rosyth was a non-
specialist who had covered personnel issues as part of the duties of being the Deputy
Electrical Engineering Manager, and whose career had been entirely in Admiralty service with
no direct experience of personnel functions in outside industry (Q942). Yet he acquired overall
responsibility for the new, wide-ranging Personnel Department being set-up. Personnel
comprised four divisions: an employment division to recruit and interview labour and to take
up grievances with the trade unions; a training division covering both management and
apprentice training; an administrative division for mainly clerical work; and an employee
services division for welfare issues inside and outside the workplace, including sickness,
housing, canteens and amenity centres (Q945). Reform was thereby contained within existing
dockyard structures with a shift from a management based upon the three core disciplines of
the old professional departments to a more specialised, functional management. While
Admiralty opposition was overcome, belatedly, functional restructuring preserved intact the
'one arm' philosophy that kept a massive industrial organisation in the thrall of naval
command. As such it was a compromise but one which left overall organisational status and
goals of the dockyard unchallenged.
Towards commercial management
A more serious structural overhaul was proposed by Sir John Mallabar's report in 1971
(Cmnd 4713). Drawing on the idea of accountable management proposed by the Fulton report
of 1968 into the reform of the Civil Service, Mallabar recommended a trading fund
arrangement for both the dockyards and the Royal Ordnance Factories (ROFs). He later
described how a trading fund, while keeping the dockyards within the public sector, would
make performance measurable:
Our idea of a trading fund was that you set the dockyards up with a working capital and
left them to stand on their own feet. If they were operating efficiently there would be a
profit at the end of the year, or at any rate they would break even; if they were badly run,
or one was more expensive than the other, it would show up in the profit and loss and
balance sheet of that trading fund in the year in question. Much as it would show up in the
accounts of the National Coal Board too. (HC 362, 1980-1: Q473).
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From his wartime experience of agency factories. Mallabar rejected agency management for
the dockyards as 'the worst of both the commercial and the Government Department worlds'.
The next detailed study of the dockyards, the 1980 study chaired by the Under-Secretary of
State (Royal Navy). Keith Speed, again favoured a trading fund arrangement. In the event,
only the ROFs became trading fund organisations. Dockyard reform was restricted to the
introduction of bonus incentive schemes as a means of increasing the work effort of labour.
The main problems identified in earlier dockyard studies persisted: ambiguities in the
dockyard/Navy relationship; constraints of Civil Service status of dockyard organisation; and
inadequate accounting procedures. As core elements in an undifferentiated 'one arm' service
philosophy, a confusion of responsibilities and accountability existed between the Navy, as
customer, and the dockyards, as supplier. Historically subordinate to the needs of the Navy
through a common service ethos, typified by the dockyards' efforts for the Falklands. navy
demands on the dockyards were to have its ships operational, in best condition and seaworthy
as early as possible. Planned programmes of work were frequently disrupted to perform
unexpected emergent jobs deemed a higher operational priority. Where accurate known
costings were unavailable or the customer relegated the price of work below a higher appeal to
service interests, the customer-supplier relationship became a formality. Naval staff, acting as
monopsonistic customer, lacked accountability for the cost and performance of work carried
out to their specifications. Dockyards, on the other hand, as a near-monopoly supplier, lacked
the incentives and pressures of commercial trading relationships for efficient production.
By the 1980s dockyard operations came under the Navy Department of the Ministry of
Defence. Ultimate control continued to rest with the Admiralty Board. In 1984, the Public
Accounts Committee (HC 342, 1984: para 6) distinguished the responsibilities and
accountability of the Naval Department and the dockyards in this way:
Within the Naval Department it is the responsibility of the Naval Staff to determine
operational requirements; the extent, timing and priority of programmed refit and
repair work; and the urgency of any unscheduled, short-term tasks. The Dockyards
for their part are responsible for carrying out Naval staff requirements; for the
economical and efficient management of the ship refit and support programme; and
for the cost-effective use of their manpower, capital facilities and other material
resources.
In other words, the Naval Department made strategic decisions concerning the programme of
work while the dockyard management exercised detailed control over the execution of the
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programme. Dockyards were often, correctly, compared to 'jobbing shops' for the Navy, with
'Naval staff requirements' overriding all other considerations.
Following the introduction of functional management, individual dockyards came under the
day to day control of the General Manager (GM) who, since 1969, reported to the Chief
Executive Dockyards (CED) at the MOD Headquarters in Bath. Functional management,
however, resulted in as many as eight layers of management between the Technical Supervisor
(TS) and the General Manager (Speed, 1980: Vol. I: 29). As predicted, between 1950 and
1980 there had been an explosion in the size of dockyard management. By 1980 there were
over 8,000 non-industrials, an increase of 328 per cent compared to 1950, although around
3,300 of this growth is attributable to the redesignation of certain formerly industrial grades,
such as recorders in 1977 and technical supervisors between 1953 and 1970, as non-industrial
(Speed, 1980, II: Fl).
Civil Service constraints on dockyard management blunted its effectiveness. At the level of
senior management blurred accountability was evident in the mediating role of CED. He
reported to the Chief of Fleet Support (CFS) who, as a member of the Admiralty Board,
allocated resources for dockyard operations. Thus situated, CED played 'an active role firmly
placed between the policy making centres of the Fleet, the Ministry of Defence, the Civil
Service Department and the Royal Dockyards' (Brown, 1983 :305). As the key element in this
linkage, CED mediated the confusion between customer and supplier; accountable through
CFS to the Admiralty Board for dockyard operations without exercising control over the
allocation of resources and constrained by Civil Service rules and procedures over the
management of these resources.
The principles of the Civil Service, the consistent application of general standards and norms
and hierarchical organisational procedures, were enshrined in the voluminous MOD Manuals
for dockyard operations. The Civil Service reward structure valued generalist administrative
and technical expertise, resulting in an atomistic division of labour and discontinuity in the
decision-making process, contrary to the continuity and inter-relatedness of ends and means
needed for managing a complex, large scale industrial concern (Blunden, 1989 :212-220).
Civil Service traditions of promotion 'from within' maintained what Speed called 'undue
turbulence in the top posts', effectively keeping out managers with industrial experience. In
1980 such turbulence meant that:
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60% of the senior managers have been in post for under two years and nearly 40%.
including the Chief Executive himself, have moved in the last 12 months. Less than
10% have held the same post for more than four years (Speed. 1980:29).
Such a high turnover rate diminished management's authority in its dealings with subordinate
managerial grades, trade union representatives and the workforce, who tended to have
significantly less career mobility. Civil Service rules also created a tendency for disciplinary
issues and industrial disputes to be referred 'up the line' rather than resolved at the lowest
possible level.
As discussed above, the crucial managerial spheres of pay and recruitment were determined
centrally with no delegation downwards for labour costs, the absolute size of the workforce or
its composition. Throughout the 1980s, the government's fixing of targets to reduce the size of
the Civil Service arbitrarily froze the mix of skills, trades and experience of the residual
workforce after 'natural wastage', retirements, discharges and resignations had taken place. In
the early 1980s around 380 workers left the dockyard every year through 'natural wastage"
(Ros\th, 1985: 9). Tire specialised jobbing nature of refit work means a particular division of
labour is needed at definite stages in the productive process; numbers-as-a-target hindered the
co-ordination of these complex tasks. National pay bargaining took a key costing decision out
of the hands of dockyard management. Management could have little influence over those
workers with a skill in short supply in the local economy who left to take up better paid work.
The workforce itself was divided into non-industrials, mainly supervisory and clerical grades,
and industrials, subdivided into craft and non-craft workers. The co-ordination and allocation
of these categories of workers to the work that became available as a refit was being planned
or progressed was a complex activity. A 'just-in-case' approach to materials and labour was
adopted to cope with wide workload fluctuations at different points in the refitting process. In
1983/4 labour costs composed 46 per cent and materials 33 per cent of total costs at Rosyth
(Rosyth, 1985: 8). Excess or 'surge' capacity was required to meet emergencies or to prepare
the Fleet for war readiness or, more usually, to undertake emergent repairs or rectify
operational defects, which could not be planned for in advance. The under-utilisation of
resources that were retained for such contingencies made the yards open to the charge of
inefficiency; a charge compounded by claims of structural and organisational management
deficiencies. As the Levene report put it, '... the lack of the normal market forces meant that
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the dockyard undertook a wide range of what, in commercial terms, are almost certainly
uneconomic activities' (Levene: 1984:1). For example, out of even 100 workers in 1984 less
than one third were on average employed on direct work for which the customer paid (Rosyth.
1985: 13).5 This reflects the elaborate bureaucratic structure supporting dockyard operations,
the problem of coordinating work across the range of trades and the relatively generous social
entitlements for leave and sickness which together ensured that two-thirds of the workforce
were not employed on 'productive' work.
Central to organisational confusion were the accounting methods. Costs were not accurately
known and little incentive existed to find out. Different methods of accounting for dockyard
operations were used: vote accounting, operating accounts and functional analysis. Operating
accounts reflected post hoc the use of resources and were arranged for the purpose of
assessing stewardship; they did not allow for a contemporaneous judgement between other
competing claims on resources. They were presented as a supplement to the dockyard vote.
Class 1 Vote 5, itselfwidely criticised for being an inadequate account of resource allocation
to an industrial establishment. Parliament annually authorised the dockyard vote separately
from the vote allocation to the Navy Department, although it was managed by CFS as
Accounting Officer on behalf of the Admiralty Board (not CED it should be noted). Unlike the
commercial practice of accrual accounting, where all transactions are recorded for any
particular financial year, vote accounting recorded only cash payments and receipts that
occurred in the year. For instance, it did not account for non-cash liabilities or assets such as
stocks held or capital assets; and the 'annuality rule' and 'virement' prevented unspent sums
from being carried forward or switched to other purposes (Speed, 1980 Vol. 1 :26). A third
figure for dockyard costs were given in the Defence Estimates under the title of 'Functional
Analysis of the Defence Budget'. However, this figure was usually less than a quarter of the
figure given for 'production costs' (see Rosyth, 1984, Chapter 3 for a fuller discussion).
Discrepancies between different accounting methods used for different purposes clouded
rather than clarified judgements about the operational efficiency of the dockyards.
Failure to act on earlier recommendations, particularly after the Mallabar report, led to what
Speed termed a 'crisis in the dockyards':
5 Of the remaining workers, an average of 13 were on leave and holiday, 6 were sick or absent, 17
were managers, administrators, supervisors or clerical workers, 6 were on waiting time, and 26 were
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...the dockyards are failing to meet the increased needs of the Royal Navy.
Management recognises this but lacks authority to respond to the growing difficulties.
The w orkforce is discontented about pay and fearful of the future. Local trade union
representatives are dissatisfied with the lack of authority of management to settle
difficulties locally and local problems are exacerbated by delay. Job satisfaction
among non-industrials is reduced by diffused responsibility and they are disgruntled
by the narrowing of differentials (Speed. 1980. Vol. 1 :7).
These then are some of the symptoms of structural malaise. Speed's proposals for a trading
fund solution were themselves stillborn due to the 1981 Defence Review and the Falklands
war of 1982. The former cut the number of fully operational dockyards from five to two,6
closing Chatham and Gibraltar and reducing Portsmouth to a repair and maintenance base,
concentrating refitting capacity at Rosyth and Devonport (Cmnd 8288, 1981). The
concentrated effort in the dockyards to prepare the Fleet for the South Atlantic temporarily
diverted attention from organisational reform. However, when Michael Heseltine took over
from John Nott as the Secretary of State for Defence in January 1983 he commissioned a
report from his 'special personal adviser' on the efficient management of the MOD, Peter
Levene. Vice Chairman of the Defence Manufacturers Association and Chairman of the
British armament conglomerate, United Scientific Holdings (The Observer, 31 March 1985).
Levene had been initially appointed, without pay, for a period of six months from 9 January
1984. By 9 February he submitted a preliminary report which contained in all essentials what
would become government policy for the management of the dockyards - commercial
management.
The reorganisation of defence management during Michael Heseltine's period as Defence
Secretary, January 1983 - January 1986, relied on a redefinition ofmanagerial accountability.
In a break with the 'one arm' management philosophy, managers of equipment programmes in
the MOD increasingly became 'arms length' brokers and purchasers without direct
responsibility for the day to day production of services. At all levels of the organisation
efficiencies and economies were to be pursued, where practicable, through competition.
Resources were to be increasingly redeployed from the support 'tail' to the front-line 'teeth' of
actual fighting capability.
employed on overheads and support work (Rosyth, 1985: 13). And this calculation does not include
time lost through industrial disputes.
6
This, and cuts in the surface fleet, brought about the dismissal of Speed as Under Secretary of State
for the Navy.
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Heseltinc wanted to undermine the notion of protected strategic defence industries where the
state always acted as a 'bail out' of last resort or to socialise production in particular locations
or sectors. This approach viewed public sector management as compliant to self-interested
trade unions who stalled reform and caused inefficiencies. However, something more than
barely disguised prejudices and unsubstantiated assertions would be needed to privatise the
dockyards. Full privatisation would have made the government responsible for making the
dockyards attractive to private industry and investors. At some point this would have required
a confrontation with the trade unions to restructure the workforce through redundancies and
changed work patterns and organisation. Commercial management, it was hoped, would
reduce the problems of implementation and transfer the responsibility for restructuring, in
conditions of a declining naval workload, away from the state to a private company with
better experience at managing industrial restructuring. In the case of the dockyards, then, a
political judgement was made to demur on an outright asset sale. Heseltine claimed that the
main objective was to restructure management. As he later put it (1990:72):
The strategic importance of the yards persuaded us that a straightforward sale to the
private sector seemed on balance inappropriate. The reader will note the hesitancy, and I
acknowledge it. It was a fine judgement whether to stop at this stage or move to full
privatisation. The urgent need was for effective accountable management and we decided
the best way to achieve this was to keep the land and assets in public ownership, and
invite tenders for commercial management, (my emphasis)
Nevertheless organisational reform of the dockyards cannot be so easily disentangled from the
deep rooted hostility of the Conservatives to public sector trade unions (Heald, 1985). An
early indication of this was outlined in an (in)famous report drafted by Nicholas Ridley MP
and leaked to The Economist in May 1978 which set out plans to counter 'the enemies of the
next Tory government', the key public sector trade unions. Bishop and Thompson stress that
the privatisation project had as the 'key objective of ownership change...the reduction of the
power of the public sector trade unions' (1993: 4). John Moore, as Finance Secretary to the
Treasury in 1983, imputed public sector trade union strength thus:
Public sector trade unions have been extraordinarily successful in gaining advantages
for themselves in the pay hierarchy by exploiting their monopoly collective bargaining
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position7...public sector trade union experience of previous administrations has given
their leaders a taste of political power without responsibility. They are all too ready to
seek to involve the Government in the interests of their political objectives if not in the
interests of the members. Privatisation decisively breaks the political link (Moore.
1983:82.89).
Although subdued in the public presentation of the privatisation programme, trade union
officials were well aware of the implied objectives of undermining effective trade union
organisation, especially in the context of increasingly restrictive industrial relations legislation
(Marsh, 1992). For Conservatives, securing the co-operation of trade union leaders in some
collaborative arrangement was not only anathema ideologically but would prolong and inhibit
the process of restructuring without even the guarantee of membership agreement for change.
The 'management of change' was increasingly to be the business of management alone with
trade union involvement sidelined. Heseltine summed up the new management sovereignty at
an early meeting with Devonport trade unionists:
I would never blame the industrial workforce [for the uncompetitive structures of the
dockyard]. If the industrials were too strong and things were going wrong then I would
get rid of the management (TU Side minutes, 6 April 1984; my emphasis).
With this rationale, the government announced commercial management as its 'preferred
option' for the dockyards on 17 April 1985. A Defence Open Government Document (DOGD.
1985), outlined the options for reform as commercial management, a trading fund arrangement
or two methods of outright privatisation. The government was 'not prepared to contemplate the
Dockyards continuing under their present structure and system of management' (DOGD, 1985
para.39).
The commercial management concept was based on the US 'GOCCT idea of Government
Owned/Contractor Operated yards. This would allow the assets of the dockyards (land,
buildings and facilities, including plant and machinery) to be owned by the government but
operated for a fixed term by an agent selected through competitive tendering. The contract
Public sector trade unions were in fact at a relative disadvantage in the pay hierarchy. Compared to
average earnings of the whole economy, public sector pay showed an aggregated disparity of 12.3
percent between 1973 and 1979. Over the five years from 1981 to 1986 the disparity was 10 percent,
with a short-lived 'claw back' of 4.5 percent in the first two years of the Thatcher government
(Huhne, 1987).
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would guarantee a substantial amount of work, the 'core programme', of about 70 percent
from the Navy's refit and repair requirements at negotiated prices. The contract system would
mean that 'labour only' Employing Companies would have to be set up to ensure the skills and
expertise of the workforce would continue to be retained. These companies would be owned
by the first contractors and passed on to any subsequent contractor.
A trading fund arrangement under the terms of the Trading Funds Act of 1973 was the second
option. Under this the capital assets and liabilities of the dockyards would transfer to the
trading fund, with a corresponding liability against the National Loans Fund. Interest would
be paid on the loan and the dockyards would be required to meet a targeted financial return on
the assets (DOGD, para 9). The workforce would remain in the Civil Service while the
government would retain direct control and responsibility for dockyard operations.
The other non-Civil Service options were two forms of privatisation. First, a Companies Act
company could be set up by the government. Dockyard assets would be transferred to the
company, as would the workforce who would then cease to count as Civil Servants. After a
commercial record had been established, government ownership would be severed through a
flotation of shares in the company. Through the Memorandum and Articles of Association the
government could write-in strategic safeguards by retaining a 'special share' allowing it special
powers of intervention. The other form of privatisation would be the direct sale of the
dockyards to the private sector. A prospectus would describe a valuation of dockyard assets
and estimated future workloads and would invite bids from suitable companies. After the sale
the dockyards would be in a similar situation to that of other defence contractors.
Reform within the existing structures and other non-Civil Service options such as a public
corporation or a non-departmental body were dismissed by the DOGD. The privatisation
options, apparently closer in principle to Conservative preoccupations with liberal markets,
were summarily discounted. The trading fund option, as repeatedly recommended by Mallabar
(1971), Speed (1980) and the Rosyth trade unions (1984), although consistent with the
delegation of responsibility to managers did not go far enough in competitive and commercial
terms. The 'relative merits' of the options were discussed against the following objectives:
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a. enhancing the fighting effectiveness of the Fleet and preserving vital strategic
interests;
b. securing maximum value for money;
c. maximising competitive opportunities;
d. introducing a commercial approach into the Dockyards through:
- a clear separation of the customer from the supplier
- freedom for local managers to manage
- commercial accounting
(DOGD, 1985 : para 20)
Commercial management was 'preferred' because the strategic assets of the dockyards would
remain in government ownership; the periodic tender competition would introduce an added
incentive to efficiencies; and it could be introduced within the shortest practicable timescale
(para.35). While it was admitted that a trading fund would introduce commercial disciplines
and preserve strategic assets it would remain within Civil Service numbers and expenditure
constraints and would not be subject to the 'spur' of periodic re-tendering. Privatisation
options could protect strategic assets through a 'golden share' mechanism or the market
bargaining strength of the government as customer and commercial disciplines would be
introduced. However these would take longer to implement because of legislation and the need
to establish a commercial trading position to attract potential bidders or the asset sale would
be undervalued. Again the added incentive of periodic tenders would be foregone in this
option.
Conclusion
Dockyard organisation proved highly resistant to restructuring. Under the old Admiralty and
later the MOD dockyard management came under regular scrutiny but to little effect. This
was partly a result of trying to balance Naval demands for dockyard capabilities within finite
resources. However, it was also to do with meeting Cold War contingencies through a nuclear
technological fix, which brought closure for some yards and expansion for others. Rosyth's
fortunes changed with nuclear refitting. Nevertheless, the state settled for dockyard
effectiveness during the Cold War by preserving surplus capacity at the expense of efficiency
and economy. Attempts to redress the imbalance relied on internal reforms of management
structures. Still there was no way of knowing the extent of inefficiencies and diseconomies.
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The Thatcher government introduced commercial management to restore liberal concerns with
efficiency to dockyard operations. Some of the problems with the public/private compromise
of commercial management will be discussed in Chapter 11. The next chapter turns attention
to dockyard workers and their trade unions to assess the potential obstacles to dockyard
reform posed by dockyard workers and their organisations.
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Chapter 4
Labour organisation at Rosyth
This chapter builds on the previous chapter to suggest some of the ways that traditional dockyard
systems of authority and control were mediated locally at Rosyth. Here Rosyth"s location in Fife
was significant, as was its absorption of engineering and shipyard workers from elsewhere. Yet.
non-dockyard influences were not simply poured into Rosyth in a one-way process. This would be
to mistakenly assume the prior success of Whitleyism, the service ethos and lobby politics in
generating worker incorporation at the other dockyards. Research suggests that worker practices
and attitudes were more uneven and complex at the southern yards than is generally understood
(Lunn. 1992; Lunn and Day, 1997). Rosyth's singular position as a Scottish dockyard with a local
activist tradition is insufficient as a guide to the mediation of militancy and paternalism within the
routines of work organisation and the employment relation. It is not a question of artificially
counterposing acquiescence to resistance but rather of understanding how these were worked for in
particular conditions at Rosyth, as well as the impact of more general influences.
This chapter will, therefore, concentrate on how the employment relation, the effort bargain and
labour relations were understood by dockyard workers. Wherever possible, this will be given in
interviewee's own words. Beginning with recruitment and apprenticeships, a sense of dockyard life
will be given. Work organisation and the peculiarities of warship refitting are then described. Next,
workplace unionism in the context of centralised bargaining and Whitleyism is considered as at
once stultifyingly bureaucratic while also on occasion sanctioning militancy and sectional strength.
The test of this was the introduction of commercial management into the dockyards.
Dockyard workers: incomers and insiders
The expansion that followed the modernisation programme to accommodate the Polaris refits at
Rosyth in the late 1960s and early 1970s established Rosyth as one of the most significant
employers in Scotland; the most significant engineering employer on the east coast of Scotland.
Two basic kind of worker met in Rosyth dockyard. One grew up locally and entered the dockyard
as an apprentice straight from school The other came into the dockyard from outside industry.
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Each influenced the other, giving Rosyth a peculiar mixture of worker militancy combined with
traditional dockyard structures of paternalism.
In the expansion for Polaris refitting, labour was recraited from the declining traditional
engineering and shipbuilding centres on the west coast of Scotland and from smaller engineering
workshops in Fife and Edinburgh. Through kin and occupational networks workers were 'strongly
advised' to relocate from engineering and shipbuilding towns like Clydebank and Greenock to
Rosyth for 'long term job security '. Moreover, the MOD supply of housing to incoming 'essential'
workers was particularly attractive. After a six week stay in the dockyard's industrial hostel one
worker recruited in 1976 was offered a big batch of keys by the SSHA and told to take his pick of
the houses at a new housing estate, Camdean, then being constructed at Rosyth (Interview). A
sense of job security and a new house only compounded the culture shock within the workplace
itself by workers with wider experience of the engineering industry. Incomers remarked on the
peculiarities of the dockyard compared to outside industry: its size, the nature of supervision,
ample tooling and materials, relaxed pace of work and an emphasis on producing highly finished
workpieces.
Dockyard management, including supervisors, fell into two categories: 'neutrals' and 'partisans'.
Neutrals lacked commitment to any particular section or work group since they viewed their
position as transitory due to promotion prospects or transfer elsewhere. Partisans, on the other
hand, developed an affinity with their immediate workgroup, section or division and took a craft-
based pride in a superior quality of work, craft knowledge and application. One turner illustrated
how the distinction worked in the Mechanical Factory.
A good thing about the dockyard is that instead of sacking people they got moved around until
they found a job they were more suited to. That worked fairly well as a system. But the real
problem was at the gaffer level. Above the Technical] Supervisor] level was an Inspector for
each function in the Factory - Fitting, Turning, Planning, Dimensional] Inspection] and
Quality. Above them was a Foreman for the whole [Factory], Inspectors used to deal with
disciplinary problems when they arose but there was no continuity because they were always
moving on after a year or two, either sideways to another department or upwards through
promotion. Luckily, our TS wasn't interested in a career or promotion but was happy to take
pride from being involved with the Light Lathes. Because of this he created a sense of pride [in
the section] among the men.
(Dockyard turner)
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Another turner, who had come in from a medium-sized engineering shop in Edinburgh, also
commented on the role of the same supervisor and the ways in which he w on the consent of the
section, or at least of those he saw as the most competent and able turners:
[The] line supervisor [TS] was a powerful influence on the section. Some TS's didn't bother
too much and wanted a quiet life [but the TS] in the Light Lathes was a strong personality who
would get you transferred if your face didn't fit because he took a pride in his section and
would defend its reputation from outsiders.
(Dockyard turner)
Some 'neutrals' attempted to win further advancement by supervising subordinates closely with a
view to raise their work rate. For sections like maintenance, who covered a wide geographical area,
this proved to be counter-productive.
You cannot watch all your men all the time. It's an impossibility, especially in the maintenance
sections in the dockyard ... There are chargemen over the years that I've been under that's said
'I'm going to sort this lot out'. But they've found out very quickly that without the cooperation of
the workforce that there'll not [be] a lot of work getting done. I can think of one chargetnan in
particular. He thought that he was God's gift to chargeman, probably. His men ... were doing
nothing unless he was there. Everytime he left the job they sat down or whatever. They wouldn't
work unless he was there.
(Maintenance boilermaker)
Further up the hierarchy a more aloof sense of distance from the shopfloor was perceived, even
when it had been temporarily transcended outside the workplace.
Higher up the ladder you could go on a golf outing with some of them and have a drink
together on the day. But on Monday morning they would still ignore you and walk right past
you on the shopfloor.
(Dockyard turner)
Such fine gradations did not extend to every manager. Some were grateful for the advancement
made possible by a seemingly open and meritocratic promotion system. Middle ranking positions
seemed to be more numerous than in other comparable workplaces. One senior manager recalled
that advancement was rather arbitrary and depended upon an informal 'sponsorship' system.
The dockyard has been good to me and I've enjoyed being in it. ... The dockyard was always
good to me. It was never, ever bad to me. ... You always found opportunities, I didn't have to
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go seeking them terribly much. They were always there for me to exploit them if I wanted to
exploit them. The thing was a living entity itself, people leave and people are replaced. I just
seemed to move from job to job when the timing came right. I ken when I wanted to move and I
made myself knowrn. And people were always very good above us. I've got to say that, looking
back. When you go back, you find that you always had a mentor, a more senior individual, just
a wee bit ahead of you or a wee bit older than you. that would say, 'there's the right way to go
and now's the time'. A lot of people in the dockyard, if they were in the right area at the right
time, could move on in the dockyard. No bother at all. You could develop until you reached a
niche you liked.
(Industrial relations manager)
However, as well as being a possible source for consent, the personal sponsorship system
underlying advancement opportunities could also lead to conflict.
In 1971 I was contemplating going into management. Well, not management, we always called
it 'management', but staff, non-industrial. I nearly went in to become a draughtsman, which is
what I wanted to do. But I got absolutely conned by my manager and I felt very, very annoyed
that a manager could do that to you. I went to the union and I thought they were absolutely
appalling in they way that they treated [the issue] and I decided to take my revenge by
becoming a shop steward. It may not be for the right reasons but that in fact is what actually
happened.
(Union convener)
However, trade union activity itself was not perceived to be an obstacle to promotion. Indeed, it
might be an advantage involving some of the same personal and political skills.
For incoming workers, a Rosyth newly re-tooled for nuclear refits presented a stark contrast to the
more primitive conditions and technology often found in both large and small engineering shops in
Scotland. One young worker, whose father-in-law had worked in the dockyard since 1939, joined
the dockyard in 1971 from an 'antiquated' small heating engineering workshop in Leith which he
had left in disgust over being 'swindled out of £2 a week by the gaffer'. Entering the dockyard came
as something as a shock after working in a small, family-run workshop.
I got a big shock when I started. The dockyard was a big place. About 300 [people] worked in
the factory alone. The Lathes were a big section and they used new tools with special tips and
things like thread wire gauges [for measuring screw threads] which I had never seen in my life
before. Somebody even came to check your job for accuracy. And they had these big drawings
which I wasn't used to. Even micrometers [engineering precision measuring instruments], were
fairly new to me. I had been a bit of an expert with hand calipers [basic measuring device] but
nobody used them much at Rosyth. A lot of the machinery in the Light Lathes section was
brand, spanking new because they were getting geared up for the first refit of the
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Dreadnought. So I didn't like it much to start with and thought that I'd probably chuck it in a
few weeks.
(Dockyard turner)
Even turners with wide experience of the engineering industry were struck by the situation at
Ros\th. One turner who joined Rosyth in the mid-1970s had 'never seen so much gear for
machining' despite having worked with Babcock in Renfrew throughout the 1960s, worked in the
US in the early 1970s before returning to Scotland at Weirs in Yoker, Glasgow. Partisan
supervision also came as a surprise to him, although he was less impressed by dockyard insularity,
You were spoiled for choice when it came to tooling and gear. Any tools you wanted were
ordered up and the tool store was always well stocked. The gaffer had all the respect of the
men in the section - the only gaffer I ever knew who got any respect from the men. But he
wouldn't take any advice about anything. You were expected to obey instructions. The idea of
the dockyard is you start learning when you come in. They don't like to think that anybody
from outside knows anything about the job.
(Dockyard turner)
This emphasis on the excessive working up of jobs extended to a relatively relaxed approach to
rework. Inferior work readily found its way to the scrap bucket (or sometimes to the bottom of the
river) and the lack of stock accountability meant a steady supply of material was always on hand
for reworking such jobs.
If the TS didn't like a job or if you knew that you had scrapped it, you could simply go away
and get another bit of material and start all over again. There was little quality control and
material bar was plentiful. Each turner kept a stash of off-cuts of different materials such as
Nickel Al[uminium] Bronze, Phosphor Bronze, Stainless Steel, Mild Steel and so on, and a
good range of diameters for just such an emergency. One time somebody scrapped a small
shaft and it so happened that a new set of stairs were being built in the bay. So, at dinner time
the shaft was pressed into the wet concrete and covered over. It was never discovered and when
those steps get demolished we will be waiting to see if it makes a re-appearance for the first
time in twenty years.
(Dockyard turner)
Within sections time was spent creatively devising rituals implicating the workgroup in various
forms of 'time wasting'. Numerous examples of this were cited, from fairly innocuous games to
surreptitious drinking sessions. With a target to employ a certain proportion of the workforce as
general labourers for social reasons, such individuals would often be at the centre of clowning
around.
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At this time the dockyard also had a policy of employing people who were a bit on the mental
side [sic]. The labourer for the Light Lathes was ... the butt of a few pranks. One was to fill
the scrap metal bucket with lumps of [heavy] material and put some lighter cuttings on the top
and we'd watch him struggle to get it lifted onto his barrow. Another stunt was for a couple of
us to go up to the scrap bin and rummage around and pretend to pull out a pound note. On
seeing this [the labourer] would rush over to the bin and empty out all the scrap onto the floor
to see if anything was lying at the bottom. This went on quite a few times but he never twigged
we were at it.
(Dockyard turner)
Although it was admitted that this may have been 'a bit cruel ... nothing nasty ever happened' and
the pranksters felt that they were involving someone who, in other circumstances would be socially
marginalised, in the life of the section. Some workers in the factory brought in old clothes and
boots, 'otherwise he would have walked about in rags', and gave him food. The donations of
clothing could also have unforeseen consequences for the mythology of the section. Stories such as
this would be repeated over and over: 'Once he was even given a bus inspector's uniform. He
caused absolute chaos at the dockyard bus station when he started directing drivers into the wrong
platforms'.
Such experiences were not confined to turners. A boilermaker who came to Rosyth in 1976 from
shipbuilders Scott Lithgow in Greenock was also attracted by the prospects of job security despite
low dockyard wages. The context of this was the rise of South Korea in world shipbuilding making
the position at Scott Lithgow precarious:
At that time [early 1970s] tradesmen used to go about to different places to get working
experience elsewhere. So this Rosyth job came up, actually looking for unemployed folk. So I
actually stopped working at [Scott Lithgow] and I went for this interview. I was taken on right
away. So 1 came through [to Rosyth] in 1976 ... I thought that if I wanted a job for life then
this was the place although the wages were below what I could get elsewhere. The pension
scheme and the 'job for life' syndrome that everybody used to quote ... [meant that] I was
willing to sacrifice larger amounts ofmoney now for security in the future.
(Maintenance boilermaker)
For local workers Rosyth had the same attraction,
I always used to think that the dockyard was really poorly paid. I remember some of my pals
earning ten or fifteen pounds a week when I was on three pounds and thrupence. I used wonder
what I was doing here when I should be somewhere else getting decent pay. But my parents
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said. 'No. stick it out and you'll be alright' . .. Of course, you got sick pay. pensions, gratuities,
all in the back of your mind was some sense of security.
(Dockyard shipwright)
Rosyth also became a final settling point for many, older ex-miners as the surrounding Fife
coalfields ran down in the 1970s and 1980s.
After the pits shut there was a hell of a lot of ex-miners came [into the dockyard]. I can talk
about that with some justification. When we were giving some evidence to the House of
Commons Defence Select Committee on dockyard sickness [levels]. A hell of a lot of the
sickness was coal-related diseases. It was a lot of middle aged guys in the non-craft unions with
bronchitis, silicosis and all the rest, strangely enough going on sick leave at the dockyard. When
the pits were on their way down they were coming in there.
(Union convener)
Local male school leavers were socialised into the dockyard system through the apprenticeship
system. Little thought was given to non-dockyard or non-mining careers. Entering the dockyard
was simply part of a seemingly natural drift of local male adolescents into working life.
We were always going to be working at Rosyth. The dockyard was the main place, in 1977 i
sat the dockyard exam. When I left school that was all I tried for. 1 never tried for anything else
at all. I signed on for two months, having already been given the results, I was in, accepted for
a dockyard apprenticeship.
(Shipwright shop steward)
The dockyard was one of the few alternatives to coal mining locally for young male workers and
Rosyth recruited out of Fife mining villages like Oakley, Comrie, Lumphinans, Valleyfield, Kelty,
Lochgelly and Cowdenbeath.
Basically, my family history is mining. I come from Kelty, I live in Kelty. My brothers were
still there when the pit shut. I went for an apprenticeship. At the time it was the Gas Board, the
Electricity Board, the dockyard and a few others if you didn't go to the pit.
(Union convener)
Others emphasised Civil Service job security that Rosyth represented.
Coming from Kelty, the dockyard was the second choice. My first choice was into the NCB
Workshops. My dad was in the pits, my grandad was in the pits. I was going into the pits as
well, as a lot of the lads from Kelty did. Most of my pals from the school went into the pit. I
went initially into the pits as well. But my dad was always saying to me, 'Look eventually this is
going to be finished, I don't know when or what time, but you should really start thinking about
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other things'. I put my name into the dockyard after six months. I accepted the fact that the Civil
Serv ice meant a job for life [compared to the] Coal Board pits running down. Where am 1 going
go? My answ er was to go somew here secure. In my psyche I w anted a job for life and the Civil
Service, dockyard, represented that for us.
(Industrial relations manager)
Once the hurdle of the dockyard exam was successfully negotiated, the precise trade that would be
followed was a bit of a lottery and the broad-based training did not always seem particularly
relevant to actual dockyard practices.
It was so easy then. I chose shipwright because I was told that that was the main one in the
dockyard at the time, [laughs], I could have chosen. I don't think I could have electrical but I
could have had anything else. Why I picked shipwright I don't know. 1 don't know who I was
listening to at the time. It's a jack of all trades. It started off quite interesting in the Training
Centre where I got the basics of woodwork and metalwork, and then Glass Reinforced Plastic
came along and you got the basics of that as well. But then the stuff that you used in your
apprenticeship you never seen it again when you went into the big, wide world.
(Shipwright)
However, it would be wrong to suggest that dockyard apprentices passively inherited deferential
attitudes. Newly acquired trade identities, shared by large groups of young men coming under
stricter work disciplines during training than adult workers, also socialised apprentices in sectional
pride,
We were a wee bit of a rebellious group [of apprentices]. In fact we were told that we were the
worst intake ever. ... A couple of the instructors came from the Navy and they were real
disciplinarians. [One instructor] in particular was a real stickler for discipline and we had
loads of problems with him. We were all sent round the front to see the Head Instructor. He
couldn't handle us and we couldn't handle him. That was another case where we called the




Dockyards typically divide into shop workers and afloat workers. Repair and refit work carried out
on board ships was done by gangs of craft workers from the same trade and, therefore, the same
union. Working in close co-operation, afloat gangs were able to form closely-knit, sectional
identities and carved out large measures of workgroup autonomy and control over the labour
process. Such self-sufficiency bred a deeply sectionalist consciousness among afloat workers,
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aware that their own industrial strength was usually enough to preserve the advantageous terms of
the effort bargain against managerial encroachments.
For workers engaged on nuclear refits the position was even clearer. Working in the nuclear
complex created a sense of separateness; a physical separateness represented by the erection of a
fence marking-off the nuclear area from the rest of the yard and an ideological sense of
separateness derived from the strategic nature of the work done 'behind the fence'. A tacit
understanding of the vulnerability of nuclear refits to industrial disruption ensured that nuclear
workers received the best working conditions and monetary benefits. One indication of the ways in
which the nuclear area was protected was that a number of more militant shop stewards failed to
get security clearance for access to work 'behind the fence'. Despite this,
one of the groups who were deemed to be more militant were the people who worked in the
nuclear complex because they felt important. If you set elite groups up who are there for a
special reason, as the management did with the nuclear, they can also turn on you ... On
acoustic tiling we wanted [fifty pence] an hour otherwise we won't do it because it was
dangerous. Well, it wouldn't matter if it was [fifty pence] an hour or a pound there was still the
same danger.
(Shipwright shop steward)
Although the division of labour in the Factory was more clearly defined than for afloat there
continued to be considerable discretion for detailed control over certain jobs and certain machines.
One such machine was the giant shaft lathe which was only used for refurbishing propeller shafts.
Management simply allowed the turners to organise and plan the programme of shaft work
themselves.
The [shaft] stock programme was ran by the men. The boys kept a history for the Nickel
Al[uminium] Bronze programme for minehunters. This should have been under management's
control but 'the phantom' foreman simply by-passed the gaffer and came directly to the men to
find out about the progress of the shafts. It has to be said that this seemed to suit the gaffer as
well as us.
(Dockyard turner)
New recruits, even from medium-sized engineering firms, found that the scale of the dockyard and
individual sections permitted a certain degree of anonymity.
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The size of the Light Lathes section, with 42 machines and about 40 turners [meant that] if one
guy went missing it was not noticeable.
(Dockyard turner)
Although craft prerogatives were as jealously guarded in the shops as afloat the division of labour
under factory conditions was more detailed, with workers operating individual machines under
closer supervision and stricter job definitions. In general, labour organisation in the shops was less
robust and more passive than afloat sections. Sectionalism in the Mechanical Factory, for example,
produced a union organisation largely under the hegemonic sway of the Factory management.
... [T]he trade unions abdicated authority to the management in the Factory. They refused to
give any leadership. Even on the Shop Steward's Committee rather than agree a common policy
with the afloat stewards they would rather protect the autonomy of the Factory. In this case the
autonomy of the Factory really meant the autonomy of the Factory management.
(Engineering shop steward)
An exception to this seemed to be the coppersmiths. Coppersmiths, a trade largely specific to the
dockyard, had few avenues of promotion, had a lower than average age profile and acquired a
strong sense of group identity from being a numerically small trade working within a single
workshop. Their reputation for militancy grew in the 1970s, particularly after a young shop
steward from a Fife mining and Communist Party family background became first, a senior
steward and later, convener. Under his combative leadership the coppersmiths wrested concessions
from management until the union was consulted on virtually every decision affecting the Pipe
Shop.
Certainly the coppersmiths were easy to, I'll not say manipulate, they were easy to manage. If I
went to speak to a meeting of coppersmiths there were 150 people there and that was it. I didn't
have to go to speak to different sections, different ships or anything like that. The average age
of the coppersmiths was probably mid-20s. And at that particular time everybody was leaving.
Everybody and their dog were leaving to go to Mossmorran, and Braefoot Bay and
Burntisland. So people coming out of their time, traditionally in their early 20s, that's where
the coppersmiths had a wee bit of strength - where we had young boys prepared to have a go
and they were all under the one roof.
(Coppersmith convener)
Nor was this confined to Rosyth. A similar reputation attached itself to coppersmiths in other
dockyards.
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At Chatham the most prone group to industrial disputes were the coppersmiths in the Pipe
Shop. I also found that at Ros\th too ...
(Chatham shipwright)
But coppersmith militancy was not simply an automatic function of age. factory work or skill. It
was part of a process of an ongoing competition for craft survival. In the 1970s and early 1980s
this was conducted around who should control the new, emerging labour processes being
introduced by nuclear refitting. As a relatively small and obscure work group, coppersmiths had to
struggle not only with management but also with more dominant craft unions. For a minor trade,
facing both ways, militant leadership had to be seen to produce results.
I was giving the leadership. Only it had to work. Nuclear welding was getting developed and we
and the AEU went to war over the question of who would do the welding. The AEU, plumbers,
boilermakers and coppersmiths all went to war in the late 60s, early 70s over what was a new
phenomena then, nuclear welding. And the vast, vast majority of it went to the coppersmiths.
We went to local demarcation and then national demarcation courts and came out very
favourably, with about 90 per cent of it. Fitters were making the argument that it was largely
mechanical joints that were being replaced and we were making the argument that it was largely
joints that had been soldered in the first place. This went on for a couple of years. Because our
union was only about 150 men, I suppose I struck a chord there.
(Coppersmith convener)
Nuclear refitting introduced not only technical changes to Rosyth but also brought changes to work
organisation in its wake. Shiftworking was introduced on a large scale to ensure a continuous
round-the-clock work effort on the submarines. Shiftworking represented a minor change from the
more passive routines of Whitleyism because it permitted increased shop steward activity around
its introduction, operation and distribution.
When the coppersmiths really took the bit between their teeth in the '70s and '80s. them and the
shipwrights, that was the first real local bargaining in terms of shiftworking. When
shiftworking burst onto the scene in 1969 with Dreadnought there was an opportunity for local
bargaining. As long as it wasn't wages you could take the time and trouble and effort to try to
negotiate. That was the first wee show of strength that started to come off, when people stood
up for themselves. In the main that was the coppersmiths and shipwrights to start with, the
boilermakers followed suit later on. Basically because they were under the one roof.
(Coppersmith convener)
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Shiftworking allowances represented a rare way to improve take home pay. It was also difficult to
monitor night work.
When I worked nightshirt we had 'trade relaxations' between the shipwrights and the
boilermakers, shipwrights and plumbers, shipwrights and laggers. It always suited me because
there was always money there. You either worked nightshirts or overtime, lots of overtime. I
remember doing about ten or twelve weeks of nightshirt work and going in at half past seven to
half past seven in the morning and working from half past seven to midnight and then having a
shower and then having my tea and going into a proper bunk in a sleeping bag with my clock
and going to sleep every night with half a dozen other guys. We were given a portion of work
to do. For example, delagging. The gaffer would say 'right I want this bit down tonight' and he
might get a blue marker and mark it down to there. He'd say, 'if you get that done boys that's
splendid'. So you would go in, dig out, do your bit of work, work hard to get this bit done. But
as soon as you were finished have your shower and meal and that would be it. He'd come in in
the morning and say 'how did you get on, alright?' There was not a soul there to check on you.
But you'd done your allocated portion ofwork and so were seen to have done exactly what you
were required to do.
(Dockyard shipwright)
Dockyards were viewed not just as different from 'outside' industry but also from other dockyards.
This is clear from the way that each yard pursued different approaches to the detail division of
iabour within the overall dockyard structure. Changes were communicated between unions in
different yards as a matter of courtesy to let each other know of new developments. As one ex-
Chatham shop steward who moved to Rosyth recalled,
I can remember letters coming from Rosyth and Devonport to our convener saying, 'We've
organised this, negotiated this, and this is this now. We are just letting you know'. So they had
changed something, perhaps taken on somebody else's work, maybe there was a dispute
procedure [being followed]. The boilermakers would say 'That's our work' and the shipwrights
would say, 'Well it used to be but the material has changed. It was aluminum but now we are
making them in timber, so surely its ours'. And the procedure would go down to Bath, there
would be a discussion, a board, a hearing, and then somebody would make a decision and that
work would be deemed the [property of] shipwrights or boilermakers. And that information
would be fed to the other dockyards. So there was that feeling of that maybe we were slightly
different from each other but we were all really part of the same thing. There was a link-up and
a wanting to stand on your own two feet.
(Chatham shop steward)
79
Dockyard workers were therefore divided by yard, trade, grade, union, section, and immediate
workgroup. Yet union organisation seemed on the surface to be based on the underlying strength of
controls over work and Whitleyism.
Whitlevisnt and union organisation
The Whitley system of representation set a seal on dockyard unionism. The consolidation of
Whitleyism at Rosyth in the 1950s institutionalised a dockyard consciousness. On the one hand,
Whitleyism took care of industrial issues; on the other hand lobby politics dealt with political
matters. Even the convener of the coppersmiths eschewed 'politics' and stressed direct workplace
organisation. Sensitive about threats of 'subversion', dockyard workers were 'positively vetted' by
the Admiralty. In a Communist Party stronghold like West Fife the Admiralty could well expect to
be employing left-wing militants. As part of the Civil Service Cold War purge of active left-
wingers among the workforce, in March 1950, a welder, John Copeland, was suspended from
Rosyth by the Admiralty.1 Copeland, Secretary of the Lochore branch of the Communist Party and
the Communist candidate at the Fife County Council elections in 1949, pleaded 'guilty to the fact
that I am a Communist' and claimed that 'security' was being used to remove working class
militants from the dockyards (Glasgow Herald, 18 March 1950). An Admiralty statement said.
The First Lord has decided that Copeland is employed in connection with work the nature of
which is vital to the security of the State ... Mr Copeland has admitted that he is an active
member of the Communist Party and it is therefore necessary to remove him from his present
duties. {Glasgow Herald, 12 April 1950)
More usually, the divorce between 'politics' and 'economics' went unchallenged in Rosyth. An
exception to this was a layer of left-wing TGWU shop stewards who were active in the Labour
Party.2 On occasion this wider sense of socialist politics within the TGWU transcended the
Whitley/lobby politics dichotomy and translated into workplace-based action. A ringing example of
this was the blacking of tailshafts for the Chilean submarine O'Brien in 1974 in protest against the
Pinochet regime in Chile. After docking at Scott's yard in Greenock the O'Brien sent tailshafts to
Rosyth to be repaired, protected and shipped back to Chile as spares. On arrival at Rosyth local
* Political suspensions were not confined to Rosyth. A similar case arose at Devonport dockyard when a
dilutee electrical fitter with nine years service in the dockyard and ten years in the Navy was suspended in
October. {Glasgow Herald, 31 October 1950).
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TGWU stewards in PSTO(N). the stores organisation, refused to release them and demanded from
the MOD 'that no future Chilean Navy work will be done in Rosvth Dockyard until the fascist
Junta is removed and a freely democratically elected government put in power and human rights
restored in Chile' (TGWU letter, 15 December 1978). After years of blacking, the MOD eventually
relented. The Materiel Manager wrote to the TGWU. 'Your action has resulted in specific
assurances that no materiel supplies will be made from Rosyth to the Chileans in the foreseeable
future or work undertaken at Rosyth on their behalf, (PSTO(N) letter, 16 October 1978) and
repeated an earlier request for the TGWU to lift the blacking: 'I wonder if, in the light of the above,
you are now able to seek your membership's agreement to lift the blacking imposed so long ago on
these MOD (N) shafts in order that they may now be transported to Portsmouth'. (PSTO(N) letter,
29 August 1978). Eventually, in December 1978, the TGWU agreed to lift the blacking.3 Although
internationalism at Rosyth could be traced as far back as 1919 when a group of Portsmouth
engineers based at Rosyth agitated over the 'Hands Off Russia' campaign (Holford, 1988: 7), such
examples of strong class-based internationalism were exceedingly rare.
By the 1960s, then, traditional dockyard employment relations were taking root as a strange sense
of 'normality', based on the seemingly permanent character of the Cold War, settled upon Rosyth.
A benign internal dockyard state (Burawoy, 1979) was created, with the seniority functions of the
internal employment structures and the routines of collective bargaining and grievance procedures
bolstered by the corporate-welfare functions of the dockyard. For example, a Whitley housing
committee allocated 3,500 houses to dockyard workers on the basis of documentary evidence of
marriage, profoundly shaping the structure of the local residential community. Whether from small,
medium or large engineering firms, new recruits were impressed by the plethora of formal and
informal benefits, allowances and privileges.
The discipline and benefits system [meant that] the most important thing was to turn up on
time. Less emphasis was put on what you did when you were there. Conditions were generous:
2 One of these, senior TGWU shop steward and dockyard lagger, Alec Falconer, became the left-wing
Labour MEP for Fife and Mid-Scotland in 1984.
3 The TGWU letter of 13 December 1978 stated: 'The TGWU in Rosyth have accepted a request from
MOD(N) to release these shafts, providing that they are destined for a British vessel and it has been
confirmed that they are to be fitted to HMS Opossum due to undergo refit at Portsmouth Dockyard.
Additional safeguards have been achieved in that the shafts are to be transported to Portsmouth by a
PSTO(N) vehicle driven by a TGWU member and the Trade Unions in Portsmouth have been notified
accordingly'.
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four weeks paid leave and two weeks unpaid, leave could be taken in one hour units, [and] 14
days paid sick leave, which was often treated as part of the annual leave entitlement. Turners
booked their own individual times on jobs with the recorder and the bookings were rarely
checked by anyone - unless it was a 'flapper' [i.e. urgent] of a job. Some dockyard turners even
had the cheek to go on the sick with 'stress'. Another way of getting more money in your wages
was to work shifts. The premiums for shiftworking gave you an extra 3 hours pay a day for
night shift and 1 and a half for backshift and you got half of that rate on the daywork w eek
which follow ed the shiftwork week. So for a 40 hour backshift week you would get 47 and a
half hours pay and 43 and three quarters the following week.
(Dockyard turner)
It took time for recruits to find out how to work the intricacies of the system to individual
advantage.
The benefits system was great but I was scared to do anything because I was more used to the
risk of the sack at any time. At Leith we even worked Christmas day because it was not a
standard holiday then. [The dockyard system] was totally new to me but at first 1 didn't know
how to take advantage of it.
(Dockyard turner)
New starts soon learned what the dockyard system of establishment and allowances meant,
materially and symbolically.
The older, more established turners used to stick together and hogged whatever went on in the
section, landing the best jobs, overtime, shifts. So I learned fast and started to make up some of
the money. Under Civil Service rules there was a distinction between established and non-
established men. They could never get rid of a man once he was established. Once you got that,
the next thing for turners was to get 'Grade A Allowance'. This was paid to turners working
within tolerances of half a thousandth of an inch]. Most turners worked to this tolerance at
some time so the [local] full-time union negotiator came in to make sure it got paid out. He
managed to get seven Grade Ones [i.e. A] paid. These went to the six most senior turners in the
section and we found out that the seventh was going to him, even though he was on full-time
union duties and never once touched a machine.
(Dockyard turner)
The elaborate system of benefits was matched by an equally elaborate system of representation. As
a 'model employer' union membership, consultation and representation was formally encouraged.
The highly structured Whitley system connected numerous committees and sub-committees from
national to local level. Enforcement of bargaining rights depended on an intimate knowledge of the
procedures outlined in the voluminous MOD Manuals and various local and national agreements.
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All key negotiations on pay and conditions took place nationally at the Shipbuilding Trades Joint
Council (STJC). Locally, the shop stewards fed on the scraps of Whitleyism. bargaining over the
details of centrally determined policies. A constant competition with management w as pursued, so
that the ante was ratcheted up when national decisions arrived back in the yard. A suffocating
localism pervaded dockyard unionism making national dockyard-wide practices difficult to
implement. The less influence shop stewards felt over national policies the more forceful they
would be in defending immediate conditions and applying a local colouration to standard
agreements.
The unions took a very parochial view of everything. They were only really interested in what
was happening inside the dockyard gates. When workers from our union [AUEW] from
Chatham were being offered the alternative of a transfer to Rosyth when their dockyard was
being closed, all the AUEW [at Rosyth] wanted to argue about was for two local men to be
hired for every worker that came up from Chatham.
(Engineering shop steward)
At each stage of the Whitley system a distinctive spin was applied, reflecting the relative power of
rival factions on the national bargaining group, the Shipbuilding Trades Joint Council, STJC, the
individual dockyard concerned, the particular union, trade or grade, right down to the workgroups
affected. Where Whitleyism attempted to flatten employment relations by imposing uniformity
distorting ripples appeared on its even surface. Standardised policies were in a certain tension with
the peculiarities of individual union organisations, often led by the same convener and
bureaucratically efficient secretary for years on end. Each individual shop steward committee
fiercely defended its own organisational integrity, preserving its autonomy and specific trade
identity, according to time honoured rule books and traditions. All power seemed to emanate from
the conveners of individual shop steward committees.
One of the problems ... was that everything was negotiated at national level and applied across
all the dockyards. The union's job in the yards were of a small nature in respect of welfare,
wage complaints and general small grievances. Apart from conveners, there were two types of
set-ups: there was the Joint Efficiency Team reps who looked at work standards, work
measurement, and there was the DES reps, who did sometimes do what their functions said
they should. But the vast majority of the time they were the convener's right hand man who
looked after the general well being, its welfare, 'pain and paint', stuff like that.
(Union convener)
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Individual union conveners often survived in place for more than a decade and acquired authority
from this longevity and know ledge of Byzantine Whitley procedures:
The convener tended to be placed on a pedestal. I can't talk too much about other unions I can
only talk about my own. But the convener was protected by his other reps and he had enough
full-time reps to be able to do that. He tended to only take the most serious cases, dismissal
cases and stuff like that, and he was left alone basically, to have a good life. I think [laughs],
and coming out every year at mass meetings. He was seen as something away from everybody.
(Shipwright shop steward)
The Whitley system ran the dockyard and the Whitley Chairman was a very powerful guy. The
leaders of all the unions all seemed to be fairly elderly guys who had been there forever. What
they said was the law ...
(Shipwright shop steward)
By the 1970s, a new layer of younger shop stewards at Rosyth became increasingly dissatisfied
with the complacency of the older conveners, the sluggishness of the Whitley system and the
displacement of effective bargaining to a distant centre.
If! want to be honest with you, it was a disaster. When I went on the Whitley Council in 1970
there would be 17 of them, 15 of them would be over 50 [years old], probably 12 of them
would be over 60. It was all sort of cushy numbers, jobs for the boys ... It wasn't nepotism,
[but] it was something similar, the old pals act. These were full-time positions. I'll not say that
that was any different from any other company but it was a disaster. Then again it didn't need
to be anything else. For £4-odd a week you didn't need anything else because there was nothing
to argue about, there was nothing to fall out about. The vast majority of stuff was done
nationally because of the Whitley structure. After we had exhausted the Yard Whitley level
then that just shot right up to national level. It was not unusual for cases to take three and four
years. I can remember on a couple of occasions being in London [for a hearing] and people had
already died [before their case was heard]. You didn't need livewires or any hotshots in those
days. All you needed was somebody that was clever enough to write it down for you, stick in to
the system and hope for the best.
(Union convener)
This, establishment and the relaxed pace of work, had the effect of drawing the heat from potential
confrontational situations.
So although there was maybe a furore in the dockyard once it got to [Whitley] level it didn't
blow up and [people walked] outside the dockyard. And obviously there were established men




Whitleyism also encouraged a shared set of institutionally-based practices and attitudes between
management and the union leaderships. Individuals cultivated personal relationships and recognised
a shared dockyard background, behind which a commitment to overall organisational goals was
simply assumed. As one long serving shop steward noted,
I found that the people in the yard were fully committed to the yard, actually. Even on the
management side, they had maybe come in as a draughtsman, and they'd been promoted and
had gone to Bath. So you met people on the Whitleys that actually knew the dockyard system,
how the dockyards worked. Now, whether they were making the right decisions, that's another
thing. You could talk to them on a level that they knew what you were talking about, which
was very beneficial.
(Non-industrial office representative)
Considering the minutiae on which the system turned, Whitleyism supported a bloated workplace
bureaucracy. With the introduction of any new bonus scheme the unions fought, usually with
success, to have increasing numbers of senior stewards 'made up' to full-time status. By the 1980s
there were over thirty industrial shop stewards working full-time time on union duties and around
300 lay shop stewards representing about 4,000 workers. In 1985 a typical shop stewards'
committee covering some 800 workers would elect six full-time representatives from among its 67
accredited shop stewards (AUEW List of Shop Steward Posts, 1985).4 At that time there were ten
such shop steward committees for the industrial workforce at Rosyth, ranging from those
representing mass memberships like the 1500-strong Transport and General Workers Union
(TGWU) to the couple of dozen represented by the Furniture, Timber and Allied Trades Union
(FTAT). However, large numbers of full-time shop stewards did not translate into a united
dockyard union organisation, cut across as it was by inter-union and personal rivalries. With time
to spare, shop stewards on full-time facilities often engaged in strengthening their own individual
positions at the expense of the overall interests of the union membership. For some, this was the
secret weakness underlying formally strong dockyard union organisation.
There were thirty-odd full-time reps, a huge amount of full-time reps in the dockyard, situated
not in one place, but all over the dockyard. Even the conveners weren't together. Its not as bad
as it was then but basically it was, 'I'm the convener ofmy union and you'll do as you're told.
4 Typically these full-time posts consisted of a Health and Safety representative, a Joint Efficiency Team
representative to oversee time management and productive bonus factor analysis, and four representatives
to monitor and negotiate on specific areas of the Dockyard Efficiency Scheme.
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I'm GMB and that's it. UCATT have no say in what I do'. And there was a number of
problems. Some of the shift patterns that were introduced caused all sorts of problems. One
union in particular decided that they wanted a certain shift pattern that suited them and didn't
suit anyone else in the dockyard. And away they went and done it! So although we had strong
individual trade unions it wasn't really conducive to a strong trade union set-up.
(Union convener)
In the relaxed work conditions within the dockyards, individuals became shop stewards for a
variety of reasons. Often it was the outcome of a personal grievance or incident.
I could see things that weren't quite right and I would say something about it. It was a natural
progression that I would get more and more involved with the union. At first, it was the 'blue-
eyed boys'. The big thing in the dockyard was that certain people got looked after, got the
cushy numbers, got the majority of the overtime. They got well treated and the rest were
fighting over the scraps. That was the main thing at the beginning ... They were well
established. They were in with the bricks. I suppose they knew the ins and outs, the dodges, as
well as anybody. Only they could hide better. And they were well in with particular gaffers.
(Shipwright shop steward)
This made it difficult for younger stewards who came into the section to establish credibility in the
eyes of older workers.
I became a shop steward two years after coming out ofmy time ... The first couple of years [as
a shop steward] I was treated as a bit of a joke because they knew my background from the
Apprentice Training Centre. I always had this rebellious bit. They thought I was a militant so
some of them treated me as a joke and viewed me with suspicion. But I think over the years
they knew what I was about and I was acting in their interests. I got more and more respect as
time went on.
(Shipwright shop steward)
In Fife, however, with strong Communist traditions in the mining communities, an orientation
towards trade union activity was often already present, even before workers came through the
dockyard gates.
My father was Chairman of the Fife Communist Party for 15, 16 years. My grandfather was
active in the Fife Communist Party. Both were National Union of Mineworkers
representatives. My old fella', he was the checkline man, collecting the union money round the
doors and all that. So historically my family has always been steeped in it as far as I could
remember. I suppose it was just a natural progression from there.
(Union convener)
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Such a background predisposed such individuals to rise rapidly through the union structure at
Rosyth.
I went to the dockyard in 1966 to serve my time as a coppersmith. Prior to 1970 I became the
Apprentice's Representative on the Whitley Council, first for the coppersmiths and then for the
full Training Centre as a whole. That's how you progress on. I became a shop steward in 1971.
I was actually sitting on most of the committees before my time was out. I was the first
apprentice to sit on the Joint Monitoring Committee.
(Union convener)
His subsequent career as a dockyard trade unionist in the 1970s and 1980s was charted with a
certain inevitability.
After I became a shop steward I went to Ruskin College in Oxford for a month. Then 1 became
the branch secretary and I went from there to become senior steward for the coppersmiths, onto
the Whitley Council, then Secretary of the Whitley Council for a while. Then privatisation
came up I became chairman of the [union campaign committee], I think I was chairman of
about 500 committees at the time. Ultimately, I became the convener, the yard convener, if
that's what you want to call it.
(Union convener)
Not everyone saw shop stewards as selfless representatives of the common good. Others held the
quality and motivations of shop stewards in low esteem, regarding them as inferior tradesmen, with
the Whitley bureaucracy enabling a self-interested pursuit of their own advancement.
I was a shop steward at one time but I wasn't very impressed with the unions.
Interviewer. What was the problem?
It was just that I felt that they were, shall we say, at the top echelons of the union, weren't that
good as tradesmen ... A lot of them were lazy gets. You've heard the saying 'They couldn't have
put a nut in a monkey's mouth'. Useless. They couldn't even use a spanner and now he's in an
office, you know. I'm not saying they were all like that. There were two or three good ones.
One in particular who was really good and Babcock ended up giving him severance, which I
think was the best piece of business that they ever done. The respect was lost, in my case
anyway, I stopped being a shop steward because I felt people were just trying to better
themselves by using the union, that was the reason that they were there. Especially when the
Safety Reps came in, that was all shop stewards. It was turning them round about. And then
they end up getting made up to PTOs [supervisors]. That was boys that wouldn't have got to a
PTO position going any other road bar shop steward and then beyond. They used the union. In
fact they used the people in the dockyard to advance their wee bit ofmoney and their careers.
(Boilermaker)
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Differences in dockyard trade unionism from the rest of industry was emphasised repeatedly, by
both those who had experience of 'outside' industry and those with wide experience of the trade
union movement but whose workplace unionism was confined to dockyards.
But then again the dockyard wasn't really a reflection of the rest of the trade union movement.
It was a microcosm, if you like. It was a world within itself. It was totally different from
commercial industry.
(Shipwright shop steward)
An AUEW shop steward, who led a major occupation of an engineering factory in Glasgow against
closure in the early 1970s, found the dockyard bonus scheme indicative of the rigid, centralised
industrial relations system.
There was a different attitude from outside industry. We got virtually no information from the
Shop Stewards Committee about what was going on. This attitude probably stemmed from the
fact that there was no room for bargaining [locally] on wages. The bonus was split 60 percent
[of the saving on time] to the worker and 40 to management. You could only really make any
bonus on nuclear work. Everything else was lOp on each hour regardless of how long a job
took. There was little a shop steward could do except to try to keep money in the boy's pockets.
(Engineering shop steward)
If the bureaucratic structures of dockyard unionism made it a haven for self-interested individuals -
and not all were - it did not go unchallenged. By the early 1980s, just as the Levene reforms came
on the agenda. Shop Steward Committees saw internal struggles conducted around oppositional
and accommodative attitudes to management.
There was no one younger than me [on the shop stewards committee]. The rest were about ten
years older. Our particular committee was very well ran, I felt... At that time they were maybe
not anti-management but definitely not pro-management either. There was big, big numbers on
the committee ... maybe touching 30 [shop stewards] covering 350 to 400 members.
Interviewer. Would you say that the union had a cosy relationship to the management?
Not as far as I could see. Far from it. They were really head to head. Then again I wasn't party
to any the higher talks at that time, I had just come in. Maybe they were a bit cosier than I was
led to believe but it certainly seemed listening to the reports that were coming out that there
was a wee bit fight there... There was two main camps in the committee. One was sort of softer
and one was harder and the rest were in between. So whoever was coming off strongest out of
these two camps the rest would follow. I think the one that was a wee bit more left, if you like,
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were starting to score a lot of points and were getting more and more listened to. Things
dramatically came upon them with privatisation and it was all up in the air.
(Shipwright shop steward)
Rise of dockyard militancy in the 1970s
Even though it permitted a certain belligerence from union conveners towards dockyard
management, Whitleyism was highly effective in channelling local discontent into the formal
regulatory machinery. Only in 1962 did the first post-war strike at Rosyth take place when over
1,000 workers at Rosyth struck against the government 'pay pause' for public sector workers
{Dunfermline Press, 10 February 1962). However, strikes did not become a regular feature of
labour relations at Rosyth for another decade. By the late 1960s discontent was building up in the
dockyards over low pay and the bonus system and, as in the years before 1914 (Haas, 1985), the
dockyards were affected by the wider industrial militancy in Britain. The lowest paid dockyard
workers were first to engage in serious industrial action.
I joined the dockyard in July 19th 1969. I don't think it was anything to do with my
background but I was on strike, I think on August 15th 1969 with the Lagging Shed. At that
time laggers were paid Band 4 rates, the maximum wage. Whereas persons employed alongside
us coming from the private contractor were on treble time working onboard Polaris submarines
and they were also on double time on other crafts, other ships. Laggers were just plain single
time and a very low wage. The lagging shed at that time had 18 workers and the lads were
determined to go on strike, the first strike that occurred at Rosyth dockyard for any sustained
length of time; it took five and a halfweeks.
(Dockyard lagger)
Then in 1972 two serious disputes occurred In May nine TGWU members of a Port Auxiliary
Service (PAS) crew, refused to work two tugs to clear a path for the Polaris submarine HMS
Repulse, which was being undocked after refit. The nine were soon joined by the other PAS crews.
An overtime ban had been imposed by the PAS crews since January because a claim for an
allowance for handling nuclear work was being dealt with too slowly. Against threats that the
SSBN HMS Renown would not be refitted at Rosyth if the dispute continued management offered a
cash settlement and a revised shifhvorking agreement. After the PAS crew returned to work on 3
July the dockyard newspaper stressed the need for conciliation on all sides: 'The return to duty of
the PAS and the offer made by management may be the basis of a goodwill for which there is
always room in this sort of situation' {Spotlight, July 1972).
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Yet the dockyard axioms of goodwill, compromise and reasonableness were to be put immediately
to an even sterner test with the rejection of the annual pay award as 'insulting' (Dunfermline Press,
7 July 1972). Labour-management relations quickly deteriorated at Rosvth and pressure grew to
escalate the dispute: mechanical fitters and constructive trades organised an overtime ban; one day
token strikes were held in all dockyards in June; management efforts to lay off 250 workers at
Rosvth in July because of the PAS dispute were successfully resisted by the unions; the
government again threatened not to risk putting Renown into Rosyth; management docked 1.25
hours pay from the wages of 2,000 workers who attended a mass meeting, the unions withdrew
from the Whitley Committees in response and management withdrew permission for further shop
steward meetings {Dunfermline Press, 21 July; 28 July; 11 August; 18 August 1972). As the
Trade Union Advisory Committee expressed the mood: 'We are fighting the government here. They
are using us as whipping boys. They want to put the boot into us. But the attitude of the workers is
hardening' {Dunfermline Press, 7 July 1972). Yet the Trade Union Advisory Committee was more
equivocal and resumed their Whitley positions a few days later. As a spokesman put it 'We are
sensible and reasonable people ... we might be doing our members a disservice by suspending
negotiations' {Dunfermline Press, 18 August 1972) Demonstrations were organised outside the
Civil Service Department headquarters and MPs at the House of Commons, which was, according
to the union secretary of the Whitley committee, 'the first instance in which Government industrial
employees confronted their employers in this manner and for this purpose' {Spotlight, August
1972). Until late August a combination of lobby politics and token action prevailed at Rosyth with
the result that the offer was increased from £1.50 to a still unsatisfactory £1.75.
Then a qualitative shift in the dispute occurred. According to the District Official of the TGWU,
Jimmy Mclntyre, nationally the unions recommended that 'the members continue to exert moral
pressure on management by limited stoppages, working to rule etc.,' but locally he conceded that
'some of the members decided that was not strong enough' {Dunfermline Press, 25 August 1972).
Typically the action was unco-ordinated, as individual shop steward committees recommended
their members take strike action. One striker recalled the general chaos that resulted from the lack
of union leadership:
We went to a meeting to get a report back from the Whitley committee and also the
Shipbuilding Trades Joint Council about what was happening at national level with
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negotiations. There was a general unhappiness with the Heath government. The miners had just
been on strike and won a sum. although it had been a bitter strike and a lot of people had been
affected through that strike and in the communities. We said at the meeting, 'we're unhappy' and
Jim McCusker. the Yard Whitley secretary, stood up on the platform and said. 'You can take it
or leave it and that's the end of the meeting', which disturbed a number of us. On reflection we
would maybe have been better to co-ordinate our activities a bit better. But quickly there was a
[TGWU] shop stewards meeting and we agreed that the TGWU should push for all out strike
action within our own membership. However, what we neglected to do was to inform the other
parts of the T&G, for example. PSTO(N) and the Captain of the Port's [department], who had
just been on strike at the same time as the miners, drivers, Caledonia, who came under outside
branches and would obviously be affected if we went on strike. We had the meeting in the Boot
and Shoe Shop. The T&G shop stewards from the General Managers Department vastly
outnumbered the rest of the stewards called a mass meeting right away. The mass meeting was
held in the dockyard ... and voted overwhelmingly to accept the T&G recommendation to go out
on strike. But again we never left time for people from the bottom end of the yard and other
areas to come up get to the gate. And when we went to the gate that day we found out that the
AUEW had decided to strike, the Boilermakers had decided to take strike action and it
overflowed into a general strike at Rosyth dockyard ... The coordinating [meeting] ended up in a
shambles because of Jimmy's [TGWU District Official] wrong attitude, the paternalistic
attitude that Jimmy had at the time. Jimmy done a lot of good work at Rosyth but he had a
paternal attitude to the workforce. And that broke the solidarity of that collectivism.
(TGWU shop steward)
Despite this an unprecedented 4,000 industrial workers at Rosyth walked out on unofficial strike
on 22 August. Even a management statement admitted that 'Production work at Rosyth has
virtually come to a standstill. Only about 1,350 crossed the picket lines this morning ... and this
includes 600 apprentices' (Spotlight, August 1972). Large numbers of pickets, sometimes
involving 1,000 workers, demonstrated outside the dockyard gates. A 'picket line', set up at a
bridge near Inverkeithing railway station, was observed by local railway workers who refused to
take any passenger or goods trains into the dockyard.
Despite persistent appeals little was done to overcome the strikes' principal weakness: the limited
action at the southern dockyards. Although it was made official in early September the Rosyth
unions' call for all-out strike action from the southern yards continued to meet with little response.
Two Rosyth shop stewards toured the southern yards in an attempt to spread the action and
reported that while the response at Chatham was 'poor', things were improving at Portsmouth and
Devonport (Dunfermline Press, 29 September 1972). Devonport had already taken sporadic action
in support of the wage claim and finally struck on 25 September - one month after the strike at
Rosyth began (Bums, 1984: 120). One of the shop stewards remembered the reception they found
at Devonport:
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When we went to Devonport we were extremely pleased. We were in Devonport and showed
our pass, at that time it was a common pass, and they just let us in . .. We managed to have a
meeting inside the dockyard and the lads at the dockyard turned round and said, 'we cannot
stand here at Devonport and have the lads at Rosyth out on strike therefore we're coming out'.
So they all walked out. It was a marvelous sight. They then had a rally on this great big hill
just outside the dockyard, a huge rally because Devonport had around 13,000 to 14,000
workers at that time. We were well received and they had a collection for us. We bundled all
the money in a bag, we had big sacks of money to take back. And the Devonport lads stayed
out on strike [after we left].
(TGWU shop steward)
Action spread to other MOD establishments; 500 TGWU members struck at Faslane, 200 at
Coulport, with establishments at Arrocher, Livingston, Lathalmond and several in England were
also affected (Dunfermline Press, 1 September 1972; 22 September 1972). Regular meetings were
held in Stirling with union representatives of 25 other government establishments in Scotland,
including the Faslane and Coulport bases. While the unions claimed that 17,000 workers were on
strike across the country in late September, both the southern yards and the Royal Ordnance
Factories' gave only limited support.
Yet this came too late to affect the course of the dispute. Throughout the seven week strike fewer
than 10 per cent of industrial government workers in Britain joined the action. Nationally, the
union leadership in the Joint Co-ordinating Committee decided to refer the claim to arbitration, a
decision immediately denounced as a 'sell-out' by the fifty Rosyth strikers in London for the
meeting. At a meeting, held at Dunfermline Athletic's football ground to report the arbitration
decision to the Rosyth workforce the TGWU National Secretary, John Cousins, was jeered and
heckled over the 'sell out'. Cousins claimed that the failure of the southern workers made such a
decision inevitable (Dunfermline Press, 29 September 1972). But even at Rosyth things began to
ffay at the edges. Isolated and frustrated the strike at Rosyth seemed doomed to certain defeat. One
indication of this was the boilermaker's narrow vote to return to work two weeks before the strike
ended. A call for a return to work at Rosyth in the first week of October was backed at a mass
meeting amid bitter recriminations against the MOD, the trade union leaderships, strikebreakers
and, of course, against the passivity of the southern yards. Back dated strike pay was used to
engineer the return to work. According to a member of the 1972 strike committee:
At that time the Heath government stopped the Social Security, you had to prove hardship
before you could get any Social Security and they deduct your strike pay, automatically. So I
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can remember us going up. and it was a hardship allowance we got it wasn't strike pay. and
Jimmy [Maclntyre] had bribed the workers to go back to work: 'Vote the right way and you can
get this money: don't vote the right way and you cannae get it. The law will stop you'. We went
out [with the slogan], what was it. 'One pound seventy-five. Ted Heath take a dive'. We
eventually went back. I think, for £1.90, which was about fifteen pence.
(TGWU shop steward)
On the day of the march back to work placards were carried sav ing 'Southern Yards Let Us Down'
and workers refused to start work until 'scabs' were moved to different sections (Dunfermline
Press. 13 October 1972). As the normally moderate union secretary of the Industrial Whitley
Committee, Jim McCusker, (in Dunfermline Press, 13 October 1972) put it:
We have been promised all sorts of support from our Trade Union representatives, at national
level from our Executive Committees, from the Trade Union side of the General Co-ordinating
Committee. These promises have never been fulfilled. We condemn and deplore their attitude.
We condemn them for their lack of leadership. They should be condemned for failing miserably
Against a government determined not to risk another defeat by public sector workers as that
inflicted by the miners strike in February 1972 and trade union officials who seemed unsure of how
to conduct the strike nationally, iocai initiatives proved incapable of generalising fne dispute much
beyond Rosyth, even to the other dockyards let alone to the hundreds of thousands of industrial
workers in other Government establishments. As a trade unionist at Chatham who later moved to
Rosyth recalled,
1972 was a big dispute here but I only found out about it when I came here. People would say,
'you bastards in Chatham, you never supported us in '72'. I can vaguely recall it being
discussed but it was certainly never publicised, 'lets go out and support them', or anything like
that.
(Chatham shipwright shop steward)
Shop stewards at Rosyth suspected that the government had served 'D' Notices on media coverage
of the dispute to suppress information about a strike in one of the most sensitive industrial sites in
the country (Dunfermline Press, 13 October 1972). Although the Arbitration Committee awarded
an across-the-board rise of £2.60 per week, with percentage increases for women and apprentices,
the abiding memory of the 1972 strike among Rosyth workers was one of defeat and betrayal. It
would take another five years before the unions began to recover and when the next test came in the
1980s some of the strengths and weaknesses of 1972 would reappear.
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The test of commercial management
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the unions recovered from the 1972 defeat, industrial
action again became a familiar feature of labour relations at Rosyth.5 This account, from the
management point of view, of the £50 million refit of the Polaris submarine Renown in Rosyth
between July 1978 and February 1980 shows some of the many sources of labour unrest and their
consequences:
The refit got off to a bad start when an industrial dispute over quality control
documentation escalated to such an extent that all work stopped, other than that essential
for nuclear safety. Work resumed after three weeks' delay and for the next two months
progress was up to schedule though already there was cause for concern about the
coppersmith effort... The portents for the New Year were not encouraging as industrial
problems in the pipework area resulted in a considerable backlog in the welding of
pipework... It seemed likely that the refit was already running four weeks late when a non-
industrial pay dispute brought all work to a stop for about six weeks. Industrial morale,
already badly hit, was further worsened by problems over their pay award. All this led to a
re-scheduling allowing eight weeks delay. (Brown, 1983: 21-22).
Naturally, the trade unions were expected to lead the opposition to commercial management. The
Economist (16 March 1985) assessed the prospects thus:
The plan sounds more radical than it is ... The navy will not object ... [T]he main problem
will be with the trade unions ... One of the attractions of the scheme is that dockyard
labour problems can be dropped in the laps of the commercial operators who run the
yards.
From the outset the prospective bidders for the tender were acutely aware of this. The Managing
Director of Babcock International said that, 'The biggest task will be to convince the trade unions
that we are responsible management organisations' (in The Engineer, 7 November 1985). Kennedy
(1986: 28, 31) argued that by advocating commercial management the government entered a
procedural 'minefield' in getting the enabling legislation onto the statute book. Union expertise in
lobby politics would mean that this process would be '...easily exploited by unions with sixteen
years' experience of running rings round overdue reforms'. Far from being a bulwark against
change the unions' initial response to Levene was 'constructively' measured in the forlorn hope of
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opening up a dialogue. The Rosyth trade unions commissioned a study which argued for a trading
fund arrangement to counter 'the current vogue where decisions are based on narrow ideological
grounds' (Rosyth. 1984: vii). In the preface (Rosvth. 1984: vii) Rosyth union leaders appealed for
full participation in the decision making process:
This document is not a policy statement. Any reader will note that several of the
suggestions in the document are anathema to some within the trade union movement but
we let them stand to demonstrate our willingness to participate in a full debate and to show
that we are ready to negotiate on measures to improve our efficiency.
Such efforts at consultation were studiously ignored by the government. Trade union requests for
information through the conventional Whitley system and direct appeals to the Secretary of State
fell on deaf ears. Whitley ism as a system of cooperative industrial relations in the dockyards was
clearly finished. Levene's proposals were excluded from the normal channels of consultation on the
pretext that his status as a 'personal adviser' put his advice beyond established procedures (HC
453. 1985. Q200). The duration, method and biased content of the consultation process were
criticised both by the trade unions and the Defence Select Committee. The Defence Committee
concluded that the MOD's handling of the consultation process was 'inept and insensitive' and that
there was a 'strong reason to suspect that "consultation period" is in any case a misnomer, and that
the Government had already decided for its preferred option' (HC 342. 1985: xii-xiii).
The banning of trade unions at GCHQ in early 1984 indicated the level of hostility of the Thatcher
government to public sector unions.6 This disintegration of participative forms of Whitleyism into
the seemingly harsh and unyielding environment of 'new realism' returned lobby politics to the
centre of the STJC strategy. In this it largely succeeded. The success of lobby politics was reflected
in two highly critical Parliamentary Committee reports. When the government decided to press
ahead anyway the unions drew even closer to the Labour Party as the agency for resisting
commercial management. Union success at this phase came from the substantial delay to the
Dockyard Services Bill which took 25 sittings to eventually clear and so jeopardised the
government's implementation timetable. For TGWU Secretary of the STJC, Jack Dromey (1986:
101), this was a 'major blow' to the government. An amendment to the Bill by Lord Denning
See for example Dunfermline Press, 4 August 1978; 6 July 1979; 18 December 1980; 5, 12 June 1981;
7 August 1981.
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allowed the unions a provision to obtain a declaration from the High Court if they were dissatisfied
with the government's consultation process. Commitments were also given by the opposition parties
to return the dockyards to the public sector after the impending General Election.7 Delaying the
introduction of commercial management until the election when, hopefully, a Labour government
would set up a trading fund became the main plank of the union strategy. Unfortunately, on Friday
3 April 1987, the last working day before Vesting Day, Judge Millet at the High Court dismissed
the unions' argument about inadequate consultation. Commercial management was introduced into
the dockyards on the following Monday.
Throughout the campaign the Labour Party and the trade unions persisted with the core themes of
Tory ideological dogma versus rational managerialism, the elevation of private profit above
national security and the indecent disregard of the Tories for Parliamentary institutions and the 'due
process'. A broad alliance was formed, ranging from Lord Denning to the likes of Ken Gill the
Communist trade union leader and unilateral disarmer. This was mainly achieved by employing the
rhetoric of defending the national interest and endorsing the procedural role of Britain's national
institutions, House of Commons, House of Lords and the High Court. All the established symbols
and myths of British maritime history and national archaism were freely drawn on. One leaflet
produced nationally in 1985 and distributed in the yards declared in large type under a depiction of
a warship flotilla:






6 A token one-day national strike in defence of trade union rights at GCHQ called by the TUC was well
supported at Rosyth. Dunfermline Press, 3 February 1984.
7 Even though the Bill had already been given Royal Assent on 25 July 1986, an opinion poll carried out
for the TUC in October 1986, seemed to support growing union optimism about stalling commercial
management, when it found that 71 percent preferred public ownership of the dockyards and ROFs with
only 15 percent favouring privatisation. TUC, NOPMarket Research Poll, 1986, Q4b.
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The unions frequently emphasised that the yards were Royal Dockyards and that the workforce
were loyal. Dromey (1986: 101) even stressed that in the Queen's Speech announcing the Dockyard
Services Bill that she had called the yards 'My Dockyards'. It was from such imagery that Lord
Denning's support was drawn. For him it was a constitutional issue over whether the Crown could
compulsorily transfer the workforce of the dockyards to a new employer without their consent. He
related anecdotal evidence from Devonport, 'I have been there and I know that from generation to
generation for the last two hundred years they have been in the service of the Crown, and proud
they are of it' (.House of Commons Debates, 9 June 1986, col 39). Even the Royal Prerogative
could not deny the rights of 'free born Englishmen' to be consulted about which employer they
should choose to 'serve', with Denning citing Lord Aitken from a 1940 case. 'That right of choice
constitutes the main difference between a servant and a serf.
In the dockyards industrial action was expected to play a purely supporting role to the main lobby
politics strategy at national level. Yet industrial action at Rosyth threatened repeatedly to escape
nationally circumscribed limits. Strikes, demonstrations, delegations, 'guerrilla actions', 'blackings',
overtime bans and general non-co-operation and hostility to management maintained the
momentum of the campaign in the workplace between 1984 and 1987. Local management, under
pressure to improve efficiency before Vesting Day, adopted a more austere form of labour
relations. For instance, they refused to officially recognise the Rosyth unions' anti-privatisation
committee because it fell outside of the Whitley machinery. And in 1986, in an unprecedented
move, 86 ex-apprentices were refused employment as craft workers. Union fears that the ex-
apprentices were being used as 'pawns' by management in order to force through flexibilities
between craft and non-craft grades resulted in a deep distrust and hostility (FACT, No 18).8 Any
work associated with private refits was blacked by the industrial unions. In June 1985 mass
walkouts took place in support of stores workers refusing to handle equipment for the private refit
of HMS Euryalus. In October the entire craft section of the AUEW membership were suspended
after refusing to perform remedial work on the propellers of the privately refitted HMS Redpole.
Yet even at the height of the blackings attempts were made to shore up Whitleyism. In one case the
TGWU convener issued a call to union members for a return to orderly workplace relations after
8 Rosyth industrial unions bulletin.
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unofficial meetings were held by shop steward to discuss blacking work on HMS Whitehead (This
Week. 21 June 1985) 9
Locally organised demonstrations, harassment of and walkouts against private companies became
part of the national strategy to 'scare off interested companies in late 1985. The government had
become increasingly concerned that 'while companies were interested in the government's
proposals, few were pressing for the contract' (Harte, 1988: 319). At Rosyth five companies had
dropped out by February 1986 leaving seven companies or consortia showing a continued
interest. I9 Demonstrations within Rosyth and pickets of contractors displayed the depths of
workforce opposition to private contractors. Interested contractors were prevented from physically
touring the yard because of the threat of disruption. When representatives of Babcock International
and Thorn EMI attempted to tour Rosyth workshops on 2 April 1986 it was cancelled after a noisy
demonstration of around 2,500 workers surrounded the visitors (Dunfermline Press, 4 April 1986).
Demonstrations were also organised against government Ministers and Departmental officials
when they visited Rosyth or the locality. When David Harte, the senior civil servant preparing the
introduction of commercial management, visited Rosyth industrial workers staged 'guerrilla action',
stopping work for an hour at pre-arranged staggered times, to ensure that the yard was 'in a state of
total disarray' and production was 'disrupted for the day' {FACT. 29 October 1986).
A series of walkouts and one-day token strikes to coincide with key government announcements
were solidly supported by the industrial workforce. The first strikes were called in August 1984 to
protest against what was to be the first 500 redundancies in the yards, the general decline of the
yards and the predicted job losses of 25 to 30 percent that would follow the implementation of
commercial management. As part of the national strategy they were designed as set pieces
primarily for propaganda purposes; they were not designed to hit production:
9 Rosyth management bulletin
'9 The announcement of lucrative Trident refits to be undertaken at Rosyth in December 1984 ensured
serious interest was more easily retained. Dunfermline Press, 7 December 1984. However the biggest
problem for the government was at Devonport where three of the leading companies who had passed the
MOD's pre-qualification assessment, Northern Engineering Industries, a Trafalgar House led consortium
and Vickers, withdrew after the massive scale of redundancies, an estimated 5,000 on top of the 2,000
before Vesting Day, became clear.
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In taking industrial action at this stage, we arc not seeking to put at risk the functions of
the Yard. Our objective is to bring home to the government our intention to bitterly resist
their proposals and to show to [the] public and Parliament what is happening (STJC
circular. 15 August 1984).
Traditional dockyard forms of union campaigning were resurrected. A study into alternatives to
Levene was commissioned by the Rosyth unions; the Queen Mother was petitioned; all the main
party conferences and MPs at Parliament were lobbied; a music festival was organised; a series of
public meetings and a conference with Fife Regional Council were held; regular collections took
place outside local football grounds; and leaflets were distributed in the local communities.
Yet the inoffensive cultivation of public opinion came unstuck when Norman Lamont, the recently
appointed Minister for Procurement, visited Rosyth in early December 1986. His visit came only-
days after he had steered the Dockyard Services Bill through Parliament enabling privatisation to
go ahead. A demonstration of 1,000 industrials blocked all the exits to the Central Office Block,
trapping Lamont inside the building for thirty minutes. Eventually, the police forced a passage
through the demonstrators to effect his release (The Scotsman, 7 December 1986). During the
meiee which followed windows were broken, the Managing Director's official car was damaged
and policemen and demonstrators were injured. Eleven workers were later suspended by the MOD
with seven eventually dismissed after being convicted of charges of affray in court.11 Nationally,
the union leadership were embarrassed by the publicity over the Lamont disturbances and worried
about the impact on sympathetic MPs and Lords. Although neither the local nor national union
leadership had been present at the Lamont demonstration they ensured that no further local
initiatives were taken after it.
And yet the MOD and Babcock were unsettled by the militancy of dockyard workers during the
campaign. It was later revealed that the MOD had secretly planned a £1,000 pay off for breaking
down workforce opposition to changes in working practices, a total sum of around £10 million was
set aside (Bathurst, 1988). However, by March 1987 the MOD became confident that such
'' A weekly levy was collected from the workforce to pay the wages of members suspended because of the
Lamont disturbances. Later, in May 1987, the Civil Service Appeals Board found that the dismissals were
unjustified and the new commercial managers offered the workers their jobs back as part of a general
amnesty for previous conduct, helping to 'set the scene for a smooth transition period' according to the
Chairman of the industrial unions at Rosyth. Dunfermline Press, 8, 15 May 1987; Interview with
suspended worker, 24 November 1995.
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measures would not be needed. This coincided with the period following the final walkout at
Ros\th on 23 January 1987. Babcock Thorn officially signing the contract for Rosyth on 27
January, and the issuing of a writ by the unions after DML signed the contract for Devonport on
24 February. The extent of the MOD's anxiety is indicated by evidence given 'in private1 by CFS
nearly a year later. It concerns memoranda prepared by the Comptroller and Auditor General on
the contingent liabilities agreed by the MOD with the commercial managers. A measure of the
MOD's sensitivity is the repeated use of asterisks to blank out precise details:
When the contractors went into the contract process *** both of them felt that unless there was
some guarantee *** they would not be prepared necessarily to take on the contracts and
therefore we believe that it was right to give them this guarantee. *** have settled down and it
is greatly to the credit of both Devonport Management Limited and Babcock Thorn Limited that
they have; they have handled their *** extremely well. We are still in an uncertain period *** .
As a result of that it would be irresponsible to release the precise details of these contingent
liabilities into the public domain. ***. It would disrupt what is turning out to be a favourable
situation, albeit in difficult times. (HC55, 1988:Q 3002, my emphasis)
What is clearly being discussed as 'contingent liabilities' is the public funding of contractors to
buy-off worker discontent, if necessary. That there was no need was due to the top-down
constitutionalism of national lobby politics combined with the divisiveness and intrigue of
bureaucratic workplace union organisation.
Despite all the workplace activity at Rosyth it was not enough to prevent a determined
Conservative government, fresh from defeating the miners, from introducing commercial
management. Nationally, the union campaign was hailed as a triumph. Locally, it had helped forge
a militant response but it also revealed deep rooted divisions, between white and blue collar unions,
between unions in Rosyth and Devonport, between shop stewards and conveners. Disunity within
the ranks of the industrial unions surfaced as individual conveners attempted to rescue the old,
unresponsive style of stewardship. From time to time this was transcended by more dynamic, more
broadly based networks of shop stewards who kept up a demand to democratise the campaign by
making mass shop steward meetings the decision making forum. That a dozen conveners prevented
a couple of hundred elected shop stewards from realising this is testimony to the entrenched
bureaucratic inheritance of Whitleyism. What this legacy meant for the new commercial
management structures will be pursued in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Rosyth under commercial management
On entering Rosyth dockyard on Monday 8 April 1987. Babcock Thorn. (BTL), were faced
by an unusual set of circumstances. No private company had run a British naval dockyard
before, let alone manage the refit of one of the most lethal weapons platforms on earth; there
was no precedent for setting real prices involving the passing of real money out of navy hands
for dockyard refits; nor was there any for a company who owned neither the fixed assets of the
yard nor, at least formally, employed the workforce; and the managers had little control over
the nature of the work to be done under its supervision. But initially the most worrying aspect
of all for BTL was the attitude of the trade unions. BTL faced at Rosyth a deeply-embedded
trade union organisation which had just waged a two and a half year anti-privatisation
campaign and was more used to the long drawn-out procedures of the Civil Service than the
so-called 'sophisticated' industrial relations of the privately-owned engineering sector.
This chapter sets out some of the key ways BTL attempted to change Rosyth from its Civil
Service legacy. To Babcock the Civil Service legacy at Rosyth seemed incongruous for a
large-scale industrial workplace. According one director,
... when we came here in 1987 we found an organisation really, which rather amazingly
considering what it did, was somewhat backward in its industrial relations and somewhat
backward in its engineering practices. It was not registered to any quality registration; it
was not accountable to the Health and Safety Executive - it had Crown Immunity; and
although they made a lot of play at that time that everything was run efficiently, the reality
was that there were a lot of shortcomings in how the affairs were managed. On the other
hand, there was an extremely good quality of management, enthusiastic ... and
intellectually bright management, but they weren't used to operating within a more
commercial framework and weren't really in an industrial framework.
Some of the more obvious deficiencies in industrial practices quickly became apparent to
BTL. For instance, less than a handful of people were engaged professionally in the quality
function:
Shortly after we came in, a [diesel] submarine had been refitted ... and we had to virtually
rework the submarine because ... there were no quality records available. Of course the
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Navy would not accept it back into service without quality records. So we had to go back
and re-do a lot of the work that had previously been done but there was no evidence of.
Generating financial and other management information was another problem for BTL.
... we had quite a lot of heartache in the first few months extracting good management
information to run the business and it took us quite a long time to establish that. How
effectively was labour performing, management of materials and cash flow stocks, and
project financial information - none of that was readily available in any effective way.
Despite such difficulties, Rosyth was viewed as a profit-making opportunity with little risk to
the finances of the parent company:
[I]t was a business opportunity, first and foremost. There was perceived to be an
opportunity there to generate some profit ... for shareholders and, at that time, it was a
seven year contract which did not require a lot of capital investment. So that was seen to
be attractive.
BTL claimed to have the right background as a consortium to handle the transition to a more
commercial approach at Rosyth. Babcock's experience in the private engineering field gave it
a number of advantages for tackling engineering practices and industrial relations.' First, it
had a long history of managing complex engineering projects. Second, it was a well-
established firm in Scotland. Moreover, it had an intimate knowledge of trade unionism in a
Scottish engineering environment. Rosyth, a director admitted,
was seen as being principally an industrial relations problem. Babcock felt confident in
their ability to manage that because of the experience they had at the Renfrew plant where
' According to a senior Babcock source:
Thorn EMI, on the other hand, were a large consumer and defence electronics and music and
entertainment company. Thorn gave Babcock what it lacked: a pedigree in high-tech defence
markets. Babcock was seen to be in the metal-bashing end, although sophisticated metal-bashing
... We weren't a major defence player. It was considered we needed somebody who was a major
defence player, which Thorn were, and also had a major high tech electronics [background] and,
with that blend, we were a powerful consortium.
As senior personnel within Thorn changed and the business was re-focused around music and
entertainment, Thorn's minority, supportive role in the consortium became increasingly passive.
Thorn decided to leave the defence sector in the early 1990s and sold their 35 per cent share to
Babcock in 1992. In any case, from the early days Babcock were always the main driving force
behind the consortium: 'The results were consolidated into Babcock, any funding requirements were
on Babcock's balance sheet, and all the reporting by management here was through to Babcock
corporate headquarters'. (Rosyth director).
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there had been major industrial relations changes and initiatives over a number of years
which obviously led to the management developing skills and experience necessary, (my
emphasis).
The Babcock side of BTL became the main part of the Facilities Management Division of
Babcock International. At Rosyth the Babcock management team enjoyed a high degree of
autonomy from the parent company. By the early 1990s Babcock International had became
increasingly dependent on BTL for revenue. As table 5.1 suggests Rosvth's contribution to the
profitability of Babcock International was regularly around a fifth, while turnover accounted
for about a quarter.
At the end of the day [corporate HQ] turn to us and say 'Well, what do you want to do as
local management'? If you have a pay dispute or we want to do something about pay
strategy, or we want to re-organise the business in some way we need to keep them
informed. But they will say: 'What is it you want to do? You are managing the place' ... If
you need to find money or if there is investment required we need to seek their approval.
But we agree a budget each year for our operating results and we have got a high level of
freedom to operate within that.
(Babcock manager)
Babcock's roots in Scotland can be traced through to the 1870s. The Renfrew plant of
Babcock & Wilcox, an American boilermaking firm, opened in 1895. After 1900 the firm
developed into a large, diversified engineering multinational (Babcock, 1991). Until the mid-
1960s its main products were the original water tube boilers for power stations, marine and
industrial usages. Its connection to the defence industry was traditionally based on boilers for
Royal Navy ships. Since the 1940s Babcock carried out fabrication work for nuclear power
stations and in the 1980s has done work for the Trident programme (Babcock, 1991:34, 37).
By 1985 Babcock International was a diverse engineering and contracting multinational with a
worldwide turnover of more than £1,000 million and employment levels of 26,500 (Annual
Report, 1985).
Babcock's background of restructuring production and labour relations in Scotland in the
1970s and early 1980s seemed to make it well-suited to undertake the changes envisaged for
Rosyth. Declining, less frequent orders for domestic power station boilers, changing
technology, increased market entry costs, higher quality demanded by CEGB, nuclear boiler
exports limited by national politics, lack of a turnkey capability and a sluggish financial
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position, combined to make Babcock's market position precarious in the mid-1960s. This was
reflected in the internal structure of the Manufacturing Division to which Renfrew belonged.
First, a physically inflexible labour process limited Babcock's ability to switch production to
respond rapidly to changing product markets. Second, an irregular pattern of fewer but larger
orders placed by the prime customer, CEGB. made it difficult to operate fixed capital
economically. Typical of a 'capital widening' approach, Babcock accumulated plant during
high ordering periods before the early 1960s, simply adding new stock to the existing plant,
within buildings 80 years old and equipment up to 50 years old. With the 1960s shift in
market and product conditions the extent of obsolete surplus capacity became more obvious.
Table 5.1: Contribution of Facilities Management Division (FMD) to Babcock International
turnover and profit (before taxation), 1990 to 1995 (£m)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
FMD Turnover 165.0 1791 1781 148.7 1971 230.3
(as % of Babcock's overall
turnover)
26% 23% 21% 19% 24% 30%
FMD Profit 10.3 10.6 10.4 5.4 111 10.9
(as % of Babcock's overall
profit)
24% 22% 18% 25% * 139%
Sources: Annual reports
*Note: FMD's contribution to overall profits in 1994 is massively exaggerated by a £54
million loss inflicted by Babcock's Energy Division
In response, Babcock adopted a two-fold strategy (Batty, 1980). At the corporate level, the
plan was to diversify and grow through acquisition. For the Manufacturing Division the plan
was for a controlled contraction of plant and labour. By 1978, the factories at Dalmuir,
Dumbarton and Porterfield were closed and Renfrew slimmed down. Two redundancy
programmes and progressive 'natural wastage' resulted in a 56 per cent loss of jobs in the
Manufacturing Division by 1978 compared to 1967. At Renfrew 20 per cent of the workforce,
1,000 jobs, were made redundant in 1971 and 30 per cent of the remaining jobs, 1,200, went
in 1977. Meanwhile, a joint campaign ofmanagement, unions and MPs lobbied government to
preserve national boilermaking capacity through a consistent ordering policy. This 'created a
sense of common purpose between the workforce and management which provided a solid
basis for future consultation and participation on other issues' (Batty, 1980: 23). Chief among
these 'other issues' was the redundancy programme. An 'extensive communication' exercise
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with the unions in April 1977 was intended to 'ensure a responsible approach by the Unions to
the redundancies required in a manner which did not damage the important long-term objective
of securing the future of the plant' (quoted in Batty. 1980: 23).
The union's 'responsible approach' culminated in the 1985 Productivity Agreement for
Manual Employees at Renfrew. This amounted to a fundamental revision of the formal basis
upon which the effort bargain was struck. The frontier of control clearly favoured
management, at least on paper, to allocate and define the detailed terms of the effort bargain
independently of the trade unions. Moreover, workers were invited to identify with the
company's goals as their own. The introduction to the agreement makes this explicit, 'It is
recognised that individual prosperity is dependent on the success of the Company and, in order
to maintain its commercial viability, there must be wide ranging changes in work practices and
responsibilities, ...'. 'Key requirement' provisions set out the 'commitment of all employees to
work in whatever way is required by this Agreement ...'. 'Key requirement's' 1 and 2 agreed
that workers were now to be 'adaptable' and 'multi-skilled' so that teams could 'complete a task
with the minimum number of people'. 'Multi-skilling' was to be implemented in two phases:
immediately, with the 'Implementation of within union flexibilities and interchangeabilities
without reservation' (my emphases) and between 1986 and 1987 across union flexibilities,
including flexibilities between staff and manual employees, again without reservation. 'Key
requirement' 3 reserved the right for management to change shift patterns and overtime to suit
individual contracts. 'Key requirement' 4 inadvertently summed-up the changing balance
between workplace control and consent where it stated that. 'Workers will co-operate fully in
new work organisation structures', particularly with reference to worker self-inspection of
workpieces. Non-negotiating Area Implementation Committees were to be set up within the
factory to promote 'effective communication' in keeping unions and employees informed of the
implementation of the Agreement. As part of a 'convergence' of conditions between staff and
manual workers, new sick pay and pension arrangements and a move from weekly pay packets
to monthly pay by credit transfer were introduced. Finally, the agreement stated that a revised
trade union structure became 'necessary'.
The far-reaching 1985 Agreement was signed and implemented at the same time as the unions
at Rosyth were resisting the introduction of commercial management. The Renfrew Agreement
was circulated among shop stewards at Rosyth to indicate what could be expected under a
Babcock management regime. Yet, for the first three years the unions and BTL enjoyed an
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amicable, not to say amorous, relationship in an initial 'honeymoon' period. This was in the
context of a conscious effort by the MOD to construct mechanisisms to simulate market
conditions within the dockyard. How the "market" was created is considered next before
moving on to consider changes in industrial relations under BTL.
Inventing a market
Central to the restructuring of customer-producer linkages in the naval dockyards was the
setting up of new market structures. For the MOD, the pressing priority posed by the new
arrangements was to simulate rudimentary market-type instruments. Throughout the period
when the concept of agency management was being formed precise details about how it would
work remained ill-defined and under-developed (Harte, 1988). Insofar as these were worked
out at all it was in response to the external pressure of the trade union campaign. Above all the
new structures were to be as close as possible to ideal-civil market relationships including: the
incentives and penalties of competition; profitability or failure; real money would be charged
and paid for the value of work done; and a clearer separation established between the
customer and the producer, with risk being passed increasingly to the latter. Sometimes called
'marketisation', this was to be neither the free-play of market forces, somehow spontaneously
creating the necessary conditions for market entry or exit in line with neutral price signals, nor
was it the complete organisational fusion of the past of an undifferentiated Navy and dockyard
organisation.
The poorly worked-out nature of the new environment was readily apparent particularly
during the early years of agency management and major anomalies persisted throughout the
course of the nine year term contract. As a monopsonistic client the state could not adopt a
disinterested stance towards dockyard organisation, capacity and capability because of its
need to be assured of the future availability of capacity. It continued to own the dockyard
estate, fixed assets and decided where and when the work should be allocated. The contractors
were thus highly dependent on state agents' monopsonistic and ownership power for both
setting its rate of profit and for the use of the means of production. Autonomy for the
contractors was mainly confined to organising and managing the details of the productive
process, with little scope for determining the shape of the final product. Lacking ultimate
control through legal ownership rights, BTL were contractually committed to improving
dockyard performance through the exercise of detailed and general control of the labour
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process. Management operations, however, only remained viable to Babcock if they proved
sufficiently profitable.
How the contractors restructured management and the productive process will be discussed
below. First, the construction of market arrangements will be examined.
The new customer organisation
One of the principal aims of commercial management was to separate out the customer from
the supplier. In the past much work was taken on informally and did not. therefore, fully enter
the accounts.
A lot of [work] would come from a skipper coming at the weekend with a list of defects. If
he went to Small Ships he would know who the chargeman was, the supervisor, the
inspector or whoever it was. and he'd phone them up to get his work done. That work could
be hours of work [or] it could be weeks of work, quite substantial. That was rife
throughout the yard. So if that was done the ships in refit [were affected]. We were here to
serve the customer ... but a lot of that work used to get done an ad hoc basis ...
(Planning manager)
A new customer organisation was created, the Directorate Genera! of Ship Refitting (DGSR),
to manage the Navy's ship refitting programme, the dockyard assets and to place refit
contracts.2 DGSR was intended to be a sleek, dynamic organisation. Unlike the Navy
Department ensconced at its Bath headquarters, around half of DGSR staff were to be
encamped within the dockyards, working closely with the refit managers.-' In the new
'commercial' environment it was envisaged that decision-making would be speeded-up and that
any tendency to 'empire-building' within the DGSR organisation would be curtailed.4
2 More fully. DGSR's 'primary objectives' were:
To provide specialist advice, policy and guidance in ship refitting matters and to inform the planning
and resource allocation process.
To establish and achieve the ship refitting assets programmes to agreed time and costs whilst
meeting specified standards.
To manage allocated resources efficiently and effectively in compliance with Departmental
standards.
To develop, introduce and maintain appropriate organisation management and communication
structures, procedures and systems. (HC 23, 1992:36)
2 While the aim of locating around fifty per cent ofDGSR staff at the waterfront was achieved in
1991, fewer than 20 posts were relocated from Bath itself.
4 The technical complexity of managing refits on a commercial basis coupled with the sharp
fluctuations in workload ensured that DGSR numbers in fact grew in the first four years: from 621 at
Vesting Day to 701 by April 1991, before falling to 651 by April 1992, a figure still higher than the
initial complement at Vesting Day (although it was estimated to reach 585 by March 1993) (HC 23,
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One of DGSR's biggest problems was in setting initial refit specification. Instead of
attempting to write the detail division of labour into the contract specification, outlining
precisely how the work should be done, DGSR began to define the specification in 'output'
terms leaving the detailed technical decisions to the contractors. CFS gave the example of a
pump refit,
... we might have specified that its bearings had to be changed, what clearance it had to
have, [and so on] ... Now what we might do is to look at the specification and say the
pump is part of a total system and it is returning that system to a particular specification
which is more important. That allows the commercial manager then to use his acumen and
flair in managing the programme, to do things in the most efficient way and to do things
perhaps better than would be done by us specifying how things should be done.
(in HC 391, 1993 :Q 85-6).
Since both DGSR and the commercial managers were at the stage of learning how to manage
specification and pricing systems, where real costs were involved for the first time,
negotiations were often protracted, resulting in time delays and rising costs. As the extent of
work needed on a vessel only becomes clear once the refit is underway, it is difficult to
anticipate beforehand the amount and type of 'growth work' required. Moreover, the customer
retains ownership rights over the 'product' and remains present throughout the work process
reducing Babcock's sovereignty further still:
... we are dealing with live products [sic]. It's not as if we are saying here is a design we
will make you this and deliver it to you. It is their product ... at all times. They never give
over to the company full ownership of that. During the refit they retain ownership. They
don't let go of responsibility on the reactor systems for example. That's their responsibility
... [T]he fact they are there and constantly in our pocket and not standing back can be a
considerable frustration.
(Babcock director)
The customer therefore intervenes routinely and directly in defining what work is to be
performed. The contractor is restricted to determining how work will be organised. A
1992:13, 36; HC 391, 1993:14, 40-1). Compared to an estimated decline in non-industrial staff at the
dockyards of 27 per cent DGSR numbers fell by a mere five per cent between 1987 and 1993 over the
same period. However, when the additional work taken on by DGSR is accounted for the staff
reduction was estimated to be 14 per cent (HC 391, 1993: 40). Such comparisons between non-
manuals and DGSR staff numbers mean very little since the demands of'shadowing' the refit
contract and dockyard assets and actually managing the refit work itself are radically different in
nature. However, in the absence of other measurements for efficient staffing levels, as civil servants
DGSR numbers needed some kind of benchmark, however arbitrary.
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bargaining relationship develops between producer and client, closer to an integrated,
emergent "service" function than traditional pre-planning of shipbuilding, where the product
remains the property of the builder until completion. Because of emergent work, early refit
specifications were inadequate guides to the overall work package. For 'growth work' 'contract
variation orders' were negotiated, by which DGSR pays for the additional work. BTL argued
that the arrangements for agreeing prices for variation orders were too expensive, unwieldy
and bureaucratic and did not differentiate sufficiently between major and minor variations to
the work package.
Such problems with variation orders were compounded for the contractors by the introduction
of risk pricing and 'incentive contracts'. Risk pricing involved a clear attempt to shift cost
uncertainties from the customer onto the contractors through 'fixed prices' for labour,
materials and services and sub-contracts and the setting of target costs and profits. The
National Audit Office argued that fixing profits to a percentage or a money sum above actual
costs within an overall maximum price limited the incentives for efficiency gains (HC 23,
1992:15). By 1992, DGSR were meeting their target of 90 per cent of total value of contracts
by 'risk' or incentive pricing for labour and services but failed to reach the target for materials
as table 5.2 shows. Material contracts often continued to be issued on a cost plus basis.
Table 5 .2: Percentage levels of'risk' and incentive pricing agreed with BTL
Labour Materials Services
1989-90 99 84 61
1990-91 92 76 73
1991-92 93 68 95
Source: HC391, 1993: 14
Fixed capital and material supplies
Material supplies were a particular problem because the material content of a refit could not
be known accurately in advance of 'strip and survey' work taking place. To a considerable
degree materials were ordered at short notice. Because BTL decided to concentrate on
industrial relations at Rosyth their contract bid deliberately left out the management of stores,
which remained with the Navy stores organisation, PSTO(N), now DGST(N). However, some
outsourcing was permitted, reducing slightly the dependency on PSTO(N). The term contract
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also stipulated that contractors would receive certain ranges of materials on a free-issue basis
from the MOD.5 Even for those materials which the contractors were permitted to source for
themselves there was often little scope for alternative sourcing.
Most equipments are unique to Naval vessels and full procurement specifications are
seldom released by the original manufacturers. The Navy supplies organisation are
effectively the sole stockholder for many items, while for others the lead times involved
are too long. (HC 23, 1992:16)
The Navy supplies organisation itself became subject to the shifting tides in the defence sector.
It operated from a complex of sites dispersed across the country, often located close to the
bases and dockyards which it supplied. In the first half of the 1990s this was being
rationalised by Options for Change, Front Line First and the Defence Costs Studies exercises;
between 1990 and 1995 the number of civil servant stores officer grades declined by some 40
per cent (IPMS Bulletin, January 1996: 5). As the naval stores organisation centralised and
reliability deteriorated it had a knock-on affect on the dockyards.6
At Rosyth, BTL inherited stores which under naval control had accumulated stock over many
years in an ad hoc way. Existing material stockholdings had poor documentation, storage,
traceability, monitoring and accounting. BTL decided to dispose of these materials to ensure
that the customer was charged fully for all material costs of future refits. In the process of the
clear out everything from raw materials to fully assembled units were scrapped, amounting to
an unknown magnitude of scrapped material. Waste on this scale amazed and shocked the
workers involved in disposing of it.
With the MOD retaining ownership of the dockyards license fees, linked to base interest rates
and inflation, were introduced for the use of buildings and plant. These were intended to
5 When delivered late Ministry-supplied materials could cause substantial delays to refits. In 1990,
for example, 15 per cent of Ministry materials were supplied late causing nine per cent of all refit
delays (HC 23, 1992:16).
6 The main stores were based at Eaglescliffe in Teeside, Wrangton in Devon, Exeter, Devonport,
Rosyth, Colerne near Bath, and Portsmouth. Problems created by the decision in 1994 to centralise
all stores at the giant waterfront receiving depot at Portsmouth resulted in using the threatened depot
at Coleme as an overspill facility. Although Portsmouth reportedly held naval stores to a value of
£758 million and was receiving daily 18 lony-loads of stock from the depots being run down it was
simply unable to cope with the sheer quantity of stores. Even Colerne was soon engulfed by supplies
and the Navy's stock location system became snagged up. The result was extra costs and delays in
tracing, identifying and documenting what was often sophisticated electronic equipment lying
around piled up and exposed to the elements {IPMSBulletin, January 1996:5).
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ensure that commercial managers did not receive an unfair subsidy compared to private repair
yards and to encourage the most efficient use of dockyard land, buildings, plant and
machinery. An annual profit of around £1.5 million to £2 million was made by the MOD from
the fees (HC 23. 1992:18). However, such sums were largely fictitious since the contractors
paid their fees to the MOD and later re-charged the costs of the fees back to the MOD by
building it in to the hourly rates for naval refits. It was only for work won commercially that
charges for the use of dockyard assets constituted a real cost to the commercial managers.
While the proportion of naval work remained high, little incentive existed to use the assets
efficiently, particularly where the commercial managers complained that the license fees
constituted an unfair penalty when competing for non-naval commercial work. In 1991-92
revised license fees were introduced, more sensitive to fluctuating non-core work rates.
According to a Babcock manager, flaws in the license fee arrangements were sorted out
because, 'the Ministry themselves realised that they had shot themselves in the foot by
charging a profit and if they could actually cut the license fee in half, the company got half the
profit so they saved circular money'.7
Despite non-ownership, the commercial managers acquired responsibility for maintaining the
fixed assets to a standard acceptable to the MOD. The MOD were responsible for capital
investment but had expected the contractors to finance some new asset purchases, other than
information technology. Yet investment by the contractors was limited indeed, confined mainly
to commercial projects, such as the £1 million spent by BTL in 1991-92 to develop the Rail
Division at Rosyth.8 According to the commercial managers, the prospects of periodic
retendering for the dockyard management contract inhibited them from sinking investments
into fixed capital for core work, which they argued was the duty of the MOD:
We are not doing massive long term investment. Up till now, we have had a term contract
which started off at seven years and was extended to nine years and we don't own the
assets and we don't have a continuing contingent obligation after nine years.
7 Thus at Rosyth license fees fell in 1991-92 by 40 per cent to £5.4 million compared to 1990-91, fell
again in 1993 by some 22 per cent to £4.2 million, down to £3.7 million in 1994, and £2.9 million by
1995 (HC 391, 1993:15; BRD Annual Summary, 1994:14; Annual Summary, 1995: 14).
8 The net book value of fixed assets owned by BTL remained fairly stable at £928,000 in 1993,
£926,000 in 1994 and £892,000 in 1995 (BRD Annual Summary 1994:15; Annual Summary, 1995:
14).
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Even when rationalisation plans were proposed for fixed capital, such as the 1990 £27 million
'spend to save' measures, the commercial managers found the procedure 'too cumbersome and
prolonged' with the MOD taking two years to approve the rationalisation proposals (HC 23.
1992: 20). The physical layout bequeathed to the commercial managers was haphazard.
Although facilities for nuclear refits improved some aspects of dockyard layout the problem
identified by the General Manager in the early 1960s persisted into the 1980s,
I think the shops tend to be too far away from the working area. One would prefer to see
the main workshops closer to the main refitting area and the docks. There is a big space
between the head of the dock and the main shops. I would prefer, from an economic point
of view, to have the shops closer to the working area ... We have got to remember [that] the
yard finished development in a very incomplete state and what the original plans were for it
I really do not know ... (HC 263, 1961-2: Q989).
Nevertheless, license fee costs effected some rationalisation of the physical assets. This took
two forms at Rosyth: first, the elimination of redundant space, and second, a more intensive
use of productive space. On the first count, around 80 buildings were demolished, others were
returned to the MOD and the physical infrastructure generally tidied-up. On the second front,
Babcock inherited the legacy of blind accumulation in production areas.
It was a very poor situation indeed we found here in this regard. A lack of professionalism
in [the] management of assets ... [l]t was ridiculous, the bays and buildings ... you had
totally cluttered production space and that was something Babcock brought their
production engineering skills to bear in terms of improving the layout of all the buildings.
(Babcock manager)
Although rationalisation made substantial surplus land and buildings available for alternative
use or disposal, actual cost savings as reflected in lower refit costs proved difficult to quantify
accurately.
Efficiency andproductivity
No agreed measurement for the efficient use of space and physical capital exists. Neither does
one exist for the use of labour. A National Audit Office study (HC23, 1992) concluded that
efficiency claims suffered from a lack of adequate performance indicators.9 Efficiency
9 In general, the NAO study notes that the Navy were pleased with the quality of vessels returned
from the dockyards. Their main concern was the late completion of refits, which had a knock-on
affect on operational planning. For the most part the dockyards were absolved from blame for late
completion. On performance, competition and efficiency the results of commercial management
seemed to suggest that some improvements had been made but were difficult to measure.
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improvements were claimed by both dockyard contractors, with DML claiming total estimated
savings of roughly £50 million between 1987 and 1991. while BTL claimed that total annual
costs were reduced by £ 13 million and the unit cost of refits were reduced by 20 per cent (HC
23, 1992:21). These figures are based on assumed annual productivity improvements of eight
per cent by DML and five per cent by BTL. Such assumptions, however, could not be
validated in the absence of directly comparable measures of output.
One comparative measurement was direct hours worked by industrial employees. Here it was
claimed that the 'labour utilisation rate' at Rosyth improved by 20 per cent by 1991, with a
similar rate only reversed at Devonport during 1990-91 because redundancies could not be
made at the same rate as the workload fell that year (ibid.: 22). However, these figures are
inconclusive. Due to increasingly complex technological, supervisory, recording and
monitoring infrastructure supporting refits, it was increasingly difficult to erode overhead
costs. Table 5.3 indicates a rising number counted as 'direct' labour until 1991. By 1995, as
table 5.4 shows, the direct/indirect labour balance was roughly equal. With workload
reductions and falling employment levels overheads were being spread across a reduced base.
This resulted in a reduced willingness by DML and BTL to carry overhead costs between ship
refits. When the start of a major refit was delayed in 1990-91, for example, the MOD
accounted for overheads separately and paid BTL £9.5 million, including profit.
Other measurements of efficiency were target completion dates, cost and quality. Target
completion dates were set at the start of a refit and a final contract date negotiated once the
full extent of the work became more clearly known. The final contract dates were realised in
all but a small percentage of cases. Even where projects exceeded their original targets these
were largely attributed to the growth in emergent work once the refits were under way. Thus
in 1990-91 BTL were estimated to be liable for 19 per cent and DML for 28 per cent of time
overruns with the remainder attributed to the customer or its agents. A similar case was made
for cost. Because of the amount of emergent and extra work being approved by the customer
or its agents during refits costs grew on most refits, sometimes by as much as another third.
As an efficiency indicator quality is perhaps the most difficult to record 'objectively'. Once a
ship was accepted by the Navy after trials, except for the most serious problems post-refit
defects were repaired by ships' staff. Thus the quality control system could not guarantee that
contract quality assurance specifications had been fully met.
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Table 5.3: Direct hours per industrial employee
1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91
Rosyth 870 956 963 1.047
Devonport 1,036 1,050 1,250 1.050
Source: HC 23, 1993:22
Table 5.4: Percentage of direct and indirect labour at Rosyth, 1991 and 1995
1991 1995
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
Craft 82 18 79 21
Non-craft 51 49 36 64
Total industrials 68 32 67 33
Non-industrials 20 80 21 79
Total core 52 48 48 52
Periphery
Industrials 90 10 94 6
Non-industrials 23 77 30 70
Source: BTL
Given the relatively indeterminate nature of refitting, time and cost disciplines contain an
arbitrary element. In the absence of definitive measures there is simply no way of knowing if
restructuring produces efficiency savings.
The effects ofdeclining workload
Sharp changes in workload affected dockyard operations more than any other single factor,
further frustrating claimed efficiencies. In not a single year between 1987 and 1992 did the
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actual core w orkload at either yard match the planned work set out in the tender document 10
Things worsened considerably in 1990. That year a range of factors combined to dramatically
reduce numbers of vessels in refit: ships were on service for extended periods in the Gulf;
refits were delayed because of pressure on public finances; nuclear submarine refits
encountered significant technical problems; and the sudden retirement of major vessels while
in refit. The refit programme was particularly disrupted by the cancellation of refits of the
nuclear submarines, HMS Warspite and HMS Churchill in September 1990 and,
subsequently, HMS Revenge. This followed on rapidly from the Options for Change
announcement in July 1990, which proposed immediate economies to take advantage of the
favourable strategic environment of the Cold War thaw, and technical problems with the
reactor cooler system. Despite already spending £137 million on Warspite and Churchill refits
since March 1988 and April 1989 respectively, the government valued immediate savings
rather than incurring further refit, maintenance and operational costs over their 'natural'
service lifespan. After 1990 the workload declined even more precipitously. In 1991 the core
work at Rosyth was 30 per cent below plan and 43 per cent in 1992, with Devonport faring
even worse, a 44 per cent reduction in 1991 and 64 per cent in 1992 (HC 391, 1993: 14).
Major cancellations played havoc with the remaining refit programme, reducing the amount of
non-core work available for competition and ships allocated on a non-competitive basis.11
Although the contractors had no legal entitlement to core work the Ministry accepted that it
should bear the costs of retaining capacity and labour in the event of cancellations. When it
came to a choice between the principle of competition and 'value for money' the latter clearly
held sway. Competitive efficiencies were foregone because the MOD was committed to
retaining certain types of excess dockyard labour. A straight choice existed for the MOD
between paying the costs of redundancy caused by cancelled refits, which the MOD were
obliged to cover, or of paying the contractors directly to retain surplus labour.
This problem of labour 'under-utilisation' further clouded efficiency claims. Uncertainties and
disruptions to the refit programme were compensated for by the MOD. Under-utilised labour,
Over the four years to 1991, the volume of core work below planned levels was 22 per cent at
Devonport and 17 per cent at Rosyth (HC 391, 1993: 14).
11 For example, the refit ofHMS Gloucester was originally allocated to Devonport, then it was going
to be open to a tendering competition before, finally, it was redirected to Rosyth. Switching the
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valued at £4.1 million in 1990. was included as an overhead cost for calculating local hourly
rates (ibid : 12). BTL were able to spread the cost across other work in the yard, even making
a £250.000 profit from surplus labour. In 1990-91. however, so severe was the sudden
disruption to the programme caused by the decommissioning of HMS Churchill and Warspite
while both were in refit that the MOD paid BTL £18 million and DML £25 million, plus a
three per cent disruption fee. to cover the cost of retaining surplus labour (ibid: 12). Taken
together, overheads, surplus labour, programme disruptions, changing employment levels, lack
of performance indicators and strong assumptions for productivity gains made the relative
efficiency of commercial management impossible to establish.
Competition and diversification
As commercial managers, BTL were expected to compete for the term contract periodically.
In the original commercial management proposals this was to be a further spur to efficiency.
However, first the contract was extended from five to seven years before commercial
management was introduced and then, in 1994, it was extended non-competitivelv from seven
to nine years. The contract was further extended in 1996 as negotiations over full privatisation
dragged on, an option ruled out by Heseltine and Levene back in 1985.
Additional competition was to be introduced in two other ways: over that portion of naval
work not already allocated to the yards and unrelated commercial work. However, unallocated
naval work won by both yards was 'substantially less than the commercial managers' original
estimates' (ibid.: 24). The NAO study argued that there were two main reasons for this: first
that the size of the unallocated programme never exceeded one quarter of the total naval
workload between 1987 and 1991 and. second, that where BTL (and DML) made bids for
such work they were rarely successful.
Table 5.5 shows the poor response rate of both yards for unallocated contracts and the even
poorer award rate. In part this was a result of spatial restrictions imposed by the MOD. BTL
and DML argued that because priority had to be given to allocated work dry docks could not
always be available for unallocated work. At Rosyth only three docks were available for
refits. Two of the docks, however, were dedicated to submarine refits and the third, which
could be split in two, normally housed a warship refit, with only the other half available at
Gloucester refit to Rosyth allowed the MOD to absorb some of the surplus labour originally allocated
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most times to accommodate other work. Thus the timing of when unallocated work became
available largely determined whether it can be accommodated physically. BTL also argued
that the basic nature of unallocated work discriminated against cost structures designed to
support more complex ship refits.
Again the artificiality of 'market' competition was clear. Outside firms needed to be induced
into competing for warship refits. Merchant shiprepair yards and shipbuilders which lacked
sophisticated systems of refit planning were subject to high entry costs for naval refits. The
further refit costs were driven down by the dockyards the lower the entry costs for outsiders
were assumed to become. At some undefined point a 'crossover price', at which outsiders
would be prepared to enter the market, would signal a competitive warship market situation.
But knowing the planned future programme of allocated work gave the commercial managers
a further advantage over rivals. As a director at Rosyth said, '... we can top [the allocated
work] up by doing competitive tendering on other work. Obviously, some of the competitors in
the ship refitting industry think this is unfair because we can do marginal costing and fill in
the troughs'. Only one major warship refit was subject to competitive tender, won by Swan
Hunter by undercutting dockyard bids through extensive use of competitive sub-contracting.
Table 5.6 shows that unallocated work won fell substantially below the projections set out in
the original management contracts. Only Rosyth in 1989 won more than half of the original
estimate. More often than not the amount was derisory. Admittedly the original estimates were
based on a much larger programme of work but, even allowing for that the estimates are
extremely optimistic compared to eventual outcomes.
Table 5,5: Response and award rates for unallocated naval programme, 1987 to 1991
Unallocated Rosvth Devonport
contracts Response rate Award rate Response rate Award rate
Royal Fleet 17% 5% 45% 2%
Auxiliaries
Small ships 36% 7% 42% 13%
Minor contracts 90% 38% 74% 18%
Source: Director General of Ship Refitting, in HC 23, 1992:25
to the paid-off submarine Revenge.
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Table 5.6: Estimated and actual unallocated naval work won 1988 to 1991 (in manweeks
[sic])
Ros\th Devonport
Estimate Actual Estimate Actual
1988 6.000 1.315 6.000 nil
1989 15.000 8,402 14.000 nil
1990 22.000 4.730 22.000 1.577
1991 29,000 3.427 23,000 1.626
Total 72.000 17.874 65.000 3.203
Source: BTL and DML. in HC 23. 1992:25
Original targets for winning non-naval commercial work by the contractors proved more
realistic . These were reached and even surpassed, with the two contractors wimiing roughly
equal amounts of work, as table 5.7 shows. Although this reflects their relatively modest
contribution to overall workload compared to allocated work, this was a rare case of a
successful diversification programme in the British defence industry in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.
Table 5.7: Non-naval commercial work won by BTL and DML (in manweeks [sic])
Rosvth Devonport
Target Actual Target Actual
1988 1,000 661 nil 2,750
1989 3,500 3,855 150 3,750
1990 5,500 5,564 3,500 3,829
1991 7,500 7,532 7,000 7,200
Total 17,500 17,612 10,650 17,529
Source: BTL and DML, in HC 23, 1992:26
Diversification into non-naval work has been hailed as a success story. Financial support from
the corporate centre and a low liability for the fixed capital allowed Babcock to pursue
commercial work employing existing labour. A senior manager at Rosyth identified "core
competencies' with profitable opportunities.
We actually had targets to achieve as part of the commercial deal and what we decided to
do was in the early days to [take] a bit of a sceptical approach ... We looked at the skills
and competencies and the facilities at Rosyth and said 'Right, what work can we bring in
to fill these competencies and resources'? and we said, 'this is a repair and maintenance
place essentially: we refit ships, we do a lot of metal work and do a lot of joinery work
and perhaps we could fill the joiners shop with commercial work, perhaps we could fill the
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fabrication shops with commercial work', and that is how we started off... [A] lot of what
you see in the Joiner}'. Fabrication and Rail is just bom out of matching Rosyth's existing
skills to new opportunities. We refit ships so why can't we build boats? We started off in a
modest way and now we have done several of them.
Serendipity played a part backed, of course, with Babcock International's financial clout. The
much praised diversification into rail carriage refiirbishments, for example, was a result of
buying into the contract through the takeover of Tickford, the firm that had already won it.
We also looked at railway refurbishment in a similar way to start with and that grew. We
saw an opportunity there. We got talking to a company that we noticed in our trawls that
had won a contract with London Underground to refit ... underground carriages. We just
cold-called and said 'this is our capability. Is there anything we might do for you?' And out
of that, to cut a long story short, we eventually bought the company ... Tickford, and we
actually bought that contract.
How well the performances of BTL and DML compared during the first five years of agency
management soon became central to the competition for nuclear submarine refits. For the
industry journal Defence Industry Digest (July 1992) the NAO study showed that DML's
performance bettered Rosyth's for winning commercial contracts and improvements in direct
numbers per employee. As the above shows, however, there was little between them in the
amounts of commercial work won, although DML estimated that they would win 18,968
manweeks [sic] in 1992 while Rosyth predicted 16,650. Again in terms of direct hours per
employee there was little between them, both improving by around 20 per cent. For most
measures broadly comparable performances were found, with Rosyth marginally ahead in the
amount of unallocated work it actually won and showing less liability for time overruns, 19
per cent, than Devonport, 28 per cent. But how far efficiency discourse was rhetorical rather
than a reflection of improved performance is impossible to discern.
The social contours of restructuring
As described above, where future availability of specific skills on a casual or sub-contract
basis might be in doubt the MOD judged that it would be better to pay for the excess labour in
the short-term. Where skills might be more easily available or not required in the future the
Ministry would agree redundancy payments with the contractor. Table 5.8 shows some of the
costs to the Ministry for continuing to underwrite dockyard capacity. At Rosyth, the MOD
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paid for 1.987 redundancies in the five years to 1992. 34 per cent of the original workforce,
while 5.642 redundancies were made at Devonport. nearly half of the original workforce (HC
391. 1993: 14). The rate of redundancies at Rosyth accelerated in 1991 when 942 were made,
nearly as much in one year as in the previous four. A similar trend existed for surplus labour,
rising sixfold in value at Rosyth from £4.1 million in 1990 to £29 million in 1992.12
Table 5,8: Pa\Tnents to the contractors bv the MOD to 1992
Ros\th Devonport Total
Redundancy costs £20 m £110 m £130 m
(to March 1991)
Redundancy costs £42 m £125 m £167 m
(to March 1992)
Surplus labour costs (1991) £18 m £25 m £43 m
Surplus labour costs (1992) £29 m £15 m £44 m
Overheads (1991) £9.5 m - £9.5 m
Overheads (1992) £19.5 m - £19.5 m
Totals £118 m £165 m £283 m
Source: HC 391, 1993: 14.
The difference between combined figures for 'natural wastage' and redundancy and the net
employment reduction, 750 at Rosyth and 864 at Devonport,'21 indicates that over half of all
jobs lost at Rosyth were replaced and around 12 per cent at Devonport. This was necessary,
the study argues, to allow BTL and DML to shape workforce skills, knowledge and
experience profile to commercial imperatives (ibid: 11). Yet a criticism made by BTL
managers was that the relatively ad hoc nature of the job reductions left imbalances within and
between trade groups. Due to the emphasis on union consent, BTL were reluctant to directly
target the trades and grades they considered 'surplus'. Instead, age or social criteria was
employed to select from among the masses of individual volunteers. The result more or less
randomly designed the skill contours of the remaining workforce.
12 A seperate sum of £29 million, including profit, was also paid to BTL to cover increased cost of
overheads from being spread across a much reduced workload base due to delays to the start of a
major refit in 1991 and 1992.
'2 The NAO study noted that after allowing for 'natural wastage' of 1.515 at Devonport and 360 at
Rosyth, the rate of redundancies outstripped the net reduction in the workforce (HC391, 1993: 11).
When the number of redundancies and 'natural wastage' are combined, 6,813 jobs were lost at
Devonport and 1,405 at Rosyth.
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Table 5.9: Employment and redundancy, 1987 to 1991
Ros\th Devonport
Numbers at April 1987 5,800 11,460
Numbers at March 1991 5.146 5,510
Net numbers of jobs lost 654 5,949
Total redundancies 1.045 5.298
Redundancies as % of 1987 18% 47%
"Natural wastage1 360 1,515
Source: Commercial managers, HC 23, 1992:11
By 1991 the workforce had declined modestly in aggregate terms to around 88 per cent of its
Vesting Day size. The underlying trend was for about one in five industrial jobs to be lost
while the number of non-industrial jobs grew by some six per cent. The numerical weight of
non-industrials within the core workforce thus increased from just over one in four of all
workers to one in three. After 1991 absolute white collar numbers declined by around one-
sixth although their numerical weight relative to industrials improved to around two out of
every five core jobs. Manual workers bore the brunt of restructuring. So while total core
numbers fell precipitously between 1991 and 1995 to nearly half (57%) 1987 levels,
industrials were the worst affected, at well under half 1987 strength, while non-industrials
retained over 80 per cent.
Two groups of industrial workers fared worst: apprentices and non-craft workers. By 1995
the total number of apprentices being trained was around one quarter of Vesting Day
numbers, while non-craft workers were down to about one-third. Craft workers overall
retained around two-thirds of 1987 numbers with around four craft for every one non-craft in
1995 compared to around three to two in 1987. Greater concentrations and a much lower
reproduction rate for craft workers mean a more gradual, managed decline as the programme
ofwork tapers off after 2002. Fabrication trades show the weakest attrition rate. Trades, such




From the outset new managers were brought in to Rosyth by Babcock to develop more
commercial practices, such as project, contract, financial and quality management. Industrial
engineering and production managers were also brought in to introduce modern industrial
methods. However, for the day-to-day business of refitting ships, few new managers were
introduced. A major clear out of dockyard management was impracticable. Existing dockyard
expertise blended with more general, commercial practices. Dockyard management would
change but only gradually. As more traditional dockyard managers began to be replaced or
became subordinate to newer, 'all-round' managers their verdict could be scathing.
Table 5, KkComposition of Industrial workforce, 1987 to 1995
1987 1991 1995
Craft
Mechanical 635 543 343
Fabrication 599 581 385
Electrical 473 374 266
Minor trades 390 365 210
Apprentices 595 317 155
Titular and others 110 110 149
Craft total (Minus apps) 2,207 1,973 1,508
Non-craft 1,361 1,062 413
Industrial total 4,163 3,352 1,921
Source: RRD
Table 5.11 :Minor trades: 1987 to 1995
1987 1991 1995
Minor trades
Coppersmith 112 97 66
Joiner 82 82 60
Painter 89 100 44
Plumber 59 48 27
Coachbuilder - - 8
Sailmaker 8 11 2
Patternmaker 8 4 2
Bricklayer 9 6 -
Sheetmetalworker 1 1 -
Upholsterer 11 7 -
Founder 11 9 1
Total 390 365 210
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Source: RRD
Table 5.12:Fabrication trades: 1987 to 1995
1987 1991 1995
Shipwright 348 329 228
Welder 67 89 58
Boilermaker 75 54 46
ICRDB14 86 76 34
Blacksmith 23 23 12
Fabricator - 10 7
Total 599 571 385
Source: RRD
There are not too many older guys left now. All that experience has been lost. Younger
guys with degrees come in on two year contracts and big ideas. For them jobs are just
numbers to be processed and they have no particular knowledge of how jobs are done so
long as it can be deleted from their spreadsheet. The Industrial Engineer, for example,
spent two days last week designing a leaflet to let people know that the new car park is
now open. Things like this go on because the overhead men are better thought of than
people at the sharp end of production.
(Supervisor)
Nevertheless, generalist managers with no particular knowledge of refitting processes began to
shape work organisation. Central to this has been an attempt to simulate market conditions
within the dockyard. Formerly integrated Divisions set up as 'stand-alone' businesses. This
meant that centralised functions such as Design and Industrial Engineering were to be 'bought
in' as required.
Very soon I'm going to be a 'stand alone' company and I'm going to have to get somebody
to do these things for me. This means that I have to set up a trading agreement or set up
some form of arrangement between me and all these different groups of people, whether
they be in the dockyard or outwith it to furnish my requirements ... Babcock Rosyth
Fabricators have their own accounting set-up ... The Design Division still play a major role
in the supply of drawings for any manufactured items. As a stand alone company, I deem
myself as just another sub-contractor. Ship comes in, ships wants work done, they are
going to go to a number of sub-contractors, I'm one of them.
(Fabrication manager)
14 ICRDB stands for the already integrated 'black' trade of Ironworkers, Caulkers, Drillers, Riveters,
and Burners.
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Yet "stand alone' autonomy was largely illusory since Divisions remained substantially
dependent on Babcock for money and fixed capital and the MOD for work. Bargaining with
the Board for resources continued, with even the internal use of space and plant subject to
agreement. With these restrictions an important area for increased Divisional Manager
autonomy was the ability to augment the supply of labour power through external sources.
It is often said that, particularly over the last two years, it is too easy to bring labour in
here now. Simply because when people want labour, they want it yesterday, and we can
phone up an agency whenever and have them in within a couple of hours or certainly
tomorrow morning. If a Division comes to me and says, 'look, I want 20 shipwrights in on
Monday', we might throw them a few questions back and say 'well, are you really going to
need 20?' But, by and large, if they say 20 they will get 20 because it is up to the
Divisional Manager to justify his costing for that 20. It is not our task. If I was going to
make any judgements on that I would need to know all the details about the Division. I am
not in the business to know all the details. That is the Divisional Manager's responsibility.
So before he comes, he knows that he has got to justify the costs himself before he bids.
(Planning manager)
Greater financial control was expected. Increased autonomy over operational decisions for
Divisional Managers was coupled with increased upward financial accountability. 'Everybody
is now a budget driver ... on a budget you have a certain amount of cash and you've got to
account for it". As part of the incentive pricing regime payment milestones guided
management judgements, particularly about when to add on extra labour or whether to sub¬
contract work.
Everything is geared towards payment milestones. If its cheaper to get a job done outside
or buy it then they do it. There is less work coming off the refits because they are done
less thoroughly. Only obviously damaged parts get repaired not whole systems. Now jobs
get fitted in according to the priority to meet payment milestones.
(Fabrication manager)
Individual rewards improved for senior managers. No longer pegged to public sector pay,
Divisional Managers were generously remunerated for their contribution to profitability in a
radically revised individual pay and benefits review system. Personal rewards, financial
accountability and payment milestones conspired to install a new ethos based on cash and
undermine the hold of the service ethos. Meritorious promotions deepened under BTL but, for
some, ineffable qualities of the service ethos seemed to get lost. Work relations appeared to
become more instrumental under commercial management:
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[IJn this company it does not take you too long to determine who is ex-Civil Service and
who is not. There is a sense of service and responsibility and affinity that you don't really
get now. I could be more cruel and say that ... a good number of those people who have
come in are just more interested in what they are getting in their pay packet at the end of
the week or the end of the month or whatever. Now it is clearly not true to say that people




The re-organisation of the Mechanical and Electrical Division (MED) sheds some light on the
internal restructuring of work. The Director of Manufacturing accepted proposals to
'rationalise space and facilities' with machine, mechanical assembly and fabrication functions
concentrated in single major areas (Profile, February 1989). MED was split initially into two
operational groups, the Mechanical factory and the Electrical shop in 1988. Mainly
mechanical fitters, turners, electricians and electrical fitters refurbished and manufactured a
wide range of electro-mechanical equipment, such as valves, pumps, compressors, diesel
generators, electrical motors, control systems and pipework systems. The main tasks involved
stripping, cleaning, inspection, diagnosis, repair, modification, assembly, machining, testing
and commissioning. Such a range of functions were needed for the iarge numbers of items
which passed through MED from ships under refit. For example, in December 1988 alone 750
jobs were completed by the mechanical factory for the refit of HMS Renown. Plant and
equipment in MED was reorganised after review and the layout of the shops altered to
improve the through-flow of work. Obsolete machine tools were removed from the machine
shop, which was basically a quick-turn-round jobbing shop supporting the mechanical factory,
manufacturing few large-batch items, except on orders for the MOD's Stock Manufacture and
Repair programme.
With thousands of individual jobs passing through MED a major activity was monitoring. In
order to conform to quality standards set by BS5750, which replaced the MOD's own AQAP1
system, a reliable check on the status of any job should be possible. A computer-based Shop
Floor Control System, (SFCS), was installed in MED to allow transparent real-time
information regarding the location, status and incurred cost of any single item of equipment.
But this elaborate technological fix has difficulty in coping with the small scale, quick turn
around nature of jobbing. Instead, it appeared to one supervisor as a vehicle for aspirational
junior managers.
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The big thing is the Shop Floor Control System. SFCS. This was going to solve all the
problems. Younger, ambitious t\pes were promoted to develop and implement SCFS. But
they never got the right system for our needs. SFCS can do miracles but it is too
sophisticated for the things we need it for. which is basically a question of job traceability.
It spews out reports and processes chunks of data. But when it comes to a rush job it takes
too long to feed all the information in so SFCS gets by-passed in order to get the job done.
As a system it is a misfit because it does not marry up to what is used in the rest of the
dockyard. The dockyard does not plan jobs as a single process.
Instead of jobs passing through the individual sections of MED. informally at the discretion of
the supervisor, control was now posited with the producers of documentation and monitoring
systems. This has led senior managers to believe that the actual time taken on jobs correspond
to the time recorded on their spreadsheets.
We don't con anybody. In the past figures were forged, a fifty hour job might get done in
twenty, this is a hundred hour job but it takes you five hundred, and you cover the hours
and you shuffle them all around. We don't do that any more. If its forty hours and you've
got fifty hours you book forty, if this takes twenty hours and you've got one hour you book
twenty. We now have more accurate data for packages ofwork.
(Fabrication manager)
Supervisors, instead of controlling the flow of work through their sections, are now supposed
to be controlled by SFCS and BS5750. However, because supervisors circumvent the system
what actually gets done, when and by whom can remain opaque. As one said, 'All the talk is
about 'continuous improvement' but mostly its just common sense, like when they moved the
drill sharpening machine closer to the drilling machines itself.' Spreadsheets give the illusion
of rationality and traceability; supervision is a rather more messy affair, which still relies as
much on tacit knowledge as on formal procedures.
Numerical flexibility. BTL's labour market policy
The other major trend in the four years after 1991 involved an increasing use of both short-
term industrial and non-industrial workers. Evidence shows that two forms of flexibilisation,
numerical and functional, emerged at Rosyth in the 1990s which did not exist previously, or
only on the fringes. A further form, specialised sub-contracting, always existed before for
particular jobs, such as electronic systems or nuclear-related technologies. Most tertiary
functions became subject to sub-contractorisation. This section will focus on the two key
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shifts: first, numerical flexibility employing a second periphery and a more limited functional
flexibilisation of the 'core' workforce.
According to Table 5.13, between 1991 and 1995 peripheral industrial workers grew tenfold
while non-industrials grew nearly fivefold.15 On taking up the contract to manage Rosyth.
BTL assured the workforce that it had no intention of adopting a dual labour market. Instead
of numerical flexibility based on external labour markets BTL wanted internal functional
flexibility. In this way it hoped to enrol workforce commitment to a long term 'high trust'
strategy. As one study put it, BTL 'consciously rejected the adoption of a short-term strategy
relying on numerical flexibility to fine-tune labour costs to workloads' (Gennard and Kelly,
1991: 88). Yet the same study reported that in fact numerical flexibility was already well-
established: 'Numerical flexibility initiatives have involved the use of short-term contracts and
sub-contractors to cater for short-term peaks' (ibid.: 83). However, this was more than simply
a response to short-term workload fluctuations but a conscious strategy entered into with the
customer organisation for reducing labour costs. As Chief of Fleet Support said, 'We set
capacity in our negotiations with [the commercial managers] well below the peak loads that
we foresee, specifically to encourage efficiency, not least by sub-contracting and the use of
casual labour* (HC 391, 1993: Q68).
For dockyard planners numerical flexibility is simply a function of fluctuating workload. As
one put it:
A Ministry programme always conspires to give you peaks and troughs. It is not a
chocolate factory ... production line where you get a straight line workload or even a
straight line increasing workload or decreasing workload. It is all over the bloody place. It
is like looking at a set of mountains on the horizon. It is up and down.
Instead of shadowing peaks, however, the permanent labour force is kept at a level below the
troughs. Traditional levels of dockyard slack and under-employment are replaced by a tight,
'just-in-time' labour supply.
15 All the tables derived from data supplied by RRD take only a single week for the financial year to
indicate the changes between 1987 and 1995. They are not averages for the year and therefore cannot
be taken as entirely representative. As random weeks they may over- or under-estimate the figures
for the year. Nevertheless, with this important qualification some sense of quantitative shifts in the
workforce can be ascertained. For 1987 the second week in April has been given, for 1991 the final
week in March 1991, and for 1995, November 1995, the week when the data was compiled, is given.
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What the Ministry did in those days, was that they generally kept the w orkforce that met. if
not the top of your peaks, pretty w ell up there. Whereas nowadays, the name of the game is
to keep your permanent workforce at a level just below your troughs. Then you top up w ith
temps and agencies
A Rosyth worker who worked for Babcock at Renfrew in the 1970s recognised what he
thought was a consistent approach.
What Babcock are doing at Rosyth is nothing new. They want to reduce the workforce to a
skeleton staff, to the bone, and then rebuild it exactly how they want it. Babcock
introduced temporary workers at Renfrew around 1973/74. But once they came in it
couldn't be reversed. This was true after a three month strike in 1975 against temps failed.
At Rosyth no similar industrial action occurred.
In 1987 considerable use was already being made of non-industrial temporary labour, largely
related to the setting up of new management structures in the transition to commercial
management. By 1995 the use of short term labour had become a routine part of the
management repertoire for 'growing' the workforce during peak workload periods. This was
particularly the case for industrials. The presence of industrial 'casuals" was negligible in the
past; by the mid-nineties 'casuals' accounted for one in five industrial workers. The Resource
Management team attempted to optimise the allocation of direct labour against the planned
divisional workload by making a 12 week forecast of labour needs and making actual
allocations four weeks ahead of work starting. Labour allocation was often subject to last
minute revision because of changing workload levels or types of work and so required a
sophisticated system for matching available skills to particular functional requirements. A
computer database information held information on specialisms and qualifications of the
manual workers enabling quicker and more accurate decisions on labour allocation. By the
late 1980s 2,000 industrial workers were covered by this instrument. The Resource Manager
saw his role in these terms
The constant aim is to maximise the use of existing resources within the Dockyard and
this frequently involves discussion with the trades unions to agree flexibilities. The last
step is to bring in casual or sub-contract labour. We also try to minimise the number of
moves people have to make in order to build team spirit and identity, but there is room for
much improvement in this respect, (quoted in Profile, February 1989)
In the early 1990s the labour function was further displaced from BTL's direct organisation.
Agencies specialising in supplying labour for short-term contracts mushroomed around
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Rosyth. giving management an additional instrument for numerical flexibility to match
changing workload patterns.
You can imagine that labour is always migrating from one area to the next area ... If.
[say], Ships Division require additional people then it is up to the Resource Manager to
get additional people. They can do that in [three basic] ways. [First], you can do that by
trawling within the dockyard to see if there is any spare capacity elsewhere and placing
them in Ships Division. If there is no spare capacity elsewhere we will go outside and
bring in either, [second], temps or, [third], agency staff.
(Planning manager)
Table 5.13: Core and periphery for industrial and non-industrial workers, 1987-95
1987 1991 1995
Core
Industrials 4163 3352 1921
Non-industrials 1629 1733 1362
Total 5792 5085 3283
Periphery
Industrials 53 42 425
Non-industrials 200 47 234
Total 253 89 659
Total industrials 4216 3394 2346
Total non-industrials 1829 1780 1596
Total 6045 5174 3942
Source: RRD
Note: core are defined as 'permanent' staff, periphery is defined as 'temps/agency'.
This difference between temps/casuals and agencies marked a significant step in offloading the
responsibility for reproducing labour to private organisations as distinct from internal control.
On the one hand, temps work short-term, defined contracts, supplied through Babcock's own
list of mainly ex-dockyard workers or through lists maintained for the dockyard by local Job
Centres. Agencies are independent firms trading in labour power.
[Temps] are short-term casual employees. ... that would come from the Labour Exchange
or Job Centre and would come on the company payroll and they would end up getting the
same rate of pay as company employees. The alternative is to go to agencies because there
are a lot of agencies that have sprung up over the last three years. I think they have
always been in business but they have increasingly grown over the last three years. They
supply the 'body shoppers'... They are very competitive as well so most of our external




the whole range of skills from high class electrical people to support workers, non-craft
labourers. There are companies nowadays that will supply you with anything you want.
Equally, their task is made a bit easier because since Vesting Day we have come from
approximately 6.000 bodies to ... 3.400 ... So a lot of the labour that we have is brought
in externally is ex-dockyard labour in any case, guys that have gone out on severance over
the piece.
(Planning manager)
However, the same manager was blunt about the pros and cons of large scale use of labour
only agencies:
With agencies we let other people make the investment. There is a harder-edge to these
companies. But whenever you start to let a culture of 'just get the job done kind of thing1
with a more relaxed approach to safety, then that has a habit of creeping across into other
areas as other dockyard managers see them getting away. For shotblasting and activities
associated with hazardous materials the neighbourhood workers also get caught in it.
Both macro and micro level planning functions became subtler and more precise. Investment
in IT enabled the co-ordination ofwork programmes, docking programmes and the forecasting
of the individual labour skills throughout the dockyard to be centralised. The Resource
Manager drew attention to the detailed information available through the reporting structures,
even down to the skills and knowledge of individual workers. The key is to fully use
permanent labour before bringing in peripheral workers:
We make sure that the utilisation [of labour] is as high as it possibly can be. Take week
38, for example. Out of 219 we have one spare shipwright but five temps are in. So on
Monday past one of those temps should have gone out to give us 100 percent utilisation of
shipwrights. And so on mechanicals, there is twelve available from Subs and Ships. But
there is three temps and two agencies in Weapons and Electrical Division. They've been
on a specific project for some time and have built up expertise. In theory, we want to get
rid of them and replace them with five from the twelve to increase the utilisation. But it's
not practicable to do that. So we've ended up with twelve mechanicals spare this week.
Electricals there's two [spare] but there's eleven temps and five agencies in there. So there
is sixteen casual people in there at the moment. Eleven painters who were spare are on
sub-contract work at VSEL. So we've taken steps to utilise them ... making money for us.
Three plumbers spare, ... one coppersmith spare, one temp and five agencies ... joiners:
balanced ... support workers: twelve available ... Those people will be utilised ... they
won't all be sitting around on their arse ... So we have high utilisation rates ... For
production week 38, we actually have 28 spare people but a shortfall of 149 others ...
We've got four shipwrights short, thirteen electricals, 52 welders short, 30 ICDRBs.
Whilst we've got 28 spare we've had to bring in 150 other types. You never strike a
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perfect balance. But nevertheless, of the permanent employees that's a good utilisation
rate.
(Planning manager)
This relied on a deepening centralisation and rationalisation of planning to minimise and
control for uncertainty. Planning became programme specific rather than discipline specific.
You have got to make sure you can berth the vessels and that there is a good interface
between the programme [ofwork] and what is possible in terms of docking interfaces. We
also do a lot of work in terms of forecasting the individual labour skills required
throughout the dockyard. So we draw a programme up to start with and then from that
programme we will draw up a corresponding workload programme, and from that
programme we will determine what sort of skills we require. That has become quite
difficult as well because [its] part of the process of developing in a commercial way. It
used to be nice and easy because we used to bring a vessel in and there was all different
cost centres. Each cost centre applied to a trade so there was a technical cost centre on a
frigate, there was an electrical cost centre, there was a welders' [cost centre], and on it
went.
(Planning manager)
Until the early 1990s the trade unions would attempt, often successfully, to have 'casuals'
made permanent if their 'temporary' employment lasted longer than some specified period,
usually six months. In this phase 'casuals' would typically be ex-dockyard workers either
contacted directly or through the Dunfermline Job Centre and offered an immediate start for a
specified time period. In the second phase employment agencies would be engaged to supply
specific kinds of labour for particular projects. Again the agencies which sprung up around
the dockyard would mainly have ex-dockyard workers on their books. 'Casuals' would often
be on the lists of more than one agency to stand a better chance of even short-term
employment. In the first half of the 1990s the use of peripheral labour markets threatened to
turn into a deluge on some ship refits. On a ship like RFA Sir Bedivere, undergoing an
innovatory ship length extension process, 'casuals' were reputed to form the greater part of
the labour. One interviewee recalled 'casuals' from Tyneside sleeping in a van to save on
accommodation expenses.
With most casuals and agency workers former dockyard workers returning for a brief period
to operate machinery they may have once considered their own can be a harrowing experience
With temporary contracts there is constant uncertainty. You are in Timboland' with the
letters issued on a week to week basis. But after three years unemployment I enjoyed
131
working again and the company of the men and. of course, the money. But you're working
with people who are going to be doing the same job next week when you're gone. I just try
to keep occupied with the immediate job in hand although its hard to see other people




To illustrate some of the issues surrounding functional flexibility the case of the fabrication
trades will be considered. This was viewed as a major breakthrough for overcoming trade
demarcations across the yard. The fabrication trades union, GMB, agreed to reduce trade
demarcations within the Fabrication and Outfitting Division (F&O). An 'Integration of Trades
Agreement for Fabrication and Outfitting' (ITAFO), signed on 12 November 1990, allowed
the introduction of 'composite group working'. Composite groups were to be composed of
Shipwrights, ICRDBs, Smiths, Boilermakers, Welders and Machinists under the direction of a
single supervisor. As the company newspaper put it, 'Each member of the composite group
will primarily work on his [sic] own trade but will receive training to develop additional skills
to allow greater flexibility within the group. The Agreement ensures that there will be no loss
to trade identity but allows for composite group members to have a primary skill backed-up
by a secondary skill' {Profile, No 21, November 1990). The ITAFO was viewed as a
necessary stage in overcoming three related difficulties in the Fabrication areas: first, the F&O
division faced a gradual decline in traditional MOD work; second, it was not competitive in
commercial markets; and third, the skilled workforce were spread over a large area. In 1989
only five per cent of F&O work was commercial but this had risen to 25 per cent a year later
and was expected to increase further to offset declining MOD work. The F&O Manager
argued, 'Our competitors had an edge because of their superior facilities and their technology
but this is a problem which is now being addressed through a substantial investment
programme. With improved facilities and cost effective space utilisation the opportunity exists
to achieve higher productivity and become more competitive' {Profile, No 21, November
1990).
Ten main advantages of the ITAFO were listed,
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Integration Benefits To Company and Employees




• Improved Job Satisfaction
Flexible Response To Load Fluctuations
Less Job Tedium
Improved Job Security
Reduction in Rigid Demarcations
Opportunity for Growth
{Profile, No 21, November 1990)
Even though they would perform additional tasks, the unions emphasised 'improved job
security" under the ITAFO. The number of shipwrights, for instance, was planned to rise from
70 to 160 in the F&O Division. Central to the union's view of the ITAFO was that training
would take place. With previous integration agreements for particular projects the unions
complained that 'real' training had never taken place. With the ITAFO training began almost
immediately.16 The way that the agreement was reached was seen as indicative of co-operative
industrial relations style, in some ways more important than the final agreement itself.
'Participation', 'involvement' and what the GMB convener called 'goodwill and a true 'Working
Together' spirit on both sides' made the ITAFO possible. The ITAFO came about when in
February 1990 a move to rationalise space within F&O Division led on to early discussions
about group working. After examining the use of group working by other companies in the
UK and abroad, in March and April a series of consultation meetings were held to gather
information about how to improve productivity. Such a 'sedate' approach to the negotiating
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process was deemed necessary because of the potential for inter-trade disputes which could
emerge from a hastily constructed agreement.
The GMB had previous experience of failed integration.
The first agreement was in the Small Boat Unit and was designed to go to a seperate
business unit to gain lots more work. Great plans were designed for it. It would be a
model for the country. There was a 'working together' relationship already in the area. We
had shipwrights for the wooden boat-building, we had two mechanical fitters and
electricians and a few labourers. They generally worked together anyway but obviously
the dominant trade was the shipwright. They wanted to bring lots more people, trebling
the size of the Small Boat Unit from about 16 to about 50. That was the first real
integration agreement in the dockyard. Unfortunately it proved a total disaster and shut.
(GMB convener)
When it came to integration in the F&O Division GMB shop stewards based in the workshops
were initially given the freedom to negotiate 'responsibly'. After a few months of little
progress the GMB convener intervened and discovered that shop stewards wanted to control
every work detail instead of reaching a broader understanding. After the Small Boats fiasco
the key issue for the GMB convener was training and en-skilling not detailed control of tools
and processes.
1 have to say that after months and months after getting nowhere, I went to the meeting,
asked management to give a presentation on how far they had got. They virtually had
every nut and bolt designated, which meant that there were going to be huge amounts of
grey areas and huge amounts of disputes. Integration means the integration of skills and if
we were going to do that we only needed a general agreement outlining the training
commitment and a fine-tuning meeting every couple ofmonths or every quarter.
The convener balanced between worker demands to retain detailed trade controls and
management demands for more sweeping relaxations, with promises of training. By the mid-
1990s training still seemed elusive, with management reluctant to commit resources. As a
senior steward put it:
ITAFO failed because of a lack of training and co-ordination and the realisation that you
need specialisation in some parts of the Bay. The move to a more general integration still
lacks the commitment to training. People still think in terms of their trades. But the threat
of sub-contractors is changing this a bit. The main problem is that management cannot
16 Machinists and ICRDBs went on a two-week marking-off, assembly and sheet metal appreciation
course, shipwrights and machinists trained in grinding and machine burning and welders spent two
days on grinding.
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manage. Once the easier demarcations are overcome it is difficult to see very much further
room for a genuine overlap between trades
Despite this, more scope existed for integration in the workshops than afloat, where
specialised skills are needed for various systems and sub-systems fitted into ships. Even so.
afloat workers became subject to limited flexibilisation. A new system, "zone management",
dedicated specific parts of the ship to mixed-trade work gangs under a single supervisor. This
was designed to allow a more flexible use of afloat workers. Supervisory grades became
responsible for a particular 'zone' of the ship and lost their single trade identification.
We have introduced what is called zone management ... You now have a 'zone forward' a
'zone aft' and a 'mid-zone' site. And each of these zones carry a line supervisor and the line
supervisor has got a number of functional people [sic] under him. So instead of an
electrical supervisor having an electrical squad, you could have an electrical supervisor
having a squad ofmixed skills now.
(Production manager)
In consuming labour more flexibly, however, zone management creates still other problems.
Tautness on labour use depends on the effectiveness of monitoring, recording and planning
systems. Zone management, instead, increases the indeterminacy of labour power for senior
managers since it relies more on discretionary personal, intuitive decision-making at the point
of production and less on remote bureaucratic forms.
Now [zone management] leads supposedly to greater efficiency but it causes havoc in
other directions, in terms of accountability and in forecasting terms. How do you forecast
for the next two years in terms of the number of sparks you require or shipwrights or
whatever?
(Planner)
This also has implications for the so-called 'efficiency dilemma", which more sophisticated
communications cannot disguise. Squeezed between functional and numerical flexibilities
labour can become more indifferent to the nature of work. As one 'casual' put it,
People don't seem to care about the place now. The mood is vastly different. There is a
perpetual cloud in the middle of summer. The workforce are more alienated, the joviality of
the past is gone.
(Temporary boilermaker)
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Even the planners are aware of the demoralising effect of marketising work: "You can only
sub-contract work for so long until your whole fabric breaks down and end up in the shit".
Formerly comfortable white collar positions were also aware of the stakes involved. With
temporary workers moving in and out of jobs continuity and accountability diminishes.
Peripheral labour represents labour market vulnerability and forms a protective cushion for
permanent workers facing lay-offs with peripheral workers released before compulsory
redundancies can be called.
Through severances, through Babcock bringing in people from the west, who know nothing
about dockyards, putting them in charge of sections, etc., the continuity is not there. Also
the safety factor is not as good as it used to be because they now employ a lot of
contractors. The Drawing Office was hit. When I made a move seven years ago I was
replaced by the first contractor in the Drawing Office. That was the first time I had even
thought of any contractors coming in to do drawing work. But since then it has been quite
frightening the numbers coming in. As the permanent staff have gone out on severance the
numbers of contractor staff have built up. The contractor staff have been coming from the
other yards. I'm working now with a variety of people. In my own section its something
like five staff and five contractors. It's about equal.
(Draughtsman)
While claims for improved 'efficiency' are difficult to justify, changes have been made in the
nature of the employment relation. On the one hand, within production workers are expected
to repeatedly prove versatility and, on the other, a sense of labour market vulnerability has
been made proximate. The main point about restructuring in this case has been the various
ways in which labour has been made more pliable. Yet, Babcock have not yet gone on the
offensive to dictate a radically different employment relation, at least so far as core workers
are concerned. For some, the 'Company has played it safe by, one, enlightened employer
practices and, two, buying time, rising pay rates, etc. with everything offset by the MOD.'
Senior managers at Babcock admit that the nature of restructuring has been modest.
There has always been an observation made that we had not been radical enough pursuing
change. I think we have got a good reputation for the amount of new work we brought in,
the commercial work, and for the fact that our sites appear from the outside to be well
managed. And they have been well managed. The one thing we are criticised for is that we
have not been radical enough.




Dockyard unions and commercial management:
Honeymoon and recrimination
From the levels ofmilitancy shown in the years 1984 to 1986. dockyard unrest quickly subsided as
the local dependency on centralised leadership and lobby politics was re-asserted in the latter
phases of the campaign. This return to workplace normalcy prepared the way for a three year
'honeymoon period' after the new commercial managers took over in April 1987. Initially, pay
levels were improved, a new Code of Behaviour for employees introduced, a new industrial
relations organisation and bargaining machinery was created. A general mutuality developed
between the new managers and the trade union conveners. Clearly, a modified service ethos was
being reconstructed here, albeit on the basis of the 'risks and rewards' of'competitive markets'. The
decentralisation of bargaining also diminished the power ofWhitleyism as a set of rigid, routinised
bureaucratic reflexes at once preserving and limiting labour's organisational capacities. New-
organisational capacities for labour around the twin poles of bargaining independence and a
corporate responsibility to make the dockyard efficient and competitive were in the process of
creation. Lobby politics was held in abeyance since key bargaining matters were being decided
locally for the first time, although lobby politics would be resurrected with a vengeance for the
campaign to refit the Trident submarines at Rosyth between 1991 and 1993.
Not only were organisational capacities reshaped but leading individual actors from both
management and unions were replaced in the process. In the first few years there was a rapid
turnover of full-time shop stewards and conveners. Some found a place as union negotiators in the
new structures, many of the longest-serving union conveners elected for voluntary redundancy in
the first year, while some of the shop stewards most active during the anti-privatisation unrest were
promoted to staff BTL's new industrial relations organisation. Thus the unions lost the carriers of
the old organisational capacities and, to a lesser extent, the potential carriers of new forms. Around
a numerically smaller layer of conveners who became active in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and
thus less encumbered by the old organisational order, BTL attempted to 'professionalise' industrial
relations around emerging capacities of mutuality and strong, independent but responsible
bargaining. This enhanced role for local union conveners met with little resistance as opponents
became marginalised; more usually it was positively embraced.
This chapter will deal with the way in which the four year 'honeymoon' between BTL and the
dockyard unions was created and how it turned sour in the early 1990s as a more aggressive
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management style emerged. Since BTL have been the subject of academic praise for their employee
relations here it will be suggested that a unique set of conditions, operating for four years after
1987. enabled BTL to come to a modus vivendi based on secure profits, little risk and a perceived
union threat. After 1991. with the death of the main architect of the modus vivendi. a perceived risk
to profits and seemingly pliable trade unions, attempts to hasten the restructuring process relied on
more traditional management ploys. Employment relations at Rosyth will be considered against
recent academic studies in the final chapter.
Workplace relations
Industrial relations was identified as the key area by Babcock on assuming management of the
dockyard and has since been repeatedly identified as a management strength. A by-product of the
anti-privatisation campaign was that Babcock and the MOD took workplace unionism seriously at
Rosyth. If the unions lost on the fact of commercial management they were able to present a
potentially disruptive threat.
[The campaign] certainly told the people who were coming in, Babcock, that we weren't going
to be just walked all over. I think it was made clear that this group of people were fairly well
organised, had a pretty good campaign, could get high profile in the papers, on the television,
there was lots of support. Anybody coming who thought that they were just going to come in
and do this, this and this, knew full well that that was never going to be acceptable to the people
here because we bumped our gums a lot. By being as loud, as vociferous, as pushy, as
aggressive as we were what we did was we told them that 'OK you can come in but you are not
going to shove us around. You can maybe shove us a wee bit. But when we come to negotiate
we come in with people standing behind us. Its not just me and the three people at this table. I
represent people who have been prepared to walk up the road. When we come to negotiate I'm
talking from a position of strength'.
(Boilermaker shop steward)
Recognising this early, Babcock cultivated union conveners before they entered the dockyard in
1987, at a time when the union campaign against commercial management was still continuing.
BTL struck a conciliatory tone in issuing an amnesty on conduct and setting out a simple
disciplinary procedure in a colourful Code of Behavior booklet.
They employed the right people to calm everyone down and say, 'we're not this bad bunch that
you've been told we are 'We are a good bunch. Here have a pay rise'. They did that straight off.
And people started saying 'well, they are not such a bunch of bad guys'. They went through our
conditions ofworking, put in a new set-up, negotiated it, put their little booklets out and they'll
give you the yellow card and the red card. It looked as if this was great, you know. It was
almost as if, 'do you want a box of chocolates boys? we won't have any drinking anymore.
There's been an accident'. They came across as your big brother and they made a good start.
But you can't kid them all all of the time and guys were convinced that it wasn't all sweetness
and light. And it hasn't been all sweetness and light that's for sure.
(Boilermaker shop steward)
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BTL worked hard to communicate their 'working together" message to a sceptical workforce. Early
company statements were littered with team metaphors.
The company at that time had a particular style. They wanted to change things, they wanted a
'working together'. There was a couple of cliche phrases used but they were the ones used all the
time: 'mutual trust' and 'cooperative action'. These are easy words to use. especially the trust
one, but you've really got to deliver on trust. Abuse it once and you will have a hell of a lot of
other instances to make up for it.
(Industrial relations manager)
A new Industrial Relations team was created in 1987. Managers with wide experience of unions in
an engineering environment were introduced, complemented by a long serving dockyard Industrial
Relations Manager. After a whole series of interviews, including psychometric testing, a team of
six Industrial Relations Officers, IROs. were appointed, including an ex-AUEW convener, two ex-
EETPU shop stewards and an ex-IPMS representative. Initially, IROs were based in specific areas
of the dockyard and worked in pairs, consisting of an ex-union IRO and a manager, 'to integrate
ourselves into the various areas, to make ourselves known, what we could do, what we could help
on'. IROs could draw on their own background to communicate sympathy and understanding in
helping managers make the transition from status-ridden, command structures of the Civil Service
to the more egalitarian sounding mutuality of commercial management.
I had also been a manager so I could say to people 'look, I've been through all that, or I know
what you mean by that but you've got to then understand here's what we're saying to them,
here's what we're talking about. You don't just say get it done because I'm telling you, because
the management say so, its because we're working together'. There was a certain style coming
from the Industrial Relations Director right away that it wasn't all about sacking people and
going up the road, it was about building a future together. It was easy enough to build on that.
(Industrial relations manager)
Personal relations between shop stewards and managers further helped cement the new mutuality.
One IRO said, 'I knew most of the conveners and shop stewards ... and the IRM was very good
with the conveners because he took time to explain what the new industrial relations was all about.
They saw the procedure as something they could live by or work to". One way of doing this was
the amnesty on previous conduct and offering employment to the workers dismissed during the
Lamont incident. Still some over-zealous managers had to be restrained: 'You had to impose a
certain discipline on first line supervisors and managers that they couldn't think back to the Black
Book which some managers kept'.
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However, the attempt to "professionalise" personnel issues under 1RO leadership, now called
Human Resource Management, has instead created what some conveners see as a new layer of
experts who have taken away any discretion from local management.
Because the IR organisation have taken control, I can count on the one hand the times that local
managers actually control a hearing, the vast majority of hearings in this dockyard are
controlled by Industrial Relations. They are meant to be there as independent and mutual
assessors of the situation to help both management and the trade union side. They actually run
the hearings and the manager sits there like a little lost boy, not making decisions at all.
(Union convener)
Pay
The first real test for the new arrangements came in 1988 with the first pay deal negotiated locally.
Pay 88 rationalised the pay structure, eliminated allowances, simplified gradings and raised basic
pay. In return, unions agreed to work more efficiently. Union conveners recommended acceptance
of the package but workers in the main craft unions voted against it, since many of the allowances
were related to specialised craft-based jobs. On the pretext of minor changes to the offer a second
vote was held, which only the AEEU and Shipwrights rejected. As one Manager admitted
it just scraped through by the skin of its teeth on the back of the non-craft side, on the back of
the Transport and General Workers. The craft unions felt that they were being used to a large
degree by the block power of the Transport and General Workers. There is no denying that we
knew what we were doing on that one. Pay structure had to be simplified and we had to get rid
of the allowances. The supervisor wasn't getting freed-up to do the IR part of his job because he
was that busy filling in forms and busy handling complaints about who was getting what
allowances and who wasn't. There was a recognition that we had to get away from that and the
money was put up front, it was £5 then it came up to £6 and £6.50 per week was what we
settled on to buy that particular part out.
For conveners of craft unions Pay 88 was difficult to sell because it attempted to simplify a
complicated Civil Service pay arrangement that had taken decades to evolve. As one convener said,
But the biggest mistake management made was making it a book. And it was a book. It was
huge and very difficult. There was something bad in it for everybody; whatever passage you
went to, some people liked that but didn't like the next thing. There was a lot in it to please
people but one little item might have made it a no vote. It was a very difficult thing to put over.
I remember starting off [addressing the mass meeting] and thinking 'I'm going to be here for
three hours'. The paperwork that went out there must have cost a fortune. I don't think there
was bad in it for anybody apart from people who getting allowances.
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After losing the first vote the conveners fell back onto the National Officials, who they thought
they had just won independence from to negotiate directly. Their credibility with management and
with their members hung in the balance.
We got guidance from our National Officers whether to put in a 'failure to agree" which would
have went to Stage 5 to be dealt with by local officers and then if there was another vote no it
would go to the national officers and obviously industrial action. We were a bit worried
ourselves that it could be seen as going back and having another vote just to get it through
because it fell by a few votes. 1 think it was under 100, around 86. The trade unions believed
and still do that it was one of the best deals that we negotiated. It was big. The national officers
said that if there was any change we should go back because if you don't you haven't
completed the procedure. I got slammed at my meeting. I obviously had to do what the
majority view [of conveners] was. I think my view at the time was to 'fail to agree' but I
accepted the majority decision to go back [to the members]. There were some tense people
there, they were a bit uptight and didn't really know what to do about it so they got advice from
the people they knew could give them proper advice and that was it and it scraped through.
(Union convener)
With the abolition of allowances like Dangerous Employment many workers were reluctant to
work in dangerous conditions or at heights.
What they done for a considerable period after that was: 'I'm not going up there. You'll need to
scaffold that'. People done jobs in certain positions that they wouldn't have done if they weren't
getting the height money. Although I wouldn't say that they would do things that was totally
unsafe, they maybe done things that they would refuse to do when their Dangerous Employment
money got taken from them.
(Maintenance worker)
If the weight of the TGWU was used to push Pay 88 through on the strength of improved wages
for its members in the short term, longer term they were thought to be storing up trouble. A senior
Industrial Relations manager pointed out,
over the years we've tried to bring back a difference because as the non-craft continued to close
the gap on the craft they would price themselves out of a job. That's where we've got to now.
We are paying over the odds. When we do wage surveys and we look at the fitter at Swan
Hunters or Yarrows and the fitter at Marconi or Ferranti, there is a nearness to it, perhaps the
Rosyth boys are a wee bit up or a wee bit lower. But when you look at the non-craft, we were
out of the park. We tried to take that back to the conveners and create a difference. But the
conveners never wanted to do it because they didn't want to say that they were better than the
T&G, they couldn't come to terms with it although they felt it in their heart of hearts. But that
was never listened to, try as we could. We slipped in a wee bit of a difference in Pay 93 but it
was minor differences. Since then we've stuck to the wage rate so that if its a 2.6 [percent rise]
its almost to what it was back in 1988.
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Union reasons for resisting a widening of the craft/non-craft differentials are to try to retain unity
but at the same time recognising that the labour market operates to widen differentials. Once the
law of the labour market is accepted to determine who works for what rate under-qualified workers
suffer first. According to a craft convener,
we've managed to curtail management attempts to produce any further differentials between
craft and non-craft, i.e. where craft get 5 per cent and non-craft get 2 per cent. Now they have
attempted it on a number of occasions and certain craft unions would have been quite happy.
One of the problems is that policy [of equal percentage rises] ensured that the T&G were going
to lose lots of people. Obviously if they keep going along that line they become too dear. They
were, and I won't say well-paid because I don't think that's the right thing to say, but they were
better paid than most firms across the country for what they did. Some of the grades were
getting more than craftsmen in other shipbuilding yards. The fundamental thing is that when
there is a surplus workforce out there that could operate under either sub-contracting or on an
agency basis, which meant they were going to get them at fairly cheap rates. You can see people
in industry getting £2 or £1.50 an hour, in here they were on £5/£5.50 an hour. So while all
unions have suffered they have suffered tremendous losses, about a thousand over eight or nine
years, which is a big price to pay for higher then average wages in the industry. They knew that,
they had opportunities to get less but the politics of it was going to be very difficult. They
haven't lost anybody from compulsory redundancies, it was all voluntary, but some of the areas
have been 'forced' voluntary, if you know what I mean. They didn't see any future for
themselves so even if they didn't want to they left.
For managers this is simply an inevitable consequence of the general nature of non-craft duties,
On the non-craft-side we were always doomed. We were over-manned, there was always too
many labourers at hand. The shipwright when he was doing his lagging for his structural
material or his ventilation system he would dump the [lagging] at the back of him and there was
a squad of labourers there to pick it up. There was nothing wrong with the shipwright, as you
do at home with the painting and decorating, you put the scrap paper in the bucket. Therefore
you could reduce the number [of labourers] and become more effective.
Pay claims gradually became more 'professionalised', or at least the form they took did with the
unions doing detailed research on comparative wage rates. Before even arriving at the claim itself it
has already been subject to informal dialogue. In 1995, management let it be known that they
wanted a 'wage deferment', as part of an exercise to hold down costs in preparation for the sale of
dockyard assets. Instead of a wage increase an ex gratia payment was offered. After holding out
for months, reluctantly the unions accepted the lump sum payment.
Non-industrial unions are seen by management as continuing to be too close to Civil Service
attitudes in defending terms and conditions. A manager noted the difference with more pragmatic
industrial unions,
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At the start it was IPMS. the Civil Service union. It would have been better if we had got into
bed with a staff union that w as used to dealing with industry at large rather than just the Civil
Service environment because they still stuck to the Civil Service in the IPMS. And we suffered
from that because it has not totally broken that linkage from the past. We still have problems
with IPMS members or IPMS senior officials. I am thinking in terms of the old dockyard and
the Civil Service. A lot of the conditions that people enjoyed, like pensions and redundancy
rights, are still linked to the Civil Service and they may want to keep that protection.
Clearly, 'working together" in industry differs from 'working together" in the Civil Service. The
1995 wage freeze was rejected by non-industrial workers to begin with, who began an overtime
ban, although the offer was reluctantly accepted five months later.
The dispute we had with staff recently I think gives a clue that we were looking to mark time
and not give an annual increase. So we are improving our competitive performance, that is
assuming that our competitors are not doing the same thing. And that was something the staff
found very hard to swallow because they had been used to inflationary rises every year in the
Civil Service inflation-proof environment. So that was a difficult wage negotiation this year
and we really stood up to them. I mean OK it was really quite difficult but I think it is a sign of
the times to come.
(Senior manager)
Unlike industrial union officials, Civil Service union officials failed to communicate the severity of
management's dilemma
On the industrial side we had to get the national officials in to help us secure the deal. On the
staff side we had the national official up and he did not say it formally outside, but he said it to
us and his own people, that he felt that the deal that management had offered was the best they
could get and yet he still would not go along with it. Yet this year we had from the staff side a
bit of a division and if the national official had been prepared to stand up out there and say 'this
is the best deal you can get' we might not have had a rejection of our first offer.
(Senior manager)
Relations after 1991
The honeymoon with BTL lasted until 1991 when there seemed to be a fundamental change in the
yard management. The Senior Personnel Director died and left a vacuum between the unions and
senior management. This was filled by the then Chair of the Pension Trustees. Goodwill between
unions and management was rapidly eroded and a green light given for a more command and
discipline approach. As a craft convener put it, the new Personnel Director,
basically sort of delegated his job to all the rest of the managers across the yard, giving them
free-range. And in they went where before they hadn't. All the nasties, all the wish lists and
everything started to come out. What we had up until then, unevenly, was the fact of a general
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[consensus]. We never actually ever gone out of the dockyard. Everything was solved
internally. On a collective issue it was always done within the dockyard. There was a certain
amount of. if you like, realism, no not realism, what is the word I am trying to get at. a certain
amount of acceptance from the members that if we w ent to them w ith a recommendation that
would generally be acceptable. There might have been a few moans, there was always
grumbling internally. But that's been destroyed.
The new, harsher management attitude mistook union pragmatism and cooperation for a sign of
weakness. A split ensued on the convener's committee over management imposing changes to the
tea break and an opportunity to resist management by command through industrial action was lost.
Workplace conveners lost further credibility over wage bargaining. After being told that profits
were well down and that several payment milestones had slipped causing cash flow problems the
unions agreed to a six month pay freeze. Initially, the conveners were worried how the members
might take such a request.
I can remember the meeting very well. We were very jittery that it might cause all sorts of
problems. We had the mass meetings and the membership responded, to what was a crisis,
magnificently. Ninety-eight per cent of people voted yes. And then the company shit on them.
To all intents and purposes this was no lie by the company. They were hemorrhaging, profits
were less than they said and obviously you need companies to make profits to take money off
them to get pay rises: you can't get a pay rise if you're making a loss. We had a position of
trust between our members and us and, more importantly, between the membership and the
company. From then on it went steadily down hill where it was seen by the members that the
company were out to screw them for every fucking penny they could.
Dockyard workers were told that the freeze was a one-off emergency and that there would be an
'equality of sacrifice'. Management, according to a convener,
started to do all sorts of silly things. They tried to get through impossible things like cutting
overtime rates and cutting the dayshift [rate] out, all sorts of things like that. The next year
[after the pay freeze] the Managing Director, of course, got £68,000, a £68,000 bonus the next
year. They tried to give us an ex gratia payment instead of a good pay increase after what we
done the previous year for them. They've destroyed basically the trust the workforce had in the
Babcock management and they lost the confidence of the local conveners.
Not only did the conveners lose face with the members but, with the help of management, the old
dependency on national officials returned to haunt them.
A classic example came this year [1995] when general pay movements across yards in Britain
were less than 3 per cent and we managed to get a 3.2 per cent increase with no strings
attached. Rejected by the membership, eventually carried by national officers. Not 3.2, they
got 3.4%. But you're talking about pennies. The previous year they had not given the
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conveners the maximum, they gave it to national officers. And the membership aren't daft, they
saw that. We said to them this year. 'You better make sure you don't do that to us again. You
better make sure that you offer us the vast majority of the money. If you want local
negotiations then that's the way you've got to do it'. They not only increased the offer for
national officers, they also increased it for local officers. It showed in the vote. The first vote
was 40 against. The second vote, for the increase from 3.2 to 3.4, was something like 300 for.
If somebody can work out why a 3.2 with no strings got 40 against and the 3.4 offer got 300
for, if you can tell me the logic of that. fine. My view was they didn't believe the conveners
when they said that there wasn't any more [money] and they were proved right. They didn't
believe the local officers. When it went to national level they put [the date for the annual rise]
back to 27 May [from June], a small move but nonetheless an improvement. This is 95, it
happened in 94, same as 93.
The conveners standing with their own members was badly undermined.
And from that day on we've never got a pay deal through. We've had pay deals but as
conveners we've never got a pay deal through. And its never been carried through by the local
officers either. Its always been national officers. Its actually gone back full circle to the STJC
if you like.
A tension exists as Babcock prepare to run employment levels down in future years. Babcock
bought the assets of the dockyard from the MOD in 1997, in a deal negotiated with MOD which
gave Babcock public funding to buy-out the relatively generous redundancy terms of dockyard
workers in return for a one-off payment. As guaranteed naval work tapers away and becomes open
increasingly to competitive tender employment relations will be put under further strain. Workplace
unionism is intact at Rosyth and has limited the scope of the restructuring process thus far.
However, local disunity and national interference present major hurdles for local trade unionists in
resisting a renewed management offensive and restoring credibility in the eyes of their
constituencies as the ultimate arbiters of workplace-based bargaining. The final chapters try to





In the forty years after World War Two. the defence electronics company, Ferranti. grew to
become one of the most important firms in Scotland. From inauspicious beginnings, the
Scottish Group became central to the fortunes of the whole Ferranti group in terms of profits
and turnover, while in Scotland the group became the biggest manufacturing employer and
was one of the few firms operating at the leading edge of a number of technologies. Ferranti
managers also became part and parcel of Scotland's institutional set up, playing influential
roles in the main industrial and policy bodies. The account outlined here charts the rise of
Ferranti in Scotland as closely bound up with its successful entry and ongoing presence in
defence electronics markets. In many ways this is unusual. Most defence electronics
companies are concentrated in a few core areas in the south and west of England, close to
government research centres (Saxenian, 1989; Hall et al, 1987). At the outset, the nature of
defence electronics as a special field of activity will be established.
Electronics is central to any state with pretensions of military power. But while civil
electronics has dispersed production globally and lowered unit costs, military electronics
retains a national character as a technological capability deemed strategic to state power. This
is part of the necessary background for understanding Ferranti's development in Scotland over
the past fifty years. Ferranti's arrival and post-war survival in Scotland is in some ways an
exceptional development in Britain's defence electronics industry. Two main themes can be
detected - unceasing expansion and intermittent crises. The crisis of the 1970s had two
significant outcomes: government bail-out and the rise ofwhite collar trade unionism. Here the
peculiar character of the Ferranti firm as a family business run by engineers in an age
dominated by the rise of the professional manager and the separation of ownership from
control is important. Some discussion will be offered of one classic account of this from the
early 1960s, Burns and Stalker, who also made a Ferranti case study central to their analysis.
Finally, an account will be given of the Conservative government's transfer of Ferranti back
into private hands in 1980, which may have been the last hurrah for the Scottish institutions'
ability to mobilise to protect Ferranti's operations in Scotland.
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Ferranti in Scotland
Burns and Stalker's (1961:58) study of the industrial uses of science in peacetime paints a
picture of less stable market conditions than is generally found in later accounts of Cold War
arms production. Undertaken following the 1957 defence cuts, the study found that 'mature'
electronics firms were beset by a range of anxieties brought on by the vicissitudes of military
demands. The difficulties firms faced can be listed thus: apprehension about the future volume
of government development contracts; relatively low profit margins on development contracts;
uncertainty over the eventual allocation of production contracts; the problems caused by
discontinuities in personnel at the defence ministries; the suspicion of unwarranted
technological elaboration by technical officers to justify their positions; a noticeable decline in
technical expertise in the military research establishments (MRJEs); and, in a familiar refrain,
technical ideas were 'virtually sterile' for generating commercial applications. Against this, all
the firms in their study had a 'good deal' of government work, although some claimed that this
was 'a form of insurance against a shutdown which a 'national emergency' might otherwise
force on them'. Government work also attracted good engineers. An additional factor for
taking on defence orders was that technological innovation might become a source of new
products should the main civil markets become too unstable, threatening future growth.
It is within this uncertain post-war situation that the exceptional role of Ferranti in surviving
as an advanced military electronics firm in Scotland needs to be considered. To grasp just how
disadvantaged Edinburgh was as a site for high level military electronics a good starting point
is Hall et al's (1987) study of the cumulative advantages of place for the Western Crescent,
spreading out from Greater London, Cambridge and Bristol, where virtually the entire post¬
war industry became clustered. The main advantages favouring the Western Crescent were:
first, 'locational displacement', involving the outward movement of an existing high tech sector
in London spawning new firm formation; second, proximity to publicly-organised research, in
particular the defence research establishments; third, the importance of intense socio-cultural,
face-to-face contacts in the defence procurement process, for electronics what Saxenian
(1989: 460-1) called the 'cosy boys' of the exclusive 'CVD club'1; fourthly, the agglomeration
economies created by indigenous national processes which attracted and, in turn, sustained
1
Dickson, (1983) outlines the 'sycophantic' nature of relations between a small number ofmilitary
eletronic firms, including GEC and Ferranti,the MREs and the Departmental body set up to support
R&D in electronics for military reasons. This body, CVD, 'Drectorate - Components, Valves and
Devices', dominated the direction of electronic R&D in the UK for much of the post-war period to
the neglect of civil commercial electronics.
147
high level multinational activities; fifth, national transport policies, especially, the
establishment of Heathrow airport in the 1940s, the M4 London-South Wales motorway in the
1960s, and the first Inter-City railway line on this route in the 1970s, taken in combination
had favourable unintended outcomes; sixth, land use planning, in the combination of fostering
growth through strategic planning and the rural restraint of green belt planning, paradoxically
had the benignly perverse effect of attracting incoming high-level labour and firms. In
summary, the location of high tech activities in the western Corridor was the uncoordinated
result of a complex of factors, underpinned by unique public policy decisions both in terms of
the physical infrastructure and the knowledge superstructure, with its pivot in the MREs.
Ferranti in Edinburgh had none of these mutually reinforcing locational prerequisites for
concentrated high tech activity which so favoured the M4 Corridor; indeed the absence of
these factors is what makes Ferranti's case so exceptional.
Wartime roots of Ferranti in Scotland
In 1942 the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) approached the Ferranti Instrument
Department at Hollinwood with proposals to finalise the design, improve the mechanical
construction and prepare drawings with the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Famborough in
the final development of new gyroscopic gun sights (GGSs). The 13,000 workers and the
existing Ferranti capacity in Lancashire were already fully occupied on war work. In light of
the capacity problem, the Works Manager of the Instrument Department, Eric Grundy, had
decided that Edinburgh, with its availability of workers, space and relative safety from aerial
attack, would make a suitable location.2
After an aborted attempt to occupy a Ministry of Supply building at the former Portobello
skating rink, and a period when dance halls, garages and boot factories were briefly
considered, Sir Stafford Cripps at MAP gave permission for a new factory dedicated to GGS
production to be built. John Toothill, who had been appointed Manager of the Edinburgh
project, laid out the plans for a building at Crewe Toll on Ferry Road, including workshops,
offices and canteens. Building work and labour recruitment both started in February 1943.
From being a greenfield site, a factory consisting of 100,000 square feet was opened after
only eighteen weeks, at a cost £111,000, and delivered the first four Mk.II GGSs in December
2
Although Tootliill claims that it was MAP who advocated a move to Scotland (in Burns and
Stalker, 1961:53).
148
(Ferranti. 1993:5). Toothill (in Burns and Stalker. 1961:53) described how the labour force
for Edinburgh was assembled:
Technical staff, production engineers, and foremen who had experience of this small and
intricate type of production were transferred from our parent factories in Lancashire, 40
men were taken from the Ministry of Labour Training Centres and sent down to
Lancashire for two months' training as machine setters, the rest of the labour, up to a
peak of approximately 1.000 people, was recruited locally.
Employment at Crewe Toll rose from 110 in June 1943, 740 in June 1944 to 950 in December
1944, and 9,594 GGSs were manufactured, at a value of £.75 million. With the end of the war
large scale demand for GGSs dried up. The problem for Ferranti was that there was no pre¬
war product to which it could return to manufacturing. As Toothill put it: 'We had built up a
good works organisation on fairly accurate instrument production. We had a small design staff
and too highly specialised-we were a body with a tiny head and we had no future unless we
could design equipment for which there was a demand' (in Burns and Stalker, 1961:54).
The 1950s: a remote military electronics firm
The immediate post-war objective for Toothil! was to keep Ferranti viable in Edinburgh. This
required first of all, to secure a commitment to Edinburgh from the company, second, to find
work from somewhere, and, crucially, to grow a 'design head' appropriate to the 'production
body'. Sir Vincent de Ferranti agreed to retain the Edinburgh factory on the condition that it
paid its own way and efforts were made to break into what was seen as a potentially
expanding electronics market. In the immediate post-war years between 1945 and 1949, a
diverse range of work was taken on, including the manufacture of cooker switches, broken
thread recorders for the textile industry, X-ray medical equipment, surgical knives, a sea swell
recorder, transformers for deaf aids and in collaboration with Enid Blyton, a 'Mini Cine1 slide
projector for children. Toothill later claimed that the attempt to base production on such a
diverse range of products 'proved a big mistake' (in Burns and Stalker, 1961:54).
At the same time, the first steps were taken to create a design team for electronic devices,
recruiting a senior engineer from Manchester and setting up in 1947 a laboratory to take over
Ferranti's radar interests. This was further enhanced by the transfer to Edinburgh of company
physicists working on specialised radio valves. By 1948 the workforce in Edinburgh totalled
538, with 187 engaged in R&D, 221 in production and 175 in purchasing, administration and
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maintenance, a reflection of how far the 'head' had grown, with serious research being done
into microwave components and radar magnetrons and klystrons.
Where spatial distance from the Military Research Establishments (MREs) and the Western
Crescent might have prevented Ferranti in Edinburgh from developing close collaboration with
government engineers and designers, Ferranti needed to create its own knowledge
superstructure. The formation of a design 'head' closely followed the method used for setting-
up the wartime production 'body' - appropriate kinds of labour were configured in Edinburgh
by simply importing them. Toothill adopted a policy of what might be called 'knowledge
substitution' and simply attracted key technologists to Ferranti's Scottish base as the means of
overcoming remote location disadvantages. Such personnel had the twin benefits of continuing
to be part of an extended technological community and privy to 'insider' special knowledge
about other engineers, departmental politics, innovations and projects, and also helped to
generate an alternative centre of design activity, mentoring a new community in a seemingly
remote and technologically barren location.
The first real breakthrough in getting work for Edinburgh came in 1949 when Ferranti, in
collaboration with Sir Robert Watson-Watt, were awarded a £500,000 development contract
for 1,000 MHz Distance Measuring Equipment for the new de Havilland Comet civil airliner.
This award put Edinburgh at the cutting edge of a new technology, albeit for the civil aviation
market, and was made possible because of the existence of the radar team in Edinburgh which
had been formed from the nucleus of engineers recruited from the MREs.
Yet the main focus of Ferranti's strategy was for a major return to defence production.
Ferranti had continued small scale production of GGSs after the war and in 1949 recruited
Mallinson Powley from the Royal Aircraft Establishment, who had been deeply involved in
the study and development of the GGS MkV, now being produced in Edinburgh. It was also
becoming evident that the instruments and electronics in miliatry aviation were increasing in
complexity because of the performance demands on jet aircraft and that military markets were
on the verge of expansion. Ferranti made a conscious effort to position themselves as a
strategic part of the emerging military-industrial complex. In Toothill's words:
We decided therefore to take on a nucleus of engineers from the Government
establishments in order that we should have a sound knowledge of operational problems,
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and so that we could educate our existing and new design staff. We wanted to be in a
position to take on a defence problem from the initial requirements through flight trial
stages to final production, instead of only engineering and production (in Bums and
Stalker. 1961:54).
The intention was clearly to resist becoming a production branch plant pure and simple and to
take on the attributes of a horizontally integrated firm covering a comprehensive range of
functions from conception to execution. The Ferranti management hoped to become
technologically indispensable to the Services. The advent of the Cold War and the build up to
the Korean war apparently signalled the correctness of this as a growth path. Although GGS
remained Ferranti's core product they were moving into a range of technologically advanced
areas, involving both naval and air technologies. By the early 1950s, Ferranti was designing
and manufacturing ten per cent of total government demand for electronic valves and, at the
prompting of the Admiralty, opened a valve research and design facility at Granton and a
factory at Dundee for production. The Admiralty was also responsible for involving the Radar
Division at Crewe Toll in designing and building the ship-bome radar. Type 963, code-named
Notorious, one of the biggest radar projects that the company was associated with. Even this
was eclipsed when the US Navy ordered radar equipment to the value of $4 million in 1954/5.
What proved critical to the maintenance of the Ferranti set-up in Scotland, however, was the
role of the post-war institutional apparatus, at both the UK and Scottish levels. In 1948, the
Scottish Council, in consultation with Toothill, approached the Ministry of Supply to make a
case for establishing an electronics research centre in Scotland. This was a break with the pre¬
war and even wartime location of high level activities and fitted the policy climate perfectly.
As one report noted: 'At no time did the Council encounter entrenched opposition at the
Ministry to their suggestion. The obstacle facing them was rather inertia or that the Ministry
officials had never thought about establishing a new electronics research centre anywhere else
than fairly far south in England' {Scotsman, 12 October 1954). The MoS agreed to fund a new
80,000 square feet laboratory opposite the existing factory at Crewe Toll. The same article
had high hopes for the new scheme when the new lab opened in 1954. Under the banner
headline:
FERRANTI LABORATORYWILL BE THE BASE OF A MAJOR INDUSTRY
A triumph for the Scottish Council
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the article breathlessly announced: 'As it proceeds it will grow into one of the greatest co¬
operative ventures seen in Scotland with Government Departments. Scottish firms,
universities, and technical colleges as the main partners working together to found a major
new industry which will give scope to more Scottish scientists and engineers to work in their
native land instead of having to seek careers elsewhere'. This became the Scottish Council's
Electronics Scheme and put Ferranti firmly at the centre of the industrial and political network
in Scotland.
Ferranti created its own physical infrastructure, through a perpetual process of expansion in
Scotland. The company now had two aircraft based at Turnhouse on loan from the Ministry of
Supply which uniquely allowed it to set up the Trials and Installation Division (TID) to flight
test equipment under development. Permanent facilities were opened in 1956, to allow the
servicing of the fleet, which had grown to nine aircraft. The Ferranti Flying Unit (FFU) at
Turnhouse provided important knowledge about the design, development and production of
major airborne systems. As well as product innovation, Ferranti also made inroads in process
innovation partly as a result of limits on the availability of existing space. Improved
production techniques and the development of Ferranti's own computer-controlled machine
tools reduced manufacturing times, with Ferranti claiming that production at Crewe Toll rose
by 40 per cent between 1952 and 1953 (Ferranti, 1993:13-15).
A project like the Airborne Interceptor Radar and Pilot Attack Sight System (AIRPASS). or
A123, illustrates the comprehensive in-house philosophy of Ferranti. The radar design team
were at work on the project before the aircraft had even been named (Lightning) in 1953. the
development work was undertaken at Crewe Toll during 1955, the advanced prototype was
fitted into the nose of Dakota used for flight testing at the FFUs hangar at Turnhouse the same
year, the production contract was allocated to Ferranti in 1957, and AIRPASS finally entered
RAF service in the Lightning in 1960.
By the early 1950s Toothill's strategy had clearly begun to pay dividends, as an ever-
expanding Ferranti assumed the position of one of the most important firms in Scotland. This
significance was not only technological but also in terms of employment and in its political
standing. By 1952, it had a turnover of more than £2 million, was the largest employer in the
electrical industry in Scotland, with a clear bias towards technical labour, and was the second
biggest industrial employer in Edinburgh (Ferranti, 1993:13). In ten years, Ferranti had gone
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from just over 500 workers in Scotland in 1948 to 3.200 in 1959. with the workforce doubling
between 1947 and 1949. again between 1949 and 1951. during the Korean war rearmament,
and virtually doubled again between 1957 and 1961. as Table 7.1 indicates. The sites at
Crewe Toll. Dundee, Granton and the FFU base at Turnhouse were added to by the opening of
facilities at Muirhouse, which included a Film and Printing Unit as part of TID. and an after-
sales Services Department, which included a training school for customers and the publishing
of technical manuals. A 17,400 feet extension to the MoS lab was commissioned in 1958.
This was one of the first buildings in Britain designed with fully air-conditioned, humidity and
temperature controlled clean rooms and anti-vibration facilities, to meet the new levels of
precision and fine tolerances in manufacturing technically-exacting products like the new
inertial guidance systems. Ferranti also expanded its apprentice training organisation, based in
three former Edinburgh Corporation schools, which was divided into Craft, Technician and
Student grades of apprentice and further subdivided into mechanical and electrical disciplines.
By any account Ferranti's growth as a leading defence electronics firm, located in a
technologically peripheral region, is striking. As in-service equipment became proven, Ferranti
acquired a formidable technical reputation and the ten years of expansion in the 1950s seemed
set to continue for the foreseeable future. Even its 'civil' projects seemed to be following an
upward trajectory. In 1961 insufficient space existed for the expanding production of
numerically controlled machinery and a 70,000 square feet factory was built at Dalkeith,
twelve miles outside Edinburgh.
The 1960s: Profit scandals and cancellations
Continuing expansion and the growing range of activities, however, masked certain underlying
difficulties for a medium-sized company in a peripheral region trying to remain at the cutting
edge of military electronics. Two projects in particular illustrate different aspects of the
problems in keeping faith with defence electronics, the radar for TSR-2 and the Bloodhound
guided missile.
Ferranti undertook considerable development work on a target illumination radar in the mid-
1950s. As Indigo Corkscrew or Type 86, this radar was designed for integration into
Bloodhound, which was being developed by the parent company in co-operation with Bristol
Aircraft Ltd. In 1961 further orders for Bloodhound were announced from Sweden, worth £17
million, and Switzerland, worth £25 million, and at the AGM that year Sir Vincent de Ferranti
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'paid tribute to the ingenuity and effort of the scientists and technicians involved in the
development of this complex weapons system1 (The Guardian. 1964: Ferranti. 1993:24).
While the system may have been technically 'ingenious', the same could also be said for
Ferranti's ability for profit-making. When the scale of Ferranti's profits from the Bloodhound
contract emerged they were accused of being 'excessive' and scandalised the defence
procurement process.
Interestingly, the charge of excessive profits did not arise from the system of cost plus
contracting, widely held to have 'feather-bedded' the arms industry throughout the Cold War.
While cost plus operated for the development part of the contract, for production fixed price
contracts were introduced to ensure efficient performance in executing the work and that the
contractor would carry all the risks (Kennedy, 1983:173). In fixed price contracts all the costs
are agreed, including a profit margin based on a percentage of the capital employed-usually
7.5 per cent-with an extra margin if risk and efficiency issues are involved. The assumption
here is that knowledge of the full costs of production is shared by both sides before production
actually occurs. Firms involved in fixed price orders attempt to 'beat the contract' either
through increased productivity beyond Ministry expectations, thus saving on labour and
overhead costs, or by getting Ministry inspectors to accept artificially inflated cost figures in
the original drawing up of the contract.
In the case of Bloodhound, an agreed profit of £810,353 on an £8.5 million contract had been
negotiated with the Ministry of Aviation after a team of Ministry technical cost officers had
spent over 1,000 man hours estimating the labour component of the contract. In the event
Ferranti made £5,772,964, a return of at least 82 per cent on capital employed (Fay, 1964b;
The Guardian, 1964). After an investigation, the Lang Committee found that:
... the firm knew when it quoted and agreed prices that unless extremely grave difficulties
occurred later in production these prices would yield a profit of the order of that
eventually secured, and, by its silence, it misled the Ministry into thinking that the price
containedprovision for only a fair and reasonable profit (although not necessarily 7 per
cent on cost), (quoted in The Guardian, 1964, my emphasis).
Sebastian de Ferranti complained that the company had not been given credit for 'the
undoubted efficiency with which we performed these Bloodhound contracts' (in The Guardian,
1964) and Basil complained, 'If there were more Ferrantis around the country there would be a
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few more missiles delivered on time [sic] which also had export potential' (in Fay. 1964a).
Ferranti eventually offered to repay £4.250.000 in return for a government promise that it
would not be discriminated against for future defence contracts.
The concern about future orders was well placed. Another source of anxiety for military
electronics, and aerospace industries in general, was that the trend towards the increasing
capital-intensity of modem warfare was accompanied by exorbitant cost inflation of
equipment. It was hoped that one way for a medium-sized state like Britain to afford to stay in
the technological arms race was to have weapons equipment perform more than one role. The
idea of multi-role weapons particularly applied to aircraft, which suffered both from acute
cost inflation and rapid technological obsolescence. Yet this solution masked a general
problem with multi-role aircraft, indeed with any multi-purpose machine, as Smith (1980:133)
points out: 'they tend to do each task less efficiently than aircraft specialised for that task'.
In the aftermath of the 1957 Sandys defence cuts, it seemed to make financial and operational
sense to develop a replacement plane which could combine the roles of the Valiant bomber and
the Canberra fighter bomber (Hastings, 1966). The TSR-2 strike and reconnaissance aircraft
was to combine an ability to fly at high speeds and high altitudes for long range missions east
of Suez and to fly at low speeds and low altitudes for the European theatre. In response, the
British aircraft industry was transformed from a large number of small to medium companies
to a handful of larger manufacturers through a series of major mergers in anticipation of the
expected benefits of co-ordination and economies of scale for military projects. In 1946 there
had been 23 airframe companies and nine major aeroengine firms; by the 1970 there were six
airframe and one aeroengine companies (Wood, 1975). Two main UK aircraft companies,
British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) and Hawker-Siddley, emerged out of this process of
centralisation as powerful and influential interests (Edgerton, 1991).
Work began on TSR-2 in 1959, but by 1962 the Treasury was already deeply concerned
about the escalating costs and slow progress; by 1964 the original estimate of the cost of
TSR-2 had tripled to £750 million and the project was at least two years behind schedule,
according to Denis Healey, then Labour Defence Minister (1989:273). Healey had inherited
the project from the previous Conservative administration and it had become the subject of
considerable political controversy (Law and Callon, 1992). The Labour Party had opposed
'prestige projects' such as Concorde and TSR-2 while in opposition and eventually cancelled it
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in 1965. Fifty replacement American FB-111A fighter bombers were ordered at £380 million
each. Healey claimed that the FB-111A would save the Chancellor £250 million over ten
years. These were also cancelled three years later and US Phantoms ordered instead.
Since virtually the entire UK aircraft industry had a stake in the project and knowing the fierce
nationalist anguish cancellation would cause, the Cabinet were hesitant about making a public
announcement. The decision was deferred from February until April, when it was 'smuggled
into the Chancellor's budget speech', at a further cost of £1 million a week for keeping
development work ongoing (Healey, 1989:273). Despite the accumulation of data from
successful test flights, the government ordered all aircraft on the line to be scrapped and the
tool jigs to be destroyed, which was soon followed by over 8,000 redundancies in the industry
(Gardner, 1981:113, 118).
Healey's figures were vigorously challenged by industry, who blamed Treasury opposition to
the project for the cancellation (Gardner, 1981:106-120). Cancellation resulted in the
inevitable cries of betrayal across the British defence industry (see Wood. 1975). For some
this was further evidence of British technological and industrial decline, coming after the
cancellation of Blue Steak missile project in 1960, the US Skybolt replacement in 1962, and
the recommendation by the government inquiry into the British aircraft industry, the Plowden
Report, the same year as the scrapping of TSR-2, recommending that advanced military
aircraft should be met directly from US sources. As one defender of the industry recently
argued,
This 1965 decision, which resulted in a furore of unprecedented proportions, has been
described as a massive blow struck at the British aircraft industry. But it was really a
coup de grace because the main damage had already been done in the nineteen fifties
(Sherwood, 1989:17).
Sherwood and Wood both blame the 'decision makers', politicians and civil servants, for the
spate of cancellations. Industry blamed Mountbatten for the fate of TSR-2, because he wanted
the RAF to share the costs of developing the Navy's Buccaneer (Gardner, 1981:106-7), while
Healey argues that the fault lay in British service structures:
The real tragedy is that the TSR-2 should never have been begun; it would have been
possible to develop the naval Buccaneer strike aircraft to meet the RAF's needs much
faster and at far less cost. But under conditions of internecine warfare which then ruled
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between the services, the RAF would never accept an aircraft originally designed for the
navy ... Indeed Admiral Sir Varyl Begg [Chief of Naval Staff], ... claimed that
Mountbatten had allowed the RAF to go ahead with the TSR2 only to compensate them
for losing the strategic deterrent to the navy 's Polaris submarines - a typical example of
'log-rolling' (1990:274).
Cancellation of TSR-2 dealt a serious blow to Ferranti's confidence and compounded the
uncertainty created by Bloodhound. Ferranti had expected to receive major production
contracts from the TSR-2 bomber and the PI 154 vertical take-off jet fighter, which was also
cancelled. Such was the severity of the loss, one estimate put 1000 jobs under threat - mainly
technologists and scientists - and raised fears of a 'brain drain' from Scotland (Evening News
and Dispatch 7 April 1965). Ferranti's plans for TSR-2 project were well advanced. Before
the Bloodhound scandal broke, Edinburgh had already designed a terrain-following radar for
TSR-2. Besides the radar, the Ferranti organisation had significant interests in TSR-2
including map displays, the airstream direction detector, the inertial navigation platform and
aircraft instruments. The radar underwent airborne trials by the FFU at Turnhouse and a
customised Environmental Test Laboratory was built at Silverknowes to enable 24-hour
reliability testing in realistic conditions. Around 80 per cent of TSR-2's electronics had been
developed by the time of cancellation and the flight trials of the radar yielded impressive
results about its capabilities. Indeed one interviewee, who worked on the forward looking
radar, suggests that as the last fully nationally developed aircraft, TSR-2 was 'too advanced
for its time'. After cancellation, a number of development projects were scaled down and the
FFU was 'particularly badly hit' (Ferranti, 1993:29).
Although the loss of TSR-2 work was a 'major blow' to Edinburgh, it was partly offset by the
procurement of electronic work for maintaining and modifying the 300 US Phantom bombers
bought for the RAF and the Navy. Ever sensitive to political, industrial and service pressure
about national prestige and capabilities, the Phantoms had to be 'Britishized'. The
appeasement of the military-industrial nexus was much to Healey's chagrin:
Unfortunately, the Cabinet's insistence on putting a British engine and avionics into the
Phantom fighter meant the each of these aircraft cost twice as much as it would have cost
ifwe had bought the American model off the shelf... (1990:272).
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The initial £1.75 million contract for the 'Britishization' of the Phantoms allowed Ferranti
some consolation after the TSR-2 blow to the Scottish Group and returned employment to an
'all square' position (Evening News and Dispatch 10 December 1965).
Business as usual
Who or whatever was to blame for the cancellation, the operational requirements which TSR-
2 was designed to meet continued to be pursued. This meant that the problem of matching
desired weapon capabilities to resources persisted. Even after the cancellation of the FB-111A
and the abandonment of the east of Suez policy in 1968. Britain remained attached to a multi-
role combat aircraft. The government knew that it could not afford such a project by itself but
Wilson had been stung by De Gaulle's charge that Britain were becoming a satellite of and
over-dependent on America technology after the TSR-2 cancellation (Wilson, 1974:129). The
solution lay in the formation of transnational alliances with other European states and
industries with a similar penchant for prestigious multi-role projects. BAC joined with
Dassault of France to develop the Anglo-French Variable Geometry multi-role aircraft until
Dassault withdrew in 1967. BAC persevered for another year but could not involve new
collaborators in the project. Fortunately for the aircraft industry in Britain, a multinational
multi-role combat aircraft. Tornado, was proposed following the setting-up of the European
Panavia consortium in 1969, comprising BAC of the UK, MBB ofWest Germany and Fiat of
Italy.
Table 7.1: Employment numbers for Ferranti Scotland, 1943 to 1965
1943 1945 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965
0 500 300 800 1500 1800 2100 2300 2800 4500 5200 5400
Source: Ferranti (1966:5)
As the military aircraft industry revived under the promise of Tornado, Ferranti recovered
strongly. The workforce had also grown by 500 to 5900 in the past year. As Table 7.1
indicates, since the low point of 1947 when employment numbers fell to 300, Ferranti's
workforce had doubled three times between 1947 and 1949, 1949 and 1951 and 1957 and
1961. Table 7.2 shows that Ferranti occupied 12 separate worksites. Yet even then Ferranti
were running out of space and people to sustain expansion. Ferranti's stress on technological
innovation is indicated by Table 7 .3, with more than one-third of total floorspace given over to
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R&D. Despite the cancellation of the TSR-2. at the annual Christmas luncheon in 1966
Toothill announced record orders of £26 million, enough work to last until 1969 even if no
other orders were won. The main problem. Toothill complained, was a lack of space and
skilled labour. 'To sum up the position. I would say that we have too much work, too little
space and too few people1 (Scotsman, 20 December 1966). Toothill claimed that Edinburgh
had to turn away £3 million worth of dollar exports during the year because of the lack of
skilled labour {Evening News and Dispatch 18 November 1966). A major problem was the
loss of skilled workers as new plants opened up in development areas. A large number of
toolmakers had left Ferranti, for instance, to work at BMC in Bathgate since it opened in 1961
{Scotsman 17 November 1966). In desperation, Ferranti offered to take on some of the 200
skilled and technical workers from a closing electronics factory in Hillington, but the problem
was one of getting housing for the workers. The following year the labour shortage continued,
with the firm estimating that four out of every five workers trained by Ferranti move to or get
poached by other firms or emigrate. Despite these problems, the firm still managed to recruit a
further 700 workers by the end of the year {Evening News and Dispatch 14 April 1967; 25
December 1967).
Table 7.3: Floor space use of Ferranti Scotland, 1966 (square feet)
Production 385,000




Table 7.4: Ferranti workforce composition according to occupation and sex, 1966
Qualified Scientists and Engineers 345
Draughtsmen 290
Skilled Males 1,263
Semi-skilled and Unskilled Males 1,503





Table 7.2: Sites and factory space occupied by Ferranti in Scotland in 1966
Site Year occupied Floorspace (square feet)
Crewe Toll
Original factor, 1943 216.282
Main Laboratory 1954 64.105
New Wing 1959 17,400
Silverknowes




Auxiliary premises 1961 12.042
Dundee 1952 51,715
Edinburgh research lab 1953 24,516
Turnhouse
Flight trials 1956 98.963
Environmental Test 1951 7,187
Alnwickhill Radar site no date 4,778
Apprentice Training
Dean School no date 9,851
Couper St School no date 7,589
Muirhouse Mansion 1957 8,805
Craigroyston House no date 9,369
Total 692,595
Sources: Ferranti (1966:2-4); Ferranti (1993).
By 1968 Ferranti had become the biggest single employer in Scotland, with a workforce of
6,600 and a turnover of £16 million, although this dropped to 5,300 workers and an order
book of £23 million in 1972 (Ferranti, 1993:34, 38). As Table 7.4 shows women comprised
around one quarter of the workforce at this time, the second biggest category if production and
clerical activities are collapsed together. Only qualified scientists and engineers and
apprentices are not denoted by gender, although it is reasonable to assume that since these
categories did not need to be gendered, women were unrepresented in them. Job definitions
also obscured heavily gendered occupations. For instance, one woman who worked at Ferranti
in the mid-1960s recalls that while tele-printer operators were women computer operators
were always men, even though the actual skills employed in feeding in information were quite
similar in nature (Interview). An article appearing in the local newspaper (Evening News, 22
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October 1969) on women workers in the clean room at Robertson Avenue gives some idea of
the position of women w orkers in the late 1960s. Ferranti was view ed as one of the best paid
local workplaces for women workers. No special qualifications were required for entry,
although the women must be between 16 and 45 years old and have a 'light touch'. The
supervisor. Joan McCue. commented, 'We find people who have worked with hair or flowers
are very good at this type of job'. The basis of the work was soldering intricate components.
The women sat an aptitude test, which was followed by a six week training and probationary
period. The training course started every seven weeks, indicating the constant recruitment (and
turnover) of female labour. Concentrated in routine activities, women had few avenues of
promotion. They could become trainee leading hands and, then, leading hands or supervisors,
in charge of the line. Yet this appears to have been as much a social and counselling role as a
command function. One leading hand, Madge Pae, explained her responsibilities, 'As a leading
hand I am approached by the girls with problems, whether personal or to do with work, and I
have to decide whether it is something I can deal with, or whether it should go to personnel or
the foreman. This makes life very interesting'. Thus the workforce was rigidly segregated by
sex according to the type of work and position in the command hierarchy. Only later would a
few women rise to the higher echelons of the hierarchy, and these cases would be mainly
restricted to the Personnel Department (Interview). The amount of service women
accumulated was also much less than men. Thus, in 1979 when the qualifying criterion for the
long service gold watch was reduced for men from forty to thirty years, bringing it into line
with women, only two women were among the 121 awards made that year (Evening News 18
April 1979). And this was in a workplace where service was a matter of pride and status,
made possible by over four decades of almost unbroken expansion and continuity of
employment.
The 1973 Christmas message from the General Manager, McCallum, announced that
employment had started growing again, with 300 taken on in the past year and that the order
book was 'bulging' with a 'very good spread of work' (Evening News 21 December 1973).
Multi-million pound export orders were even being received for the Bloodhound missile from
Libya, later cancelled, with a third of turnover accounted for by exports in 1972. New military
avionics projects, which were to become Ferranti mainstays in the future, were being
developed, including an airborne laser ranging device, Laser Ranger and Marked Target
Seeker, and display equipment, the Universal Head Down Display.
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All this activity was bolstered by the prospect of the substantial orders w hich were expected to
be generated for the proposed new European collaborative multi-role combat aircraft
(MRCA). Tornado. This was to be the largest military aircraft production programme since
1945. surpassing even Concorde in size and cost, with the avionics systems comprising some
thirty per cent of total costs (Evening News 10 March 1973). As the company history puts it .
The aircraft required a wide range of complex avionics and Ferranti's successes with
airborne equipment in the Lightning, Buccaneer, Harrier and Phantom placed the
company in a good position to bid for these systems. Radar, moving map displays, lasers
and inertial navigation systems were all required for this important and vast project
(Ferranti, 1993:38).
Expansion followed anticipation. Ferranti occupied the former McVitie & Price biscuit works,
a 300,000 square foot factory at Robertson Road in Edinburgh. This site housed around 1,000
people in the design, development and manufacture of specialised test equipment, the Service
Department and. later, the Electro-optics Division. Yet an editorial in the local newspaper
argued that compared with the 1200 jobs lost at Robertson Avenue due to United Biscuits'
rationalisation there would still be an overall jobs deficit of 200 for Edinburgh; the reason
Ferranti expanded within Edinburgh was because 'the firm did not find it easy to expand in the
development areas, which do not have the facilities and amenities for the scientists, engineers
and technicians involved' {Evening News and Dispatch 21 April 1967).
If the production orders for the MRCA were won it would guarantee employment continuity
for 1250 workers in Scotland. It thus came as a bitter disappointment when Ferranti lost out
on the bid for the radar for Tornado to Texas Instruments, despite the earlier innovative
development of the TSR-2 radar. Other bids for the inertial navigation system, the cockpit
displays, the airstream direction detector and the laser rangefinder were successful; taken
together this constituted a considerable package of work for the forseeable future. The dip in
employment between 1968 and 1970 in Table 7.5 can largely be attributed to the loss of
Tornado and mainly consisted of the non-replacement of leavers thus minimising
redundancies.
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Table 7.5: Employment numbers of Ferranti Scotland, 1966 to 1981
1966 1967 1968 1970 1972 [973 1979 1980 1981
5900 6600 6600 5200 5300 5600 6300 6800 7500
Sources: Newspaper files
Ferranti in Scotland was not totally dependent on Tornado, however, and had attempted to
diversify into civil markets. In the 1950s Ferranti had developed computer-controlled machine
tools and had been involved in the first transatlantic communications link-up using the satellite
Telestar in 1964 because of interest in Ferranti microwave communication technologies. The
following gives an indication of the range of other types ofmilitary and civil projects Ferranti
were working on in 1972 alone:
Major military projects were[:] the radars in the Lightning and Buccaneer, support for
the radar in the Phantom; INAS in the UK Phantom and harrier and in the US Marine
Corps AV8A Harrier; inertial guidance packages for the European space programme;
airborne and ground-based laser equipment and ISIS gun sights in Canadian and
Norwegian F5 aircraft.
Major civil equipments included[:] microwave communication links; power line fault and
overload detectors; inspection and measuring machines; precision potentiometers;
industrial lasers; microwave components; and small lightweight transformers. (Ferranti,
1993:40)
By broadening their product range, Ferranti wanted to avoid narrow specialisation in defence
electronics and the vulnerability to cancelled projects and political interference that this
entailed. However, the move to become a large, diversified company in Scotland was to prove
illusory and defence electronics was to remain the staple market at the core of Ferranti's
operations, despite innovatory developments in a number of civil technologies.
The 1970s: Financial crisis and bail-out
For a long time the private control of a leading electronics firm by the Ferranti family had
been viewed as an underlying weakness of the company and of the industry in general. At the
time of the Bloodhound scandal one commentator reported .
As Ferranti see it, the problem is how to finance expensive, nationally invaluable projects
[sic] and the long chancy wait before they pay off - 'We always have more ideas than
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cash'. The problem isn't unique: nearly everybody else in electronic capital goods shares
it. But the Ferranti family is marching in the vanguard of twentieth century engineering
with a financial structure fit for a nineteenth century ironmaster ... As Sir John Toothill
... remarks. 'We don't pay any dividends worth a damn'. The old family firm runs a
whopping overdraft and ploughs nearly all the profits right back into its precious home¬
grown projects. (Heller. 1964)
The family had long been derided for their high-handed, patrician disregard for the way that
modern high tech companies were supposed to be managed, particularly during the
technocratic white heat of the 1960s. The firm had a history of financial crises and was twice
rescued from the hands of the receivers to remain a family firm. Sir Vincent de Ferranti
created the Ferranti myth by emphasising the technical basis of the firm over its more vulgar
financial basis; 'we are not businessmen, we're engineers; that's the whole point of the thing' he
is reputed to have said (Fay, 1964a). Out of the massive profits made between 1957 and 1964
- largely from Bloodhound - £6.7 million from £8.1 million were retained by the business for
investment into pioneering military technologies such as defence computers, microcircuitry,
radar and inertial guidance, but also for funding substantial loss-making civil technologies like
computers and sophisticated machine tool controls (Heller, 1964). As Sebastian argued 'We
subsidise bad [projects] with the good ones' (in Fay, 1964b).
It came as little surprise in 1974 then that Ferranti were yet again in serious financial
difficulties. Profits had plunged from £2 million to £373,000 on a turnover of £70 million
(Ferranti, 1993:42). The severe liquidity problem became urgent when the company exhausted
its overdraft limit with the National Westminster Bank. The financial structure of Ferranti was
widely blamed for the crisis:
Ferranti found itself in financial difficulties because the family basis of the holdings
restricted the amount of capital that could be raised. It was essential to have access to
capital in order to expand, and it is necessary to expand in order to survive.
(Senior manager; my emphasis).
The crisis threatened to bring to a standstill the expansionist strategy of the Scottish Group.
The poor productivity of the English Transformer Division based in Manchester was seen as a
contributing factor, particularly in Scotland. Scottish management and trade unions, united in
their lobbying efforts in London, emphasised that the Scottish group were virtually
autonomous, self-reliant and profitable. Both sides wanted a solution which would keep
Ferranti independent; if that failed a merger with one of the other big electronic companies
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was to be avoided at all costs. The Scotsman argued that Ferranti in Scotland 'need not be
sucked down in an imposed solution designed to cure the financial problems of the English
factories' (17 September 1974). At the time Ferranti's Edinburgh plants had vital defence
contracts in hand for Tornado. Jaguar and Nimrod. One senior manager recalled:
Ferranti Defence Systems was always profitable and we felt 'sick fed up' with the rest of
Ferranti taking cash we were making but not putting anything back in themselves. The
defence side was subsidising the whole operation. In Scotland, we felt that the good
return on capital we were generating was disappearing down some Englishman's throat.
In particular, a GEC take-over was especially feared, with consequences for rationalisation
and the transfer of work and devolved expertise from Scotland to centralised plants in
England. Political support was promised from all political parties in Scotland for a 'Scottish
solution' should Ferranti fail to be kept together as an independent entity on a UK basis. As
the convener of the manual shop stewards put it: 'We want the Scottish factories to stand on
their own feet' (in Scotsman, 17 September 1974). By way of contrast, the white-collar unions
at Manchester were demanding that Ferranti be nationalised.
Both the Scottish identity and the self-image of the family firm were important to Ferranti.
The management style itself was frequently referred to as 'paternalistic'. By this is meant the
deliberate cultivation of a strong set of overlapping identities backed by a reward system to
generate a clearly structured sense of company 'belongingness' and affinity. The main
emphases here were a series of local commitments to: family, Scotland and technology. One
manager drew attention to the disciplining effects of the Ferranti identities:
The Scottish Group was very important under Ferranti. The Ferranti brothers were keen
on both Scottish and Lancashire identities. They believed in a system of nepotism since it
would give you two forms of discipline over younger workers: i. the parents and ii. the
company.
Another suggested that the sense of family worked not only because of the kinship networks
that ran through the firm and the sense of making a valued contribution and personal
advancement but because these were made possible by the continuity of employment over
many years:
Workers at Ferranti had a very strong identification with the firm as a 'family' company,
in that it was owned by a family and that fathers and sons (and daughters) could be found
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working here. There was also a sense of family because of the security of employment at
the time and the feeling of loyalty towards the company, who had given many workers a
chance to make it in an advanced engineering sector. People were proud to work for
Ferranti and got status and recognition from each other and more widely for the kind of
skills they had and work they done.
[Ferranti] was a company whose managers, the vast majority of whom had been
apprentices in the company and had come through the structure. It was very much a
family-based company ... people still knew Basil [de] Ferranti and Sebastian [de] Ferranti,
who regularly visited the operations in Edinburgh.
(Union convener)
Such an inclusive set-up was also able to withstand periodic shocks of cancellation and
financial crisis. A senior trade unionist also detected a similar process in operation.
Within the workplace, the Ferranti management operated a regime of 'smothering
paternalism', which was irregularly modified by external pressures, e.g. financial crisis,
Bloodhound, nationalisation, etc. People at Ferranti had a particular mind-set and strongly
identified with the firm, showing pride in the reputation for good engineering. Even now
some people still call the place Ferranti.
How deeply the workers bought into the identities on offer is another matter. Certainly,
Ferranti's expansion and crises were accompanied by a remarkable period of industrial peace;
the first serious industrial action did not occur until 1979, thirty-six years after setting up in
Edinburgh. Yet it is not clear whether the family-nation-technology trinity is a cause or a
result of industrial peace. Sometimes the paternalism and localism of Ferranti was felt to be
too claustrophobic and parochial and could not offset the material advantages in wage levels
being offered elsewhere for highly qualified engineers. Hence, the permanent problems posed
by labour turnover were left unresolved, although an 'open door' policy was adopted which
kept vacated posts open for workers who might want to return to the company in the future.
Even long-serving Ferranti engineers are prepared to point to a down-side in the occupational
costs of Ferranti's technology-centredness and poke fun at their inflated self-image:
It is sometimes said that alternative employers viewed workers with thirty years at Ferranti
as 'institutionalised'. This means that they have acquired certain habits and ways of working
over the years, especially in the defence sector, which may be not so adaptable for other
environments. Ferranti, for instance, used to have a marketing slogan playing up a picture of
being at the cutting edge of technological excellence: 'First into the Future', to which we
always used to say, 'Aye, and Last out of the Past".
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Both the family and Scottish identities were also overlaid in Edinburgh by site specific
rivalries:
Over the years the Scottish Group mushroomed from Crewe Toll to become an important
multi-plant firm. Crewe Toll regarded itself as the 'centre of the universe', to the
resentment of Silverknowes and Robertson Avenue, since all the top managers and
decision makers were based there.
Paradoxically, Ferranti's strengths and weaknesses flowed from the same source - its self-
image as a lone island of family ownership and control surrounded by a sea of anonymous
corporations run by professional managers. One trade unionist recalls that the firm delayed
going public for as long as possible and only did so after internal wrangling within the
Ferranti family (Interview). Until then, autocratic control was stubbornly retained by the
immediate family. As Sir Vincent de Ferranti put it, 'We're used to having our own way'
(quoted by Fay, 1964a). Traditionally, the family had been staunch supporters of the
Conservative Party and found the prospect of being bailed out by a Labour government and
public interference in their affairs distasteful. Basil de Ferranti had briefly been a
Conservative Minister after Macmillan's purge in 1962. He won a by-election for the
Conservatives in 1958, and went on to become the Minister of State at the Ministry of
Aviation, but was forced to resign three months later because he could not 'satisfactorily
dispense with his shares' in Ferranti, who were, of course, a key avionics supplier to the
Ministry (Fay, 1964a).3
Distasteful or not, discussions with the Labour government resulted in a £15 million cash
injection in return for a 50 per cent shareholding in the company and a management
reorganisation. This was to be the first opportunity for the Labour government to put its
proposals for a National Enterprise Board (NEB) into practice. The main idea behind NEB
was that it would act as a catalyst for improving the performance of British industry. The
state would buy up profitable areas of manufacturing to improve the poor rates of growth
attained by private industry. Then Prime Minister Harold Wilson recounts how the need for
such a body was sharpened by the crisis at Ferranti. Although the company 'did not stand high
3 Basil reportedly began his political career in 1955. One day, while cycling to work he suddenly
thought, 'Gosh, wouldn't it be awful if the Socialists got in'. He later became the sole open
Conservative critic of the decision to buy Trident and worked at ICT, the computer firm, after
Ferranti's computer department merged with them (Fay, 1964a).
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in the City: the brilliant Ferranti brothers were regarded as too theoretical and not profit
minded enough'. Ferranti represented for Wilson 'a spearhead of British industrial innovation'
(1979:135-6). As one analyst of the electronics industry put it. 'Unwilling to accept additional
unemployment in politically-unruly Scotland on the one hand and disinclined to see a critical
defence-electronics firm disappear on the other, the government of the day felt no compunction
about its decision to undertake a partial nationalisation of the enterprise' (Todd. 1990:146).
Tony Benn, then Secretary of State for Industry, drew a wider connection between role of the
state and capital,
I suppose this will enable me to hammer home most purposefully the main political
lessons: Ferranti subscribes to the Tory Party to get Government out of industry's hair, and
then comes round with the begging bowl, when it gets in trouble, for help from a Labour
Government. This is the lesson of modern capitalism and the Government policy is highly
relevant, while the Opposition are being odiously hypocritical. (1989:225).
The Ferranti family wanted to restrict the degree of state control over the company. According
to Benn,'... the Ferranti brothers, or Basil at least, had tried to persuade the unions to agree to
just 25 per cent Government holding so that the family interests in the firm could be preserved.
In fact, we are going to have to go up to 75 per cent or 85 per cent holding as a result of the
need to put in large sums ofmoney and value the share correctly' (Benn, 1989:385). Benn was
determined to sideline the Ferranti brothers and refused their request for ten year contracts as
Chairman and Deputy Chainnan on £25,000 and £20,000 per year (1989:374).
Little wonder then that the trade unions were pleased with the NEB take-over. As Doug
Rooney, convener of AUEW shop stewards, put it:
This is a good agreement. The alternative is redundancies and breakdown of the group. We
are satisfied that the Scottish work will go on as before. We have built up over the years a
good working relationship with management and there is no doubt it will improve. It has
become very close in the past couple of months, and it will continue along these lines
(in Scotsman, 15 May 1975).
An agreement was made between Benn and the trade unions that some redundancies would be
necessary at the Transformer Division, reported to be losing £1 million annually, to make the
company viable but that no decision would be made to seperate it from the group without
government approval first. Benn praised the Scottish unions:
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I am grateful to the Scottish workers for recognising they should not impose on English
workers - in this case the transformer division - the penal sanctions that in the past other
governments have applied to unviable Scottish plants. The Scottish workers had not sought
to secure their own survival at the expense of workers in other areas.
(in Scotsman, 15 May 1975).
Either Benn was not aware of the 'Scottish solution', which seems unlikely, or he preferred to
gloss over it as a way of reconciling the overall interests of the workforce. At least that is w hat
the Scotsman editorial argued, 'Mr. Benn's ideas on a transfer of power to the working class,
his refusal to countenance the shedding of surplus labour and his low rating of profitability
make it unlikely that he would be content with a change of ownership and leave management
to make the hybrid a profitable concern' (15 May 1975). In fact, that is exactly what
happened.
By 1978 NEB effectively held 62.5 per cent of capital, the sprawling Ferranti organisation
was broken into five operating divisions and Derek Alun-Jones had been instated as Managing
Director and Chief Executive. Sebastian de Ferranti was allowed to stay on as Chairman.
Important orders had been placed with Ferranti since the bail-out. including components for
the Tornado radar in 1976 and a production order for the Tornado cockpit display in 1977.
Increasing orders put pressure on space at Robertson Avenue and it was decided to build a
customised 120,000 square foot complex at South Gyle, on the western outskirts of
Edinburgh, to house the Product Support Department. Plans were laid to expand the
workforce by 1200 over the following five years. Between 1977 and 1980, Ferranti increased
the floor space it occupied in Scotland by over half and one third of Ferranti's £40 million
investment was earmarked for Scotland (Scotsman, 2 March 1977).
Ferranti had become the fastest growing company in Scotland. By 1979, the company
employed 6300 in Scotland, the order book for the Scottish Group of Ferranti was substantial
and the expansion in capacity continued unabated. According to the General Manager, Donald
McCallum, 'We have a tremendous load of work ahead of us - greater than at any time in the
past' (Evening News, 7 March 1979). A £1 million extension to the Environmental Test
Laboratory was added to Silverknowes, to simulate a range of severe operating conditions.
The Communication and Control Group at Silverknowes moved to Bellesk House, Granton in
1979 and soon won an order from Phillips in Holland for the Type 1400 microwave radio
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relay system. 25.000 square feet of factors space was also occupied at Bellshill, near
Glasgow, to expand test equipment facilities. The South Gyle complex opened in 1980 as the
biggest of a number of developments in and around Edinburgh. A new facility was built to
house the Receiving Stores and the Sheet Metal Shop at West Shore Road. Granton and a new-
clean area and conference suite was built at Silverknowes. In 1981 alone £12 million was
spent on expansion, the order book was worth £100 million, research into several radar
projects was being funded and a further 200 workers were recruited, including 60 graduates
(Ferranti, 1993:54).
Further inroads had also been made in a range of civil activities. Although Ferranti's
numerical control interests at Dalkeith were sold to Plessey for £2.5 million in 1969. the
remaining Information Systems Group (ISG) at Dalkeith won a Queen's Award to Industry in
1972 for its Automatic Draughting Equipment and the Rotating Components Group (RCG)
was awarded the British Standards Institution BS 9000 approval, after six years preparation,
for the manufacture of precision wirewound potentiometers. Dalkeith also developed a range
of garage forecourt equipment, winning an order from the Total Oil Company for £2 million
of fuel dispensing equipment (Ferranti, 1993:38, 42, 44). Ferranti Offshore Systems Ltd
(FOSL) was formed in 1973 to use company expertise in electronics in the exploration and
production of oil reserves opening up in the North Sea, supported by the Product Support
Department in Edinburgh. FOSL later set up a joint venture company, TRW Ferranti Subsea
Ltd, with TRW of Houston, Texas, to design, develop, manufacture and install undersea
production control systems. Two Dalkeith groups, RCG and the Measurement and Inspection
Group, were merged into the Industrial Products Group (ISG) in 1976. The reorganisation and
change in name reflected a shift in management style from an orientation towards the defence
equipment at the main Edinburgh plants to a distinctively commercial undertaking at Dalkeith
(Evening News, 25 August 1976). In early 1977, ISG merged with the Cetec Corporation of
California to form Ferranti Cetec Graphics Ltd. based in Glasgow. Ferranti Cetec, later
Ferranti Infographics, had a large and expanding market in both software and hardware for
computer graphic cartographic systems, digitisers and plotters, and moved to a new factory
with 30,000 square feet of space in Livingston in 1980.
With all this expansion and a return to profitability, the NEB seemed to be vindicated from
Conservative charges that it was merely propping up another 'lame duck'. In 1977 profitability
rose to £6 million from a turnover of £125 million and rose again to £9.1 million in 1978,
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repaying the £6.3 million loan element of the original government bail-out. Ferranti was given
a fresh listing in September 1978. in what The Economist (9 September 1978) described as
'quite a sexy package' for fund managers and opposed by Benn for the same reason. This
reduced the government's holding to the originally intended 50 per cent and netted the NEB
£10 million (Wilson, 1979:136.149; Benn, 1990:3). By this time the Scottish Group were
contributing more to Ferranti's profitability than any other single division: making up one
quarter of total profits in 1976, around £2 million before tax out of nearly £7.5 million, to
over one third in 1977 and 1978, just under £3 million out of a total of £8.5 million in 1977
and £4 million out of £11 million profits in 1978 (figures estimated from bar chart in The
Economist, 9 September 1978). The military contracts won by the Scottish Group
underscored the boom in Ferranti's profits in the early 1980s. Between 1980 and 1981,
company trading profits grew from £15 million to £20.2 million, of which the Scottish
Group's contribution grew from £5 .8 million to £11.1 million, over half of total profits, from
Scottish Group sales which grew from £73.2 million to £111.4 million (Scotsman, 25 June
1981).
The Scottish Group seemed to be going from strength to strength in terms of its range of
activities, contribution to profit-making and orders; the Scottish operations were absolutely
central to Ferranti's further development. The Scottish Group had grown to become the single
biggest division within Ferranti, accounting for 40 per cent of turnover and nearly 60 per cent
of trading profits by 1982 (Firn and Roberts, 1984:317). Within Scotland, Ferranti's industrial
importance can hardly be exaggerated. By 1981 it employed 7,500 people across ten sites in
Edinburgh, Bellshill, Dundee, Aberdeen and Livingston at the leading edge of a range of
technologies (Ferranti, 1993:52). One indication of the Scottish Group's technological strength
is that over three hundred patents were issued for locally-based inventions between 1946 and
1973. Ferranti's role in defence avionics was officially recognised when the Scottish Group
won two Queen's Awards for Industry in 1982 for COMED, the combined map and electronic
display, manufactured by the Display group of the Navigations Division.
White collar unionism and a blue collar strike
Yet the expansion and official recognition masked underlying difficulties and simmering
discontent. We have already noted the constant problem of labour retention during the 1960s
and 1970s expansion. By the late 1970s the problem of holding onto skilled manual workers
and certain semi-skilled grades was just as difficult as ever, even in the midst of a severe
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contraction in the UK engineering industry, and the 'brain drain' of technicians, draughtsmen,
planners, designers and research engineers continued unabated. In 1979. the Senior Personnel
Officer. Jean McQugh. even went as far as Australia to conduct a graduate recruitment drive
(Ferranti. 1993:49). A scheme was also devised to recruit 30 first year undergraduates each
year who had failed courses in engineering and science. The Graduate Training Officer at
Ferranti reasoned that for £46 per week the firm got 'an intelligent employee able to fill in for
continual vacancies in semi-skilled departments' (Scotsman 13 August 1979).
The haemorrhaging of qualified labour was compounded by pay restraints. Because of the
NEB share-holding, Ferranti were bound to the Labour government's incomes policy. A mass
meeting of 2700 white collar workers in August 1978, were told by TASS officials that in the
three years since 1975 staff at Ferranti were being paid 15 to 20 per cent less than those in
other comparable firms. A claim to the Fair Wages Tribunal by TASS was supported by the
firm. At the Tribunal Ferranti criticised the application of the government pay code to
qualified scientists and engineers, arguing,
The group could expand but this is being limited by a low recruitment level in skilled
categories. We also have difficulty in keeping staff. Fifty per cent of the people who train
with us leave within five years of completing apprenticeships - generally for better money.
More business could be accepted and more unskilled labour employed if we could get more
skilled staff. (Evening News 2 August \9T&,Glasgow Herald, 3 August 1978).
A trade union official pleaded that Ferranti should receive special consideration because of its
involvement with government projects. The Fair Wages Tribunal eventually awarded the staff
an 11 per cent rise (Glasgow Herald, 1 September 1978).
While a consequence of government holdings was curbs on pay, it had also been the catalyst
for a wave of unionisation among white-collar workers across the Scottish Group. The blue
collar workers already operated a closed shop arrangement and had a 'coded relationship with
management'. White collar workers were about 50-60 per cent unionised in the Draughtsmen
and Technicians Association (DATA), which became part of the left-leaning scientists and
engineers section of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers -Technicians and
Supervisory Section (AUEW-TASS) and the more moderate Association of Supervisors,
Technicians, Managers and Scientists (ASTMS) (Interview). For Benn, the NEB bail-out had
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been an opportunity to introduce 'industrial democracy1 into Ferranti. He records in his diary
entry for 17 September 1974 that.
... a huge delegation arrived representing Ferranti workers from all over the UK, led by
the CSEU, the STUC and the individual unions and management. They all said much the
same thing - even the senior management - namely, that they wanted the company kept in
its present form, that they didn't want to see jobs lost, that they rejected a take-over by
others (in their minds was a Weinstock take-over), and they wanted Government support
which should carry accountability with it. The senior management identified themselves as
employees, which is what they are, and I promised to give consideration to their requests.
Afterwards Bob Wright of the AUEW and Jack Service [of the CSEU] came and we
drafted a reassuring statement. (1989:182)
Benn included a participation clause as a condition of the bail-out that management should
consult the trade unions on major issues of policy. For the first time, shopfloor representatives
from Crewe Toll sat in on talks with Benn (Evening News, 7 May 1975). A senior AUEW
shop steward at the time said:
An especially important condition of the 1970s bail-out was the addition of a participation
clause by Benn making it incumbent on the management to consult the trade unions on
major issues of policy. So there was a certain transparency of decision making and trade
union influence on strategy in Ferranti to an extent unseen before. Derek Alun Jones was
appointed MD and had a good relation with the trade unions which extended throughout
the 1980s.
The unions now found it easier to organise on a Scotland-wide basis:
Ferranti Scotland did not want to negotiate separately at different sites so a system
evolved of centralised Scottish bargaining. This was formalised when the unions drew up
the first formal constitution in 1975.
Benn had set the tone for the wave of white collar unionisation by refusing to speak to non¬
union groups from the company at the time of the bail-out. A Personnel Manager recalled that,
When some workforce representatives not belonging to an official trade union went down
to Parliament to meet [Benn], they were turned away and he insisted in only dealing with
the recognised trade unions. This [highlighted the] move ... from the old manual workforce
as the bastions of trade unionism to the rising importance of staff unionism as big and well
organised ...
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An AUEW-TASS shop steward describes the phenomenal rise in white collar unionism over a
short period of time in the mid to late 1970s:
The big breakthrough came in the mass recruitment of test engineers at Robertson
Avenue in the mid-1970s once they discovered that draughtsmen and planners already
organised in the union were on higher pay rates ... The sudden feeling of insecurity and
vulnerability after the financial crisis and government bail-out [also] gave a real impetus
to mass staff trade unionism.
This was reflected in TASS threats to escalate the unofficial action being taken by 13
technical authors at Robertson Avenue over the placing of an inexperienced worker in the
Department (Evening News 10 October 1975). White collar workers had been involved in
industrial action in the past, such as the walkouts over wages by draw ing office staff at Crewe
Toll and Dalkeith in July 1965 (Scotsman 28 July 1965). By the late 1970s, however, rapid
unionisation, labour turnover, company expansion, the government bail-out and pay curbs
altered the character of staff unions; they began to see themselves as more like a traditional
trade union than a professional association and took their first steps out of the sectional and
craftist shadow of the manual workers.
The tradition of the staff following in the wake of the hourly-paid unions for the annual pay
settlement had been reversed for the first time by the Fair Wages award. However, by October
1978. the discontent of hourly-paid workers was also beginning to surface. Sixty-two skilled
craftsmen from the Development Department walked out over bonus payments, demanding
parity with maintenance workers. The threat of escalating the dispute was made by the AUEW
convener, albeit reluctantly. This would be a 'tragic situation', he said,
Our last industrial action was in 1972 and the firm's industrial relations are second to none.
But if this matter is not resolved soon, and it has gone through official procedure over the
last eight months, then we anticipate it could lead to lay-offs and the closure of the
Dalkeith plant within two weeks. It would not be much longer before it led to a complete
closure of Ferranti plants in Edinburgh as well. {Scotsman 17 October 1978)
The company felt less need to meet the pay demands of the manuals than they had for the staff
and called in the Scottish Engineering Employers Federation to mediate. This time the threats
of escalation were withdrawn.
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The following year. 1979. the most serious strike in the history of Ferranti in Scotland took
place. The unequal treatment between manuals and staff by Ferranti was felt acutely by craft
workers, who had long-established traditions of sectional strength. The manual workers union,
the AUEW, put in a wage demand for a 25 per cent increase on basic pay to make up for
some of the ground lost over the four years of wage controls. In response the company agreed
to 13 per cent and a productivity scheme which would be incorporated into basic pay. This
offer was rejected outright by the AUEW, resulting in industrial action. The strike by 2500
manual workers was well supported by the membership and lasted for three months, by which
time the unions recommended a return to work with very little to show for the action.
Although the company had been damaged by the dispute it had been prepared to sit it out. In
part, this was because the dispute coincided with the national engineering dispute, which
meant that the company would have had to lay-off workers during the three day week anyway.
The conduct of the strike mirrored the way that bargaining within the plant was conducted.
One report said, '... the dispute has been a most gentlemanly affair, not least because neither
side could see the possibility of negotiations against the background of the national
engineering dispute' (Scotsman 29 September 1979). Within the plant TASS blacked all work
normally done by the strikers and senior managers worked to complete prototype lasers
themselves rather than lose a £25 million US Army contract. Nevertheless, the estimated cost
of the eleven-week long dispute to the company was put at around £2 million while the
profitability of the Scottish Group fell from £6.2 million to £5.7 million (Scotsman 25 June
1980). The staff workers, who were not on strike, took out their frustration at crossing the
manual workers' picket lines each day within the plant. As a Personnel Manager later put it,
... the 13 week long strike of 1979 by the AUEW ... made things inside the workplace
extremely tense. There was a range of petty bits of vandalism and sabotage, such as
blocking the toilets until they overflowed, by staff employees who remained at work, in
support of their brothers and sisters on the outside. The way that the vote was taken to
strike gave the unions carte blanche to stay out for as long as they wanted without
returning to the membership to get a mandate for the best deal possible. They eventually
came back with a marginal rise, about 1.5 per cent. We had to normalise things as quickly
as possible to prevent further disruptions and backlashes against people.
One craft trade unionist pointed to the tension between the idea of a paternal, family firm, who
resolved problems on the shopfloor by consensus and compromise through face-to-face,
informal networks, and the company's hard-nosed attitude to manual workers' pay:
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Ferranti had saw itself as an enlightened engineering company ... Most local things would
get settled with very little problem through informal relations or conduits which by-passed
the line supervisors. Line management had very little authority to take action because they
would ultimately be undermined by the unions contacts with decision makers in the
Personnel Department. The company had traditionally been quite mean, they would fight
you over a spare penny, so there was a bit of a contradiction between the idea of service
and loyalty to the firm and the meagreness of cash benefits for the manuals.
Despite the growing organisation of white collar workers, it would still take another fourteen
years before staff and manual unions would come together to take joint action, and even then
it would end in acrimony.
Ferranti was the first company in Scotland into the 'sunrise' industries and hoped to influence
the employment practices of other organisations in Scottish industry. They attempted to set an
example as a 'model employer' to other employers in Scotland in the Engineering Employers
Federation (EEF), described by one shop steward as 'a bit of a primitive organisation'. The
Ferranti management style and the government bail-out certainly contributed to growing
unionisation, although the role of union activists in seizing opportunities to organise,
especially in the 1970s, must be central to any account. At Ferranti white collar activists were
both hindered and helped by the pre-existing strength of the manual unions; hindered by their
sectional and craftist disdain for staff unions, helped by their day-to-day example of how to
organise.
In contrast to the popular view of the electronics industry in Scotland as a barren desert for
unionisation, the Ferranti case indicates that even highly-qualified white collar workers could
become well organised. Unionisation proved possible among white collar workers, many of
whom were working at the cutting edge of their technologies. Indeed white collar unions grew
in strength after the 1970s crisis and consolidated their position in the 1980s, while blue collar
unions were progressively weakening. What is also interesting in the context of a defence
company is that the employment of a fairly large pool of ex-servicemen at Ferranti did not
prove to be a barrier to unionisation. Indeed, local union leaders were often drawn from this
quarter:
[T]he first white collar trade union secretary was actually ex-RAF and a number of the
leading proponents in the trade unions were, and to a large extent still are, people who had
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been in the RAF. either doing national service or whatever, rather than coming from
science-based companies.
While this may seem surprising, there was little evidence of widespread gung-ho militarism
among the Ferranti workers I interviewed:
There was no real feeling of militarism or patriotism, even though the firm employed
many ex-service people, especially electronic technicians. The attitude was more
expediently based on the need to bring in a wage at the end of the month and [Ferranti]
was as good a place as any to do it.
The evidence of unionisation at Ferranti supports Maclnnes and Sproull's research into the
extent of union recognition in the electronics industry in Scotland (1989). They conducted a
postal survey of 144 electronics plants in 1987 which showed that 100 per cent of defence
companies and 100 per cent of plants opened before 1950 recognised trade unions. From the
latter it can be inferred that the pre-1950 plant must be Ferranti since the employment levels
given for 1987, 5999, roughly correspond to the available data. They also argue, counter-
intuitively, using multi-variate analysis techniques that the defence market was not an
important factor for high levels of unionisation; what seems to matter is the impact of plant
size and age. Hence, defence firms were over three times the average size and Ferranti had
been opened in Edinburgh for over forty years by 1987.
From the evidence presented here, however, it is clear that the defence market did in fact shape
the possibilities for unionisation in particular ways at Ferranti. Although issues of size and
age of plant are important factors for unionisation, as Maclnnes and Sproull argue, together
with management style, as Findlay (1993) argues, for disentangling the direction of causation
a more nuanced account needs to be reconstructed. First of all, it is the perpetual expansion
and periodic crises induced by defence markets, at least in part, that gave rise to issues of size
and longevity for Ferranti. Second, unionisation is, as Maclnnes and Sproull argue, an
outcome of definite social processes and conjunctures. It is difficult to trace the direction of
this from a purely quantitative approach which always risks over-extending explanation. The
politico-strategic importance of Ferranti to the UK defence industrial base made some kind of
rescue in the mid-1970s inevitable, particularly by a Labour Minister committed to a
modernising corporatist project, like Benn. But here, thirdly, the proximity of staff to strong
union traditions and embryonic staff union structures become important. Within this context,
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the large craftist component of the workforce had already prepared the ground, sometimes
negatively, for the extension of organisation into hitherto unorganised sections. Fourth, the
management sty le at Ferranti encouraged stable negotiating arrangements where continuity on
technological problems and production required pacific, if not quite harmonious, industrial
relations. The familv-nation-technology trinity of company identities omitted trade unions as a
pole of identification for workers, yet the unions themselves were often pulled in behind the
appeal of the Ferranti trinity. That is to say, orderly and 'responsible' trade unions were not
incompatible with Ferranti's benign self-image. And finally, of course, there are always the
active agents who actually do the recruiting and organising among their co-workers. Their
worldviews, determination, enthusiasm, judgement, confidence and so on is of paramount
importance - union recognition is not something that merely happens to people because of
plant size, age or management attitudes (or defence production, for that matter). Sufficient
weight then needs to be attributed to the influence of specifically defence market conditions in
relation to age, size and management style as factors in the process of unionisation,
particularly for white collar unionisation, and a fuller account given of agency as an active
force in the process.
Privatisation
More immediately, a Conservative government had been elected in 1979 and was beginning
what would become a long programme of privatisation rather tentatively by selling-off the
more obviously attractive and easiest to offload activities. A medium-sized, part publicly-
owned, defence-dependent company like Ferranti was an ideal candidate for getting a quick
return for the Treasury. Yet the process of selling-off Ferranti proved to be more difficult than
originally thought and nothing like as straightforward as the big sell-offs in the second wave of
privatisation in the mid- to late 1980s would later appear to be.
Throughout June 1980 a fierce battle was fought over NEB's remaining 50 per cent
shareholding in Ferranti. Keith Joseph, the Secretary of State for Industry, wanted to sell the
shares, valued at £55 million, to the single highest bidder. This, it was argued, would both
realise the best price and help to create a large, UK electronics firm able to compete
internationally. The most likely candidate for buying the shares would have been GEC. Yet
the mobilisation of the network of political, economic and social interests around Ferranti,
with the connivance of the Scottish Office, meant that Joseph was forced to retreat. Hailed at
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the time as a victory for the distinctive institutional set up in Scotland, it proved a pyrrhic
victory• and was the last gasp for technocratic militarism in Scotland.
Politically, its involvement with military electronics assured Ferranti's importance for the
British defence industrial base. In Scotland there was the added dimension: Ferranti managers
were adept players in Scotland's institutional structures, the 'Scottish lobby', and sat on all the
key quangos. The Managing Director of the Scottish group, for example, was believed to have
a direct line through to the Scottish Secretary of State (Interview). The Scottish lobby was
fully mobilised to prevent the shares being sold en bloc directly to a single purchaser.
Although matters of national industrial policy were now to be resolved through the free
working of'market forces', and the Scottish Office publicly denied any involvement to secure a
buyer (Glasgow Herald, 10 June 1980), it was greatly exercised by the repercussions for the
electronics sector in Scotland should a hostile bid be successful. All sides in Scotland were
determined to prevent a 'forced marriage'. For the Scottish lobby, Ferranti represented the
industrial embodiment of distinctively Scottish interests within the United Kingdom. One
Ferranti manager described the relationship:
Ferranti ... regularly called upon the 'Scottish Mafia' if their interests appeared to be
threatened or needed extra clout. The Mafia consisted of the Scottish Office, the Scottish
trade unions, the political parties in Scotland, Scottish Enterprise and the Scottish CBI.
We all sang from the same hymn book at that time.
Another summed up the situation of Ferranti Scotland:
... the Scottish Group accounted for around 30 per cent of Ferranti's turnover but 50 per
cent of its profit. There was considerable autonomy and you were left to plough your own
furrow. We were also closely in tune with the movers and shakers on the Scottish scene.
Particular concern was expressed in Scotland about what a suitor like GEC, with a track
record of selling-off peripheral activities, might do to the operations of the Scottish Group. It
was feared that Thatcher had already done a deal with Weinstock and an anti-GEC network of
political, labour and business interests quickly emerged in Scotland. Sir William Gray, former
head of the SDA, used an honorary degree ceremony at Glasgow University to proclaim his
support for the campaign to keep Ferranti in Scottish hands {Scotsman 19 June 1980). The
Church of Scotland's Home Mission Department also lent support, emphasising the key role
Ferranti played in the community {Scotsman 17 June 1980). The Edinburgh Chamber of
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Commerce were concerned that the sub-contracting work and an estimated 9000 to 14000
additional jobs that Ferranti generated locally would be at risk (Evening News 23 June 1980).
while Lothian Regional Council were vexed that the one-fifth of Ferranti workers who were
qualified scientists and engineers, giving the region six times the Scottish average, would be
lost to Lothian {Scotsman 25 June 1980).
While union officials were lobbying for a dispersed sale of the shares, the shop stewards at
Ferranti were opposed to the sale of the NEB shares and argued for full nationalisation. The
Edinburgh office of TASS initially opposed the Ferranti board's desire to see the shares
dispersed across a large number of seperate buyers to maintain independence and issued a
circular arguing for outright opposition to the piecemeal sale of the government's stake in
Ferranti on the grounds that it 'offers at best a delay in possible change of control and a delay
in the necessary restructuring of the electronics industry' {Evening News 2 June 1980). The
TASS executive endorsed a resolution calling on the TUC and the Labour Party to make it
clear to prospective purchasers that a future Labour government would reclaim the shares
without compensation. Both these positions were quietly abandoned as the campaign unified
around the demand for Ferranti's independence to be protected against a predatory take-over
by GEC. Gavin Laird, Scottish executive member of the AUEW, was typical, '1 see no reason
why it should be sold at all, but to sell it to a single buyer will make a rationalisation
programme inevitable and almost certainly to the detriment of Scotland. It would be disastrous
for Scotland if Ferranti were to lose their independence' {Scotsman 7 June 1980). Doug
Rooney, chair of the Ferranti trade union's Scottish Division Participation Committee, made a
direct plea by letter to George Younger, Secretary of State for Scotland,
Accepting that there are idealogical [sic] differences between the viewpoint of the trade
unions and the Government, re the role of the NEB in industry, there are surely some
things, particularly in connection with Ferranti Scotland, we can agree about. In Scotland
we have been fortunate in having an effective management team and one that we support
and a community of workpeople prepared to cooperate in order to maintain and improve
the competitive position, (in Evening News 10 June 1980)
This was a period of deep uncertainty for the workforce. On 19 June, a mass meeting of 3000
Ferranti workers at the Usher Hall in the city unanimously passed a resolution opposing the
sale. The following day a letter to the Scotsman from 13 workers at Silverknowes talked in
terms of'industrial genocide' in the event of a take-over.
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Different solutions were advocated for keeping Ferranti out of the hands of GEC. The SNP
Industry spokesman. Tom McAlpine. wanted the NEB shares transferred to the SDA. In this
way 'The Ferranti jobs would be secured, a Scottish agency would have a stake in the firm and
the fear of more redundancies in job-starved Scotland will have been averted' (Scotsman 6
June 1980). Robin Cook argued that the Labour Government had not rescued Ferranti to have
it delivered, 'trussed up like a chicken', to be swallowed up by GEC and threatened GEC with
referral to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. Hopes were raised that Edinburgh-based
financial institutions, encouraged informally by the Scottish Office, would form a consortium
to bid for the shares, although they faced the problem that they could not bid for individual
Scottish factories but only for the company as a whole (Evening News 9 June 1980). The
Edinburgh finance house, Financial and General Holdings proposed a 'restrictive covenant' of
two to three years after the sale before the shares could be resold. However, the Scottish
financial institutions supported a 'Scottish solution' insofar as it represented a bargain to them
and were reportedly only prepared to pay £45 to £55 million for shares with a market value of
£55 to £60 million (Scotsman 23 June 1980).
The Conservative Party and the Cabinet were split over the Ferranti sale. On one side. Keith
Joseph wanted a one-off sale to the highest bidder, while the Employment Secretary, James
Prior, backed by Younger and Michael Ancram, chair of the Scottish Conservative Party,
argued for a dispersed sale. Joseph attempted to placate the Scottish lobby by arguing that a
highest-bid sale would maximise returns to the taxpayer but would not automatically lead to
closures in Scotland. He said, 'No potential bidder is going to ignore the importance to
Ferranti of its Scottish operations ... It would have to make its bid in such a form to reconcile
the management and workforce to ownership by the new company1 (Scotsman 19 June 1980).
GEC broke its customary silence, saying it would be 'inconceivable' that redundancies in
Scotland would follow a take-over: 'What would be the point in paying a high price for assets
and skills and then throwing them to one side - what benefits would there be for GEC? On the
contrary, a connection with GEC would enhance Ferranti's electronics activities and prospects'
(Scotsman 20 June 1980). Such assurances from GEC were immediately dismissed by the
anti-GEC campaign, pointing out the overlap between GEC's Marconi operations in defence
electronics and Ferranti's.
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With the union threatening to take the opportunity of the Queen's visit at the start of July to
open Ferranti's new South Gyle complex on the outskirts of Edinburgh, rumours spread that a
favourable announcement would be made quickly. When it came, the announcement was
greeted as a victory for Scotland's special interests. The Scotsman of the 28 June, under the
headline:
YOUNGER WINS BATTLE FOR FERRANTI FREEDOM
reported that a dispersed sale had been approved by the Cabinet. This was a considerable
boost to Tory morale in Scotland, with Ancram quoted as saying 'This demonstrates again that
the Government do have the special needs of Scotland at heart and are prepared to be flexible
in securing these'. The government were reported to be expecting losses of at least £10 million
against the market value of the shares and were reluctant to consider further conditions, such
as a restrictive covenant, since it would depress the sale price still further. Yet when the full
details of the sale emerged a two year restrictive covenant was a condition of the sale. This
was further seen as confirmation indeed of the outright victory of the Scottish campaign. An
issue of around 10.24 million shares at 530 pence each, with a discount of 11.2 per cent, was
expected to raise £54.3 million for the NEB, an estimated profit of £47 million for the
government. The NEB would retain nearly 5 per cent of the shares to put in trust for an
employee share scheme. As one account of the policy implications note, 'The decision was
seen as a victory for Scottish Office Ministers and as confirming Ferranti's continuing
financial independence' (Firn and Roberts, 1984:320). While the Scottish Mafia were all
singing from the same hymnal however, the Scottish financial institutions were being far more
circumspect and, much to the disappointment of Ferranti's supporters in Scotland, only bought
around twenty per cent of the shares being offered.
Nevertheless, the Younger announcement brought some relief to the workforce. Although
continuing to prefer Ferranti staying under NEB control, Rooney was 'pleased' that the
company's independence would not be compromised and curtly rejected reports that Ferranti
workers might still demonstrate about the share issue during the Royal visit the next day
(.Evening News 1 July 1980). Workforce relief in avoiding GEC was palpable. One shop
steward recalls that 'The trade unions opposed the sale of the state-held shares and argued for
full nationalisation in 1980, but the main feeling, at this time of deindustrialisation, was 'thank
god we're in the lifeboat'.
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The employee share option scheme was also offered to the workforce. Under this provision
four per cent of the NEB shares would be available to Ferranti employees. The employee
share scheme was viewed by the unions in Scotland with some suspicion. One ex-trade union
convener recalls that shares were
quite widely taken up [although the take up was] comparatively low in Scotland, ...
perhaps because of the higher trade union incidence up here ... 1 think there was
something like 3 per cent of the shares in total went to the w orkforce, so it was hardly a
controlling interest.
Another ex-convener claims that Gavin Laird planned to use 'share power' through organising
an employee's share bloc. Such plans came to nothing. Instead, employee shares were
taken up on a mercenary basis ... Needless to say, when the time was up they were
promptly sold to pay for holidays, cars or redecorating the house and that kind of thing.
By the time that the restrictive covenant expired Ferranti shares had doubled in value. A
hostile take-over by GEC seemed increasingly remote as the company's financial position went
from strength to strength in the first half of the 1980s.
Conclusion
By the early 1980s Ferranti had established itself as one of the most important firms in
Scotland. A deliberate managerial strategy initially made the growth of Ferranti possible
through carving out a niche in indispensable military technologies. Ferranti were therefore
able to take advantage of the growing importance of military electronics and the
remilitarization of industry during rearmament for the Korean War. The management strategy
involved a substitutionist policy for both infrastructural and superstructural deficiencies, once
a fairly relaxed degree of autonomy had been negotiated from central control.
The peculiarities of the military electronics sector involved both negative and positive
structural capacities. Positively, Ferranti survived and prospered in Scotland where its lack of
pre-existing infrastructural and superstructural endowments might have militated against the
successful entry and lengthy occupancy in such a difficult environment. It has been argued
here that this was largely due to two main factors: the configuration of a talented design team
in Edinburgh and the skilful enlistment of British and Scottish-level policy agencies in
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establishing Crewe Toll at the intersection of British defence technological needs and Scottish
industrial policy for electronics. Within the workforce, staff unions became further embedded
because union-builders among the workforce seized the opportune conditions of the 1970s
crisis and state intervention to frame a collective solution to their exposure to corporate risk.
Negatively, the absence of a commercial 'sales function' for defence electronics curtailed the
degree to which a firm like Ferranti can move in and out of different market settings. Where
Ferranti attempted to develop a diversified product base in civil technologies they proved to be
a constant drain on the profitable defence activities and exacerbated the strain on the limited
financial resources of a medium-sized company attempting to stay at the forefront of several
technologies. Even where large profit margins could be made, such as on the Bloodhound
contracts, much of the money was immediately ploughed back into high risk development and
design work. Being tied to defence electronics meant being tied to the political vicissitudes of
project cancellations and the public scrutiny of excessive profits. The marketing function in
defence industries was premised on selling the customer a technological solution to a problem
while, or even before, the product was at the development stage. Sometimes the customer, the
MOD, would be actively involved from the development stage, funding at least part of the
project, and altering specifications even as the product went into manufacture. Again two
things are crucial here: a credible reputation for technological achievement and adopting the
political and bureaucratic skills demanded by defence production. These Ferranti in Scotland
acquired in time to take advantage of Korean rearmament and proposals for the Scottish
Council's Electronics Scheme.
Despite intermittent crises, Ferranti's resilience in Scotland largely stemmed from the fact that
it was profitably run as a separate company from the rest of the organisation and was granted
considerable strategic and operational autonomy by the centre. This served to confirm the self-
image of the Scottish Group as self-sufficient but vital to the company as a whole. This
confidence is reflected in the thirty years of almost ceaseless bouts of expansion and
innovation. It was also evident in the indignant reaction of the Scottish Group to the financial
crisis of the early 1970s and the mobilisation of the Scottish lobby to fend off any threat to
this autonomy. After absorbing the scare generated by the sell-off of the NEB shares, the new
set-up at Ferranti seemed to be on course to take advantage of the more favourable regime for
military electronics under an incoming Conservative government committed to an aggressively




From Ferranti International to GEC-Marconi Avionics
Two things dominated Ferranti's prospects in the second half of the 1980s: a £2 billion contract for
the radar for the proposed European fighter aircraft (EFA) and a merger with the US defence
company, ISC. The merger was to rock the company from top to bottom, putting at risk the
European radar contract and consequently the very existence of the company itself. Throughout
this period, GEC's presence lurked in the background as Ferranti once again became an attractive
proposition for take-over with the expiry of the restrictive covenant in the early 1980s. For a large
diversified company like GEC, redoubling its efforts to dominate the defence electronics market,
control of Ferranti would eliminate a smaller but important rival in a number of areas. For a
medium-sized company like Ferranti, a merger with ISC offered a way to protect its independent
status from GEC and give it a big enough capital base for future R&D investments. The merged
company existed for less than two years until Ferranti found out that they were victims of a multi-
million pound fraud. Fifteen years after the NEB rescue, Ferranti were bailed-out again only this
time by the GEC. What emerged from this was a changed organisation, in part moulded by the
wider forces of defence industry restructuring; the corporate style of the industrial giant, GEC, who
took over the ailing Ferranti in 1990; the weakening influence of the Scottish lobby; and shifting
industrial relations. In sum, the forty years of almost continuous growth, inter-generational
employment patterns and paternalistic work relations were to be rudely severed in the 1990s.
The second half of the 1980s might therefore seem to be merely preparing the conditions for the
inevitable GEC take-over in 1990. While it will be argued that there are good reasons for taking a
restructuring perspective this must also be able to account for the specific conjunctures within
which Ferranti became embedded. These include issues within the company of management style,
of technology versus economy, the judgement of decision-makers to merge with ISC and the over¬
riding desire for company independence. Taken together these tell us something about one
particular company in a specific location. This risks seeing the ISC debacle as either inevitably
derived from organisational deficiencies or from the personal failings of individuals. Important
though these factors may be, it is necessary to stress the wider context of defence industry
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restructuring and. in particular, the rise to dominance of GEC's virtual monopoly in defence
electronics.
In this section, the importance of EFA to Ferranti and British industry will be established. Some
discussion will follow on the Ferranti/ISC merger. The most important task, however, will be to
understand GEC's role as a diversified corporation making strenuous efforts to position itself as the
dominant force in the UK defence industrial base in the decade following 1985. This will mean an
examination of the two phases of corporate restructuring between 1967 to 1972 and 1985 to 1995.
The earlier phase established a pattern of acquisition followed by thorough rationalisation. The
later phase will concentrate on acquisitions within the UK defence industry. Particular account
needs to be taken of the Conservative government's pro-market competition policy and the problem
posed for this by the emerging GEC monopoly in many defence product areas. An examination of
the merger process and the role of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, as one of the few
statutory instruments available for publicly shaping the structure of the defence industry, would
show de facto state support for 'national champions' like GEC. Ultimately, competition policy for
the defence industry has been, at best, inconsistent although perhaps it can be more accurately
described as incoherent. The differing management styles of GEC and Ferranti will be contrasted
as a preliminary means ofmeasuring the scale of the changes at Edinburgh after the take-over.
EFA and British industry
A four-nation European collaborative project to develop a new generation of agile, single-seat
fighter aircraft was formed in August 1985. Agreement was finally reached after years of
wrangling, principally between the British and French governments and their respective aerospace
companies, British Aerospace and Dassault (Hayward, 1989:179-183). The British aerospace
industry developed relationships with European companies. Seven British companies had been
involved since 1982 in the Experimental Aircraft Programme (EAP), the precursor for what would
become the EFA project (Enserink, Smit and Elzen, 1992:101).' With France dropping out after
the early studies to pursue a national alternative aircraft, Rafale, the remaining governments, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Spain, Britain and Italy set up two consortia - Eurofighter and
Eurojet. Eurofighter is responsible for developing the airframe, avionics and weapon system;
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Eurojet for developing the engine. Both consortia are German registered companies. The direction,
co-ordination and execution of the joint programme for the development, production and in-service
support of the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA), comes under the overall control of NATO
European Fighter Development, Production and Logistics Management Organisation (NEFMO).
Based on the multinational Panavia consortia which produced the Tornado fighter, this was to be
one of the largest industrial undertakings which the British government had ever sponsored and
was the most ambitious co-operative venture in Europe, according to one of its architects
(Fleseltine, 1989:203). In 1990 Britain's share of the work for developing EFA was estimated to be
around £1,800 million, one-third of the total cost, providing direct long term UK employment for
3-4,000 people (HC380, 1990). The British Prime Minister. Thatcher, was reported to be
concerned about committing the MOD to such a large programme as EFA, which was being
opposed by the Department of Trade and Industry (Clark, 1994:256).
EFA has become a classic example of the problems posed by international collaboration in such a
politically sensitive industry as arms production. Nationalism and 'national interests' are always
uppermost in the minds of politicians and state officials when deciding on defence procurement. As
Secretary of State for Defence, Heseltine (1987:267) argued against large scale nationally-based
weapons projects. Instead he advocated European co-operation in production and procurement to
withstand the pressures from US advantages in economic scale and technological scope:
To a minister in his national capital the easy and traditional way forward is to wrap a project
in the eloquence of the Union Jack or the Tricolour ... It is natural for the leading companies
in each country to push continually for supremacy, and natural for officials to join
industrialists in putting to the minister what appears to be the national, the patriotic case. The
industrialists in every country have access to the member of parliament whose constituents
they employ, and to the journalist hungry for stories of ministers who are about to sell the
national interest short.
Heseltine resisted the argument for the British government to follow the French example and to
design and build the new fighter on its own. He recalled, 'The arguments were venerable, seductive
and mistaken: British was better, the RAF would control the specification and British jobs were at
stake' (Heseltine, 1989:203). For Heseltine the solution lay in the principle of juste retour,
1 The seven British companies involved in the EAP were: British Aerospace, Rolls Royce, Dowty, Lucas,
Smiths Industries, Ferranti and GEC Avionics.
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according to which the final national division of work from the project is proportionate to the final
number of products which will be ultimately purchased. Yet juste retour and ministerial
determination cannot easily overcome duplication, waste and inefficiencies borne of the national
basis of defence procurement. Each national government seeks to have the work share package
distributed to the advantage of domestic industry but wishes to spread the cost burden of
development across national boundaries. In contrast, the US has advantages of a single currency,
language, governmental apparatus and technical standards. Attempts to move away from national
self-sufficiency and juste retour have been proposed by Roger Freeman, the UK Procurement
Minister, so that work would in future be awarded on the basis of capability and cost and not on
the number of orders each country makes. This approach is being adopted for the Horizon
programme to develop the next generation of frigates for the UK, France and Germany (Gray,
1995a: 17).2 Table 8.1 indicates the revised work share for EFA in the two years between 1990 and
1992.
Table 8.1. Revised work-share for EFA based on announced plans, 1984-1992
Country 1984 1984 work August October 1992 1992
numbers share at 1985 work 1985 work work-share numbers
planned feasibility
stage (%)
share (%) share (%) (%) planned
Germany 250 25 38 33 30 200
UK 250 25 38 33 37.5 250
Italy 165 15 24 21 19.5 130
Spain 100 10 - 13 13 87
France - 25 - - - -
Total 765 - - - - 667
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1994, p427; Elzen et al, 1990, ppl75, 178.
Creasey and May (1988:1-2) listed three typical problems which arose with EFA: apportioning
work-sharing and design leadership; the standardisation and interoperability of common
components and sub-systems enabling optimal European systems integration; and European fears
of US control over the transfer of'sensitive technologies'. The production of the F-22 fighter, for
example, the nearest US equivalent to EFA, is confined to a single procurement environment and
able to employ the latest electronic scheduling, process and costing technologies across the project
: See Gray (1995a) for a useful summary of European rationalisation in the light of deep restructuring of
US defence industry. In US employment is down from 1.3million to 800,000 in 3 years while firm size is
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before the major sub-assemblies are integrated at the final assembly line. The allocation of inter¬
state workshares in the US is done on the basis of Lockheed Martin and Boeing's existing
worksites, without the arbitrary divisions of labour and national-state conflicts in European arms
collaborations. The problems that confronted Ferranti in bidding for the EFA radar contract
highlight these and other obstacles for a medium sized company wanting to stay at the cutting edge
of weapons technology.
It is possible to get beyond generalised notions of the UK defence industrial base and identify more
precisely the scope and location of industrial activity for EFA. In 1992 the national trade
association for the UK aerospace industry, the Society of British Aerospace Companies (SBAC).
conducted a survey among its members into the EFA supply chain and presented some of the
findings to the Trade and Industry Committee's investigation into the British aerospace industry
(HC 563 I & II, 1993). The supply chain uncovered by the survey involved complex
interdependencies between the three major prime contractors, British Aerospace, Rolls-Royce and
GEC, 314 separate first tier suppliers and a further 250 second-tier companies. The survey found
that over two-thirds of the first-tier suppliers would simply not be classified as aerospace
companies under SIC 364. In tenns of geography, the aerospace-industrial complex exerts a
distinct southern bias at all levels of the supply chain (Table 8.2). The majority of first-tier
suppliers, 55 per cent, were located in the South East, with second-tier suppliers only slightly less
concentrated with 48 per cent of suppliers in the South East. Only five UK regions hosted second-
tier suppliers, a reflection of the regional concentration in the aerospace-industrial complex, with a
mere 3 per cent in Scotland. Of the 165 first-tier companies that responded to the survey just under
three-quarters employed fewer than 300 people (Table 8.3). From a total turnover of £980 million,
the turnover of the average company in the first-tier supply chain was around £50,000 per
employee, which rose to £66,000 per employee when larger companies were included in the
calculation (HC563 II, 1993:61). An employment cascade effect is evident between the three tiers,
so that for every five jobs created at prime contractor level approximately another three are
generated at the first-tier and a further two at the second-tier (Table 8.4). At the development phase
few companies were more than 10 per cent dependent on the Eurofighter project for work (Table
8.5). Small to medium enterprises (SMEs) showed higher levels of dependency at the
developmental stage than larger ones, increasing from 4 .8 per cent of turnover during development
growing through mergers and asset sales. Except for UK, continental European finns remain 'overstaffed'
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to 12.1 per cent at maximum production, compared to average dependencies of 2.8 per cent at
development and 7.1 per cent during production for larger ones. Beyond the three primes,
therefore, the typical company was a small to medium firm, with slightly higher levels of
dependency on EFA than the primes. EFA thus became a critical project for the British aerospace-
industrial complex, supporting, in part, well over 500 first- and second-tier SMEs, mainly,
although not exclusively, in the South of England.
Table 8.2: Eurofighter 2000 supply chain: location of second-tier companies






Source: SBAC Eurofighter supply chain study, HC 563 II, 1993:63
*Note: figures do not add up to 100 per cent.
Table 8.3: EFA supply chain: first-tier company turnover and employment
Employment range Number of Company turnover Number of
companies (£m) companies
>20 19 > 1 15
21-50 23 1-5 44
51-100 22 5.1-10 37
101-200 30 10.1-20 29
201-300 25 20.1-30 13
301-500 19 30.1-50 8
501-1000 8 50.1-100 14
1000-2000 14 <100 5
<2000 5
Total 165 Total 165
Source: SBAC Eurofighter supply chain study, HC 563 II, 1993:61
Table 8,4: EFA supply chain: employment estimates*
Current position (1993) Maximum production
Prime contractors 7500 17500
First-tier suppliers 4000 14000
Second-tier suppliers 2500 8500
Total 14000 40000
Source: SBAC Eurofighter supply chain study, HC 563 II, 1993:63
*Note: the figures have been derived from a bar chart and give only a rough equivalence
because of'entrenched employment rights and a political climate which opposes large scale redundancies'.
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Table 8 .5: Eurofighter 2000 supply chain: dependency ranges of first-tier companies








Source: adapted from SBAC Eurofighter supply chain study, HC 563 II, 1993:62
ECR-90: the Ferranti bid for EFA
As a medium-sized, first-tier supplier, Ferranti proposed an enhanced version of its modern
multimode radar. Blue Vixen, as its bid for the radar for EFA. Blue Vixen had been part of a
Ferranti-fiinded programme. Blue Falcon, to develop the next generation radar. The MOD funded
the development and production of Blue Vixen after 1983 for the update of the Sea Harrier aircraft
(Elzen et al, 1990). As early as 1984, Ferranti had been involved in discussions with Thomson-
CSF of France and AEG of West Germany about collaborating on radar and avionics for EFA.
Thomson left the emerging radar consortium when France dropped out of the EFA project in 1985.
In the end, Ferranti went forward with two bids. The main Ferranti tender was a 'fully compliant'
bid termed 'ECR90' (European Collaboration Radar for the 1990s), with Ferranti acting as prime
contractor in accord with European partners, FIAR of Italy, Siemens of Germany and Inisel of
Spain. The alternative Ferranti bid was for a stand-alone contract for a radar called 'Super Vixen'.
Siemens had been brought into the Ferranti-led consortium in 1989 to strengthen the political
appeal of its bid in Germany. The rival bid came from the MSD-2000 radar, proposed by a
consortium comprising Britain's national electronic giant, GEC, AEG Telefimken System Technik
(TST) ofGermany and Hughes of the US. The MSD-2000 was to be based on the existing Hughes
APG65 radar. GEC had been brought into the consortium in 1986, strengthening the political
appeal of the AEG bid in Britain. The relationships between the companies who composed the two
consortia were liable to shift under political pressure. The two consortia mobilised within the pre¬
set four nations involved in EFA to form alliances and collaborations with industry, politicians,
services and defence departments (Elzen et al, 1990). With the exception of Britain, the other
countries nominated a single company to represent their national work share. British companies
were left alone by the government, at least formally, to compete among themselves to represent the
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UK work share. Thus AEG had been part of the original Ferranti-led development team and
companies entered arrangements to participate in whichever radar was finally chosen. If ECR-90
were awarded the contract. AEG would join Ferranti. FIAR and Inisel, while FIAR and Inisel
would join AEG. Hughes and GEC should MSD-2000 be selected. This left GEC. Ferranti and
Hughes as the only companies risking complete failure (Elzen et al, 1990:183). In the main,
though, each consortium was identified with the interests of the nation from which the consortium
leader derived, the UK for Ferranti, Germany for AEG.
In late 1986 the NEFMO board visited Scotland to witness flight trials at Turnhouse and were
'suitably impressed' with the Blue Vixen prototype radar fitted to the nose of a BAC 1-11. The
Prime Minister, Thatcher, also supported Ferranti's impending bid with a visit to South Gyle that
year and reportedly left 'very impressed' (Ferranti, 1993:64). These two visits opened up a phase of
intensive lobbying in early 1987. The lobbying effort was extensive and included presentations to
representatives of the RAF, Luftwaffe, MPs and Ministers. The complexity of the Ferranti
proposal was indicated by the amount of paperwork generated, including 122 separate ECR90
reports.
By 1987, Ferranti seemed to have itself well-positioned for the EFA contract, and thus securing
continued growth and prosperity for its Edinburgh operations. A series of political alliances had
been built, in Europe as well as in the UK, based on a widely renowned reputation for leading-edge
radar technology. However, as a medium-sized company niggling doubts existed, particularly in
West Germany, about Ferranti's ability to cope financially and project manage such an ambitious,
complex project. A merger or partnership with another company of international standing would go
some way to alleviating such fears. At the same time, it was important to the Ferranti board and
the Scottish institutions, that its status as an independent company be preserved. It was widely
anticipated that sooner or later GEC would be making a play for Ferranti's defence electronics
activities. Ironically, it was precisely the series of decisions that followed from the desire to remain
independent that would result in the eventual GEC take-over of Ferranti.
Crisis and take-over
Within eighteen months of merging with the US company, International Signal and Control (ISC)
on 21 September 1987, Ferranti's fortunes as an independent player in the defence market changed
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dramatically. This was a clearly an ambitious attempt by Ferranti to become a major international
defence company. After deciding to concentrate on core defence activities. Ferranti's semi¬
conductor business was sold off to Plessey and the US subsidiary. Ferranti Defense Systems,
acquired the advanced laser technology project group of General Electric, while in the UK the
military trainer and air launcher businesses ofWardle Storeys was acquired. One Ferranti manager
explained the rationale behind the ISC merger thus:
The ISC deal seemed to give us three basic things that we were badly needing:
1. It seemed to give us a massive order book
2. It seemed to give us access to the lucrative US market
3. It seemed to give us the critical size for getting the credibility for taking on EFA.
Underlying this attempt by Ferranti to become an international defence company was an
assumption about retaining the power of independent company decision-making: 'The ISC merger
was an attempt to broaden our portfolio and give us the scope to merge or not to merge on our
own choosing' (emphasis added).
The relationship with ISC began modestly enough when an £18 million contract was agreed earlier
that year for advanced electro-optic equipment with the Electro-optics Department in Edinburgh.
ISC had been founded by James Guerin in 1971 and registered sales of $591 million in 1987 (The
Economist, 26 September 1987:83-4; Todd, 1990:157). Ferranti offered nine of their shares for
every five ISC ones in the merged firm. The share values of both companies rose sharply after the
announcement, Ferranti's by 7 pence to 137 pence per share and ISC by 18 pence to 237 pence per
share. This movement in share prices placed a value on ISC at £420 million, a good result for the
ISC directors who held around 12 per cent of ISC shares. The merged company claimed sales of
$1.6 billion, with around 65 to 70 per cent of its business coming from defence contracts. Guerin
claimed that with Ferranti's technical excellence allied to ISC's marketing expertise the company
would gain access to markets worldwide (Ferranti, 1993:65). The merged company would employ
26,000 workers in twelve countries. Sir Derek Alun-Jones, chairman of the combined group, said,
'The merger will produce a strong international group with great capability in electronic systems
and products' (Evening News 21 September 1987). To reflect this international orientation the
company was renamed Ferranti International Signal pic, later simplified to Ferranti International.
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Nothing at first changed very much in Edinburgh. Operational matters were untouched by the
merger, which was seen optimistically as giving Ferranti enough market scope to repel the
unwanted attentions of GEC. Ferranti Defence Systems in Edinburgh was contributing around one-
third of profits and sales to the company at the time of the merger. Indeed the Scottish dimension
seemed to become even more important in some ways. Ferranti International Signal held its first
board meeting in Scotland, at Edinburgh City Chambers. There Sir Derek Alun-Jones emphasised
the Scottish identity,
We are proud of our Scottish tradition. The opening this week of our new factory at South Gyle
has underlined our commitment to continue and further our links here' and now that Ferranti
had the stature of a multinational company the Scottish reputation for skilled engineering would
be helpful in increasingly competitive markets. (Evening News, 29 July 1988).
Less than two years later the commercial naivete of Ferranti's merger with ISC was cruelly
exposed. Guerin announced he was leaving Ferranti International to 'pursue other interests' on the
8th May 1989. On his departure Guerin purchased the ISC Technologies Inc. part of Ferranti
International. With the release of Ferranti's Annual Report in August speculation grew about the
financial health of the company until its shares were suspended on 11th September 1989 for further
investigation into irregularities arising from contracts entered into by ISC Technologies Inc. A
detailed investigation by Coopers & Lybrand revealed that Ferranti had been defrauded by Guerin
and ISC to the value of £215 million. ISC simply did not have the contracts that they claimed to
have while other arms contracts with the Pakistan government had been obtained clandestinely
(Financial Times, 27 January, 1990). As a result £215 million which had been included in
Ferranti's financial calculations was not available to the company and had to be written off. The
High Court ordered Guerin to repay Ferranti £189 million and Ferranti finally got £40 million
compensation from the auditors, Peat Marwick McLintock.
The financial crisis this caused at Ferranti had serious repercussions for keeping the EFA project
alive. The decision to award the radar contract for EFA was repeatedly delayed amid nationally-
based disputes involving Britain and Germany between 1987 and 1990. Eurofighter GmbH based
in Munich had been formed by the prime contractors to decide on the allocation of major sub¬
systems such as radar, based mainly on economic and technical grounds. When it was forced to
make a decision in 1988 it split along national lines, with BAe backing ECR90 and the German
MBB, MSD-2000 (Elzen et al, 1990:182). The decision was passed between GmbH, who viewed
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the outcome of the bidding as resting on political criteria, and NEFMO. who hoped for a
technically-based decision. Germany favoured the MSD-2000 bid because it was based on existing
technology, making it less risky, and it fulfilled Germany's operational requirements. They also
cast considerable doubt on whether Ferranti could deliver ECR90 to specification, cost and time.
The acuteness of the German Defence Ministry's concern was underlined by the responsibility of
German firms' MBB and Dornier for integrating the radar (HC 380, 1990:25). Because of the
territorial workshare principles which apply for EFA, Germany would have to fund any additional
costs arising from disruption to the radar integration programme, even if the territorial source of
that disruption was Edinburgh-based. In contrast, Britain favoured ECR90 because it was more
advanced and fulfilled operational requirements better than MSD 2000. The British government
argued that it would be less risky to develop because it was a derivative of the Blue Vixen radar
which was then being developed for the Sea Harrier. The British also claimed that it was the
cheaper of the two bids and would remove European reliance on US technology.
The success of Ferranti's bid in the EFA radar competition and the continuing radar development
and production capabilities in Edinburgh were thus seriously jeopardised by the financial malaise
and uncertainty surrounding the parent company. Under any circumstances EFA had to be saved
such was its importance to British industry as well as the RAF. The British government in turn
were worried about Ferranti's commercial ability to honour the contractual obligations to fully
develop the radar for EFA. The ISC fiasco had put Ferranti's commercial judgement in serious
doubt and might give the German government the perfect pretext for withdrawing and thereby
jeopardise the whole project. Germany insisted that the British government provide assurance
about the financial viability of Ferranti and indemnify German companies against additional costs
which might arise from the failure of Ferranti to deliver to specification or on time (Financial
Times, 2 February. 30 March 1990; HC 380, 1990:25).
Some kind of take-over or bail out was therefore essential; essential for the British government's
stake in EFA and essential for Ferranti's very survival and the continuation of their advanced
technological capability in Scotland. The ideological outlook of the government made a direct
infusion of public cash to stabilise Ferranti, as happened in the 1970s, extremely remote, although
if no other means of support emerged then it could not be ruled out. To avoid a public volte-face on
public subsidies for 'lame ducks', government departments were instrumental in arranging a take-
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over of Ferranti. or at least its defence division. Ferranti Defence Systems Ltd (FDSL). making use
of informal contacts in the "cosy boys club" of the British defence industry.
GEC, the electronics giant eventually emerged in early 1990 as the saviour of FDSL and with it
EFA. The government were instrumental in arranging the take-over, dangling the ECR-90 contract
before GEC. One GEC director described the role of the MoD in securing the Ferranti deal as 'the
benevolent father of the bride' (The Economist, 27 January 1990; Dixon et al, 1990a). Alan Clark,
then Minister of State for Defence Procurement, records how his acquaintance with the chairman
of GEC, Arnold Weinstock, now Lord Weinstock, benefited the mutual interests of the
Conservative government and GEC:
... Periodically I talked to Arnold Weinstock. By sheer energy and clarity of thought I put
together the deal that saved Ferranti, and its Radar, and thus EFA in time for us to outface
Stoltenberg [the West German Defence Minister] on Monday when the German delegation
come over. (Clark, 1994:274)
Initially British Aerospace and Thomson-CSF of France had been interested in a joint bid for
FDSL. The Defence Secretary, Tom King, and Peter Levene, the defence procurement official,
were busy persuading potential foreign bidders - Thomson of France, Daimler Benz of Germany,
Westinghouse of the US - to work with a British company in their bid since direct foreign
ownership of Ferranti would be unacceptable. Yet Ferranti boss. Sir Derek Alun-Jones got the
impression that the importance of nationality was on the wane.
The Government seems to be far less concerned with the nationality issue than it has been in the
past. I haven't got a single chit from Mrs Thatcher, but it must be a lower priority. I don't think
competition, the criterion which previously ruled out GEC, is quite the priority that it was'
(Scotsman 16 January 1990).
The delay in finding a partner, according to Murray Johnstone, the consortium responsible for the
reconstruction of Ferranti, was caused by the Ferranti board's insistence on receiving an outright
bid for its assets, BAe's low bid of 56p per share and Thomson's desire to examine Ferranti's
uncertain financial position with 'due diligence' {Scotsman 14 October 1989). Thomson, as
Europe's main defence electronics company, was widely expected to take-over of FDSL but
announced on 19 January 1990 that the price was too high after their £200 million bid for the radar
division was rejected by the Ferranti board, wiping millions of pounds off" Ferranti shares.
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Ferranti's reluctance to sell what it considered 'the jewel in its crown' to Thomson only increased
the nervousness in Edinburgh about the destiny of the radar contract.
Thomson were opposed on national grounds by the Ferranti-led Scottish lobby. As a leading
international competitor, ultimately owned by the French state, it was feared that Thomson would
always favour home-based production at the expense of the Edinburgh operations. Robin Cook.
Labour MP for Livingston, said, 'We will be trying to convince Sir Derek on the folly of any move
that lets Thomson get their hands on this strategically important British company' (Evening News
11 October 1989). Thomson's withdrawal was welcomed by the Scottish trade unions, who had
considered it the worst possible deal. Campbell Christie of the STUC indicated that the Scottish
Office shared their concerns but could not become publicly involved (Scotsman 11 November
1989). After meeting with the Ferranti board Labour MPs were 'impressed' that adequate funding
for the next year had been secured and the 'threat to Ferranti jobs in Scotland has now been
removed, provided the board does not sell out to some marauding asset stripping company only
interested in short term profit' (Evening News 19 December 1989). A Thomson take-over of FDSL
would also have further damaged GEC's already weakened relationship with BAe by giving BAc a
choice of two British-based suppliers to fit out its military aircraft. There was also talk of setting
up a Scottish-based defence company owned jointly by Ferranti and a partner (Scotsman 19
January 1990).
Meanwhile, the German Defence Minister, Stoltenberg, continued to doubt whether Ferranti's
financial position had been stabilised. Above all, it was this risk of losing the £2 billion radar
contract due to German objections to Ferranti's financial weakness that forced the board to
relinquish their plans for using FDSL as the basis for reviving the groups fortunes and accept
GEC's £310 million bid, fifty per cent more than Thomson's bid. In this tangled web of corporate
and political intrigue were caught the reluctant seller (Ferranti), the canny buyer (GEC), the failed
bid to internationalise the UK defence industry (Thomson), behind-the-scenes UK government
intervention and the more visible efforts of the Scottish lobby. The final decision in May 1990
confirming the selection of ECR 90 was neither a result of strictly technical-cost nor political
criteria, but a confusing mixture of compromises and careful network-building by Ferranti,
especially by bringing Siemens into the consortium. Ultimately, however, ECR-90 was selected
because of the determination of the UK government to save it by inducing a GEC take-over of the
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crisis-ridden Fcrranti. A GEC take-over allowed the government to meet the dual assurances
sought by German\ on ECR 90. First, the GEC acquisition of FDSL removed any doubts about
the future commercial and financial viability of the lead company in the ECR 90 consortium. The
second condition was met when the government agreed to indemnify Germany to a liability ceiling
of DM200 million. In turn the government signed a 'watertight' back-to-back agreement with GEC
which ensured that the financial impact of the indemnity would be entirely bome by GEC and its
industrial partners, posing no risk to public funds. (HC380, 1990:26). The result was to strengthen
the concentration of UK defence electronics in GEC's hands.
The way was clear, then, for GEC to submit a bid to take over FDSL on 23 January 1990, the day
after news had been leaked that Ferranti's ECR90 radar had been chosen for EFA, with official
government approval for the acquisition given a fortnight later (Financial Times, 23, 24 January,
10 February 1990). The reported 'jubilation' in Edinburgh over the £2 billion radar contract made
the traditional spectre ofGEC seem less ominous than in the past.
GEC had, in any case, long wanted to be a suitor for Ferranti. Indeed, according to company
informants such was GEC's formidable reputation for rationalisation in the pursuit of cash growth
that it was the prospect of a GEC take-over which drove Ferranti into the arms of ISC in the first
place. By the time of the take-over, however, the bargaining position of GEC was strengthened
considerably while Ferranti's was virtually non-existent. The purchase of FDSL enabled GEC-
Marconi to participate in the much-coveted radar contract and so preserve GEC's airborne radar
business, which would have been at serious risk without the contract. Yet this was more than what
The Economist called 'an ingenious - if extreme - way to win contracts' (27 January 1990). With
the take-over of FDSL, and Plessey before it, GEC would also be in a position to rival Thomson as
the major military electronics equipment company in the new European arms industry.
Some workforce representatives, however, got the impression that Weinstock was a 'reluctant
purchaser' of FDSL. 'It was quite clear that [Weinstock's] attitude to [Ferranti] was that he was the
reluctant buyer and that any periphery operations or anything not directly related to the radar was
probably in competition to stuff GEC were doing elsewhere anyway' (Interview with ex-MSF
representative). In the light of the back-to-back indemnity agreed with the government for ECR 90,
the GEC take-over was not entirely risk free. Indeed, GEC attempted to recover some of
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purchasing finance from Fcrranti a few months later (Financial Times 1 1 September 1990). Any
sense of reluctance on the part of Weinstock. however, may in fact have more to do w ith the
particular management sty le at GEC than hesitancy over the chance to take over one of Britain's
leading avionics firms, long-pursued by GEC, and the EFA radar contract into the bargain. Some
discussion of the evolution of corporate style at the centre of GEC's operations is therefore
necessary . This will also allow a comparison to be made between the earlier phase of GEC
restructuring between 1968 and 1972 and the current phase since 1990 and a contrast drawn
between the management styles at GEC and Ferranti.
The two phases of GEC restructuring
The first restructuring phase, 1967-72
GEC in its present incarnation can trace its roots down to the attempt by the Labour administration
of 1964 to 1970 to create an internationally competitive electrical engineering conglomerate and to
limit competition between three leading British companies, Associated Electrical Industries (AEI),
English Electric (EE) and General Electric Company (Jones and Marriott, 1970; Williams et al
1983: 134-140). In 1960 GEC took over Radio and Allied Industries and acquired the managerial
skills of Arnold Weinstock, who became managing director of GEC by 1963. As GEC's short-run
profitability performance attracted the favourable attention of the stock market, they were able to
take-over AEI in 1967 and merge with EE in 1968. both larger companies than GEC. This
represented two brilliant financial coups for Weinstock, paying less than £16 million for two major
firms with a combined turnover of more than £660 million - against GEC's £180 million - and a
joint asset value of £460 million (Williams et al, 1983; Jones and Marriott, 1970).
This process was initiated and actively supported by the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation
(IRC), which had been set up by the Labour government to facilitate the rationalisation of 'white
hot' privately-owned industry. The IRC lasted from 1966 to 1970. Economic 'modernisers' like
Tony Benn at the Ministry of Technology and Anthony Crossland at the Board of Trade, buoyed
by an idea of British technical progress, declined to refer the GEC/EE merger, at that time the
largest in British history, to the Monopolies Commission, despite the fact that it created new
monopolies and reinforced an existing one. The Labour government attempted to balance its
commitments to industrial efficiency, trade union consultation, regional policies and the
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maintenance of effective competition in the industry (see the Statement by the President of the
Board of Trade, in Jones and Marriott. 1970:334-5). Benn's tacit support for the GEC/EE merger
included a commitment by the company to 'cooperate on discussions on redundancy. But the
creation of these mammoth private companies with Government support and encouragement is a
very big political issue which has to be tackled' (1988:100). Instead. GEC was left alone by the
government to get on with restructuring the industry.
Rationalisation, communities and trade unions
Government support for 'industrial modernisation' meant backing the Weinstock management style.
GEC carried out a programme of restructuring to eliminate over-capacity and duplication between
the merged firms. Restructuring meant the workers in the affected industries would face fewer
potential employers; the most labour intensive plants would face closure; the labour process would
itself be intensified and automated wherever possible; and new techniques and technologies
introduced (Massey and Meegan, 1978; Massey, 1978; Cowling et al, 1980: 245-247). The merger
offered almost immediate possibilities of savings and money-making. As Williams et al (1983:139)
comment, 'There were thus substantial overlaps offering immediate savings through rationalisation
- which, as usual, mostly served as a euphemism for closing plants to concentrate the production of
particular lines'. By 1972, 155 separate operating units were reduced to 64 and of the 171 major
locations only 29 were unaffected by rationalisation, 49 were closed down and 10 were sold. The
workforce of the merged company was cut from 241,000 in 1968 to 170,000 by 1972 (Cm 9867,
1986:3; Cowling et al, 1980:267-9).
GEC thus acquired a reputation for growth through acquisition, followed by rationalisation and
mass redundancies. At the beginning of the rationalisation process, GEC's handling of
redundancies was simply inept. The closure of the five AEI factories at Woolwich in 1968 with
little initial consultation came as a shock and GEC were blamed by the trade unions, the
community and the press for 'causing' the closures (Cowling et al, 1980:251; Newens and Adams,
1969). Both AEI and EE were described as favouring paternalistic management styles (Jones and
Marriot, 1970; Newens and Adams, 1969) and the way that the redundancies were handled by
GEC seemed particularly callous. Although redundancy terms were improved at Woolwich after
union and media pressure, the unions felt that AEI would have handled the redundancies more
'humanely' than GEC. In response to 'the sense of employment insecurity which the mergers
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produced in some parts of the Company', GEC. under government pressure to consult, set up a
non-negotiating national joint consultative council (NJCC) to consult the unions about planned
redundancies: 'Among management, the concept of the Council acknowledged that Trade Unions
have an important and justified interest in the timing, location and character of major merger
rationalisation; indeed, in any matters which could have a significant impact on employment' (GEC
internal document, quoted in Cowling et al. 1980:252).
The basis of the consultation stipulated that there would be no compulsory redundancies, no
national policies on redundancy terms and that the unions were not obliged to 'acquiesce' after
consultation, retaining the right to take 'normal action'. The union officials believed that their role
on the NJCC reduced the number of redundancies and improved the management of the redundancy
process. Soon after the formation of the NJCC, GEC issued its plans for the major factories,
including a list of 19 factories, whose future had not yet been determined. Instead of allaying fears,
the list created deep and prolonged uncertainty among the affected workers; eighteen months later
11 of the 19 factories were still unaffected by rationalisation (Cowling et al, 1980:256-7). The
unions were also split by plant location and skill. While the AUEW supported plant bargaining,
reflecting its sectional strength, APEX supported a national plan, since GEC were finding it easier
and cheaper to implement redundancies on a plant by plant basis; a national agreement would have
raised all plants to the level of the largest, highest paid ones. The skilled workers organised by the
AUEW were often tied to industry-specific trades and so were more militant and less willing to
volunteer for redundancy than the 'unskilled', 'semi-skilled', foremen and technicians, who were less
tied to the industry and were more willing and able to transfer their skills for similar rewards. The
other divide that appeared was between the NJCC and plant-level shop stewards. Because of its
role in the redundancy process, the NJCC became known as the 'burial party' and was distrusted by
the shop stewards. This impeded the development of plant-level JCCs, which were viewed by the
shopfloor as 'minor sacking committees' (Cowling et al, 1980:255). Yet sometimes the union
officials complained that they were more militant than the people they represented.
The different forces and interests operating during the restructuring process proved extremely
difficult for the Labour government, and Benn in particular, to reconcile. Here, for instance, Benn
describes his experiences at the GEC/EE factories in Liverpool in September 1969 where 3,000
redundancies resulting from the merger had been announced:
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We went straight to the Netherton factor}' . .. I was greeted by the management, and then went
round with the shop stewards. They were a very decent crowd and they had a great possessive
sense about the place: this was their factory. I told them frankly that there was not much hope
of saving jobs ... I met the trade union officials, two of whom were extremely offensive, and
made no progress at all ... The shop stewards' 'Action Committee' had turned up to speak to us
and the trade union officials would not let them in to the meeting. Weinstock was abused and I
had to stand up for him ... the Action Committee were waiting to see me ... they said that
Weinstock had refused to meet them. (1988:202; my emphasis)
Evidently, the restructuring process resulted in a deep distrust ofGEC on the shopfloor and among
union officials. GEC preferred non-unionised labour but in conditions where it inherited recognised
unions, IRC insistence on consultation and the political pressures on GEC after Woolwich, meant
that it could not merely by-pass or directly confront organised labour. Local management seemed
to have been less concerned about formal union protocols than GEC nationally, and Cowling et al
report that cases where shop stewards had been harassed and victimised were not isolated
examples: 'Incidents involving the gradual reduction of working space, the removal of telephones
and finally desks and chairs were reported from different sources and occurring, in different GEC
businesses, to shop-stewards and union officials who were militant in their opposition to
redundancies' (1980:262).
The same study, in three case studies of the redundancy process at Kidsgrove, Stoke-on-Trent,
Liverpool (see also Spencer, 1989: 17-58) and Coventry, also shows that GEC was not over-
concerned about the impact on the local communities. From the first, there was resentment at the
locational loss of jobs. At Woolwich, and in many later cases, work was transferred to
development regions. As Massey (1978) notes, while this weakened spatial employment
differentiation, the nature of the spatial division of labour was reinforced. Massey and Meegan
(1982) found that this phase of the restructuring of production involved a general pattern of
regional plants being reduced to branch status while higher-level control and technical and
scientific functions became concentrated in the South-East. Facing fewer employers, trade unions
in the electrical industry became actively engaged in inter-area competition for the remaining jobs
(Massey, 1978). At Woolwich, for example, resentment surfaced over the way that some men had
trained workers in Scotland only to lose their jobs subsequently (Cowling et al, 1980:261).
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GEC: management style
Despite all the resentment and resistance. GEC seemed to be one of the few successful
manufacturing firms in Britain. Good early financial results in cash growth and higher profitability
largely derived from the lack of competition in electrical engineering, strong demand for
electronics, telecommunications and. above all. a colour television boom. Combined they
contributed to the seeming infallibility ofWeinstock's management style. In the 1970s turnover per
UK employee rose four and a half times, suggesting a more efficient use of capital and the labour
force (Williams et al, 1983:141). Since the early 1970s GEC has also accumulated substantial cash
reserves, initially from asset sales of peripheral or surplus capacity. Although better known for its
acquisitions, since 1970 GEC 'disposed of rather more firms than it has acquired' (Williams et al,
1983:155). Between June 1993 and June 1994 five of the eight major transactions involving GEC
were sales of subsidiaries while the rest were acquisitions. In 1994, for example, 'cash at bank and
in hand' stood at £1.2 billion, up £220 million on 1993 (GEC Annual Report 1994:59). GEC thus
defy the traditional distinction made between finance and industrial capital. The net income derived
primarily from the cash mountain as a percentage of company profits before taxation rose from
around 10 per cent in 1977, 13 per cent in 1979, just under 15 percent in 1982, to nearly 19 per
cent in 1994 (Williams et al, 1983:154; GEC Annual Report 1994:46).
Yet much of this success is too narrowly dependent on the criteria set by specific national
accountancy conventions used by UK firms and understates other measures of manufacturing
performance such as innovation or breaking new markets. Indeed the absolute primacy of financial
performance is itself hazardous for judging manufacturing performance. As Williams et al
(1983:175-6) argue,
The more crucial observation is that the missed opportunities in new markets and retreats in
old ones both stem more or less directly from GEC's methods of enterprise calculation,
grounded in financial criteria which favour relatively short-run profitability.
Even the strong emphasis on financial performance and short-term profits has not resulted in the
kind of spectacular financial success GEC are popularly renowned for. Table 8.7 shows that
GEC's financial performance was relatively consistent when the seven year period 1986-92 is
compared to 1981-85. GEC's return to shareholders was slightly above the average for the
electronics sector as a whole and slightly below the FT All-Share average. Its average returns on
equity (RoE) and the return on capital employed (RoCE) also remained fairly high in this period.
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Yet when this performance is compared to the rising level of sales which accompanied the
acquisition of other companies, the performance is not quite as impressive. Table 8.6 shows a
steady decline in profitability as a percentage of turnover, from a peak of 13 .1 per cent in 1979
falling to around 7 per cent in the 1990s.3
Table 8.6: Summarised sales and trading profits ofGEC, 1971 to 1994
(Sales and profits in £m unadjusted for RPI)
Year Sales Trading profits Profit as a % of sales
(before interest and
tax)
1971 924 77 8.3
1972 975 86 8.8
1973 1023 119 11.6
1974 1144 132 11.5
1975 1406 141 10.0
1976 1752 184 10.5
1977 2055 231 11.2
1978 2343 294 12.5
1979 2501 328 13.1
1980 3006 360 12.0
1981 3462 381 11.0
1982 4190 431 10.3
1983 4626 462 10.0
1984 4800 501 10.4
1985 5222 529 10.1
1986 5252 508 9.7
1987 5247 492 9.4
1988 5553 561 10.1
1989 6664 652 9.8
1990 8786 671 7.6
1991 9786 688 7.3
1992 9435 702 7.4
1993 9410 695 7.4
1994 9701 684 7.1
Sources: Cm 9867, 1986; Cm 676, 1989; Cm 2852, 1995
One widely recognised way of characterising GEC, is what Goold and Campbell (1987) term a
'Financial Control' company (FCC). FCC companies are defined by an emphasis on separate stand¬
alone businesses, tough budgets and short-term targets. FCCs operate in relatively stable
conditions which do not demand large, long term investments. The corporate centre retains
financial control and trouble-shooting functions while operational autonomy is devolved to the
3 See also Charles Leadbetter's reports in the Financial Times 6,7,8 July 1992.
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stand-alone business units. Each operating unit is expected to make a profit and trading between
units is done on an ami's length basis. In some ways this environment comes close to Burns and
Stalker's (1961) ideal for a mechanistic company. GEC's corporate structure is closer to the
bureaucratic model, as Bums and Stalker would predict, although at an operational level business
units are expected to find their own forms ofmanagement.
Table 8.7 GEC: Financial performance (averages)
Total return to shareholders




1981-1985 24% 17% 15% 14% 25%
1986-1992 22% 18% 15% 14% 16%
Source: Goold et al, 1993, p53
The role of the GEC centre, however, acts as a constraint on business management rather than
encouraging managers to be innovative and develop organic forms. Each operating unit has
authority for its own capital investment decisions as part of an agreed budget and also has a
discretionary budget related to its size (Cm2852, 1995:44). Proposals for unbudgeted capital
expenditure need to be justified to the centre and always depend on business unit managers pushing
from below for a decision. Caution and discouragement on the part of the centre means that
responsibility for the success of a project rests with the manager who initiated it. Caution and
inertia thus become a natural managerial reflex for fear of exposing themselves to failure (Goold et
al, 1987:118-9). It is worth quoting at some length the ways that Weinstock had earlier laid out the
underlying philosophy of his approach to English Electric managers:
... [T]he real success of our new Company depends on the individual managing directors of our
many product units. Our help (or lack of it) from HQ does not relieve you in the least of your
responsibility for that part of the business which is in your charge ... The managing director of
even' operating unit is responsible to me ... You will have considerable autonomy in the
running of your unit, subject to certain controls ...; these are largely financial, but monthly
reports should cover everything of consequence concerning the business, including important
technical matters ... It is said to be possible to maximise short-term profitability by omitting to
do those things which are required for the survival of a business in the long term. It would be
extremely stupid to follow such a course, particularly in industries such as those in which we
participate. But that is not to say that money may be wasted in injudicious investment or
recklessly conceived programmes of research. (Weinstock, 1968, quoted in Jones and Marriott,
1970:336-8).
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The restraining influence of our style only works on inferior managers. A real man [sic] rings
me up and says what he wants to do anyhow. I don't treat managers like small boys. I don't
need to approve their plans ... What people write down on paper does not control anything.
Budgets are just signposts in a wilderness of uncertainty. You can't control everything
through a budget, but you can control expenditure ... There is no such thing as good enough.
Nothing is good enough. The question is how much better is acceptable. (Weinstock, quoted in
Goold et al, 1987:238; my emphasis)
Central restraints are deliberately placed on local managers to test their resolve and commitment to
investing in as yet unrealised projects. The apparent disinterest at the centre in operational matters
is backed up by a detailed interest in regular reports from the units. For example, the seven criteria
employed by GEC in the reporting procedures to control the financial performance of individual
divisions and cost centres in the late-1960s were:
• Profit on capital employed
• Profit on sales
• Sales as a multiple of fixed assets
• Sales as a multiple of stocks
• Sales as a multiple of capital employed
• Sales per employee
• Profit per employee
(Williams et al, 1983:167)
The centre would therefore be alerted at an early stage should finical results fall below
expectations. A system of mainly financial accountability and the delegation of restricted
operational autonomy constrains budgetary spends to measured and justified levels. Investment
programmes are thus dependent on local managers taking a visibly partisan approach to their own
plans. Such exposure constitutes a considerable risk for managers should losses or failure follow
and can become a source of routine conservatism and inertia typical of a mechanistic organisation.
In his turn, Weinstock cultivated government ministers and civil servants. Personal relations
between Weinstock and government Ministers of either main political party were to become a
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common theme as Weinstock's GEC grew in industrial importance after the AEI/EE mergers4
(Benn, 1988:144-5; Healey, 1989:503; Wilson. 1979; Cowling et al, 1980: 195, Ch. 8; Clark.
1994; Bowen, 1995). GEC also became skilled political operators. For example, in 1975 GEC
donated funds to the Conservative and Liberal parties for the first time, mainly because of its
opposition to proposals by the Labour government to nationalise the aircraft and shipbuilding
industries (Cowling et al, 1980:253). Weinstock's political adeptness became particularly valuable
when GEC attempted to break into the defence industry in a big way in the late 1980s. Lord Prior,
the former Employment Secretary, became the Chairman of GEC in 1984. and the former Trade
Minister, Richard Needham, joined the GEC Board in September 1995, initially as a non-executive
director but destined to become head of exports." Even Alan Clark, as Minister for Defence
Procurement, well known for a certain haughtiness towards narrow and unseemly 'money-grubbers'
and corporate careerists, saw Weinstock in a different league from 'business lightweights',
... I am bored blue by the company of businessmen. I have absolutely nothing in common with
them. I don't like sitting around with a glass in my hand. I don't understand references to
Chelsea FC. I couldn't hit a golf ball to save my life. 1 like only the heavy movers, people like
Arnold [Weinstock] ... (Clark, 1994:246).
Management style at Ferranti
A useful contrast can be made between the GEC management style and the one operating at
Ferranti before the take-over. While Goold et al (1987:145, nl) found Ferranti among the most
difficult of their case studies to classify, they elected to list them under FCC. Derek Alun-Jones as
the MD at the centre perceived their corporate style to be closer to Strategic Control, that is the
1
Tony Benn had been so impressed with the Chairman of GEC in 1968 over the AEI deal that he
suggested Weinstock should be given a knighthood. Although Benn found Weinstock 'politically
primitive' he was also 'agreeable, easy to work with ... I have got good relations with him and I want to
build on them' (1988:144-5). This was before Benn's 'own radicalisation took shape' (Benn, 1988:xii,25).
5 Needham's appointment to the GEC Board coincided with the government finalising new rules
preventing ministers from taking up posts in the private sector where there may be a conflict of interests
immediately after leaving office. These were recommended by the Nolan Committee which had been
formed to improve standards in public life after a series of'sleaze' charges had been made against
ministers taking highly-paid jobs with companies they worked closely with or helped privatise when they
were in office. In charge of trade promotion at the DTI, Needham made three ministerial visits to
Indonesia in 1993 when BAe and GEC won a £500 million contract for Hawk jet trainers. GEC supplied
thermal imaging systems and electronic warfare for the aircraft. In 1994 and 1995, Needham again visited
Indonesia and GEC subsequently won an order in 1995 to upgrade Indonesian F5 fighter aircraft.
Needham had earlier denied that he was even talking to GEC (Financial Times, Guardian, 4 September
1995).
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centre and the business units are more involved in corporate and operational planning. At lower
levels of management, however, budget controls appeared to be a more important goal than
strategic targets. My findings tend to show big enough differences between GEC and Ferranti
styles to suggest that classify ing both under the common Financial Control heading is misleading.
After the take-over in 1990, GEC were surprised at the lack of systematic control Ferranti
exercised over finance; indeed Ferranti managers were positively decadent in their budgetary laxity
compared to the rigour GEC managers were accustomed to. Ferranti managers soon had to adapt
to a regime of financial austerity coupled with direct individual responsibility to the centre.
The ISC crisis posed a serious problem for Ferranti's management style. Tight financial controls
had been imposed after the 1974 cash crisis and the government bail-out. Although they nominated
the dominant style at Ferranti as that of Financial Control, this had been buttressed by what Goold
and Campbell (1987:140-3) called Financial Programming (FP). The FP style allows the centre a
more interventionist approach in business unit decision making, but without easing the tight
financial controls. Ferranti thus allowed businesses to forecast financial performance and their
medium-term financial needs every year in 3-year plans. Through this mechanism the centre, it was
hoped, could guide businesses away from decisions which could lead to major cash or profit
difficulties and resolve allocation demands when they exceeded central resources. Goold et al
(1993:52) claim that Ferranti's management style may have contributed to its later difficulties:
Prior to the ISC merger, Ferranti's strategies had been cautious, with its business making
relatively small investments and only experimental forays into new areas ... The ISC merger
aimed to improve, in one grand move, Ferranti's competitive position in world defence markets.
This strategy was risky as well as bold, and Ferranti's corporate centre was not accustomed to
assessing such a major commitment.
Yet the cautionary and stringent financial control style supposedly common to both Ferranti and
GEC cannot adequately account for the many differences that existed between the two management
styles. GEC managers tend to view the ISC crisis at Ferranti as only the most visible expression of
a deeper managerial malaise:
The problems that arose from ISC were inherent anyway and would have been exposed sooner
or later. The lack of business acumen at Ferranti was well illustrated in the deal with ISC. The
same deal was offered to Marconi and was instantly rejected. The 'pursuit of fear' that Ferranti
felt from the designs that GEC and BAe had on them ... drove them into the arms of ISC.
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Ferranti would have been in a much better position had they co-operated w ith either of their
British suitors much earlier After all. DeFerranti was already on the board at GEC.
The practices which had evolved and served Ferranti well during the long-decades of expansion
and protection now seemed positively archaic, particularly to managers coming in from elsewhere
in the GEC organisation. For them, albeit in a highly retrospective frame of mind, the operations in
Edinburgh had become far too bloated and decadent. Whether the reason for this was the fecklessly
indulgent management style of the old regime or sensible developments in accord with business
expectations seems to depend on the length of time managers had spent in the Ferranti organisation.
Long standing GEC managers tend to be scathing:
The root of the problem was that Ferranti was part of a free-wheeling, organically grown,
technology-led community. It was an under-capitalised, overmanned, loss-maker. No real
system of cost control or accountability existed. Ferranti was run by scientists, evaluated by
scientists, on behalf of scientists. There was no team management process, only technical
problems to be solved. Industrial relations were a 'moving target'. The evolution of a rigid
grading system did not reward skill, initiative or endeavour. The resulting overkill in numbers
reduction was therefore caused by incompetent management practices, with the tail wagging
the dog at Ferranti.
In this account all the vices of the sluggish behemoth of long-standing notoriety with liberal and
conservative critics of the defence industry like Galbraith and Melman, are present. In the mid-
1990s, however, such critics were also looking back at the evolution of the firm from a privileged
position, outside time and place. For those who passed through these times and remain rooted in
these places, things looked mundane in comparison. For Ferranti managers the company had
simply evolved in line with what the business demanded and where costs were less important than
meeting the demands of the customer for technological excellence. From their vantage point, such
peculiarities as admittedly existed were not the result of some wilful perversity on Ferranti's part
but were built into the producer/customer relationship. One manager, while recognising that things
could not continue in the same old way in the changed circumstances of the 1990s, fills in some of
the concrete detail about the ways that the problems of supplier/customer relations, payment
systems, narrow specialisation and labour hoarding were intimately related:
The company [i.e. Ferranti] was by necessity very close to the customer. When contracts were
being drawn up a milestone plan would be agreed. Instead of the firm being paid after the
finished product was sold to the customer, the customer would monitor the contract at regular
progress meetings. You had what was called 'sponsors' related to different products, such as
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representatives of the MOD's Supply Management branch and the Services. The sponsors
would arrive in Edinburgh for a couple of days for progress meetings and we actually had a
small percentage built into the contract price for entertaining the product sponsors. So a lot of
business would get discussed informally over a meal and a few drinks the night before the
meeting and we would get to know the kind of people we were dealing with. The meeting the
following day might involve some tough negotiation but you felt that you were all basically
working to the same end: getting the very best products delivered on time, with costing worries
coming further down the scale of importance. The company would of course make a profit
which was more or less guaranteed when the contract was agreed. Certain factor allowances
were built into the structure of the contracts costings with a final top-up agreed at the end of
the contract, (emphasis added)
(Engineering manager)
This is not to suggest that workers at Ferranti were unaware of the problems. The same manager
drew attention to the hazards of acquiring specific knowledge and skills without controlling
adequately for costs:
In the early 1970s this system contributed to a financial crisis within the company, putting
them on a credit hold with suppliers, because money would come in over a period which would
not necessarily match the spend needed to pay the suppliers off and bear your in-house costs.
The fundamental flaw that derived from this set up was the policy of hoarding labour and the
underdiversified nature of our product base. Previously some of the functions that were around
were more like a job creation scheme. These problems became fully exposed when we moved
from cost plus to fixed price contracts ...
A picture emerges of a self-confirming nexus, from the MOD to the shopfloor, which conspired to
create a 'degenerate capitalist firm1 where management largely abrogated control of costs and the
labour process.
The customer was encouraged to treat the supplier as an extension of their own activities,
where technical difficulties would be resolved, rather than Ferranti behaving as a commercial
outfit with distinct interests in continually improving how it does its business and the costs
involved. At the middle management level, ... , costings were largely ignored in the equation of
solving technical problems. This led to the problem of a lack of accountability and a tendency
for effort and knowledge to become specialised and localised, confined to some few
individuals. You know what they say: 'knowledge is power'.
(GEC manager)
210
When GEC managers arrived in Edinburgh they were determined to transform the Ferranti
management style. One incoming GEC manager noted the way that the previously acquired
hierarchical status of senior managers resulted in cultural aloofness:
One of the main problems that was discovered on arriving at South Gyle was the Victorian
attitudes of the senior Ferranti management. They seemed more interested in exuding an air of
visible superiority over their subordinates than in managing and leading people as part of team
effort.
GEC managers viewed such patrician affectations as part of the wider problem of hierarchical
disdain for strict financial accountability. The laxity of cost-control bordered on the treasonous for
the new managers steeped in the pecuniary practices of GEC.
Table 8.8: Ferranti: Financial performance (averages), 1981-92
Total return to shareholders




1981-1985 20% 20% 30% 14% 25%
1986-1992 3% -18% -21% 14% 16%
Source: Goold et al, 1993, p52
The tight financial controls at Ferranti were nowhere near as rigorous as the controls at GEC, and
nor did they penetrate all levels of decision-making in the same way. Furthermore, the claim that
Ferranti's strategies were 'cautious', making 'relatively small investments', may apply to the group
as a whole. In Scotland, however, even after the new financial regime installed by Alun Jones in the
1970s, Ferranti continued to invest in new buildings and plant, especially the South Gyle complex,
employment continued to rise and they managed to retain enough of a technological lead in avionics
to be the leading contender for arguably the most prestigious radar contract in Europe. As Table
8.8 indicates, Ferranti's annual return to shareholders was higher than average for the electronics
industry as a whole and, at 30 per cent, twice the level of GEC between 1981 and 1985. It is only
after the ISC merger that Ferranti's financial performance deteriorates. Whatever model of
management style is appended to Ferranti, the underlying problem was structural. As a medium
sized company in a high tech market coming under increasingly monopolistic control in the second
half of the 1980s, any possibility of maintaining company independence required desperate
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measures. In any case, independent control would probably have proved to be short lived, even
without ISC.
GEC: The second restructuring phase. 1988-1995
In the late 1980s GEC faced strong international competition. Goold and Campbell (1987)
predicted that the emphasis on short term performance and stand-alone businesses of FCCs were
becoming ill-suited to increasing global competition in markets like defence. In terms of
competitive environment, FCCs performed best in stable 'battles' for market share. The competitive
environment in defence markets after the mid-1980s was becoming more like that of'fierce battles'
in which a Strategic Control style was more suited. In 'fierce battle1 environments intensified
competition, depressed profitable opportunities and dramatic changes in the fortunes for some
companies means that the centre has to decide whether it wants to pursue an ambitious 'win'
strategy requiring flexible controls, a 'hold' strategy requiring tight strategic controls, or a 'retrench'
strategy needing tight financial controls (Goold and Campbell, 1987:227-233).
GEC opted to protect its Financial Control management style by meeting the competitive threats of
'fierce battle' through a series of joint ventures and alliances and consolidating its presence in
defence markets. Initially this seemed to be a high risk strategy, particularly with the vulnerability
of large projects to cancellation. Thus GEC Avionics and GEC Computers faced job losses of
1,500 when in December 1986 the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system for Nimrod aircraft
was cancelled and the US built Boeing AWACS system ordered after technical difficulties resulted
in substantial cost overruns and time delays. At a cost of £1 billion and an additional £860 million
for AWAC, the AEW cancellation further damaged GEC's reputation for innovation and
efficiency. Comparing GEC to a 'manufacturing white elephant', Willet (1988:167-8) argued 'One
billion pounds sustaining 1,500 jobs over nine years is a very expensive employment creation
scheme, which has done little for the nation's industrial or technological prestige'.
If GEC was indeed a white elephant it had a severe case of elephantiasis. It embarked on further
corporate growth by a series of major take-overs between 1985 and 1995. These are outlined in
Table 8.9. In non-defence sectors, GEC amalgamated its telecommunications activities with
Plessey in 1988; merged its power generation, distribution and transmission and rail transport
businesses with Alcatel Althsom of France in March 1989; and formed a joint venture with GE of
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the USA for GEC's Consumer Goods Group (Cm 2852. 1995:42). Williams et al
(1990:469).recently summarised GEC's overall approach.
GEC is becoming a rentier capitalist firm whose profits increasingly come from short term
investment and shareholdings in electrical businesses which somebody else manages. GEC's
remaining direct responsibility for manufacturing is increasingly confined to defence
contracting where the profitability of development and production is guaranteed ...
Table 15.9 Major acquisitions and alliances involving GEC, 1985 -1995










1989 General Electric (US) Consumer goods group 50:50 Joint venture
1990 Plessey Aerospace, avionics, naval
systems, electronic systems,
semiconductors
GEC 60: Siemens 40
Take-over
1990 Ferranti Defence electronics, radar,
avionics
Take-over
1992 Ferranti Dynamics division Take-over
1993
Ferranti Defence systems integration
division
Take-over
1995 VSEL Warshipbuilder Take-over
In the defence sector, the Clyde warshipbuilder, Yarrow, was acquired from British Shipbuilders in
1985; in alliance with Siemens of Germany, GEC took over Plessey in March 1990 after the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission prevented an earlier single bid by GEC in 1985; acquired
FDSL in 1990 and later acquired several other Ferranti businesses, including Ferranti Defence
Systems Integration and Ferranti's 50 per cent shareholding in Ferranti Thomson Sonar Systems,
and took over several small US-based defence firms; and acquired the warshipbuilder, VSEL, in
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June 1995. At some stage. GEC is widely expected to acquire or merge with the other UK defence
giant. British Aerospace (BAe). giving it a national monopoly in a broad range of UK defence
markets.
By the mid-1980s GEC already had a virtual monopoly in some areas of military radar, such as
army tracking radar and naval tracking radar. When Plessey's activities were added the merged
firm dominated most other areas of military radar. With Ferranti the only major competitor in
military airborne radar, GEC still controlled just over half of the £150 million annual sales between
1984 and 1988. Through the acquisitions of Plessey and FDSL, GEC's main defence division,
Marconi, was strengthened considerably. In 1989 GEC received over three times the amount of
MOD spending as Plessey, who in turn received about 50 per cent more than Ferranti, the next
largest electronics company. Combined the two companies took around three-quarters of the total
value of MOD spending with major electronics companies. The greater part of this expenditure
with GEC and Plessey was issued on a non-competitive basis (Cm 676, 1989:23, 24). While one
commentator saw the joint venture to take-over Plessey as evidence that 'the one time crown jewel
of British industry seems doomed to become an offshoot of Siemens' (Riley, 1991, in Dunne and
Smith, 1992:100), Goold, et al (1993) noted the tension in the contrasting management styles of
GEC's financial control and short-term performance and Siemens emphasis on long-term research
and cross-subsidy support for even poorly-performing subsidiaries.
Ferranti at the time of the take-over
Against the background of an incoherent competition and merger policy and GEC's determination
to become the UK's national champion in defence, the take-over of Ferranti can be better
understood. Whatever happened to the government's competition policy? Nicholas Ridley,
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, decided against referring the take-over of Ferranti to the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission because competition issues were outweighed by 'public
interest' considerations (Financial Times, 10 February 1990). The public interest was represented
by the strategic importance of the technological capabilities of Ferranti and the commitment of the
government to EFA. In fact, here the government were directly responsible for brokering the take¬
over and had no intention of submitting GEC to an MMC investigation. The international context
of competition was beginning to have a wider resonance than just a few years earlier. In the
emerging European arms industry pan-national consortia were increasingly becoming permanent
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collaborations, thus reducing the need for the MOD to maintain domestic competition between
equipment suppliers (Campbell. 1990). While a take-over gave GEC a monopoly in airborne radar
design and manufacture, the MOD could claim that its competition policy was unaffected by the
creation of a domestic monopoly. Although the UK government was at the vanguard of the liberal
restructuring of weapons procurement, as the case study of the Ferranti and ECR-90 makes clear
defence electronics was still informed, above all, by the strategic and technological priorities of the
nation-state.
Ferranti International officially sold the Edinburgh-based FDSL and part of the operation in Italy
to GEC for £3 10 million on 2nd March 1990. The news that Ferranti had been chosen for the £2
billion contract to design the EFA radar had been leaked on 22 January and GEC submitted a bid
to acquire FDSL the very next day (Financial Times, 23, 24 January 1990; The Economist, 1990).
GEC's attitude to the take-over was summarised by one manager:
The rule that is applied by GEC when making an acquisition is whether the sum of the parts of
the targeted group make it worthwhile. The bits that are outside the core focus of activities can
be disposed of later. In the case of Ferranti the EFA contract made it extremely attractive and
complemented GEC's existing activities in the avionics field.
ECR-90 ensured that Ferranti would be within GEC's core activities. The new company became a
subsidiary of GEC Marconi and was renamed GEC Ferranti Defence Systems Limited (GFDSL).
The take-over of Ferranti did not happen only on the basis of Ferranti's poor financial credibility
but fits within an overall pattern of restructuring in the defence industry. Taking on size is a key
way for defence companies to retrench and consolidate their activities:
What has been happening to Ferranti is not exceptional or different from the experiences of the
rest of the industry in the UK or globally. It cannot be looked at as one discrete item but as a
point in a set of events. Independent, stand alone companies have now gone for good in the
defence industry. The fact is that such firms need to become part of global oligopolies in the
defence market or they will perish. Looked at this way, Ferranti was only one molecule in a
wider reconfiguration of the industry. Standing alone, it would have been unable to fund the




In the light of government policies of competition, privatisation and fixed-price contracts, designed
to pass on the risks and costs of programmes to private capital, the need to commit major
investment to research and development was emphasised by a number of managers as a crucial
factor in the take-over. GEC managers bemoaned the lack of institutional support for the UK
defence industry' when it comes to international competition, which they saw as a further reason for
medium-sized firms to come under the umbrella of GEC.
The global market in arms equipment is now saturated with choice. The export-driven post-
Cold War environment has led to global market entry into previously restricted areas by new
producers, fully backed by their governments. The UK government's notion of a level playing
field in the market is misconceived. The UK license approval system and Export Credit
policies prevent contracts being won in particular places such as Argentina, because of the
political legacy of the Falklands war, which was fought over ten years ago, and inflation, debt-
riddled countries like Brazil. In the latter case, GEC was working with a German firm for a
contract in Brazil, who had backing in terms of export credits and licenses from their
government within days, while the UK government dithered for months. Only the timely cash
support of GEC and certain financial institutions helped the firm to participate in the
collaboration on the contract. The UK government, the Board of Trade, MOD and the Foreign
Office do not offer British manufacturers the same kind of institutional support as that
available from the French or German governments. As a result of this concern with an
idealised level playing field, we tend to play short-handed when it comes to competition.
In the face of the changed procurement conditions and the ISC scandal Ferranti were thus seriously
under-capitalised.
In the past capital investments for developing new systems were always government-led.
Commercial customers, unlike defence customers, do not pay for product development, at least
not directly (they usually pass on the cost of development onto the customers by building it in
to the final price of the product). This kind of government sponsorship is now no longer true
for defence companies. They now have to find much of the resources for staying in the game
from their own pockets. Therefore firms need the protection and support of larger and larger
units which really ends up undermining the competition ethos which led to the withdrawal of
government support in the first place. This is part of the logic of the GEC take-over of
Ferranti.
(GEC manager)
With fixed price contracts the lowest bidder may not be the best bid. Other factors than cost
alone enter into bid packages such as technology and the corporate ability to absorb risk and
costs. GEC provided Ferranti with the latter. The risk involved could mean financial ruin to an
under-capitalised firm so mergers and take-overs become the means of protection. This also
puts fewer firms in the position of competing for the prime contracts. There was a logic to the
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take-over. Smiths and Racal are also in the running to follow Ferranti and it is only a matter of
time before somebody makes a successful bid for them ... Now even foreign firms such as
Thomson in France are interested in partnerships on projects and are making inroads into
British industry.
(GEC manager)
A further factor besides possession of the ECR 90 contract made Ferranti particularly attractive to
GEC: its technological capabilities. One manager noted the way that the 'food chain' of adding
value to equipment operated in conditions ofmonopoly control or low competition:
If you look at military aircraft there is only now one manufacturer, BAe. If you look at
submarine construction there is only one company, VSEL. If you look at tanks there is only
one manufacturer, Vickers. So the inescapable conclusion must be that the government's
competition policy is a myth, at least within Britain. Yet because the defence market is based
on political decision making, government's will not make these kind of purchases from foreign
suppliers. The defence market is all about politics at the end of the day. Levene's two
successors took competition policy further than even he had intended and what has happened is
that some firms had to be swallowed up in the food chain. You are effectively left with no
competition among platform manufacturers, which makes them even more attractive to systems
integrators. This is part of 'the food chain' whereby the value of the systems in weapons
equipment becomes a greater proportion overall than the platforms that they are housed in.
Around 40 percent of the value of EFA is embodied in the radar, for example. So the people
who are pre-eminent in defence industries are the systems integration people with traditional
metal-bashing people contributing less value and are more readily subsumed by systems-led
conglomerates.
Conclusion
This, then, is the context of the GEC take-over of Ferranti in early 1990. GEC adapted its
traditional corporate strategy of growth-through-acquisition to the defence market just at a time in
the 1980s when the nature of arms production was changing; the industry had largely passed into
private hands, it was beginning to move beyond national boundaries in Europe and concentrated on
an increasingly monopolistic scale. This process was encouraged by a policy climate involving
privatisation and marketised arms-length procurement, governmental brokering of transnational
collaborations and export drives, and a disinclination for government to explicitly shape the
national defence industry, whether through the merger process, public ownership and control or the
planning of future industrial capabilities.
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For Ferranti. released from public control in 1980. the promises of marketised militarism turned
especially sour with the ISC debacle. Having initially avoided a GEC take-over and protected for a
further two years by the restricted covenant, Ferranti managers were all too aware of the
vulnerability of medium-sized defence electronics firms and the attractions they held for aspirant
defence giants like GEC. The ISC deal, premised on the demands of accumulation to expand
market reach, seemed to offer a sufficient size to replace state bail-out as a way of warding off the
unwanted attentions of GEC. Company independence at all costs was repeatedly held out by the
Ferranti management and the Scottish lobby as coterminous with the interests of Ferranti workers
in Scotland. The alternative to this, it was feared, would have been rationalisation, mass
redundancies and closure of the Scottish plants. GEC denials were deemed worthless in the light of
its reputation for rationalisation. Until the scale of the financial calamity that was to befall Ferranti
became public knowledge, company independence rested on securing the radar contract for EFA.
The ISC scandal very nearly put paid to all that: financially Ferranti was in tatters; the EFA
contract, on which so much hinged, was put in serious jeopardy; and the workforce in Edinburgh
seemed, yet again, to be at the mercy of external forces. By now the Scottish lobby was a pale
shadow of its former self. By the late 1980s it no longer commanded anything like the political
muscle it exercised during the 1974 bail-out or, to a lesser extent, when it deflected both the
government and GEC from a single sale of the NEB shares in 1980. The resources of technocratic
militarism, always important for the arms industry in Scotland, seemed to be a spent force.
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Chapter 9
Ferranti in the 1990s
This chapter will deal with the restructuring in Edinburgh in the first half of the 1990s. First,
how the restructuring affected senior and middle management will be discussed. Some of the
contrasts between GEC and Ferranti approaches to management will also be raised. Second,
some of the main processes underlying the changing contours of the workforce will be
described. Third, the character of the trade union response is addressed. Finally, a tentative
discussion of the relatively peaceful nature of this intensive burst of rapid change over a short
period will be undertaken.
Cost over technology: Changing managerial styles
This section will discuss the form of the restructuring of Ferranti's Edinburgh operations. One
of the most significant shifts has been in the management style. A move has occurred under
GEC to embed cost-consciousness more centrally in the routines of management. Although
this was already discernible in certain aspects before 1990, under GEC it penetrates through
every pore of its activities in a way that it never did under Ferranti. How managers relate to
each other and to the people they manage has been re-shaped by the new cost ethos.
After the take-over GEC were determined to transform the Ferranti management style. Central
to the GEC approach was to instate money at the centre of all managerial considerations. First
of all, this meant breaking middle managers out of their 'technology-centred torpor'. As we
have seen, it was commonly observed that GEC delegate operational autonomy to divisions
and business units. Managers from GEC frequently repeated this claim. One GEC manager
saw the restoration of the managerial prerogative like this:
The really big change that has happened under GEC is that, because middle managers are
recognised as being the really important people, they are now finding themselves with
more authority to make decisions, plan and lead. This results in increased levels of
commitment all round, from the staff who can see a responsive and authoritative middle
management; from middle managers who relish the creative challenge of responsibility for
costs and performance; and senior managers who have to agree planned targets which are
achievable if worked for. GEC insists on simple things like accountability and budget
targets being met. Operationally we are not really constrained in the way we do things so
long as the basics are taken care of.
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The basics, of course, refer to the profitability of each business unit. The result has been a
purge on spending. Exhortations to control costs are frequently made and any relationship
involving cash transactions is closely monitored. This excerpt from a leaked memo to the
Scotsman (24 August 1991) from the Managing Director to senior managers typifies the GEC
approach:
... orders and sales figures for the first four months of the year are considerably below
budget. The operational effectiveness of the company is under continual review but the
present performance when combined with the latest trading forecast to the year end
indicate that the cost of running the business must be reduced. In the light of this,
managers have been instructed to carry out a complete review of their operations.
As one interviewee put it, 'Under GEC the pressures to tighten up on costs are unremitting.
There is a continuing, systematic effort to nibble at costs'. However, the usual GEC claims
that increased responsibility on management to control costs was accompanied by autonomy
and discretion on how to do so was disputed by some Ferranti managers. With tight controls
on cost, even the power of senior managers, which was virtually absolute under Ferranti, was
restricted :
An added strain is placed on senior managers because it is their signature that goes on
everything and if there is any comeback about spending then they will take the blame.
[Under Ferranti, the] Deputy MD ... was responsible for signing around 400 cheques per
month. [In contrast] GEC will not use a facsimile signature because it is open to abuse so
each cheque has to be individually signed by hand ... Previously the MD could basically
decide everything. Now discretion has been curtailed because of the risk of auditors
uncovering discrepancies. GEC take the view that everybody is a crook wanting to rob
them.
(Ferranti manager)
The GEC approach, however, may not quite have had the desired effect of restoring
managerial prerogatives and initiative; indeed many managers, especially long-standing
Ferranti ones, may have become ultra-cautious.
At first Ferranti middle managers were the most fearful for their positions because of the
practices of past decades where people and money were thrown at a problem and
remained there after it was solved. It is of little surprise that people were remote at first.
They were a bit scared, resentful and uncomfortable because they knew that change had to
come and inevitably jobs had to go.
(GEC manager)
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Gradually GEC began to import their own people into middle management tiers, migrating
from Kent or Milton Ke\nes. This seemed to be particularly true for financial and accounting
activities, although some important developmental projects also began to be dominated by
GEC engineers. According to one source, 'in some offices only English was spoken'. One trade
unionist, who felt some sympathy for the predicament management were placed in, recalls one
of the forms this took:
There was a major change in policy within the company and you did feel sorry for the
management. There was a saying within trade union circles that if you think GEC treat the
unions badly, they treat the management a helluva lot worse ... Management were under
total fear at the time and with the placing of moles throughout the company, and GEC
appointees within the company, especially within the financial and accounting side of it, it
became quite clear that management were scared of the day they had not seen ...
[Mjanagement were so scared of the GEC team that they were scared to criticise. They
seemed to attempt to introduce Japanese management techniques ... and again it became
quite clear that when individuals within the quality circles or team briefs asked questions
from the management, the management at top level ... failed to have an understanding of
what had been said at management meetings and this was because of the fear factor - a.
They did not want to indicate to the top management that they [did not] know what they
were talking about and b. they did not feel that the working relationship was there for
them to consult ...
(Union convener)
Communications between senior and middle management suffered in this climate of fear. A
couple of examples, perhaps apocryphal, will show how communications were viewed by the
recipients further down the hierarchy.
The phrase at that time was ... the old war one where, during the battle, the general had
turned round and said to his sidekick, 'Send reinforcements. We are going to advance', but
by the time it gets down to the footsoldiers, it ended up saying, 'Send three and fourpence.
We are going to a dance' ... [A]nother true one I can recall is the laser gyroscopes, when
they were telling us how well we had performed, and the management had told us that they
had tested it on a Land Rover, and again, I had to point out to them that it was an
Andover - it was an aeroplane it had been tested on.
(Union convener)
Passing distorted communications down the line seems to have stemmed from the fact that the
autonomy of lower management and supervisory grades was largely fictitious. The technical
backgrounds of existing managerial tiers ill-prepared them for such functions.
At the team briefs, it was a typed message from the top which said to managers that on no
account were they to read out this typed message, they were to put it into their own words
and their own style. Obviously the management did not have the training to be managers.
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They were engineers and that was one of the problems with the company. Engineers and
scientists, to get on. had to become managers rather than good engineers and they had to
start having people below them and having less engineering activities without getting any
training to be managers.
(Union convener)
Obedience to the budget target thus became a surer and safer measure of managerial
competence. There was already an awareness of the centrality of costs for GEC among
Ferranti managers. The customer/producer relationship has shifted closer to being primarily a
cash relationship. A production manager said,
The driving force now is to get the job done as cheaply and quickly as possible. Delivery
on time is sales-driven. The 'drop dead date' for sales is more important than the customer
'drop dead date'. It is sales that brings money in and so it is of over-riding importance.
The initial uncertainty of middle management under GEC rule was reinforced by the removal
of several senior managers, culminating in the departure of the Managing Director, Ron Dunn
in 1993. Ron Dunn was a creature of Ferranti. He had started with Ferranti thirty years earlier
in 1962 as an apprentice and was the personal embodiment of the possibilities for making it to
the top within the company. Despite the recent success in winning a £20 million contract for
EFA laser warning system, safeguarding 100 jobs, Dunn's position became untenable when
GEC-Ferranti's budget was rejected for the forthcoming year by Derek Dickinson, Chief
Executive of GEC Marconi. Serious losses reportedly wiped out profits on the £300 million
ECR90 design and development contract because Ferranti's original bid seriously
underestimated the work entailed. When the extent of the cost overrun was revealed to the
centre, GEC moved to oust Dunn (Scotsman 24 March 1993). Two other senior managers, the
head of the radar services division and the head of materials purchasing, were also removed
around the same time as Ron Dunn (Scotland on Sunday, 2 May 1993).
This has had the desired salutary effect across management. A leading trade unionist
concluded that Dunn's removal sent 'a clear message to management at all levels that if Arnie
[Weinstock] could come in and take out the Managing Director, he could come in and take out
any manager'. The cash juggernaut now being driven through the company was increasingly
steered by GEC personnel. As one said, 'Now that there is a fairly widespread use of GEC
people at senior management level this [cost-driven] philosophy is in the process of being
better understood across the Edinburgh factories'. Only with this infusion of GEC
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practitioners could GEC be confident that the cash-driver would successfully replace the
technology-driver within the firm.
The stress originally placed upon the control of innovation by Ferranti resulted in expansive
capacity to reproduce any of the stages in the conception to execution process of product
development and manufacture. Even under this regime, where larger batches were involved
these were often supplied by outside contractors once the initial development work was done
in-house. For example, sheet metal work was usually contracted out where bulk orders were
concerned. However, in the increasingly internationalised market for avionics, particularly
from US producers enjoying economies of scale, competing on the basis of technological
sophistication alone is insufficient. Although direct control over the labour process is
forsaken, sub-contracting has the advantage of deflecting responsibility for delivery, quality
and cost onto the contractors. In the new order an austere cost regime meant getting inputs as
cheaply as possible.
Because the US has the advantage of volume production runs we need to pay people here
less to compete against this disadvantage of scale. One alternative is sub-contracting. For
example, we used to support a huge machine shop when we could get the same parts
machined for less elsewhere because they wouldn't have the same overhead costs to bear.
In printed circuit boards [PCB], we used to employ dedicated teams to keep abreast of the
latest developments in PCB capabilities. But we were not PCB manufacturers. So if there
were half a dozen PCB innovators we would replicate all their work to make prototypes
for whatever equipment we were developing to find out which was most suitable and
second-guess which would be the most successful in the marketplace. Now we concentrate
on our core business.
(Senior manager)
The move to contracting-out has affected ancillary and manufacturing activities most severely
but high-tech activities were also affected. The maintenance department has been reduced to a
skeletal force, with most maintenance functions now done by contractors. The increasing
sophistication and cheapening of civil technologies, even of highly specialised components,
meant that an increasing range of these could now be bought in (Molas and Walker, 1992;
Walker and Gummett, 1989). Complete optical assemblies, for example, could be procured
from firms in France and Canada where previously individual components would have been
purchased externally and assembled in-house. Even customised printed circuit boards required
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at the developmental stage of a project can be contracted out because of the growing
sophistication and over-capacity of sources in the external market.'
As part of this general approach, GEC installed an extensive programme of cost cutting and
cost-control techniques. A senior manager gave the following list of some of the areas where
costs have been 'nibbled':
GEC brought in their own energy and insurance advisors. Overhead costs have since been
cut by around 25 per cent. Some of the sources of these savings are:
i. Insurance The cost savings in insurance have been considerable because we were able to
take advantage of the insurance terms that a group of GEC's size is able to get.
ii. Energy The water bill has been reduced thanks to implementing a series of small
modifications, such as moving from the toilets flushing routinely after a time lapse they
now only flush after X amount of usage. Fuel costs have also been cut considerably. Our
coal fire boiler was converted to gas which is much cheaper to run. At the front entrances
to buildings double doors have been installed to protect against cold blasts getting in to the
site or heat escaping out when doors are opened.
iii. Sub-contracts We used to run a garage to maintain our fleet of vehicles; now we have
a contract with a commercial garage. The same could be said of maintenance. The
maintenance department was reduced to emergency staff consisting of a few plumbers and
electricians. The maintenance contract is strictly enforced for value. Some things have
been retained such as security and subsidised canteens, although even here routine
building security is provided by a security firm, Group 4, and the canteen subsidy has
remained constant or fallen in real terms. The gardening costs have also been cut by sub¬
contracting.
iv Overtime Overtime is viewed as expensive and wasteful and the levels have been
reduced accordingly. This is not always a good measure since it can be a cheaper option
than employing extra full time people with all the extra costs that entails for National
Insurance, pensions, sick, holidays and so on.
v. Marketing expenditure has also been cut. Newspapers and advertising expenses have
been tightened up. We reviewed the range of industry magazines we advertise in and the
ones which we have a subscription for.
vi. The 3T's are strictly controlled - 1. time-keeping; 2. travel; 3. telephones. Senior
managers have stopped travelling first class. Every telephone had a label on it with 'Call
after 1pm' to remind callers of the cheap rate, although this is no longer the case.
1 For example, Hughes Microelectronics Europa in conjunction with one of its (unnamed) Scottish
customers, who produce boards for high reliability military grade applications, developed a
wavesoldering process for producing PCBs that can operate at up to temperatures of 170°C - 30%
higher than standard high temperature assemblies - using conventional production equipment and
materials {Electronic Production, February 1997: 5).
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vii. Purchasing, for instance when resistors are being bought in there is a system of
combined or bulk buying through centralised purchasing and receiving stores. Local
model shops were centralised to reduce the overheads.
viii. Physical use of space has been rationalised. Robertson Avenue, Telford House,
Bellesk have been closed down. There has been a need for the space occupied to
correspond to the reduced numbers on the site. Clean room space was cut by consolidating
more activities in the same vicinity.
ix. Tiers ofmanagement have been reduced although much more remains to be done.
If, because of the demand for high quality inputs and in-house capabilities, the backward
linkages into the local economy were already weak under Ferranti then they were further
weakened under GEC. Despite GEC's policy of vertical disintegration, local suppliers do not
seem to have benefited from the increased use of out-sourcing. Although public figures are not
released by GEC, the impression given is that with the increasing scope for global sourcing,
particularly from civil industry, if anything GEC have reduced their supplies from local
sources. Doubts remain among GEC managers over the capabilities of local suppliers to meet
the demand for complex, high-quality components to internationally determined levels of cost
and delivery times. In terms of a preferential policy for Scottish suppliers, only those suppliers
that can meet demanding criteria will be considered:
The nature of the work done here means that very specialised types of components are
needed. My impression is that local suppliers cannot deliver in all respects. Our supplies
reach us from a range of sources near and far. We cannot afford to be isolated or
parochial about the business we get from the MOD.
GEC managers complained that local suppliers fail to orientate their marketing on what they
can offer and become over-dependent on prime contractor support. GMav have thus moved to
a 'preferred supplier' system when purchasing components and subassembled units. Assistance
has also been given on project management and GMav sometimes covered one-off
development costs. When drawing up their spend plans for the next one or five years preferred
suppliers were invited in 'as partners, so that they can tell us which aspects of the work they
would like to be involved in and where they might need project or investment support from us'
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Another way of making costs visible to the producer is GEC's amoeba approach to stand alone
business units: as soon as divisions are identified as too unwieldy break them up into smaller
single units. This played a central part in the reorganisation of the Edinburgh factories.
To begin with GEC concentrated all its defence avionics activities within a single company,
which was further sub-divided into product-based divisions. In an attempt to secure a new
corporate identity GEC Avionics. GEC Ferranti. GEC Sensors and GEC Aerospace were
brought together under one umbrella. With the formation of the new company, GEC Marconi
Avionics Ltd (GMav), GEC created the biggest avionics company in Europe. GMav's order
book worth some £1.5 billion, annual turnover of £650 million and 12,000 employees
comprised an important part of GEC's overall £9 billion turnover and 150,000 employees
worldwide (GMav, 1993).
The reorganisation removed the Ferranti name from Edinburgh for the first time in fifty years.
Edinburgh was initially split into four divisions, controlled on a day-to-day basis locally but
responsible to the GMav head office in Rochester, Kent. These divisions were Displays
Division at South Gyle, Radar Systems Division at Crewe Toll, Navigation and Electro-optics
Systems Division (NESD) at Silverknowes and the Support Division at South Gyle. Their
place in the GEC organisational structure is given in Figure 9.1.
From being the undisputed core of the old Ferranti operations, exercising almost complete
management autonomy, Edinburgh was now at the very bottom of the corporate hierarchy of a
major conglomerate. Edinburgh became three-times removed from GEC HQ at Stanhope
Gate. Coming directly under GEC-Marconi Avionics at Rochester, who were responsible to
GEC-Marconi HQ at Stanmore, who in their turn reported to Stanhope Gate, Edinburgh
seemed to be getting pushed further from the main decision-making centres. The 1993
reorganisation not surprisingly created alarm in Scotland. Gavin Strang, Labour MP for
Edinburgh East and chair of the Labour MP's Marconi group, was therefore less reassured
than Ron Dunn about the implications of the reorganisation,
I am concerned there could be a long-term threat to employment here. At the end of the
day we need to have as many top decision making centres in Scotland as possible. The
more top people there are based in Scotland the more likely we are of seeing expansion.
Therefore I very much regret the fact GEC have not taken the opportunity to make the
headquarters of this new company in Edinburgh (in Evening News 8 January 1993).
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If it seemed anomalous in the 1990s to bemoan the choking-off of expansion for a defence
firm. Strang reflected a wider unease about the relationship between the loss of decision¬
making functions and falling employment levels in Scotland.
Figure 9.1 Location of Edinburgh plants in the GEC-Marconi Avionics reporting structure
POSITION LOCATION FUNCTION




Overall HQ for GEC
Overall HQ for GEC-Marconi
Overall HQ for GEC-Marconi Avionics
GEC Marconi Avionics
Support Division, South Gyle
Radar Division, Crewe Toll
Display Division, South Gyle
Navigation & Electro-optic Systems
Division, Silverknowes*
* In 1995, NESD came under GEC-Marconi Radar and Defence Systems, also based at
Stanmore, Middlesex
A long-standing trade unionist noted the way that divisionalisation reinforced the ascendancy
of cost considerations,
The most important change since GEC arrived has been divisionalisation. This has
intensified the pervasiveness of the accountancy-driven nature of the firm. GEC
permanently lean on costs, with the sole criteria being whether people or things can be got
cheaper elsewhere. Individual divisions are now responsible for their own budgets. GEC
have a rigid and ruthless attitude to controlling costs. Although they have centralised
controls on cash, operational autonomy within strictly defined financial limits is the way
that they work. There is an ongoing attempt to match Marconi structures to revised ideas
about prospects in the market.
The main idea is to push responsibility and control for financial performance as far as
possible from the centre. Each division has an arms length relationship to each other in an
attempt to replicate market conditions within the organisation. The planning of investments
and work flows should be determined locally according to strict financial criteria.
GEC allows a terrific amount of autonomy and discretion in how its plants are operated.
The only constraints are meeting budgetary targets once they are agreed at the centre. This
means that we can generate our investments locally or plan them locally. If the planning is
done properly the centre will rarely turn down a request for additional funding.
(GEC manager)
227
This represented a major shift away from the previous Ferranti style. From a relaxed system
for regulating costs, large inventories of stock and elaborate co-ordination of multi-site
activities, individual managers became visible suddenly for tight budgets and contract
monitoring within a bounded area of activity.
After they took out Ron Dunn, they decided that they would do away with that whole
management structure, so they took out that whole team and divisionalised the company.
Yet there was a growing awareness within the company that it was now cost centre-driven
and it was direct versus indirect [costs]. I mean these were all new terms to a company
which had been cost plus. They would find themselves having to get a cost, a charge
number for anything. They could not get a pen to write on without one.
(Union convener)
Previously jobs were booked on the same charges regardless of the site it was being done
at. Now with divisionalisation each site has a charge for its part of any job and is only
responsible for maintaining its sales target. In the last month before the end of the
financial year there is a massive drive for output needed for sales. Output is now being
monitored on a monthly basis in an attempt to flatten out the peaks and troughs and so
preventing or at least alleviating the last minute flurry.
(Chief production engineer)
Yet it is far from clear how efficient divisionalisation has been for regulating costs or ironing
out work flows. In the solving of problems about making costs transparent and individual
centres financially responsible and accountable, other problems were created. Many
respondents noted the way that overall costs have risen through the increased duplication of
facilities and activities. Management were also concerned about activities in Edinburgh being
conjoined to other centres, over whose performance they had little control, and that the trade
unions may be in a position to take advantage of a divided management structure.
The setting up ofGMav meant that our overall costs have gone up because Rochester was
less efficient. More recently, the centralisation of activity is being reversed with some
duplication involved in decentralisation and independence in that each division has to
stand alone and therefore requires their own devolved Personnel team, stores and despatch
and so on. GMav wants to devolve other areas like finance but there are problems about
diluting expertise in specialist areas like arranging financial cover for foreign currency
transactions. Each division will now need a specialist in export/import license regulations
and procedures but this again is a highly specialised capability. The other danger is that
the more autonomous the divisions become the easier it would be for the employees to take
advantage of divisional differences and fears.
(Ferranti manager)
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The stores have also been decentralised, duplicating spares and stocks where before the
central store at Shore Road would have covered all the Edinburgh sites. To keep
centralised stores takes a fair bit of organisation and money gets tied up in common stock
which may not be needed for some time, although savings can be made in bulk buying and
co-ordinating orders from suppliers. With decentralised stores responsibility for the costs
of stockholding has to be borne by the division and does not evaporate into the wider
organisation.
(GEC manager)
But one of the outcomes of divisionalisation has been an increase in bureaucracy and a
slowdown in decision-making.
There are now more rules and procedures to be followed under GEC than there ever was
under Ferranti. This is mainly a function of the scale of GEC's operations where
accountability at all levels is necessary. GEC is a bureaucratically-run organisation which
causes certain inefficiencies ... The speed of decision making is now much slower because
of the bureaucracy. The division in Edinburgh now reports to GMav (Rochester), who in
turn report to GEC Marconi (Stanmore), who in turn reports to GEC pic HQ.
(Union convener)
I would say that decision making has slowed up. If we want clearance or advice we have
to go through Stanmore which takes time. You also have to spend time pushing for
attention and getting your problem addressed at the highest level.
(Personnel manager)
In Edinburgh there was widespread concern that reorganisation would culminate in the
relegation or closure of the Edinburgh activities. Just weeks before he was fired, Dunn had
been appointed Deputy Chairman of GMav and reassuringly said, 'There is no plan to relocate
work or activities, the new organisation being primarily aimed at optimising the management
of the businesses in a highly competitive international market' (Evening News 8 January
1993).
A further effect of divisionalisation has been to increase the number of layers between the
locally-based units and the final decision-making centres. Each separate company within
GEC-Marconi, such as GMav, now has its own internal structure within which the divisions
report. Organisationally, Edinburgh was subordinate to Rochester, while the management
structure locally was becoming increasingly GECified: managers were parachuted in and
initially stood out because of their accents and/or outlook and attitude, which existing
management were required to ape. In the process of adapting to the new conditions, Ferranti
managers experienced a diminishing authority and control over their affairs and there may
229
well be less sense of local ownership or commitment to policies emanating from beyond
Edinburgh. One Ferranti manager, still hoping to be promoted further, said that he has had 'to
change something of my approach to suit the new circumstances; you have to bend with the
wind or you will get broken' .
The social contours of restructuring
The redundancy process
By the time of the reorganisation, the threat of redundancy had become commonplace.
Between November 1989 and June 1995, there were nine major redundancy exercises. With
only very selective recruitment taking place in the first half of the 1990s, the size of the
workforce was halved from around 6,800 to nearer 3,000. For GEC, this was a necessary
consequence of fitting the company to the rigours of the emerging defence market.
In Scotland, GEC were widely blamed for the scale of the jobs being lost. However, the first
three rounds of job losses took place before GEC took over. Indeed the first cuts took place
before the ISC scandal became public knowledge. On 25 August 1989 Ferranti announced the
cancellation of the current financial plan and a reduction in staff levels of 400 after an 18 per
cent fall in pre-tax profits and production targets failing to be met. The 400 jobs would go as
a result of 'natural wastage', i.e. the non-replacement of retirals and leavers. A Socialist
Worker leaflet, 'Profits at £87 million - NO JOB LOSSES', was one of the first public sources
to argue that the real problem lay with the financial arrangements entered into with ISC. Two
ex-ISC Directors had only recently left the Ferranti board 'to pursue other interests' (Ferranti,
1993:68) taking the assets of ISC Technologies Inc with them. The annulment of the financial
plan took place even though profits increased from £78.9 million to £87 million. It was further
argued that production targets had been artificially inflated. Union officials accepted the
criteria of 'natural wastage' but warned that they would resist compulsory redundancies. A
similar tack was taken when four hundred redundancies were announced in November 1989
'due to declining sales'. Again this mainly affected the over-60 year olds and were realised
through early retirements. The numbers were reduced to 180, who left with a relatively
generous severance and pension package, maintained as it would have been had they retired at
the usual time. The package consisted of: statutory redundancy plus a tax free service
payment plus 1 months wage plus up to 12 weeks pay in lieu of notice.
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The trade unions co-operated with these redundancies since they were to be done on a
voluntary and early retirement basis, although Ken Gill. President of MSF. warned that the
union would 'oppose resolutely any attempt to impose compulsory redundancies' (Scotsman 11
November 1989). The next round came sooner than expected in February 1990, after it was
known that GEC would be taking over. Again, around 120-150 volunteers got roughly the
same package as the early retirals. Targeting older workers at this stage had the effect of
significantly reducing the age profile of the workforce.
With the arrival of GEC in March 1990 it was anticipated that the number of redundancies
would increase. In April, Managing Director Ron Dunn, (now nicknamed 'Ron-Dunndancy"
by the workforce), made it clear that further cuts were to be expected, 'We are in a planning
process which will probably result in some sort of cutback, but where and when that will come
I don't yet know' (Reid, 1990). The first redundancy announcement under GEC came only two
months later on 18 June 1990. Some 550 jobs were to be lost. The press release said, 'The
cancellation of a major overseas order and increased competition for orders in the defence
market-place has required a review of the business and its organisation. The result of the
review is a need to reduce manning levels with, regrettably, the proposed loss of up to 550
jobs at the Edinburgh units' (GFDSL...NEWSFLASH, 18 June 1990).
Discontent among the workforce increased with the way that the redundancy process was
handled by GEC. Immediately before the redundancy announcement, Ferranti employees were
shown a company promotional video, 'We're a Success', which emphasised future prospects in
glowing terms. Initially, around 100 workers volunteered for redundancy and it was made
clear that the rest would be composed of compulsory redundancies. A mass meeting of 1,200
AEU and EETPU members voted to ballot for industrial action if the threat of compulsory
redundancies was not withdrawn (Socialist Worker 30 June 1990). A further mass meeting on
20 July 1990, this time involving 3,000 MSF, AEU and EETPU members, again voted to
ballot for strike action. The unions complained that the company had failed to observe
consultation procedures by approaching individuals directly to take redundancy before the
unions had been advised ofwho was on the redundancy list. Time scales were also accelerated
by GEC, leaving insufficient time for the unions to propose alternative labour use through
redeployment and retraining and maximise the number of voluntary redundancies.
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Doug Rooney. Divisional Officer of the AEU. accused GEC of 'importing an alien industrial
relations culture1 into Ferranti and eroding the autonomy of local managers to make decisions.
'Quite frankly, the entire community in the Edinburgh factor}1 is not proud to be GEC
employees' (The Scotsman, 18 July 1990). Before the ballot could be conducted, however,
compulsory redundancy notices were issued. Several sections immediately walked out in
protest but were ordered to return to keep the union within legal requirements. By the time that
the ballot was finally held, after a six week delay by the unions in getting the ballot organised,
any mood for action had largely dissipated, with MSF members voting against any form of
action while the AEU and EETPU voted for limited selective action (Socialist Worker 18
August 1990). Ferranti finally renegotiated the redundancy programme with the unions and
later claimed that only 15 were compulsory redundancies out of a total of 460 across
Edinburgh (The Scotsman 2 February 1991).
The next round of cuts, involving 350 job losses, were announced in early February 1991, in
the midst of the second Gulfwar (Evening News. The Scotsman 2 February 1991). A leaked
memo. 'Cutting Costs', suggested that GEC were unimpressed by the cost-cutting efforts of the
Edinburgh management in 1990. It said, 'Since we must expect to live through hard times as
well as sunny seasons we must be able to increase our efficiency ... when demand falls there
must be less procrastination in the reduction of numbers employed' (Socialist Worker 23
March 1991). By announcing redundancies at this time GEC further inflamed the situation.
The timing of the announcement was severely criticised by the unions because many workers
were working 'flat out' producing equipment to support the RAF and the Navy in the Gulf.
Only a few weeks earlier Prime Minister, John Major, visited the South Gyle complex to
promote the Ferranti equipment being used in the Gulf (Topic, March 1991). Extra shifts were
being worked every Saturday and Sunday plus two evenings per week and the factories were
even opened on Christmas Day and New Year's Day (Kimber, 1991). A bulletin produced by
union activists reported how management 'Team Briefings' repeatedly stressed the importance
of production for the Gulf, particularly the servicing of equipment for Tornado:
• John Major wishes to thank the Ferranti workers on the magnificent role they are
playing in the current crisis (Jan '91)
• Our products are performing well in the Gulf (Feb '91)
• Thanks are coming back to the loyal and supportive staff in the UK (Feb '91)
(Ferranti Bulletin #2: Vote For Action; Ferranti Bulletin #4: Step Up The Fight Now)
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The same Team Briefings contained contradictors' messages:
In the Gulf morale is good among our teams. Equipment is performing well. In particular
the crews of the Tornados are very pleased ... Employees whose jobs are at risk due to
staffing levels have been informed by their supervisors (Kimber, 1991)
The AEU convener, Kenny Barnes said,
We have to be realistic and accept that if there is less work it [GEC] will have to trim
back. But the timing is pretty sick. There are a number of people who take the view that
this is a most unfortunate time to do this. We have people in one section working double
shifts and through the night while people are being paid off next door. It is pretty clear we
will have to pursue civil diversification with a vengeance or we will be facing the death of
a 1000 cuts {The Scotsman 2 February 1991).
Here again the principle of redundancies was accepted, 'if there is less work', while being
criticised indirectly for insensitive timing and uneven workload spreads. Instead, unions
pursued a policy of going through procedural negotiations to mitigate compulsory
redundancies and to improve redundancy terms. However, while the unions were not prepared
to ballot for action over either the terms or the principle of redundancy, some sections were
prepared to support a ban on overtime working. Individual shop stewards won support to
implement an unofficial overtime in five staff sections, involving workers on the Tornado
radar. In the context of the second Gulf war, where Ferranti products formed part of the Pax
Technologica gathered for 'Desert Storm', even an overtime ban could have an immediate
effect on the in-service support and supplies needed in the theatre to keep the complex
technologies operational. However, the MSF shop stewards committee, with one eye on the
law, rejected a proposal to ballot for an official overtime ban before negotiating procedures
had been exhausted. A tacit understanding was reached among shop stewards that there was
no law preventing individuals from refusing to work overtime on a personal basis (Kimber,
1991).
Yet before the vote the situation remained volatile. When the vague announcement of the
numbers being made redundant was translated into precise figures for particular divisions the
mood of the workforce could shift from seemingly disinterested passivity to stormy mass
meetings demanding immediate action from the unions. One example of this was the outrage
over a further 45 redundancies at Display Systems in South Gyle on top of the 350 announced
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during the Gulf war. The South Gyle complex had been largely unaffected by redundancies in
the earlier exercises. Indeed Robertson Avenue was the worst hit site in this round, with test
equipment manufacture being concentrated at Donibristle in Fife.
As a modem, purpose built site on the outskirts of Edinburgh, workers at 'the Gyle' often
seemed remote from affairs in the city sites. During the Gulf war the Support Division at
South Gyle played a critical role in supporting GMav products in the theatre through field
maintenance support and the provision and manufacture of spares and repairs of parts at
home. Although the trade unions had a presence, their base and cadre among the Gyle
workforce was not as deeply embedded as at Silverknowes or Crewe Toll. Thus the ferocity of
the Gyle workers' reaction came as a bit of a surprise to the trade unions. Barnes for the AEU
said, 'We had a very, very hostile meeting. People were upset that they have been let down by
the company after their efforts during the Gulf crisis. It was all we could do to make sure they
did not walk out. They feel they have been kicked in the teeth' {Evening News 3 April 1991,
emphasis added). The unions reasoned that GEC had kept their plans for the South Gyle
redundancies secret until the possibility of disrupting supplies to the Gulf was lifted. Rab
Menzies, Senior Shop Steward added, 'When the redundancies were happening in other
departments, the management went to great lengths to tell these people they were safe. We can
only assume it was so that they could look after themselves during the Gulf war. They have
kept their intentions under wraps until it was over' {Evening News 3 April 1991).
Although the unions lost the ballot in 1990 for industrial action against redundancies
{Financial Times 11 September 1990), six weeks after the February 1991 announcement staff
workers voted two to one for action short of a strike. The shopfloor unions announced their
result a week later, a five to one vote in favour action short of a strike {Socialist Worker 6
April 1991). There was a clear willingness by the workforce to impose some form of sanction
on GEC, even after a one and a half month delay while official procedures were pursued by
union officials. Undoubtedly, the unofficial overtime ban by a minority of sections seemed a
more effective means of pressurising management than negotiating through official channels.
Staff workers and shopfloor workers operated an official overtime ban and work to rule for
the next seven weeks. Repeated appeals by managers to have sections work overtime on
particularly urgent work met with refusal. The bulletin produced by union activists, Ferranti
Bulletin #5, highlighted a number of areas where work fell behind schedule because of the
ban, such as navigation systems for the Challenger tank and operators being put on waiting
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time at DSD at South Gyle because priority needed to be given to work delayed at Radar
Systems Division at Crewe Toll. Even in cases where some workers were willing to defy the
overtime ban. the threat of blacking any work performed on overtime during normal hours
forced management to withdraw overtime in these sections. Towards the end of May union
officials were no longer confident that they could maintain the ban and argued that a fresh
mandate from the members was needed by law. When one section agreed to work overtime
before the vote was taken over 100 workers walked out in protest. However, when the vote
was taken it resulted in a two to one split to end the official ban. This was to be the last case
of industrial action for another two years.
Later in 1991, the redundancy terms were cut back by GEC, who argued that the superior
Ferranti terms and conditions for Edinburgh needed to be brought into line with the poorer
ones prevailing under Marconi at Milton Keynes and Donibristle. A GEC statement
announced that '... it is the company's intention to approach any further redundancy exercises
on the basis that statutory payments only would apply, but this would be subject to
consultation at the time' (quoted in Scotsman 12 October 1991). GEC negotiated with the
trade unions and eventually withdrew, without agreement, the more generous redundancy and
pension entitlements and imposed a much reduced entitlement, the standard GEC package.
Money paid in lieu of notice was also scrapped although a maximum 6 weeks notice was
allowed this time. The service element was abolished, so people with, say, 20 years service
lost a great deal. Since then, all subsequent redundancies have been compulsory and at the
statutory redundancy rate plus a small supplement based on age and experience, with no 'in
lieu of notice payment' made. Andy Matson, Regional Officer for MSF called the 'dramatic
reduction ... stingy in the extreme ... Employees who have devoted years to the company are
being offered a pittance for their service' (in The Scotsman 12 October 1991). Matson claimed
that Ferranti's old redundancy package was worth up to more than two and a half times the
GEC deal.
The trade unions were forced to respond. The unions took the company to an Industrial
Tribunal, not on the issue of redundancy payments itself but on the way that GEC
implemented the new terms. The Industrial Tribunal unanimously ruled that GEC did not
allow MSF the required 90 days consultation period for redundancies. Around 500 workers
were reported to qualify for the compensation of 6 weeks salary, amounting to about £2000
each, £1 million in total (Evening News 8 September 1992). GEC employed top lawyers to get
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the ruling overturned at the Employment Appeals Court, chaired by High Court judge. Lord
Coulsfield. Although the unions were 'confident of defeating the company again' GEC's
lawyers successfully argued to have the ruling overturned. According to Lord Coulsfield. the
Industrial Tribunal had given 'no adequate reason' for holding that the consultation period
began at the date claimed by the union. Because there was insufficient material to form a
judgement he ruled to '... allow the appeal and remit the case to a different industrial tribunal
for rehearing' {Evening News 31 October 1992). The trade unions did not return to the
Industrial Tribunal.
Future rounds of redundancies were handled more carefully by GEC so that selection and
consultation procedures were observed. Although based on estimates of projected labour
requirements, one senior manager was clear that 'the redundancy process has to be handled
very carefully because the Industrial Tribunals could award each employee unfairly dismissed
up to £6000'. As one manager put it, 'You don't want to end up at an Industrial Tribunal
because they can be costly and soul-destroying for those involved'. Even picking people for the
list could be a regrettable exercise for some managers. Constrained by defined selection
criteria and continuing to have a residual identification with the family ethos in the workplace,
long-standing Ferranti managers found the selection of people, some of whom they may have
worked beside for years, an especially difficult task. The selection process did not operate the
traditional practice of 'first in/last out'. Although constrained by the threat of compensation
claims for unfair dismissal, workers with poor disciplinary records were targeted and it was
suspected that shop stewards and workers identified by management as recalcitrant were more
likely to be put in the frame for redundancy.
The way that redundancies were handled at a personal level was criticised by a number of
interviewees. There was a feeling that the trauma of being selected for compulsory redundancy
was compounded by the experience of waiting to find out who exactly is on the redundancy
list. To begin with only the numbers to be laid offwere made public. Yet it was not unusual to
wait longer than a month before the names finally came out and selected individuals were
personally informed of their fate. On the day that the names were issued a ritualised
'procession of the redundant' would take place. This ritual involved 'getting the tap on the
shoulder' before taking 'the long, lonely walk' to the Manager's Office, in full view of
workmates. It was compared to 'a public humiliation'. Then there is a further period of
uncertainty where individual cases are reviewed. Here the union might appeal against
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redundancies, usually on the basis that it is not the actual job being made redundant but the
individual. Even where management show that it is a particular function being eliminated, the
trade unions would then attempt to have individuals relocated to another position in the
company.
The individual trauma involved for individuals is highlighted in the following examples. In
1989 during the second redundancy round, an interviewee who had only been employed for
about a year was informed that she was to be selected for redundancy. It was only after a
tense waiting period, following the 'long walk' to see Ron Dunn, that a transfer to another
department was arranged. Another worker, a planning engineer at NESD, described his
experience of being selected after feeling immune from the threat of redundancy. He had
worked for four years on the important TIALD (Thermal Imager and Laser Designator)
development project. In 1993 TIALD was at an important stage in moving from development
to production. Because of this he felt secure and had only recently begun working on a new
budget for a production standard plan. Management wanted all the 'quick fixes and get rounds'
which the skilled workers had devised during development built into a much more detailed
production planning set, allowing less skilled labour to be used. It was estimated that creating
a new, more detailed planning set would have kept two planning engineers in work for two
years. The threat of redundancy therefore seemed remote for the small team of ten NESD
planners. However four planners were called in to see the Production Manager and told that
their 'jobs were at risk', which meant that they would soon be made redundant officially. The
first to be called in ended up in tears and had only recently returned from honeymoon and
committed himself to a large mortgage. Another described this as a 'kick in the stomach, a
black horrible feeling' . The four were the youngest in the section, the least qualified and two
of them were thought to have 'attitude problems' and two did not conform to the unofficial
dress code thought appropriate for planners. One of them recalled that the immediate
supervisor only came out of his locked office after all four had been informed of their fates
and 'came out with the immortal phrase 'That concludes the sweep of the Planning
Department' and I just couldn't handle it. I turned round to him and said 'Is that me being
swept up or swept out?' He just bolted back into his office and locked the door'. Because of
the low morale, the wage freeze and the 'sweated' conditions of work this worker had mixed
feelings about being made redundant and was 'less convinced to stand and fight for my job'.
His girlfriend had already left her job at Ferranti, where she had been a PA secretary at Crewe
Toll for six years, because of the low morale and had been trying to persuade him to leave
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because he was bringing his discontent home after work. After spending three months on the
redundancy list and using the 'Job Club' set up by the company, he found that his skills were
too narrow ly-based for other jobs and his ONC no match for job candidates with HNC and
degrees. On the final Friday he went in to work to clear out his desk and was excitedly told by
the supervisor that there was an opening at Crewe Toll for which his experience in desktop
publishing would be ideally suited. A three day extension was granted to allow him to apply
for the post, which he was offered immediately. The experience of working three months
redundancy notice and being told of an alternative position as late as the final day of the notice
seemed to be a fairly common one.
Others, not so fortunate, were compelled to work three months notice without a last minute
reprieve. Working the notice had the effect of raising tension in the workplace and had a
deleterious effect on performance.
Working creates tension and bitterness between workmates. The ones who are going begin
to resent the ones who are staying and friction creeps in because they can't see why they
have to go and not somebody else. It doesn't seem to make sense even from the company's
point of view because of all the petty things that go on like vandalism, sabotage and
stealing.
(Electronic design engineer)
Some managers seemed oblivious to the underlying tensions created. The re-allocation ofwork
tasks during a redundancy exercise led to 'some grumbling about having to do three or four
jobs', one manager said, but overall it has been a 'fairly painless' process .
Changing complexion of the workforce
Some measure of precisely who restructuring has been 'painless' for can be gleaned from the
following data on the changing workforce composition before and after the GEC take-over.
This section will employ a number of measures to determine the changing complexion of the
workforce, including occupation, gender, age and registered disability.
Occupation
From Table 9.1 it is clear that the total number employed by Ferranti in Edinburgh was
already in decline before the GEC take-over. Total employment fell by nearly half between
1986 and 1994, with the rate of job loss more marked in the years after 1990. The 6571 jobs
in 1986 fell to 5859 by 1990 and 5102 in 1991 before dropping to 3383 in 1994. The rate of
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job loss was around 11 per cent in the four years between 1986 and 1990. but speeded up
quite dramatically after the take-over - some 42 per cent of 1990 total employment was lost
after GEC took control.







Technical staff 1778 102 1909 115 1071 103
Check workers 1637 832 1286 490 545 161
Management 1032 27 1088 35 1060 36
Clerical staff 350 475 169 409 185 222
Apprentices/
trainees
320 18 330 28 - -
Total 5117 1454 4782 1077 2861 522
Source: Company sources
Restructuring affected different workgroups differently: check workers were the worst
affected, retaining just over one quarter of the 1986 employment levels by 1994; clerical staff
were next, retaining around half; while technical staff stood at around two-thirds of their
former strength. Meanwhile, employment in management categories rose marginally over the
same period. Again, ifwe take the four years before and after GEC the rate ofjob loss is more
pronounced for the later period for all categories. Overall, check workers declined by nearly a
third between 1986 and 1990, and by almost two-thirds between 1990 and 1994. Clerical staff
fell by a third between 1986 and 1990, and by another third over the next four years. After a
slight increase in the years immediately preceding the take-over, the number of technical staff
was almost halved between 1990 and 1994. Managerial staff alone increased in numbers over
this period, albeit slightly, and nearly doubled their proportionate weighting in the workforce.
To get a clearer picture of shifts in the workforce Table 9.2 gives a more precise breakdown
of work categories based on EITB definitions. This Table shows that PESTs emerged as the
single largest group, moving from just under a quarter to nearer a third of the total workforce.
Technicians dropped from being the largest single group to second largest, well under two-
thirds of their 1991 size. Similar strengths were retained by Clerical staff at 61 per cent and
Skilled Manuals at 60 per cent. Operators and Apprentice/Trainees were by far the worst
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affected with the former at 43 per cent of 1991 strength and the latter at just above a third
The vague Management category in Table 9.1 is sub-divided into Managerial staff.
Supervisors and Administrative and Professional grades in Table 9.2. These categories
retained a higher proportion than average in 1994 of their 1991 base: Management (104 per
cent). Administrative and Professional staff (80 per cent). Supervisors (67 per cent) and the
much smaller number ofOthers, mainly canteen staff (78 per cent).
Table 9.2 Shifts in workforce composition by EITB categorisation. 1991-1994
EITB category 1991 1994 1994 as %of
1991 numbers
Technicians/Technician Engineer 1141 (22) 668 (20) 59
Graduate Engineer 1108 (22) 980 (29) 88
Clerical/Secretarial/Typists 588 (12) 357 (11) 61
Operators 574 (11) 246 (7) 43
Skilled Manual 508(10) 307 (9) 60
Administrative and Professional 360 (7) 289 (8) 80
Supervisors 239 (5) 159(5) 67
Managerial staff 220 (4) 228 (7) 104
Others 58(1) 45(1) 78
Apprentices/Trainees 306 (6) 104 (3) 34
Total 5102 3383 66
Source: Company sources
It is clear that even in this short time period there has been a sharp confirmation of the trend
towards the increasing importance of highly-qualified labour in contrast to the decline of
routinised, manual labour. The increased use of sub-contracting out machining and
assembling tasks and the increase in the higher technological content of avionics explains
much of the reconfiguration of the labour force on the basis of technical knowledge. The
relative consistency of Management and Administrative and Professional strengths while the
numbers of direct producers tumbled, in part reflected the duplication of specialised activities
wrought by divisionalisation in decentralising decision-processing tasks (as opposed to policy¬
making tasks) and increased levels for monitoring and measuring the performance of direct
producers.
However, Table 9.3 shows that while the number of'direct' productive workers fell by around
one quarter between 1991 and 1994, the number of'indirects' fell even faster, by just under
half over the same period. The result has been a changing balance between overhead and
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productive functions: for every two indirects there were four 'directs' in 1994. an extra direct
worker compared to three years earlier. Does this contradict the argument that the numbers
involved in production support activities have grown in the 1990s while directly productive
activities have declined? The definition of what constitutes 'direct' or 'indirect' labour often
depends on accountancy criteria rather than changes in actual activities. Increasingly, as the
tasks of PESTs became measurable and calculable by amounts of time expended and therefore
cost they have shifted over to direct categories. In contrast, those functions which cannot be
broken up in advance into discrete, predictable time segments in contact with worked
artefacts, such as Personnel, Management, Supervision and Secretarial support, cannot be
charged against particular projects or workpieces. But the core of an explanation for falling
'indirects' against rising 'directs' rests with changes in the supply of ancillary service functions,
such as plant maintenance, security, cleaning, bus drivers and mechanics and so on. Where
such activities were performed in-house under Ferranti they soon became an early casualty of
GEC's cost-cutting measures. In eliminating in-house ancillary activities GEC pared the
overhead costs to productive, financial 'value-added' activities, to the bone. The fall in
'indirects' can thus be accounted for in substantial measure by the cutting away of 'non¬
essential' ancillary functions and the peculiarities of definitions used for accounting purposes.
Table 9.3 Shift in direct/indirect employment numbers and ratio, 1991-1994
Direct Indirect Ratio
1991 3051 2050 3:2
1994 2266 1117 2:1
Source: Company sources
Taking indices of sex, age and disability it is possible to refine further these initial impressions
of changing workforce composition according to function and to enquire: what were the
primary social characteristics of an emerging workforce heavily biased towards managerial
and higher grade technical functions?
Gender
Male workers always constituted by far the greater part of the workforce at Ferranti and
dominated management, engineering, professional and skilled positions. Segregation by sex in
Ferranti occurred both vertically and horizontally: vertically, women were to be found at the
base of the company hierarchy, horizontally, they were concentrated in mainly clerical and
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routine assembly activities. The position of women workers at Ferranti barely changed in a
quarter of a century. In 1966 women constituted around a quarter of the workforce: twenty
years later women still formed less than one quarter of the labour force. Eight years after that
women fell to around one in even,- six workers. This is significant since Ferranti had a long
tradition of employing large female workgroups, particularly in routine assembly line work.
The already poor position of women in the workforce thus deteriorated, both in the years
before the take-over and afterwards, compounding the unequal sexual division of labour.
According to Table 9.1, in 1986 women composed 28 per cent of total male numbers,
declining to 22.5 in 1990 and declining again to 18 per cent by 1994. Even in occupations
where women had traditionally been over-represented, such as clerical, typing and general
office duties, the position worsened both relatively and absolutely. Male clerical employment
increased from 169 to 185 in the four years before 1994. while women clerical grades were
nearly halved from 409 to 222.
But it was the relative position of hourly paid women workers which deteriorated furthest.
Hourly paid women had been the single biggest female employment category and it is
instructive to compare their changing position compared to male check workers, the second
largest single group. From half of the rapidly decreasing male figure in 1986, women fell to 38
per cent in 1990, and even further to 30 per cent by 1994. Although male check workers
suffered a decline in numbers by around two-thirds between 1986 and 1994, female check-
workers declined even more dramatically by about four-fifths. The category 'check workers'
included a range of manual activities from skilled fitters and turners to assemblers of
components. The latter were more likely to be women and the former nearly always men, as
can be deduced from the figures for apprenticeships. The performance of routine assembly
tasks in-house was cutback massively and even faster than cutbacks for the skilled manual
category. Table 9.1 suggests that the rate of reduction was more rapid for Operators than
Skilled Manual. In contrast, the relative position of women technical staff improved. This was
largely because the numbers of male technical staff were almost halved from 1909 to 1060.
Female technical monthly paid workers stayed at a fairly constant level: 102 in 1986, 115 in
1990, and 103 in 1994. While the numbers of women remained tiny compared to men, they
grew proportionately from a twentieth of male numbers in 1990 to around a tenth in 1994,
simply by remaining stable in absolute terms.
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Women were massively under-represented in management, the only category that broadly
remained constant over this period. Women formed a mere 2.5 per cent of the total number of
managers in 1986, and grew only slightly to 3.1 per cent in 1990 and 3.3 per cent in 1994.
Always under-represented as apprentices or trainees, women were thus denied the traditional
route to skilled or high-level technical activities and ultimately promotion into even the lower
reaches of the management hierarchy. The evidence of workforce restructuring shows that
existing sex patterns were reinforced and, in contrast to the 'feminization of the workforce'
thesis, finds that the redundant worker at Ferranti was more likely to be a female assembler
than a male manager or engineer.
Age
Table 9.4 indicates how different age groups were affected by rationalisation. All age cohorts
saw their absolute numbers fall in this period. Two-thirds of all jobs lost between 1991 and
1994 were borne by the under 35 year-olds. The largest absolute fall in employment numbers
occurred in the 25-34 cohort. Yet they remained the largest single age group, composing
nearly a third of the total workforce. The next most senior group, 35-44 year-olds, had the
smallest fall in their numbers, retaining around 90 per cent of the 1991 numbers, rising from a
fifth to over a quarter of the total employed by 1994. The under-20 year-olds, however, fell to
a mere 16 per cent of the 1991 figure while the 20 to 24 year-olds only retained around a third
of their strength three years earlier.
Table 9.4 Shifts in workforce composition by age, 1991-1994
Age category Employees in 1991 (% Employees in 1994 1994 as a %
ofworkforce) (% of workforce) of 1991
<20 264 (5) 43(1) 16
20-24 705 (14) 241 (7) 34
25-34 1561 (31) 1081 (32) 69
35-44 1002 (20) 901 (27) 90
45-54 995 (19) 636 (19) 64
55-64 575 (11) 477 (14) 83
65+ 0 5 -
Source: Company sources (Percentages rounded)
What needs explained here is why the position of under-24 year-olds was the worst affected
while the 35 to 44 year-olds were the least affected. In the terminology, under-24 year-olds
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faced a negative replacement rate: as people left that category either through ageing or exiting
the company, they were not being replaced by a new cohort. Most of the 264 under twenty-
Near olds in 1991 would have been included in the 20-24 category by 1994. which was
stagnating as a category through recruitment policies as much as by leavers. The conclusion
must be that the situation of younger workers was adversely affected because of the virtual
abolition of apprenticeships. As indicated in Table 9.1, apprenticeships were still strongly-
supported by the company at the time of the GEC take-over. By 1994 the figures in Table 9.2
for apprentices/trainees had fallen by two-thirds, from 306 in 1991 to 104. Most of these
trainees, however, would have been over 20 years-old since only 43 under-20 year-olds are
registered in Table 9.4 and would mainly have been engaged in forms of training other than
the traditional four-year apprenticeships for technicians and craft workers. As the
apprenticeship system declined so the 20-24 cohort could not be reproduced at the same rate
as in the past.
In contrast, the least change has been among Graduate Engineers, Managers and Professional
and Administrative staff. These categories are the most likely to fall within the over-twenties
category. Graduate engineers typically enter first-time employment in their mid-twenties and it
is this group who constituted the largest single category in 1994. Yet it is also this group who
have been identified as the most susceptible to turnover in numbers. It is therefore important
to differentiate PESTs between a settled core group of family-centred, recently upwardly
mobile graduates, who have already entered the career seniority path, and a large group of
first-time graduates, who find advancement blocked after an early phase of quickly acquiring
salary and status benefits . So although I do not have figures for co-relating age and work
categories it is reasonable to assume that the most stable occupations in the 1990s have also
been those occupied by the over thirty-fives.
The exception to this is the 45 to 54 age group. Again the reason for this has to be inferred.
From interview discussions it was clear that there was a large pool of long serving clerical,
skilled manual and operators whose functions were being replaced either by automation or by
the contracting out of activities. Many of these workers would fall within the mid-forties to
mid-fifties age range. Some suggestions were also made to indicate that as such functions
were being changed this age band would be the least capable of adapting themselves to new
technology or lower status or wage rates. The long accretion of'ways of doing' over the years
was viewed as inhibiting increasingly flexible forms of work performance. Whether this would
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be borne out in practice does not seem to be have been demonstrated. Nevertheless, that such
assumptions were made based on age is indicative of the fact that by 1994 nearly 60 per cent
of the workforce were concentrated in the twenty year band between 25 to 44 years-old.
Disability
Table 9,5 Shift in the number of registered disabled workers, 1982-1994




159 170+ 41 17
Source: Ferranti, 993, for 1982 and 1985; company sources for 1991 and 994
The fall in the number of registered disabled workers employed by Ferranti to a tenth of the
1985 peak by 1994, strongly confirms the recent shift away from any notion of socialised
production. One manager claimed that workers who might be regarded as disabled may prefer
not to register as such for reasons of personal pride. While this may account for at least some
undercounting, it only defers the issue, which could be restated to ask what has changed that
disabled workers were more prepared to register in the 1980s than 1990s? Employment of
disabled workers was often seen positively, as an endorsement of Ferranti's paternalist
approach to its employees and the wider community, a sign of socially-responsible
employment practices. Ferranti twice won the Manpower Services Commission 'Fit for Work'
Award, in 1982 and 1985, in recognition of their contribution to employing disabled workers
(Ferranti, 1993:58, 62). Elsewhere in GEC, other parts of the organisation continued to be
officially recognised for their disabled employment practices. GEC Avionics, Rochester, for
instance, won its third 'Fit for Work' award in 1991 {Topic, March 1991). Many disabled
workers tended to be older workers who had serious illnesses or developed disabilities while
working for the company and so were entitled to an enhanced early retirement package. Again
this begs the question why disabled workers were not replaced generationally? Part of the
explanation for this lay in strict recruitment policies after 1989 and that the narrower criteria
of financial value became increasingly sovereign over social value in Edinburgh. For example,
among the 85 redundancies in June 1993 the unions claimed that there was a disproportionate




Where people work in Edinburgh was also affected by the restructuring. GEC inherited a
multi-site organisation dispersed around Edinburgh and its outskirts. The number of sites of
FDSL in Scotland peaked momentarily at twelve in the late 1980s when the second part of the
South Gyle complex opened to house the Display Division in 1988. Such was the movement
of people and parts between sites that Ferranti even operated a fleet of mini-buses working to
a set timetable. GEC soon moved to rationalise the Edinburgh factories. In 1990 Bellshill,
Telford House and Bellesk House were closed as part of a national reorganisation. Most
significantly, Robertson Avenue, situated in a central urban area and presumably encumbered
by agglomeration diseconomies, was closed and the Electro-optics Division eventually
relocated to Silverknowes as part of the new Navigation and Electro-optics Systems Division
(NESD).
Between 1986 and 1994, around one third of floorspace had been vacated while employment
levels were almost halved. Table 9.6 indicates that jobs were lost at a faster rate than
floorspace was vacated. Thus, despite the closure of Robertson Avenue, each worker on
average occupied increasing amounts of space in the 1990s. Some of the recent growth in
average floorspace may be accounted for by the physical limits to rationalising fixed capital,
particularly where workloads remain roughly constant, and the greater spatial requirements of
technical labour. As the Personnel Director put it,
The average floor space per employee has increased partly because of a changing mix
where there is a much smaller proportion of semi-skilled operators who occupy very little
space and a higher proportion of engineers who each occupy four times as much space.
Technology has also changed with more computer controlled processes which require
considerably more space per person employed. Within the buildings many have had space
converted from production areas into offices and laboratories.
(letter to author, 24 January 1995).
While this may be seen as part of a long-run trend, from the 126 square feet of floorspace per
average worker in 1966 (see Table 7.2), to 196 twenty years later and 277 by 1994, the more
recent shift is closely bound up with the contingencies of restructuring. Technology and labour
mixes alone are insufficient to account for the thirty per cent rise in average space per worker
over eight years. Floorspace occupied can only be reduced through stepping down in one-off
events while employment reduction has been a more gradual process. It is doubtful if the
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accelerated trend in growing average floorspace will be maintained over any longer period. If
expectations of flexible product and process technologies, and declining and more
discontinuous workloads are extrapolated then the further rationalisation of floorspace to
reduce the average worker:floorspace ratio, perhaps involving closures of older city sites and
integration at the more modem outlying South Gyle complex, cannot be discounted.
Table 9.6 Shifts in floorspace occupied and site-specific employment, Ferranti International
and GEC-Ferranti in Scotland, 1986 to 1994
Numbers employed per site
Site Floorspace 1986 1990 1994
(square feet)
Crewe Toll 323,000 1944 1528 1379
Robertson Avenue 319,500 1371 998 -
Silverknowes 259,000 1792 1250 958
South Gyle 1 196,150 915 923 590
South Gyle 2 98,250 - 590 377
Bellshill 64,700 214 204 -
West Shore Road 50,000 167 110 72
Bellesk House 32,500 42 159 -
Telford House 16,500 88 57 -
Tantallon 16,250 31 34 -









Between them, low or negative replacement rates and the redundancy programmes halved
employment levels in Edinburgh. This contraction affected some groups in the workforce more
than others. The typical Ferranti worker in Edinburgh had gone from being a skilled or semi¬
skilled male manual worker in the mid-1960s to a male professional engineer, who now
occupies increasing amounts of floorspace. This worker is likely to hold an engineering
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degree, be in their early to mid-thirties, and have ten or slightly less years in the company.
While they may be disenchanted with their prospects, they have fared better than younger
workers, women workers, technicians and manual workers. They have not fared quite as well
as senior management, at least numerically. The soft Ferranti regime of part-socialised
production has given way to a more explicit cash-based style which admits of less room for
workers who are incapacitated in some way or another. Combined, the changing social
complexion of the workforce involved a sense of loss, particularly for those Ferranti workers
who held residual notions of the social workplace as a point of integrated, co-operative
activity. Following the closure of Robertson Avenue in the heart of the city, continuing
question marks over the future of 1940s site at Edinburgh's Crewe Toll and the possible
concentration of activities at the shiny 1980s South Gyle sheds at the edge of the city the
erosion of Ferranti's identification with Edinburgh was well advanced by the mid-1990s.
Workplace relations
As we have already seen, GEC have a deserved reputation for, and a history of, poor labour
relations. Widely noted for their dislike of trade unionism, the style of industrial relations in
Edinburgh has changed in important ways. This seems to involve the progressive elimination
of any social obligation to labour, with Personnel functions more clearly identified with the
task of squeezing costs. One manager involved in personnel functions outlined the shift in
labour policy at the firm,
GEC have made little secret of their hostility to trade unions and attempt to marginalise
them by presenting them with fait accompli. They don't properly understand the positive
contribution trade unions can make. In my division I have retained a rapport with the trade
unions but I also see the need for survival in a competitive market. My role is now as
much that of a businessman as that of a Personnel [manager]. This need not be
contradictory since each role needs to complement the other. Personnel now make a bigger
contribution to the business. As I like to put, we prefer to be at the front of the horse
where the head is, leading and guiding, instead of cleaning up the mess at the back, out of
sight, and largely forgotten ... The importance of Personnel has been recognised at NESD.
I believe the MD should have the Finance Director on one side of him and the Personnel
Manager on the other.
In taking this approach workers are treated as a 'human resource', distinct from other capital
inputs but to be managed across the same cost-frontiers. In some important ways this is seen
as a break from Ferranti's attempt to socialise production through internal labour markets and
reward systems, a shift seen as one of a management style appropriate to the 'realistic' and
'practical' demands of changed defence market structures.
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While senior management were concerned that the trade unions might be in an improved
bargaining position after divisionalisation, the trade unions themselves viewed
divisionalisation as part of the strategy for undermining the effectiveness of their organisation.
Although operating as formally distinct units with local discretion and autonomy in labour
policies, the management of industrial relations continued to be centralised in Edinburgh.
Common labour policies were emphasised, even for divisions like NESD. which now stands
formally outside the GMav organisation:
When GEC arrived they had their own approach to Personnel and brought in a Personnel
Director. I recently moved sideways to NESD as a result of the process of
divisionalisation, instead of being responsible for all of Edinburgh ... The move to self-
contained divisions was viewed with suspicion by the trade unions since it split them up.
All of the unique agreements that had been struck over the years for individual sites under
Ferranti were extended to cover the four divisions in the first instance. This allows each
division to adopt those agreements appropriate to its particular situation and to drop the
ones they have no need of. NESD is now under the tutelage of GEC Marconi Defence
Systems Ltd (MDSL) and not GMav, like the rest of Edinburgh ... I report direct to
Stanmore, although ... Crewe Toll has overall responsibility for Industrial Relations
matters across Edinburgh. We meet once a month, or as required, to discuss common
policy matters although we are split by divisions and now by MDSL and GMav.
(Personnel manager)
For GEC, the complex rules and procedures for monitoring and regulating labour under
Ferranti were culturally self-serving for reproducing the management hierarchy, resulting in a
senior management fixated by the minutiae of minor transgressions, such as lateness or sick
records. GEC's cost-driven approach has had the paradoxical effect of relaxing some labour
disciplines. Increasing reliance seems to be placed on the general effect of repeated
redundancies on workforce morale as a disciplining mechanism.
We try to use disciplinary procedures sparingly. There are not many disciplinary
problems. Where they do come to light, such as in the case of peddling or using prohibited
drugs on the premises, we want them to have an exemplary effect. Chancers are now made
an example of. . . A small team such as ours cannot hope to monitor every single discretion
so it is up to line management to become more proactive and we have set up a programme
for first line supervisors to acquire skills in the management of people.
Under Ferranti, there was a tendency for disputes to get immediately passed over the head of
the line supervisor. This was mainly due to a combination of line supervisors not seeing
personnel issues as a proper part of their functions; not having the ability or training to deal
with issues locally; and the close relationship that existed between the unions and the
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Personnel Department. Line managers were often former engineers and usually saw their role
in narrowly technical terms. A blue collar trade unionist echoed the views of the Personnel
manager, although he thought that supervisors were not yet fully conscious of the potential
power they could wield.
The managerial regime is now more lenient than before on the relatively trivial things that
Ferranti used to get so worked up about: things like clocking on has been abolished, sick
record is rarely used for disciplinary reasons. However, while they are more lenient on the
nitty gritty they act more quickly and decisively on gross misconduct ... Line management
now have a lot more authority where they were marginalised in the past by Personnel.
These are the same individuals and they may not have realised the extent of their power
yet.
Over 1991 and 1992 GEC implemented single-status employment or 'harmonisation',
equalising terms and conditions of employment between staff and manual workers. Many
managers considered this the single biggest change to happen under GEC. According to the
Personnel Director, the main terms of harmonisation were that the formerly hourly paid
workers were moved to: a monthly credit transfer payment system from being paid weekly in
cash; an annual salary review based on performance/merit assessment from a piecework
bonus system; and have common holidays, sickness pay and other terms and conditions with
the staff (letter to author, 24 January 1995). GEC managers hoped that hierarchical
distinctions between grades would fall into disuse. A shorter working week was negotiated,
including a one p.m. finish time on Fridays. Although GEC made this concession reluctantly,
it has been claimed that the 4.5 day week and early Friday finish became an attractive benefit
for recruiting scarce skills to the company and has helped to hold people the company want to
keep. The company also benefited financially from the deal, making Friday afternoon the
principal day for overtime, which was cheaper at time and a third than the double time
overtime premium paid for Sunday working. 'Bell to bell' working was also introduced and
officially recognised tea breaks during the shift were abolished. Harmonisation was also
welcomed by many workers and managers with experience of the fine, and not so fine,
gradations of status under Ferranti.
The move to single grade status is also a step forward. There was a fair bit of class elitism
at the higher levels of Ferranti. They used different words from 'staff to describe manual
workers: 'manuals', 'hourly-paid', 'check workers'. The staff/hourly distinction was a class
thing; the staff worked less hours, [had] more holidays, had good pension entitlements and
received sick pay - they used to eat in separate canteens. The single grade status puts
everyone on the same terms and conditions.
(Engineering convener)
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Such sentiments about the just abolition of blue/white collar distinctions were repeated
frequently in conversation. Yet the eclipse of the craft standing was painful for many skilled
workers. The agreement negotiated in 1995 to end such demarcation as continued to exist was
sensitive to this in areas where residual concentrations of craft workers remained. One such
area is NESD:
We have just negotiated a flexibility agreement which will rid us of demarcation rigidities
and pigeon holes. All bonus schemes are scrapped and the ex-hourly paid are now on PRP
[Performance Related Pay]. We want to create small working teams which begin to break
down the white/blue collar divide. Naturally, the ex-hourly paid want to keep their own
identity, they want to 'keep the join' if you like. They want to protect their time-served
status and the distinction against dilutees. Since this group are only about 30 in number
there is really no point in going to the wall over it. The time served status is protected over
a five year period and there is a tacit acceptance of 'the join' at NESD while other
divisions are attempting to merge completely. This is largely because the majority of
hourly paid work in NESD.
Harmonisation of blue and white collar grades also had the effect of rupturing Ferranti's
relations with the employer's organisation, the Engineering Employers Federation (EEF),
which sets minimum wages and conditions across the industry. In 1979 GEC withdrew from
the EEF because it felt that the EEF's formal procedural arrangements and common policies
for member employers were too restrictive for dealing with trade unions on a site-by-site
basis, fragmenting and weakening trade unionism within the company (Transnationals
Information Centre, no date[1986]:9). When it had around 9000 workers in Scotland Ferranti
had been one of the biggest fee payers to the EEF because membership was based on
workforce size. In some respects, Ferranti were the EEF in the east coast of Scotland. With
harmonisation GEC effectively tore up the EEF's Black Book, which contained common
standards for manual workers in the engineering industry.
Ferranti managers claim to have an ongoing affinity for what they termed 'co-operative,
representative and constructive' trade unionism. Now that harmonisation relieved managers
from spending time going through lengthy procedures over relatively trivial misdemeanours or
relatively minor regrading claims, there is more emphasis on 'consulting' the unions, that is,
informing them of management's intentions rather than detailed bargaining.
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GEC managers, however, detect a residual recalcitrance among the Edinburgh workforce.
This was viewed as a cultural hangover from Ferranti. One GEC manager identified a
distinctly Scottish factor at work, making a need for a 'Celtic' form of management. 'The
labour force in Scotland seem more disinclined to participate in the change process than
comparable ones in England. This means that a more direct form of leadership of the
workforce is needed'. In response, quarterly presentations have recently been given to the
workforce, in groups of about 50, outlining the company's plans and its place in the market
competition. 'The focus on the need to be competitive is now being understood by the trade
unions, making them more aware of the realities of life'.
When discussing the mood on the shopfloor, however, the words that were most frequently
used by both shopfloor workers and managers were 'resignation' and 'uncertainty', indicating a
general feeling of despondency and demoralisation. A sort of fatalism has been created where
workers have reluctantly adapted to the new regime. Demoralisation among the workforce and
the trade unions seems to have been accentuated in the aftermath of the 1993 strikes.
... last year the only way we could fight it was to have the strike but that has gone and
there is nothing we can do. There is no point in going to work and moaning about it all the
time. If you work for GEC, you either get on with it and make the best of what you have
got and realise that it pays the mortgage or whatever, or get out ... OK, it is not a great
job, but there are a lot ofworse jobs out there at a lot worse pay.
(MSF member)
The 'softly-softly' approach to formal discipline has therefore been unable to mitigate five
years of redundancies, pay restraints, closures and simmering industrial unrest. The coupling
of workforce morale and work effort, which formed such a central part of Ferranti
management's outlook, has been jettisoned by GEC. Questions of workforce morale lag a fair
way behind effort measured in monetary values.
It was frequently stated by trade unionists that GEC deliberately create a climate of
uncertainty to bolster effort and sales.
The uncertainty about the future also plays an important role here; it has a disciplining
effect. They deliberately cultivate a climate of fear, taking the workforce up one minute by
talking about the great future ahead of us, only to take them back down the next by
adopting a confrontational attitude and putting the pressure on for further cutbacks.
(MSF shop steward)
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Rumours also circulated that certain GEC managers deliberately employed aggressive, even
bullying, tactics to put pressure on individuals to leave the company. One manager in
particular was noted for conducting campaigns of petty harassment and public humiliation
such as moving individuals to isolated work areas and even, on occasion, physical
confrontation. Yet the fact that this was believed to be one method employed by GEC for
reducing numbers without going through a formal redundancy exercise indicates the extent of
suspicion of the company held among some sections of the staff.
Relations within the workforce have also changed. Under Ferranti a burgeoning culture of
extra-workplace activities had been created, in many cases informally based in the section.
Work groups were often welded together by the antics of or stories about 'the characters' that
each section seemed to have. It was believed that people worked together effectively in part
because of the relatively minor breakdown of acceptable behaviour, which was always
constrained within certain limits. Some socialising continues to be encouraged but is more
usually officially organised and closely related to work effort. In this it loses its informal,
voluntary character. It is worth quoting at some length the views of one middle manager who
felt that something had been lost under the GEC regime:
There is less outside contact among the workforce and association away from the
workplace. Relations are more instrumental inside the firm. The changes have amounted
to a culture shock for the longer term workers here. Before individual sites had a specific
identity within the overall family character of Ferranti and the Scottish Group. A recent
reunion of the ex-Robertson Avenue people illustrated just how much they had in
common, even after years without coming into contact with each other. Now they are seen
as part of the GEC ethos of self sufficient units who need to look after themselves and do
what has to be done in order to survive as a functioning unit ... The characters that were
around before are disappearing and are being replaced by faceless grey men ... The
working day was more enjoyable and whenever extra effort or hours needed to be put in
there was always a willingness to do so. This commitment did not have to be imposed
through rules but was genuinely given by the men. If extra hours needed to be put in to
meet a milestone target, for example, after making the necessary phone calls home at the
firm's expense somebody would go out and get take-away food and maybe a couple of
cans. That kind of informal relationship would be impossible now ... Now you hear more
insistent moaning and complaining than previously, even among people who consistently
turn in high quality work ... However, before where social events would have been
organised among the men themselves, the company make it their business to fund and
organise events in recognition of a particularly good performance, such as an early
completion or one finished under budget. There still needs to be a balance struck between
the family culture, the sense of belonging, and the realities of commercial practices.
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It has been argued that GEC deliberately sets its face against cultivating an overall corporate
identity (Transnational Information Centre, no date[1986]:9). Instead of employees being
encouraged to see themselves as part of a 'GEC family' GEC attempt to create allegiances to
the particular division in which they work. This is clearly related to the myth of local
divisional autonomy. As we have seen operational control is delegated to divisional managers,
known within GEC as 'the barons' because 'they owe their allegiance to central management
but 'own' their own particular piece of territory' (Transnational Information Centre, no
date[1986]:8). The lack of a corporate-level centralised focus hinders trade union efforts to
organise across the company. The non-marketing information GEC releases about its
operations is largely confined to meeting its minimum statutory obligations and very little
disaggregated data below division-level becomes available. Thus 'the barons' treat divisions as
fiefdoms which are only examined in any detail by the centre after budgeting difficulties are
revealed, as was the case with Ron Dunn. All this fastidious accounting takes place within the
company. From the outside comparative financial performances, employment levels or
structures of sub-divisions or within particular sites are difficult to disentangle. Paradoxically,
GEC eschew a corporate image but restrict data, and particularly financial data, to the
corporate or divisional level, while sub-divisions and subsidiaries, for which little information
is available, are meant to generate their own localised identities. In the end, however, the
emphasis put on globalised data by the GEC centre undermines local, workplace or
community level identification with the company.
Labour Process
If labour disciplines have become formally more relaxed at the same time they have often been
experienced as tighter, more regimented in practice, involving less socialised leakages. The
organisation of work has also contributed to the climate of restricted sociability. Ferranti did
not develop quite the same kind of elaborate rigid skill demarcations which evolved in
traditional engineering centres. Products were manufactured in small numbers, often
customised to suit particular customer requirements. Conventional craft demarcations only
really existed between electrical and mechanical disciplines. The main division was between
mental and manual labour rather than between different craft groupings. Two areas where a
perceptible difference was thought to exist from other local engineering firms were in the
relationship of craftsmen with designers and planners and the exacting inspection regime for
workpieces. Designers sometimes involved craft workers in the design aspects of a job, taking
the advice of the craft worker, say, about the machining properties of certain materials while
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the detailed system of checking workpieces was more thorough than other engineering firms
because of detailed Ministry quality procedures.
The division of labour across sophisticated and complex product technologies within Ferranti
required an elaborate web of relationships for co-ordinating labour and materials through
time. For instance, any alteration to a piece of equipment was a bureaucratic and costly
business.
If you changed one part of a drawing, you had to do some amount of paperwork. You had
to get signatures from your boss to four bosses up ... The amount of money involved in
changing one engineering drawing [means] you are talking thousands [of pounds].
(Design engineer)
The quality documentation demanded by the MOD and the role of the customer within the
development programme ensured that even a minor modification in the development process,
say to improve product performance under extreme conditions, had a knock-on effect for an
entire range of related components and sub-assemblies. While there was a certain degree of
flexibility for resolving product technology problems, process systems tended to become
rigidified with a premium placed upon traceability.
The company philosophy was based on the principle of being a high tech, high
specification, jobbing shop for the MoD. Because there was a high degree of technological
change, flow line processes were impossible to introduce. Working on highly sophisticated
equipment meant the hundreds of Alteration Request Sheets would be raised because even
one slight modification would have a knock-on effect on other related parts. People were
concerned with the intricate workings of that piece of the product they were working on
but would have little idea about where they're bit fitted in the overall system. This was
necessary, in part, because of the need for secrecy and security. Problems elsewhere just
couldn't be foreseen.
(Design engineer)
A certain degree of specialisation was also acquired by development teams who, once brought
together for a project, tended to remain in place. This was seen as keeping labour in reserve
for the next development programme. The result was that a fair amount of underemployment
was tolerated under Ferranti in preference to fragmenting existing expertise. For development
engineers and designers the periods of filling in time between programmes were felt to be
undemanding and unrewarding. This boredom ultimately contributed to Ferranti's turnover
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problems. Paradoxically, the underemployment between peak programmes was both necessary
to keep skills but was also an important factor in losing them.
In terms of process technologies, Ferranti were one of the leaders in developing Numerically-
Controlled machine tools and Automatic Draughting equipment. In the early 1950s, Edinburgh
developed its own milling machines which could be programmed to manufacture complex
three-dimensional shapes to very high tolerances with very little wastage and in the early
1960s applied the principles ofNumerical Control to accurately control centre lathes, using a
system known as 'Digiturn'. By removing much of the time spent on setting, measuring and
interpreting drawings through electronically measuring the workpiece, Digiturn was claimed to
reduce time on the job by as much as 70 per cent (Ferranti, 1993:31). Where this investment
had been made there was a tendency to employ it regardless of whether it was the most
economical method of manufacture. The manufacture of a Helmet Pointing System under
license from a US firm, for example, was 'anglicised' so that the NC capabilities would be
utilised. Instead of adopting the US method of fabricating the helmet from a moulded cast,
Ferranti adopted the more wasteful method of machining the helmets out of a solid block of
material using the NC machining capabilities. Despite this initial lead in NC technologies,
Ferranti sold the Digiturn activities at Dalkeith to Plessey for £2.5 million in 1969.
Ferranti continued to be innovative in automatic measuring devices and draughting equipment.
One manager described the possibilities for overcoming process complexities through the
flexible integration of CAM-X, a computer—aided design system developed by Ferranti in the
early 1980s:
New technology has made an appreciable difference. Before, we had a huge drawing
office manually drafting everything. We had a huge machine shop with machine set-ups
constantly being broken down to perform some other operation. Now CAM-X allows us
to simulate the workings of a piece of equipment and gives us an overview of the chain
reaction triggered by any alteration to the design. 'Group technology cells' were introduced
to reduce machine breakdowns. Where a particular machine will be dedicated to, say,
machining diameters under 1.5 inches while the next one will machine diameters over 1.5
up to 3 inches, or whatever and now, computer numerically controlled, Flexible
Machining Centres, allows us to machine solid blocks of material three dimensionally
without transferring the workpiece to another machine.
(Engineering manager)
A director told a similar story of what productive technologies made permissible where labour
flexibility has been established:
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In terms of process technologies, considerable investment has gone into new digital design
and manufacture and drawing office aids. With CAD we can now bypass intermediate
linkages in the chain of:
Design > Drawing > Planning > Manufacturing > Test.
The designers can now simulate drawing/planning and can process the work direct for
manufacture, and sometimes directly programming the machinery itself. In terms of
manufacturing the Flexible Machining Centre has massively increased machining
productivity.
Yet such claims for integrated design/production technologies need to be treated with caution.
During an earlier 'employer's offensive', which employed productivity deals and technology to
raise the rate of exploitation in the 1960s, Cliff (1970: 34) uncritically reported the
introduction of automatic design equipment at Ferranti's Edinburgh factories:
This equipment does not produce drawings but tapes which are used on the factory floor
directly to operate machines. This process represents the telescoping of three major
functions: planning, methods work and draughting altogether. The DATA (draughtsmen)
members at Ferranti, against their union's advice, accepted such a telescoping in a
productivity deal which gave them a pathetic 6 per cent increase.
The tacit knowledge of labour, its indeterminate versatility, has not diminished in importance
because of the introduction of CAD technologies (or the earlier automatic design equipment).
Although productive technologies are usually thought to form the core of emerging productive
systems, such systems are first of all socially organised. This vision of an integrated flexible
system thus needs to be qualified to account for the continuing role of planners in mediating
between the design/drawing function and product manufacture. In some respects, reliance on
human ingenuity in mediating between two incompatible process technologies has increased.
Because CAM-X was developed in-house by Ferranti to provide computer-aided drafting
facilities it was not directly integrated with the CNC machine tools. The kind of discrepancy
between design and machining technologies, meant that the organisation of work continued to
be a labour-intensive process, if a little less so than previously. The basic process has
therefore remained broadly constant. In the case of radar equipment, for example, the original
package of work in the contract is initially deskilled by breaking it down into manageable
chunks. The Drawing Office then develops the design drawings. These are passed on to the
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Planning Department, who interpret and break down the basic design into detailed plans for
machining, fitting and assembly. Even when it reaches the shopfloor Planners continue to play
a crucial role in mediating its reception and execution, smoothing out scheduling, tooling or
other technical difficulties.
The introduction of production technologies requires a will to invest in the first instance.
Although figures for capital investment and private venture research are not publicly
available, these seem to have remained fairly constant between 1990 and 1994, although
specialised fixed capital, such as test equipment, continues to be funded in the main by the
customer, the MOD. Furthermore, by the 1990s GEC could benefit from previous rounds of
fixed capital investment undertaken by Ferranti. Under Ferranti, there was a willingness to
stay in the vanguard of process technology through investment, although Ferranti also
benefited from considerable MOD subsidies for new plant. One manager quoted the example
of the ease of applying for £30,000 of funding in the 1970s, 'a lot in those days', for a water
washing machine for processing printed circuit boards which occupied 700 square feet of
space.
Under GEC the capital application process is more stringently related to financial criteria and
managers need to be partisans for their applications:
Each division now applies directly to the board for capital investment and the application
needs to be directly related to expected cost savings or necessity. The capital application
process depends on push from the applicant. If the application is not followed up then it
will lie dormant on somebody's desk because the assumption will be made that it is not
wanted desperately enough. Where a sound financial case is made the application, with a
push, will be successful. For instance, our old Ferranti personal computers were getting
on a bit and we had a maintenance contract to get them repaired when they went down.
Yet it was a false economy because we would be even cheaper to buy a new system based
on the kind of technology now available than to persist with the costs of poorly
performing PCs. When the application went through we spelled out the financial benefits
of replacing the old computers and got the capital investment approved.
(Engineering manager)
Such capital intensity puts a premium on retaining highly qualified labour to programme
computer-aided design, drafting, planning and machining functions. Yet labour turnover
persisted as a major problem in the 1990s. The evidence from two different labs at Crewe
Toll, tells much the same story. At one lab, from a workforce of forty, 14 people left between
1993 and 1994. From an average of around forty or fifty engineers in the other lab, it was
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reckoned that the annual turnover was at least 25 per cent. Much of this movement seems to
depend on position in the relationship between career and family cycles. As an engineer from
the latter lab described it.
There is a central core of management there, but there is a high turnover. I mean I am
probably one of the most experienced engineers on the job and I am only 28. Once you
come up to my level, there are people who have been there maybe ten or twenty years.
They are not moving as their kids are going to school in Edinburgh - they are really tied.
Again you see them getting persecuted as well because the bosses say 'they have got their
kids at school so they are not going to start going down south, so we will give them a
minimal wage rise this year', even though technically they are very good and they could
command better salaries elsewhere. They know that they are not going to leave ...
Even people who remained optimistic for their career prospects detected a general feeling of
aimlessness. Again all the previously mentioned problems associated with morale were given
for the turnover: dissatisfaction, insecurity, resignation, demotivation, falling real earnings,
less interesting or challenging work, career immobility, increasing work intensity, and so on.
White collar workers seemed to be increasingly subject to similar time disciplines as blue
collar workers, while the responsibility and discretion for some manuals had been increased:
An attempt has been made to bring in TQ methods but GEC pay lip service to people.
Manuals worked to a bonus system, PBR [Payment by results], where time has always
been under scrutiny. Now with white collar workers working from workstations and where
electronically recorded data takes away key elements of judgement and discretion, the
monitoring of time has become further intensified for staff in certain jobs, e.g.
draughtsmen using CAD. There has also been a cutback in third-party inspection, with
operators expected to inspect their own work. Other jobs have vanished because of new
technology, such as the wiring of circuit boards which was previously done on a mass
basis mainly by women.
(AEEU convener)
The same worker was quite clear about the different possibilities for flexible time-use through
shift-working, 'silent running' or multi-manning, leading to more intense use of productive
technologies:
The thirty seven hour week was won in 1987 as part of a wider campaign in the
engineering industry. A condition of this is that we are supposed to operate bell to bell
working but there has been no real change in practice. However, pressure on deadlines
does filter through from the management to the shopfloor. Management are also making
inroads to 24 hour running of high value machinery. A four-night shift system operates
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just now but there is the possibility of three shift system being introduced. There is also
the possibility of 'silent running' where machines are set up to run unattended, or the
multi-manning of machinery, so that one operator covers three or four machines at the
same time.
(AEEU convener)
With unrelenting pressures for economy and the externalisation of low level routine manual
functions, harmonisation of the grades amounts to a recognition of an admittedly weak trend
towards convergence between blue and white collar workers; proletarianisation of staff
conditions and a limited increase in autonomy in some areas for blue collar workers.
Convergence in conditions at work should not be exaggerated however and should be seen in
the context of a tension between intensification of work strategies and continuing requirements
for specialised kinds of labour.
The substitution of capital for labour in this process may have gone some way in addressing
the perennial problem for Ferranti of labour turnover. The paradox here is that as highly
qualified labour becomes even more indispensable to the labour process it feels less valued in
monetary and status terms and senses a declining sociability in the workplace. While these
symptoms of proletarianisation of intellectual labour abound, the importance of the extensive
use of manual labour diminishes. Smaller numbers of more versatile manual workers are
employed, while many of the routine jobs formerly done by them gets sub-contracted out.
Ferranti's large machine shop encompassing the whole gamut of conventional machining
operations no longer seemed appropriate with the introduction of CNC technologies, the
economies of using external sources for supplying manufactured components and the changing
nature of product technologies. Added to this was the pressures for sub-contracting built into
the changed procurement environment.
With the change from electro-mechanical products to digital electronics, the large machine
shop simply becomes irrelevant. Under price pressure imposed by MoD competition
policy more works gets sub-contracted.
(Planning manager)
Although GEC continued investing in specialised equipment, the machine shop did not
especially benefit from this.
The £3 million investment promised for the machine shop under Ferranti has not been
honoured. In fact not a new machine has been brought in since GEC took over.
(AEEU convener)
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The shift in functional flexibility and the continuing need for selective specialisation in the
labour process was aided by the emphasis on out-sourcing inputs as described by one
manager:
In NESD we will be looking to recruit around 100 people this year on the back of a big
order. At least 25 per cent of these will come in here as multi-skilled labour so they will
know in advance what will be expected of them ... Our direct to indirect ratio is something
like 71 per cent to 29 per cent. This is helped by contracting out tasks which we would
need done every so often but not sufficiently to justify keeping them in-house. We will
always need a facility for certain kinds of machining, for example of glass technologies
for gyro lasers in each navigation system.
The use of working time has also been tightened up by GEC in an effort to recoup something
of the substantial overhead investment. As one manual worker said, 'Every effort is made to
reduce down time, so people move onto other tasks instead of waiting around as in the past'.
'Utilisation rates', measuring time 'actually' working against total possible working time, and
direct employment on contracts compared to indirect functions, thus become important
indicators of the flexibility of the capital/labour performance: 'We measure utilisation rates to
recover overhead costs. This averages out at 67 per cent utilisation time, which is pretty good
when you take into account holidays, sick, waiting time, training. The use of working time has
undoubtedly improved'.
Despite the fact that traditional forms of apprenticeships were virtually extinct by the mid-
1990s. training also continued to be emphasised by managers. Ferranti had been a set feature
of the university milk round and one of the major employers of graduate engineers in Scotland.
In collaboration with certain university departments, such as at Herriot Watt, Ferranti
established extra-curricula courses in optics and set up an MSc based on the kind of
knowledge needed for working at the advanced end of electronics. Technical training
apparently became more narrowly based under GEC than the extensive set-up employed by
Ferranti . Training courses to update skills were now focused on business needs rather than
the social function they served under Ferranti for rewarding people. Here also there has been a
move to contracting-out. Managers spoke of having a more generous training budget allocated
and being able to buy-in training in a more judicious mix with in-house facilities rather than
incur the extra costs of travel, accommodation and longer absences to the companies own
facilities at Dunchurch or Rugby. As one manager said, 'There is no compulsion to employ
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our own training organisation and I can go to specialist or cheaper training groups or colleges
outside'.
Summary
GEC have shifted workplace relations dramatically in five years. Divisionalisation brought a
previously unknown level of responsibility and accountability for economy to local managers.
Middle managers were already feeling under siege as GEC strove to inculcate cost-
consciousness in Edinburgh. Where the influential Goold and Campbell study located both
GEC and Ferranti under a common Financial Control style of management, the restructuring
in Edinburgh after the GEC take-over should caution against any interpretation which
collapses major differences in corporate structure and management style. These differences
became clear when GEC moved to shift the Ferranti organisation in Edinburgh away from
technology-centred modes of managing closer to a Financial Control mode. In all aspects of its
operations, whatever the mix of capital or labour employed, greater financial returns were
demanded by GEC. Improvements in productivity and the policy of out-sourcing for
increasing amounts of material inputs means that each remaining worker makes a larger
contribution to the financial performance of the company. Yet this is too narrow for measuring
the impact of GEC on the Edinburgh workplaces. The sense of labour anomie, persistent
labour turnover problems, intensification of work effort, the proletarianisation of intellectual
labour and the closing-off of socialised leakages have been some of the costs borne by the




The trade union response to restructuring
Diversification into civil markets alone held out the prospect of an alternative to mass job
losses for the trade unions. After every redundancy announcement the unions would repeat
their case for a diversification strategy. For example, when another 225 redundancies were
announced in October 1993, the MSF official Matson said, 'We are fed up saying that the
peace dividend should not result in ever-increasing numbers of highly skilled workers being
thrown on the scrapheap' (Scotsman 1 October 1993). This was echoed by Gavin Strang, co¬
ordinator of Labour MP's GEC Marconi group, who argued that the government should form
a 'diversification agency' to help companies such as GEC move into other product markets.
By the time of the GEC take-over the trade unions were campaigning strongly for
diversification, especially after the ISC experience and the first round of job cuts. The
campaign was given greater urgency by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the possibility of
a 'peace dividend' being held out. Nationally, the major defence trade unions produced a
document arguing for a government-led diversification strategy in the changed international
climate (IPMS, T&GWU, MSF, 1991). Locally, the Ferranti unions allied with Labour-
controlled Lothian Regional Council, who owned 3.8 million shares in GEC. This enabled
Councillor Donald Anderson to attend GEC's AGM to protest that non-defence work rose by
only 3 per cent in 1990 when already 1000 jobs had been lost in Edinburgh over the previous
18 months {Evening News 6 September 1991).
The campaign for diversification had been taken up locally by Edinburgh District Council and
Lothian Regional Council with the setting up of the Edinburgh and Lothian Defence
Diversification Initiative (ELDDI). In November 1989 a conference, 'Arms Diversification -
An Economic Necessity', was organised by the Lothian Trade and Community Resource
Centre and sponsored by the local authorities in Edinburgh to highlight local levels of defence
dependency and diversification strategies. Around 60 representatives from local authorities
and trade unions attended. ELDDI promoted diversification through commissioned research
into local defence dependencies, setting up a product development fund for local companies
with grants assistance of up to £20,000 per project and, almost uniquely, involved trade
unions in the process as well as employers (ELDDI, 1993; Dabinett, 1993). Research findings
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highlighted the centrality of defence industries to Lothian's industrial base, accounting for an
estimated 19 per cent of manufacturing employment, with GMav the single most important
manufacturing employer in the city (ELDDI. 1993:5).
Ferranti management in Edinburgh, however, seemed to be taking the unions case for
diversification seriously enough to establish a Civil Business Directorate to attract civil
contracts and also set up a programme to encourage workers to come forward with ideas for
adapting existing products to commercial markets. A senior Ferranti manager, Roy Tait, was
nominated to head the diversification effort and a special Ferranti mug was awarded to people
who came up with an idea the company felt worth pursuing. The workforce had no shortage of
suggestions and Tait was soon able to compile a list of more than 500. The Civil Business
Directorate were awarded funding from ELDDI for modifying a radar for maritime
surveillance for two aircraft of the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency. Roy Tait said that
ELDDI 'demonstrates local support and local togetherness' (DDI, 1994:6-7). Nevertheless,
nearly 100 per cent of the Radar Systems Division's work remained military.
The trade unions were more sceptical about claims for 'local togetherness'. Management's
commitment of time and resources to the diversification process was inadequate, they claimed,
compared to the urgency with which diversification should be pursued. The convener of the
AEU, Barnes, argued that diversification should have started at least five years earlier and
that the current outlook was the 'gloomiest in his 23 years with the company', adding that he
felt that 'Complete closure is a real possibility' (Scotsman 27 September 1991). The unions
redoubled their efforts and set up a campaign under the slogan of'Diversification Not Dole'. In
November a march was held in Edinburgh demanding government funding to diversify or risk
the loss of 30,000 defence-related jobs in Scotland (Evening News 16 November 1991). In an
attempt to alleviate fears about the slow progress being made on diversifying, Ferranti's
Managing Director, Ron Dunn, met officials from Lothian Regional Council Employment
Committee, setting out forward plans to underline GEC's commitment to remain a major
employer in Lothian. Even the commitment given by Dunn to training apprentices and
graduates as part of this plan was challenged by the MSF convener, who argued that the 24
places on a professional engineering course for ex-apprentices that Dunn proposed was lower
than the original 40 places {Evening News 14 November 1991).
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While critical of the company's approach to diversification, the union campaign did not
seriously examine previous diversification efforts in the company. Ferranti had attempted to
move into other markets on a number of occasions. Then the main problem seemed to be the
continuing sway of defence production criteria in moving into commercial markets. Dalkeith
developed products with civil applications such as numerical controlled tools. Coming under
the aegis of Plessey and based at Alexandria this initiative was a 'spin off from machining
controls, mostly for milling machines, that were devised for radar equipment parts. In 1972,
the Information Systems Group at Dalkeith won a Queen's Award to Industry for technical
innovation for automatic drafting technology which it had developed. Later, in 1977, the
Information Equipment Group merged with the Cetec Corporation of California. This venture
was a serious attempt to take advantage of product 'spin offs' and there was a phased transfer
of work and equipment to facilities in Glasgow. Yet, according to one manager who was
involved in the transfer of Cetec to Glasgow, the non-military side of Ferranti failed because it
suffered from deficient marketing experience to exploit the technological leads it had in many
areas and, on the technology side, it never really abandoned the tendency to adopt military-
technological criteria of 'ruggedizing' its products. He said 'They would end up with Rolls
Royce standards when Ford Escort ones would have been sufficient'.
Another attempt at diversification was made in the first half of the 1980s after Scottish Group
turnover expanded threefold on the back of the Tornado contract. The Group was reorganised
into Ferranti Defence Systems Limited (FDSL) and Ferranti Industrial Electronics Limited
(FIEL), which jointly employed 9200 workers. Donald McCallum, later knighted in 1987, was
appointed Chairman and Managing Director of FIEL and also Chairman of FDSL.
McCailum's promotion of diversification was said to be driven by a personal Christian moral
code.
Whatever the motivation the attempt to diversify fits within a well-worn trend within Ferranti.
Typically, FIEL's efforts to break into commercial markets foundered. One manager argued
that ex-defence people should not have been allowed to manage FIEL because, he said, '...
they were too used to working to technological criteria and not the commercial rationale of
cost and marketing. Outside people with highly successful commercial track records should
have been appointed'.
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The trade unions opposed the setting up of FIEL at the time because they viewed it as a tactic
employed by the company to 'divide and rule' the workforce and also argued that the cross-
fertilisation of ideas between civil and military sides would be lost. Ferranti trade unions
wanted both diversification of products and keeping Ferranti operating as an integrated
business and so were opposed to separating out commercial and military activities. One trade
unionist blamed the failure of previous diversification efforts on the defence/civil split being
reinforced by the physical separation of the activities. For him, Ferranti's civil business was
seen merely as an 'add-on' to the core defence work while product 'spin-offs' were always
subordinate to defence contracts.
In pursuing diversification as a means of regulating the contraction of the defence industry, the
unions sought a political solution in a hostile climate. Some defence companies seriously
considered non-defence means of generating profits in the early 1990s but soon refocused on
core activities i.e. defence. The call for diversification was a weaker demand than the trade
union proposals for conversion of the early 1980s (Wainwright and Elliot, 1982; TASS, no
date[1984]). It implied developing additional activities to existing, declining defence ones and
not the outright replacement of the production ofmilitary goods for civil ones, more typical of
conversion strategies. The unions attempted to build a coalition of political and industrial
interests; in practice this usually meant with the Labour Party and the local authorities
controlled by Labour.
Diversification campaigns, while taking industrial questions out of the workplace, also tend to
be viewed by trade union officials as a substitute for direct workplace action against
redundancies. While campaigning for diversification, the unions were always at the forefront
of any lobby to place defence contracts locally. For instance, in 1992 dozens of Ferranti
workers from Edinburgh participated in a mass lobby of Parliament by UK aerospace unions
in support of EFA (Evening News 29 October 1992). Bob Hardie, senior MSF representative
at Ferranti, made this rationale for linking EFA with diversification at some unspecified point
in the future, '... whilst we hold our breath and wait for some government activity in this
direction [i.e. diversification] there is still a need to maintain an industry from which we can
diversify' (Hardie, 1992, emphasis added). The Assistant General Secretary of MSF, Tim
Webb, dropped all pretence of supporting EFA on the basis of its operational or technological
criteria,
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To begin with, the 40.000 jobs everyone has been talking about are actually 15.000. But
the point is this: for us. to be frank, it is all Keynes. It doesn't matter whether the thing
flies or not. But it is important to keep the workforce together. The EFA is a development
engineers' aircraft ... (Webb, 1993:18).
Without government backing and an explicit defence industrial policy, local diversification
campaigns were piecemeal efforts to both substitute for the absence of coherent policy
measures and to pressurise for some form of state intervention. Ambitious plans devised by
Ferranti in the early 1990s, soon gave way to retrenchment programmes, burying the company
deeper into declining defence markets. Ultimately, as a campaign for arresting job loss at
Ferranti in Edinburgh, 'Diversification Not Dole', and later ELDDI, were singularly-
unsuccessful.
The 1993 Strikes
Pay freeze - 'Robbing Pauline to pay Peter'
On 13 March 1992 GEC Ferranti announced that they were implementing a wage freeze
because of the 'depressed defence market' (Financial Times). As the final stage in the disputes
procedure, at a series of Works Conferences held during the week ending 27 March, GEC
insisted that the decision was solely that of GFDSL management and that the wage freeze
could not be overturned. In response the unions balloted their members for strike action.
Although the unions urged a 'Yes' vote, MSF members narrowly voted against strike action by
471 to 464 (MSF Bulletin, 14 April 1992). In the uncertainty surrounding EFA and the ever-
present redundancy threat, the unions reluctantly accepted the 'zero rise'; if this also meant no
increase for senior managers they were able to claim that at least 'the pain' was being evenly
spread. Moreover, the unions viewed the freeze as temporary.
In 1993, the unions were told again that there would be no increase on basic pay and that the
company wanted to move completely to a 'merit' pay system, Performance-Related-Pay (PRP),
based on individual performance appraisals. The settlement date for annual increases was also
moved from April to July. This meant that by the time that the date for annual wage
bargaining came around the following year there had been no rise for 27 months. PRP would
be paid only to selected individuals, adding no more than 2 per cent to the total wages bill.
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This policy was clearly emanating from GEC as part of the 'culture shock' needed to keep the
pressure on costs. That year, according to the Personnel Manager. there was little money
available to be spread around. It was therefore stipulated that to pay reasonable increases to
some, rises could only be paid to 60 per cent of the workforce. This advice to pay so many
zero 'rises' meant that a lot depended on the way we handled performance reviews and the
annual settlement date'. While the 1992 freeze was reluctantly accepted by the unions on the
tacit understanding that it would be an exception, the 1993 freeze would mean yet another
year without a raise for forty per cent of the workforce. More significantly, the tradition of the
company honouring annual wage settlements would be decisively broken. Much rested on the
response of the trade unions and their members.
As part of the 1993 salary claim the unions constructed a strongly argued case for a general
increase (Minutes, 29 March 1993). First, the company's performance had improved quite
dramatically. The unions argued that sales per employee had risen 18 per cent, from £286
million from 5221 workers in 1992 to £317 million from 4,800 workers in 1993 (JOC Salary
Claim, Report No. 3, April 1993). Second, GEC were sitting on a cash mountain of £365
million. Third, the company had already made substantial savings from the previous wage
freeze while MSF members had fallen behind average market rates of pay, which had risen by
some 9 per cent between April 1991 and January 1993. The unions also drew attention to the
disparities in salary levels between men and women and disabled and non-disabled staff.
GEC dismissed the union's claim, '... there was no intention ofmaking any offer which would
undo the effect the zero increase had made to the Company's survival over this difficult period.
There would definitely be no substantial increase, any increase would be merit based and
would not be paid before 1 July 1993' (Minutes, 29 March 1993). Management also claimed
that sales per employee 'was not a prime indicator' and that orders per employee was a better
guide to future prospects (Minutes, 5 May 1993). When the union claimed that orders per
employee had risen by 44 per cent between 1992 and 1993 (Salary Claim, Report No5, May
1993), the company retorted that orders were lower than sales and less than budget. At the 5
May meeting, a further 85 redundancies were announced, a virtual freeze on recruitment and
the reduction of overtime to 'essential working only'.
The unions persisted in pursuing their claim through the negotiating procedure during May. A
'failure to agree' was finally registered and an urgent Works Conference requested as the final
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obligator},' stage in procedure on 31 May. The unions immediately recommended 'an early
ballot for Industrial Action if there is no change to the Management's present attitude at the
final stage of our obligator} procedure' (Salary Claim. Report No 6. June 1993). As the salary
dispute seemed set to escalate, GEC unilaterally removed the 'check-off facility. The check¬
off system deducted union dues direct from salaries, ensuring the unions a steady income
without the physical task of collection. In response the AEEU appealed directly to Lord
Weinstock by letter. While Weinstock considered the matter a local industrial relations one.
the removal was endorsed by GEC-Marconi group Chief Executive, Dickinson. While the
company considered this matter closed on 9 June, the outstanding Works Conference on the
salary claim was postponed until the 21 June, 'so that the business managers not available
until this date could be present' (Minutes, 9 June 1993).'
The formal procedure for the salary claim lasted some three months before it was finally
exhausted. It was only at the meeting of 21 June that the company made an offer for a
selective increase payable to 50-60 per cent of the workforce, adding no more than an extra 2
per cent to the pay bill. The company stated that this was despite sales performance being 12
per cent behind budget and the outstanding order book falling from 2-3 years of sales to
around 1 year at current activity levels. The delay in awarding the A1 Yamamah contract
meant price levels had to be held constant for at least a further two years. Therefore a
selective award was necessary to hold down costs because 'certain skills and capabilities
needed looking after to retain them or the business would suffer' (Minutes, 21 June 1993). The
unions argued that this would badly affect the already low paid clerical and administrative
grades, which had a high proportion ofwomen workers, with some dependent on state benefits
to supplement their income. Selective awards would mean a 'rob Pauline to pay Peter'
approach to reward 'key skill areas' (Minutes, 21 June 1993). The company refused to
consider guaranteed minimum increases although a modest increase for the very lowest paid
workers would be considered.
' MSF Report No7, 9 June 1993, claims that 'At the Works Conference held on Wednesday 9th June,
MSF Regional Organiser Andy Matson convinced company representatives to accept their procedural
obligations with respect to the status quo provision on the issue of the check-off arrangements
between the company and the union. The company representatives have agreed to honour their
obligations whilst the matter is referred back to national level'. However, the minutes of the 9 June
meeting conclude that 'the decision to remove the 'check-off stands'. The differences in the two
accounts may reflect a genuine misunderstanding about what was said at the meeting but should in
any case alert the researcher to take extreme care when using supposedly verbatim accounts or
campaign materials. This seems especially true in situations of heightened antagonistic relations
such as those between GEC and the trade unions.
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The procedure exhausted, escalation of the dispute seemed inevitable. Throughout the
procedure union negotiators repeatedly held out the threat of industrial action if the principle
of a general increase was rejected by the company.
fMSF] warn the Company that [they] would be doing everything in their power to ensure
a ballot for Industrial Action (Minutes 31 May 1993)
Mr Goudie said that the majority of employees were prepared to take strike action and this
matter [removal of check-off] would only inflame the situation. Mr Goudie said that he
would guarantee strike action was taken (Minutes 9 June 1993)
. . . a vote for industrial action was certain if the Company did not change from its current
approach ... there comes a time when people decide enough is enough and they are
prepared to withdraw their labour (Minutes 9 June 1993)
[MSF] warned the Company that the situation was significantly different this time [from
1992], and unless the Company's position changed there would be a major industrial
dispute ... all the unions within the Company will get a mandate for strike action (Minutes
21 June 1993)
Over the removal of check-off the company simply refused to believe that workers would
strike. Over the salary claim, the company weighed up the risks of whether a strike would
actually happen and, as in previous years, were prepared to gamble on the unions failing either
to get a mandate or, if a vote for action was carried, expected it be a half-hearted affair. But
when the other grievances which had accumulated over the previous couple of years, like the
wage freeze, redundancies, lowered redundancy entitlements, intensification of the work effort
and low morale, were added on to check-off, PRP and the 1993 salary claim a more potent
concoction was being prepared. In negotiations the company seemed aware of the risks that
strike action posed. Management agreed that,
the Company did not want an industrial dispute, as this would lose the Company
credibility with its customers ... a dispute would result in lost order[s] and continue the
downward spiral, undoing the benefits gained over the last two years, and cause more job
losses. [The company] outlined what a strike would mean to employees, but it would have
little effect on GEC as a whole and would put GEC Ferranti at risk. [The company] said
that [they] wished to avert any dispute.
But this risk had to be judged against other criteria,
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However, there was not enough money to pay a general increase. To pay ourselves more
than we can afford is just as bad fas the effects of a strike], (Minutes 21 June 1993)
Merit pay or a general increase ?
Some managers recognised the strength of the union's arguments without conceding the value
of PRP for the company. As one manager put it: 'From a union point of view, it is probably
even better to spread the money thinly between PRP and rises on the basic than to pay zero. It
is probably even better to pay a decent one-off percentage rise where people feel better for
clearly knowing what they are getting [rather] than splitting it up at intervals over the year'.
The convener of the manual workers went into even more detail:
For the manual workers the new pay system is a morass. Although formally single-grade,
manuals still have a basic wage plus a bonus formula, now measured day work, with a
discretionary element of PRP added on. There has been no increase in the basic since
1991, so the PRP proportion is always increasing while the basic, on which most benefits
are calculable, is declining. The monetary value of the individual's performance is
constantly being judged. The threat is always there of no increase in the PRP after
assessment but also that PRP portion which has been awarded in previous years may be
cut back. There is a formula which is supposed to cushion the PRP element against falling
below or rising above a certain level but the discretionary part can erode that. Once a
manager gets his labour costs allocation it can be carved as he sees fit instead of across
the board or percentage rises for all.
Some white collar workers in GMav also felt that their improved salary position during the
1980s was being eroded. A senior MSF representative charted the history of pay since the
1970s and while conceding the effect that PRP might have in resolving the perennial problem
of labour retention, recognised its profound implications for the trade unions:
A Fair Wages award was made in the late 1970s of 11 per cent to try to recover some of
the ground that was lost because of Labour's incomes policy and Ferranti being under
government tutelage at that time. Things improved in the 1980s to take Ferranti into the
top quartile of average wages, which GEC is clawing back. The move to PRP means that
the turnover of younger and more mobile workers, especially in software, can be stanched
by flexibility in discretionary payments. But once collective bargaining is lost the unions'
role is diminished.
Some Ferranti managers even saw potential disadvantages for retaining labour which PRP
might even exacerbate instead of resolving:
PRP gives GEC flexibility within a fairly tight rein. In justified cases the PRP upper limit
can be waived. But where people don't get the rise they expect the option of job-hopping
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begins to look attractive, especially to comparable, if less technically-exacting firms like
Motorola and Hewlett Packard.2 We still have something like 10 per cent turnover of
labour every Near. When Motorola or Hewlett Packard can offer up to £5000 more than
we can for a particular skill then we have a serious retention problem. Alternatively, when
a skill is in high demand and short supply the option of contracting out on a constancy
basis at £26 per hour is also an attractive option.
The same manager reported a particular instance of the increased power of technically
indispensable labour.
When key individuals take these options they sometimes return after finding that what
they left wasn't so bad after all. Recently we lost a few key people with specialised
capabilities in power supply technologies. When one of them didn't get the rise he was
looking for he joined a small specialist firm and took the five other key individuals from
his department with him. They are gradually returning after two years away and we
expect them all to have returned within eighteen months or so.
PRP, designed to fragment union strength, had the paradoxical effect of increasing the
potential power of smaller groups of workers. The basis of power for labour seemed to shift
from company-wide or even sectional strength to narrower forms of individualised power
based on function, skill, experience and knowledge of other labour market opportunities. The
fact that the department has been without six key workers for two to three years, were
prepared to rely on the failure of other firms to hold them and would still offer the six their
former positions indicates the vulnerability of PRP in frustrating expectations and speeding up
turnover.
A further aim of PRP was therefore to remunerate engineers attractively enough as engineers
instead of needing to adopt a management skin to further their career prospects. An engineer's
income could now be improved by being 'a first class engineer instead of a second class
manager'; in principle an engineer could be paid the same rate as the Managing Director after
assessment. While this has not happened yet (and the possibility must be extremely remote),
the link between managerial grades, promotion and reward has now been broken. The result
was that some individuals were known to have received huge increase, with the upper-limit on
PRP waived, while most were thought to have had very meagre rises or even none at all over
three years. Since PRP is an 'invisible' reward system it is impossible to quantify with any
2 Phrases like this were commonplace, contrasting the inferiority of firms operating in commercial
markets to Ferranti's/GMav's technological superiority. The grip of technologism, the belief in
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precision what the pattern has been but the impression of accentuated inequality seems to be
an essentially correct one.
Blue and white collar trade unionism
PRP was designed to have an uneven impact throughout the workforce according to
judgements about work performance and local labour market rates. Public and collective
forms of periodic wage determination as an annual entitlement would be marginalised or even
abandoned altogether in preference for individualised and private discretionary salary-
structures. Although promoted as part of the 'harmonisation' process, PRP seemed set to
exacerbate existing divisions among the workforce.
A unified response to PRP and the wage freeze required that the manual and staff unions
overcome their traditional enmity towards each other. The restructuring process itself was
eroding the gulf between the two unions at the edges, undermining the traditional blue collar
dominance in the workplace. At the time of the GEC take-over, MSF, the union which
superseded TASS, recruited another layer of members, while the AEU's position seemed
unassailable. However, as new technology was introduced into the labour process, white collar
workers often found their influence growing in the same proportion as that of manual workers
declined. On occasion, this process led to disputed areas of control of the technology. When
Computer Aided Manufacture was introduced, for example, the operators who worked
conventional machine tools wanted to retain some control over what they saw as 'their'
machines by getting involved in the planning, which had been traditionally done by white
collar planners. Suspecting that the company wanted to reduce the cost of operating the new
technology by favouring an increased role for the lower-paid machine operators in the
planning, computer programmers and planners walked out on strike. A 12 week strike ensued,
in which the striking planners were funded by a levy of other white collar staff. The entire
planning function was granted to the white collar workers.
The manual unions had themselves been divided among a number of general and craft unions
but by the late 1980s the AEU alone represented manuals. Until the late 1980s, the AEU
operated an unofficial closed shop and were regarded as the dominant force in the company,
with power bases in the production department, including the machine, assembly and fitting
engineering solutions to all problems, and a disdain for volume producers, continues to exert a
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sections. This strength was based on the centrality of skilled workers to Ferranti's
comprehensive in-house approach to the labour process. TASS was viewed as a bit of a sham
union by the skilled workers, while many AEU stewards were contemptuous of their role in
the workplace. An MSF shop steward recalled the phrase that the AEU convener liked to use
to reflect TASS's dependency on the AEU's bargaining strength. 'We pull the barrow to the
top of the hill and when we get to the top of the hill. TASS climb on board for the ride down' .
Thus when it came to annual wage bargaining, the AEU would settle a couple of weeks before
TASS, who would subsequently get almost the same percentage rise. However, while the
manual unions set the trend for wage bargaining, Ferranti tried to retain scientists and
engineers through giving them good benefits, which were largely denied to manual workers. A
senior shop steward with the AEU said, 'It was around 1978 before we got a decent pension
scheme and 1983 for sick pay The manuals were always the poor relations and there was a
certain amount of snobbery on the part of some of the staff. Among some white collar
workers, for instance, the manuals were known disparagingly as 'brainless checkies' [ie.
workers whose work would be inspected]. The friction between blue and white collar trade
unionism was also political, with TASS seen as a left wing trade union while the AUEW were
identified as right wing.
Probably the most important factor affecting relations between white and blue collar unions
was the disproportionate impact, noted above, that restructuring had on production, ancillary
and maintenance workers, mainly manual occupations. This shift irrevocably re-ordered the
respective strengths of white and blue collar unions. A leading MSF shop steward had this
impression:
The ratio of staff to hourly paid has shifted from 4:5 to 5:1 at a guesstimate. This has also
been reflected in trade union membership rates which have changed considerably since the
days when the blue collar had 2000 [members] to 200 white collar. White collar unionism
had phenomenal growth in the 1970s and the 1980s and surpassed blue collar
[membership] in the late 1980s.
Table 9.2 indicated that combined, EITB categories Operators and Skilled Manuals amounted
to 553 workers, some 15 per cent of the total workforce of 3383 in 1994. This was a fall from
21 per cent in 1991. On the other hand, categories Technicians and Graduate Engineers grew
powerful pull despite attempts to simulate markets in procurement and corporate restructuring.
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from 44 per cent to 49 per cent of the workforce between 1991 and 1994. Another MSF shop
steward confirmed this view.
Over the period of the restructuring ... and the general trend in engineering towards
industrialising the white collar section, like just doing away with a lot of blue collar skills,
the introduction of new technology has meant that in GEC the blue collar workers have
taken an absolute hammering. They are now a tiny minority of the workforce and that is
not an exaggeration. For example, in my factory there are 1200 employees in Radar
Systems at Crewe Toll ... [I]n the actual production end there is maybe 200 involved and,
out of them, you will be lucky if a hundred of them are blue collar. Less than a tenth of
the workforce are blue collar. Clearly, over the space of seven or eight years there has
been a radical shift in the power of the shopfloor unions [compared] to the staff unions.
Such a shift was also reflected in the response of the former convener of the AEU:
Manuals now see the need to come together [with the staff unions]. The staff have not
been immune from the cuts either. We now have a joint bargaining reference which I have
to constantly remind the [AEU] members of. Our fates are locked together now.
Although relations have been uneasy between the AEU and MSF a working relationship was
thus developed with the advent of single grade status and the inverse fortunes of the respective
union's membership bases.
One day strikes
After some initial hesitancy, both unions united to resist GEC's proposals for PRP. The MSF
shop stewards committee voted to ballot the membership with a recommendation to take
industrial action. In the process the AEEU was forced to respond to the MSF approach for
united strategy against PRP but even this reflected the changed relations between the unions.
One MSF steward said 'Before the actual strike ballot we were the biggest union, the dominant
union ... [and] [i]n the consciousness of the workers it was seen that MSF were leading the
way'. Against criticisms from more militant shop stewards, who wanted to form a Joint Shop
Stewards Committee between the AEEU and MSF, control of the campaign for a joint
strategy of industrial action passed to the two separate Negotiating Committees of the AEEU
and MSF. The Negotiating Committees were composed of the senior shop stewards in each
union and the conveners, and although they worked independently of their respective shop
stewards committees, were to collaborate on setting out a joint strategy. One militant in the
MSF claimed that when it came to practical unity the union leaders had to be forced into it:
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For example, when it came to the vote to go for a ballot for industrial action. ...
traditionally they held office meetings, seperate office meetings, with the AEEU in one
comer of the factory and MSF in the other. And it would not just be two meetings in the
factory, there would be eight meetings going on because there would be four MSF and
four AEEU meetings at various locations [throughout the city]. So we decided to call a
mass meeting in the factors' with AEEU and MSF members invited independent of the
leadership ... At the meeting, who turns up. but the AEEU convener and the MSF
convener and they take the meeting. Now of course I am a bit pissed off... but at the same
time, I am delighted because they had been forced into leading the meeting off and been
forced into showing some sort of unity.
Although a unanimous vote for strike action was passed at the meeting, the same shop steward
felt that as a result of weaknesses in the local leadership the seeds of disunity were still
present:
First of all, we had to force them to come together. Secondly, no meetings were held at the
other sites. We were the strongest site, we did not need them to come down to tell us to
vote for strike action. They should have been at South Gyle, they should have been at
Silverknowes, in the weaker sections trying to build the mood for a fight. Already you
could see the problems. I don't think it was deliberate. I think it was because they didn't
know how to organise a fight. And I was asking them, 'When are you going to go to South
Gyle, when are you going to go Silverknowes', and they said, 'The stewards there don't
want us at their meetings'. It was just a lot of rubbish ... the warning signs were already
there that it was divided and they were going down the road of least resistance. They
would hope to avoid strikes and whatever.
Despite these apparent difficulties, a strike looked certain after a secret ballot of union
members. Although the combined union membership voted 60:40 in favour of action with a
majority of 500, the staff vote was closer with 55 per cent of the 1134 MSF votes and two-
thirds of the 820 AEU members voting for action (MSF Bulletin, 28 June 1993; Evening
News, 29 June 1993). The union hoped that the ballot result could be used as a bargaining tool
to let the company see the anger generated by PRP. The company, meanwhile, made little
headway to meet union grievances over PRP. Andy Matson, MSF National Official,
commented 'When describing the company's attitude, intransigence is the word that springs to
mind. They have given no indication that they are likely to come forward with a better offer'
(Evening News, 29 June 1993).
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Again the union leadership came under criticism from militants for the way that they
conducted the ballot.
We got the ballot result and it was interesting when you look at the factories and the way
they voted. They counted the boxes separately ... They had the AEEU boxes, and at South
Gyle I think they got defeated, at Silverknowes I think they just won and at Crewe Toll it
was overwhelming ... The MSF got cuffed at South Gyle, I think it was close again at
Silverknowes and overwhelming at Crewe Toll. Up until the Crewe Toll vote, we were
getting beaten; when the Crewe Toll boxes were counted it was a significant victor}'. I
can't remember, maybe 60:40 or something like that, so it carried the day. But already the
company were aware ofwhat the weaker sites were because they did the ballot in front of
the company. They should have sorted all the ballot papers together and counted them
together. But again, they had no idea how to play the game tactically.
The evident unevenness between sites and the differences between the unions perhaps go some
of the way to explain the company's 'intransigence'. If any action did come off it had the
prospect of being short-lived. Such a reading seemed to be borne out when GEC actually
organised buses to transport workers, including, of course, the sections that voted against
industrial action, to the mass meeting at Meadowbank Stadium in the city. This ploy by the
company to undermine the ballot result at the mass meeting failed. At the 2300 strong
meeting, the debate centred around whether the industrial action should take the form of an
all-out strike or a series of one-day strikes, not whether to take action or not. The platform
argued for one-day strikes, with Larry Brooke, an MSF National Officer, declaring that 'It is
time to fight back' (Evening News 1 July 1993). After some debate it was recommended that
one day strikes take place to begin with. These were scheduled for Thursdays. The unions
reasoned that with the half day shift on Fridays the company would effectively lose two days
production with a minimum loss of earnings to the striking workers. Union leaders further
warned GEC that an all-out stoppage would be called 'if it retaliated against striking staff or
eventually failed to negotiate' (Evening News 2 July 1993). The meeting was told that some
projects were reportedly already behind schedule before the walkout through informal go-
slows and an unofficial overtime ban. While the trade unions did not want to be committed to
a percentage figure for basic pay, they said that they would settle for a rise of around 3 to 4
per cent, particularly since the pre-tax profits of GEC of £863million were up 4 per cent on
1992. Depending on which source is consulted, the vote at the meeting was either 'unanimous'
or 'overwhelming' for one-day stoppages. (Evening News 2 July 1993; Interview with MSF
convener)
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This was the first Edinburgh-wide joint strike action between blue and white collar unions
ever and the first strike in the company since 1979. The first strike day was well supported
among the lower grades, while management grades, who were exempted from industrial
action, attended work as normal. The negotiating rights of staff were recognised up to
technician level but did not include more senior grades. While they could be individual
members of a trade union they had no collective bargaining rights. Picket lines were set up at
the factory gates. Accordingly picket strength reflected the willingness of different sites to
strike: 'The first day of the strike we had about eighty on the picket line [at Crewe Toll], at
Silverknowes I believe there were about 40 and at South Gyle, I think you were talking about
6. The first day was good, it was quite solid. South Gyle had a few problems but the rest of
the sites were pretty solid, apart from the management areas.' The same trends continued the
following week during the second strike. Crewe Toll stayed solid, with increasing numbers
turning up for picket duty buoyed by the refusal of suppliers and contractors to cross the line.
Meanwhile things deteriorated at South Gyle, with stewards receiving reports of increasing
numbers crossing the picket line there. Matson, the MSF full-timer, put a brave face on it,
arguing that the announcement of increased GEC Marconi profits the previous week 'do
nothing other than to support our claim that, after a two year wages freeze, this company can
afford to increase the wages of each and every one of our members' (quoted in Evening News
7 July 1993).
Even at this early stage, the extreme unevenness across the city threatened united action.
Trade union militants and activists blamed the leadership, particularly the AEEU. The strikes
had coincided with the beginning of the annual holiday period and the AEEU convener had
been on holiday during the first two weeks of the strike. When he returned, rumours circulated
that the AEEU were prepared to recommend acceptance of a revised management offer.
However, after a joint meeting between the MSF and AEEU strike leaders it was agreed to go
ahead with another mass meeting with a view to continuing the action. The meeting, now
bigger since workers were returning from holiday, voted for a third stoppage. Although the
unions knew which sites were weak, they rejected management claims that fewer than 1000
workers had joined the action. Instead they believed that EFA was falling behind schedule and
that the tough penalty clauses in the contract would force GEC to give in (Evening News 13
July 1993). Management grades and senior staff belonging to MSF had been invited to the
meeting but failed to turn up.
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In the meantime management had sent letters out to the 57 per cent of staff who were to get a
PRP award of up to 6 per cent and to 43 per cent who would receive nothing. The union
issued a leaflet which turned the company self-image against them:
THE COMPANY'S UNILATERAL SALARY REVIEW DOES NOT MEET YOUR
CLAIM FOR AN INCREASE FOR ALL MEMBERS. IT WILL NOT RETAIN AND
MOTIVATE EMPLOYEES INVOLVED IN A TEAM EFFORT TO PRODUCE
WORLD CLASS AVIONICS. GIVING SOME MEMBERS SOME OF THE MONEY
THEY WERE ENTITLED TO IN APRIL 1992 DOES NOT ADDRESS OUR
DISCONTENT. SALARY LEVELS REMAIN STUCK AT APRIL 1991 LEVELS,
WITH ANY PRETENCE OF A STABLE AND FAIR CAREER STRUCTURE
SACRIFICED TO EXPEDIENCY, IN A CRUDE ATTEMPT TO BUY OFF ENOUGH
PEOPLE AND UNDERMINE THE PRESENT ACTION.
SOLIDARITY BETWEEN COLLEAGUES AND THOSE FACING THE PROSPECT
OF AT LEAST ANOTHER 12 MONTHS WITHOUT A WAGE INCREASE
REMAINS THE KEY TO SUCCESS!
(GEC Marconi Avionics Strike Committee, 13 July 1993)
With the move to effective selective rises, the unions decided to take a vote on whether to
escalate one-day strikes to two days or even all-out action and planned to meet with 300
management members of MSF who had not yet been called out. MSF stressed that
management members would also benefit from any general increase awarded as a result of the
action and that managers took part in the ballot for action which others were now prosecuting.
Company briefings and personal letters to senior staff claimed that they would be in breach of
contract and threatened dismissal should they engage in industrial action {The Scotsman 19
July 1993). MSF clearly felt that many of their management members were willing to join the
dispute and consulted the MSF Legal Department for advice on the company's right to dismiss
striking managers. Despite getting legal backing, the unions had little success in convincing
managers in MSF to defy the company by striking.
The issuing of selective rises backfired on the company. Things even seemed to improve at
South Gyle with the third stoppage. Strengthened by workers from other sites, around fifty
pickets were reported at South Gyle to be having some success in getting solidarity from
supply deliverers {Evening News 15 July 1993). The unions claimed that of the 900 who
worked at South Gyle about 250 went in and they were mostly managers. The pickets at
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Crewe Toll reported that even fewer were going in than previous weeks. One picket said.
'Most of those who are w orking are managers w ho have been threatened with dismissal if they
go on strike or take a day's holiday' (quoted in Evening News 15 July 1993). Matson. for the
MSF was pessimistic about a settlement. 'It has been forced on them. Many of the people on
strike today were offered pay rises. The company have failed in their attempt to buy them off.
My ideal outcome would be that we go to the meeting with a new across-the-board offer from
the company. But I think that unlikely' (Evening News 15 July 1993). Yet the improvement in
morale among the strikers at South Gyle was temporary. From Crewe Toll, South Gyle still
looked like a weak link:
On that strike day [Crewe Toll] had over 120 on the picket line. You could see from 80 to
100 to 120, the thing was built up and gathering momentum. Certainly at my factory,
because we were fighting every day to build the pickets, to build the mood, whereas at
South Gyle and Silverknowes, that was not happening. At Silverknowes, there was a
better layer of stewards and they were doing what they could, what they knew how to do -
they were trying their best. At South Gyle they weren't even trying. The thing was caving
in there'.
As the oldest factory with the longest traditions of union organisation, Crewe Toll was
expected to provide the leadership for the strike. In discussing the roots of trade unionism at
Crewe Toll, one worker at South Gyle thought that the concentration of male blue collar
workers there was a significant factor:
Crewe Toll has always been far stronger for unions than South Gyle mainly because
Crewe Toll has a machine shop. Turners have always been a bit more militant than
women assemblers.
At Crewe Toll, however, the involvement ofwomen workers on the picket line was highlighted
as an important development during the strike, with one of the expressed aims of the strike to
win rises for low paid women workers. This had a special salience in the aftermath of the
strike ofmainly women workers at the doomed Timex factory in Dundee.
Two thousand workers turned out during their holidays at the mass meeting the following
week. The size of the mass meetings, during the holiday period, was one indication of the
continuing strength of feeling among the workforce. Again there were reports that key projects
were being delayed because of the industrial action (Minutes, 21 July 1993). One worker in
the Radar Division argued that key MOD contracts - Blue Vixen, Kestrel and ECR90 - were
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all behind schedule. At Silverknowes the unions claimed nearly 100 per cent support for the
action and reported that 'Production has been hit on the TIALD system for the Tornado as it
requires 5 days of uninterrupted test runs' (MSF leaflet. 4 August 1993). The people
remaining at work on strike days were expected to cover as much work as possible. When
strikers returned this created divisions in the sections and led to recriminations. For example,
before the first day of action took place managers asked engineers for their login codes and
passwords for the desktop publishing machines since each engineer had their own account and
as there was no central file server individual contracts had their own server. An engineer
recalled that when asked by the supervisor for codes and passwords to allow access for the
one individual in his section who was prepared to work, 'everyone told him a lot of bollocks
basically', logged off, changed permissions and left messages 'in no uncertain terms about his
scabbing'.
Even as the action seemed to be biting, however, the strike leaders seemed eager to find a
settlement. The design laboratories were particularly affected by the manual workers' action.
In order to progress work design staff needed to collaborate with production areas. This time
the union's position had moved from seeking a meeting with the company on the basis of an
across-the-board basic rise to a willingness to sit down with the company without precondition
to reach agreement. The mass meeting voted overwhelmingly on a show of hands for a motion
to continue the action until the unions had a realistic settlement to put to the members. The
mood of the meeting was hostile to ending the action: 'One worker's suggestion that the strike
action be called off and replaced with an overtime ban while talks were going on was met with
a chorus of "No"' (.Evening News 22 July 1993). GEC were said to be 'disappointed' at the
outcome of the meeting but stuck by the mantra-like principle of PRP as the basis of any
settlement: 'Our decision to pay a selective review is based on the need to pay skill groups
appropriately' (Evening News 22 July 1993). Again, on the following day, a GEC spokesman
confirmed the company's position, 'We have certainly not closed the door to discussion. We
continue to have an offer on the table that we will review pay claims on a case-by-case basis'
(Evening News 23 July 1993).
The contested settlement
The fifth one day strike was called off to allow talks to take place after informal approaches
had been made, although who exactly initiated this is far from clear. The day before
'exploratory talks' began a mass meeting of some 2,000 workers had again voted
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overwhelmingly to continue the action. While some AEU shop stewards were hostile to
suspending the action they were reassured by the convener that action would be resumed
immediately should there be a lack of progress made through talking (Minutes. 23 July 1993).
A spokesman for the strike committee described the talks as a 'breakthrough' and claimed that
up to 65 per cent of GEC workers had been involved in the four successive strikes, hitting
production severely (Evening News 26 July 1993). An MSF spokesman said that local
management wanted to talk to their bosses and 'will tell us today if there is enough common
ground to begin formal negotiations'. He also indicated another shift in the unions demand for
an across-the-board increase: 'We want to get everyone an increase although it need not be
the same' (quoted in Evening News 26 July 1993, emphasis added).
GEC were also meeting to assess their handling of the dispute. An internal GEC meeting
between local directors and executives from Rochester Head Office was reported to have
lasted longer than expected. Yet the union seemed to be sending out mixed signals :'Union
leaders have made clear that an indefinite strike remains possible if their demands are not met',
with MSF, AEU, TGWU wanting the original claim for 3 to 4 per cent across-the-board rises
met. On the other hand, a spokesman for the strike committee conceded the principle of PRP
and thought that a more moderate award may be enough:
We have to accept that the company have implemented this pay award. What we have to
do is force it to come up with more money for those who haven't received anything. We
actually believe the company have addressed their market needs with their selective pay
awards. What we're saying is that there should be a social element as well, particularly for
those members who have received nothing and are low paid. If we are convinced that the
discussions have been meaningful, we will not be taking industrial action this week, but if
we think that the company are wasting our time, then we will be taking further action on
Thursday, (quoted in Evening News 27 July 1993).
At the first meeting on the 27 July GEC conceded rises of between 2.2 per cent and 3.2 per
cent for 70 of the very lowest paid workers (Minutes). Although encouraged by the offer of
3.2 per cent for the lowest grade, at the meeting the following day MSF complained that the
company were making it difficult for the union 'to sell the package' to the members because
small numbers of people in lower grades were excluded from the proposed rise while other
members in higher grades were being offered up to £2,000 to persuade them to stay (Minutes,
28 July 1993).
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The strike planned for that week was 'postponed' to allow talks to continue, although the union
had no concrete offer to put to the membership at this stage. A spokesman for the unions said.
'It would be foolish to call a strike while negotiations are going on. It is difficult to say how
things are going because we are waiting for the company to come back with their response.
We can say that a lot of areas have been explored' (Evening News 29 July 1993). On Friday
30 July the MSF stance seemed to harden again. They argued that the pay award should apply
to all members and that the pressures for industrial action remained. By the time of the next
meeting on Monday 2 August, the leading MSF negotiator and JOC secretary had left the
company to take up a position elsewhere. His replacement immediately accepted a revised
offer which gave some of the low paid an increase of up to 1 per cent. The basis of the deal
was that a small number of the lowest paid workers, involving no more than 201 workers,
would get a rise, adding an extra 0.2 per cent to the company wage bill (Report on Special
JOC, 3 August 1993; MSF leaflet, 4 August 1993). This was recommended by both
Negotiating Committees to their respective Shop Steward Committees. The AEEU shop
stewards vote was equally split at nine votes for and nine against accepting the deal and was
only carried when the Chairman used his casting vote to carry the resolution (Minutes 3
August 1993). The MSF shop stewards, against the recommendation of their Negotiating
Committee, voted narrowly to continue the action by 10 votes to 9. The recommendations
were put to two separate mass meetings instead of the usual single joint mass meetings. The
AEEU held their meeting first which, after some rancorous debate, voted by secret ballot to
accept the deal. The MSF members now held their meeting in the knowledge that the AEEU
had called off the action, but again voted narrowly to reject the proposed settlement.
Over the following weekend things also shifted in the MSF camp towards calling off the
strikes. A steward who wanted to continue the action said,
... [Ojver the course of the weekend, the National Officials and the full-time Officials had
been on to the MSF Negotiating Committee, who had wanted to pack it in anyway and
recommended that we hold another Shop Stewards meeting on the Monday, with a
recommendation to go back to work. Over the weekend, the Negotiating Committee
nobbled the middle ground stewards, convinced them about going back to work, especially
after the AEEU vote, and at the Shop Stewards' Committee we got hammered.
GEC's position was hardening and they wanted to bring the dispute to a head by sending out
dismissal notices to the whole workforce. The Personnel Manager in Edinburgh describes how
his role over that weekend was crucial in resolving the dispute:
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Four thousand letters were made out and ready to get the names attached and sent out to
dismiss the striking workforce. After [four] weeks of one day strikes! I was able to resolve
it by meeting two union officials to sort out a return to work. 1 let them know the gravity
of the situation and they asked, 'Bluff?' to which 1 said. 'Last week - yes; this week - no'.
They then primed their stewards before the meeting and the vote for the return to work
was carried. The cost of the return to work amounted to £16.000 out of a £60m payroll.
The MSF JOC finally voted to recommend ending the action on Monday 9 August. An MSF
Bulletin outlined their main concerns in cancelling any further action, none of which positively
argued that the settlement would meet any of the strike aims. The following were their main
areas of concern:
The JOC Reps assessment of the likely level of support in their areas.
The fact the AEEU now have an agreement with the Company.
The threat by the Company to dismiss employees who participate in future Industrial
Action.
The level of attendance and narrow majority vote on 5th August i .e. a majority of 55
to continue Industrial Action.
The likelihood of achieving an improvement in the Company offer in the immediate
future.
At the mass meeting at Meadowbank Union members clearly stated that they would
defend any member dismissed during the dispute. Our ability to do this is now
questionable.
(MSF Bulletin, 'Report To MSF Members', no date)
The earlier vote by the AEU to call off the action represented a serious blow to the resolve of
the MSF strike leaders. When nothing was moving physically on the shopfloor the impact of
the action was obvious. However, when jobs on the shopfloor were moving again some MSF
members became disheartened about the effectiveness of the action. When the proposed
settlement was recommended to the MSF membership, the final meetings were fragmented into
a series of departmental and sectional meetings. One MSF member recalled the anger this
created among the workers who had been most active in supporting the action,
People said, 'What's the point? We've come out here, we've lost money, we've been on
strike and where have you got us? Your urging us to go back to work with no deal, no
nothing'.
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The overall vote was sufficiently in favour of acceptance of the deal to end the action, yet
sufficiently divided as to leave a legacy of bitterness and cynicism about the effectiveness of
the action and indeed of the union itself.
Just how serious GEC were about mass dismissals is difficult to determine. This would have
raised a relatively minor and ill-conducted, though acrimonious dispute into a national cause
celebre with international ramifications. It must be doubted whether GEC wanted such
attention at the gates of Crewe Toll, where one of the most prestigious technological projects
in European industry would have been subject to, at least, severe disruption coupled with the
possible withdrawal of Spain and Italy from ECR 90 and enforcement of the back-to-back
indemnity clause by the German radar integrators. On the other hand, the wholesale dismissal
of workforces had been evident in a few celebrated disputes during the 1980s, particularly
News International's print union-busting move to Wapping in 1986. In Scotland only weeks
earlier, the Timex Corporation had dismissed wholesale the, mainly female, striking workforce
at its plant in Dundee.
When rumours circulated in the second week of the dispute of GEC taking a similar tack, the
MSF convener considered the chances of GEC 'doing a Timex' - closing the Scottish plants
and moving the work elsewhere - as extremely remote, arguing that, '1500 of our members are
graduates. You cannot replace them with people straight off the dole' (Evening News 2 July
1993). Such a view was supported by Carol Reid, Business Editor of the authoritative journal
Janes' Defence Weekly.
When the decision to form GEC-Marconi Avionics was made, journalists asked whether it
wouldn't be easier, from a purely operational point of view, to concentrate the activities,
bearing in mind that GEC's aim was to have this big avionics house that could provide a
total system. We wondered how they were going to manage this with sites in the north of
England, Scotland, Kent and other parts of the country. They said that they had no plans
to consolidate the activities in Scotland with those of England and because of the expertise
of the Scottish units, they had fairly high-powered people and complex technology on
these sites. So I think initially you would have to rule out any plan to consolidate them. I
think at the moment, in the short to medium term, that it could not be an option from the
purely industrial action point of view. I think the unions could argue they have GEC over
a barrel on that one (quoted in Evening News, 2 July 1993, emphasis added).
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This was the impression GEC had consistently presented since 1990. For example, in 1991
Lord Weinstock had told a meeting of Labour MPs that the Edinburgh factories were central
to GEC's future business plans and described the highly advanced airborne radar development
and manufacture at Edinburgh as a 'world beater' which would form the 'main core' of the
business for many years to come. He was reported as saying: 'The Edinburgh factories
definitely have a long term future. When we bought them, we bought them as a major
investment. They cost £270 million. We are not going to throw that away ... GEC Ferranti is a
major part of our business and we see the Scottish operations as crucial to the whole firm' (in
Evening News 2 May 1991).
The then convener of MSF was convinced that this argument largely deflected the impact of
the GEC threat of mass dismissal: 'The argument that we used to counter that [threat] was that
we had 1500 graduates in our membership and that the company would not be able to replace
them overnight and that seemed to sway a lot of people and reassure them'. Yet this is disputed
by a more militant MSF shop steward. He argues that with the weakness of the strike at South
Gyle, the AEEU decision and pressure from national and local union officials, mass dismissals
provided a convenient excuse for ending the dispute in the face of militant demands to escalate
the action: 'The threats of the sackings really got to them and that was the argument they used
to justify their position. They said [to me] "do you want everybody sacked ..., so that you can
prove your point and go ahead with this futile dispute'". His view of GEC's mass dismissal
threat was that of a desperate gamble after being unable to beat the strike earlier:
After the first day stoppage, everybody got delivered to their houses a notice saying that if
they continued with further industrial action they would be subject to disciplinary action.
The second day the action took place there was even more folk involved and nobody was
disciplined. After the third day of action they were talking about sending out disciplinary
notices and threatening to sack people.
The same steward argued that had GEC's bluff been called by MSF, as the largest union with
a fresh mandate from their members, to '... picket out the best sections of the AEEU, keep the
strike going and try to rebuild it from the rank and file, build it on the gates of the factories,
which was a realistic proposition at Crewe Toll certainly', then the company would have had
to back down . This scenario was never put to the test.
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Instead what needs to be explained is - given the particular forces and dynamics of the dispute
why this particular outcome and what impact did it have on the restructuring process? One
factor that helped to seal the fate of the dispute was the decision, in what proved to be the final
week of the dispute by the one of the main strike leaders and MSF JOC secretary to leave the
company for another position, ironically, as the leader of an 'Arms Conversion Project1. As a
charismatic and forceful advocate of the 'Diversification Not Dole' campaign at Ferranti, the
MSF convener was ideally suited to the post. Yet as leader of MSF in Ferranti, in the midst of
arguably the most serious dispute in the company's fifty year history in Edinburgh, the
circumstances surrounding his departure were bathed in recrimination. Indeed, alone of the
people I spoke to, he viewed the outcome of the strike as a victory for the trade unions in the
way that a settlement was arrived at:
We blamed [the dispute on] the change in the working relationship within the company
and it was the company who had to send the management up from down south to speak to
the management up here. It was also the company down south who spoke to the unions on
the telephone to discuss the ways forward and it ended up with a solution being implanted,
if you like, from GEC management at a higher level over the heads of the local
management, which indicated there was an acceptance that the role that the trade unions
were playing was the best role for the long term and the future. So if there was a winner it
was obviously the trade unions.
Such an assessment contradicts other evidence, both from local senior managers and shop
stewards, and union and non-union workers. First of all, the unions settled for meagre
selective rises and not the across-the-board payments they claimed at the beginning of the
dispute. Second, PRP was accepted as the basis of future salary increases, breaking the
linking of wages with annual rates of inflation and ending collective wage bargaining; at the
time of writing there has not been a single annual across-the-board rise since the strikes.
Third, the company have effectively marginalised the union presence in the workplace for the
time being, ending the check-off system for collecting union dues at source and abolishing 100
per cent facility time status for conveners. Finally, the way that the strike ended badly
damaged the credibility of the trade unions in the eyes of both the union membership and with
GEC managers. From different perspectives, those interviewed felt that the outcome of the
strike crucially weakened resistance to further restructuring. Managers tended to see the
union's position in these terms:
Recently we had a strike among the staff when performance related pay was being
introduced but it fizzled out in the end. Consequently the unions lost a lot of their
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members, as the idea of PRP became more widely accepted. Since then, the trade unions
have become much more sensible and realistic and industrial relations have settled down. I
can speak to the relevant union people in here and find that they are just as concerned
about the condition of the company as I am. After all. here we have highly educated,
articulate people working on sophisticated high technologies. The staff might still
emotionally dislike the changes that have been happening but intellectually they accept
them as realities which are necessary.
(Personnel manager)
Since [the early 1990s] we have had some minor disputes, but the pressure has really been
on the trade unions. To be honest, Ferranti gave the trade unions respect for far too long,
long after they were in a position to demand it ... Under Ferranti the hourly paid had what
amounted to an unofficial closed shop. This has now declined as the union has been
impotent in the last few years to resist recent changes, although many continue to be
members for insurance against health and safety difficulties.
(GEC manager)
Management now have a tougher attitude to organised labour. The feeling of protection
from change in the workplace by the trade unions is no longer there. The trade unions are
impotent, with their role restricted to health and safety issues, which the company is
bound to treat seriously anyway.
(Projects Director)
Union activists stressed the extent of the damage to the credibility of union organisation.
They did not understand the ramifications following a settlement like that and thought it
would be business as usual after that, back to normal and back into the cosy negotiations
with management ... They did not understand the implications of selling the members out
after campaigning hard to get them out on strike in the first place ... People were gutted,
people were disillusioned ... I am still trying to re-recruit people to the union who packed
it in after the sell out.
(MSF convnener)
Towards the end of the strike the unions seemed to have a fatalistic attitude towards the
action. Now the union has no credibility with either the management, who take a
disdainful approach to them, or with the membership, who are completely disillusioned.
(MSF member)
Workers in sections where the unions were weakest before the action became even more
disenchanted,
The unions here don't seem that relevant. During the strike there were more and more
people working, like myself, in my department than striking. I left when they stopped
deducting the subs out of the wages. I never bothered to re-join.
(Assembler)
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I personally am against strikes on principle. There are no winners in a strike. The strike
was totally disorganised and they returned for nothing in the end. Even though I am still a
union member, they are non-existent now and had too much to say for themselves in the
past.
(Quality inspector)
Seven weeks after the strikes were abandoned, GEC announced a further 225 redundancies in
Edinburgh (The Scotsman 1 October 1993). Bloodied and discredited, the union response was
even more feeble than it had been to earlier announcements.
The abolition of the check-off system undoubtedly had a symbolic importance for showing
where the balance of workplace power lay. It represented management's ability to take
unilateral action against the unions, in a way that was seen as vindictive and petty by the
unions, while non-union members among the workforce felt that the unions had reaped the
bitter fruits of their own ineffectual posturing. By cancelling check-off, the company hoped to
further weaken the union's membership base. While this move saved the company very little
money, stopping the deduction of union dues at source lost management an automatic measure
for gauging union strength in terms of the density of membership: 'Trade union strength has
become something of an unknown quantity and our judgements have to be more intuitive now'.
While some members undoubtedly took the opportunity to let their membership lapse, the
unions continue to be organised into branches and although there is 'a grey area' they retain
some idea of the strength of their base. While this is more difficult for the AEU who are
organised on the basis of geographical branches, MSF operate a closed branch where every
branch member works for GEC in Edinburgh. The closed branch system also partly helps to
overcome the divisionalisation of the workforce. Although the unions seem to be pushing for
standing orders as the replacement method for check-off, where union reps need to collect
subscriptions in their sections on a regular basis, involving direct, face-to-face contact with
union members, paradoxically, the abolition of the check-off may strengthen levels of
commitment to union organisation.
Restructuring the workplace
Why was the restructuring relatively peaceful?
Explanations for the relatively peaceful nature of the restructuring differ widely. Trade union
inability to effectively challenge the restructuring process was put down to a number of
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contradictors reasons. In one account, from an ex-AEU convener, trade union members in
Edinburgh are characteristically moderate and reluctant to take industrial action.
The contraction has been relatively peaceful because there is a reluctance to 'take the
coats off ' here. Unlike the workers in the west coast there is a specific, more cautious
kind of east coast culture. It is only over the last 18 months or so. after a phase of initial
quiet, that GEC have really cut it up rough. In 1992 the wage freeze was imposed and that
was the start of the spiral of central interference. Since then we've had redundancies, cuts
in redundancy pay, real wage cuts, divisionalisation and we've still narrowly lost the
ballots to take strike action to resist them.
As we have seen, not all ballots for action were lost. In another account, from a GEC
manager, the Ferranti unions had been too militant.
It was only natural in the early stages that the unions were hostile to these lay-offs. The
unions had traditionally been militant and untrusting ofmanagement.
Not surprisingly, longer-serving Ferranti managers did not find the unions especially militant.
The Personnel Manager claimed that most union officials were 'reasonable' to deal with,
regardless of their political convictions.
On the whole I find the union officials to be tough but fair negotiators, regardless of their
individual politics. This goes for some left wing negotiators.
However, the specialised mediation practices acquired by union conveners constantly involved
in procedural routines under Ferranti tended to concentrate leadership functions in the person
of the convener. When conveners left the post, particularly in the changed conditions of the
GEC regime, there was little expertise to fill the leadership vacuum on the union side. At
South Gyle, for example, this led to some local managers becoming hegemonic over union
representatives in identifying the needs of the company as corresponding to the interests of the
union representation,
Local TU reps have yet to find their feet after divisionalisation because they relied too
much on the expertise of one person, the convener, in the past. The convener would
become a bit of a specialist building up knowledge and relations over the years, covering
the whole of the group, and his reps would take a back seat. The local stewards are getting
more focused on the business needs of the firm and some are even reluctant to take
advantage of the opportunities for trade union training courses because they don't see
them as particularly relevant to their patch.
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The Crewe Toll factories seem to have been less affected by this than the other sites. There a
residual union cadre continued to function after the 1993 strikes. This was the traditional
centre for 'bringing on' younger stewards and where union and section leaders were based.
Also present at Crewe Toll was a vague socialistic presence among the stewards ranging from
traditional right and left wing Labour supporters through to the MSF convener who identified
himself as a Marxist. The MSF convener at Crewe Toll explained the relatively pacific nature
of the restructuring mainly in terms of the legacy of the workplace union organisation under
Ferranti,
There has always been that 'we're all Jock Tamson's bairns' attitude ... Generally the
Personnel Officer was on very good terms with the trade union convener. A lot of ex-shop
stewards became managers. There was no clear line of demarcation ... So you had a
flabby shop stewards organisation which had never fought for anything, had never had to
resort to militant tactics to get what were the best wages and conditions in the city ... It
was a shop stewards' organisation, a trade union organisation that was built up on the
basis of guaranteed big wage rises [and] guaranteed good conditions.
Although formally trade union organisation by the 1980s seemed to be secure when it was
tested by GEC over issues such as redundancy, divisionalisation, wage freezes, PRP, it was
exposed as being unable to alter the nature or direction of the shift. Individuals might be
allocated to another job rather than be made redundant because of the union negotiator's skill
but the restructuring of the workforce remained.
Part of the union's difficulties stemmed from an ideology which accepted, at least implicitly,
the underlying necessity for restructuring. After all, who could oppose the logic of a world
historic process, the ending of the cold war, and the opportunities of the so-called 'peace
dividend'? For most left-wing stewards this seemed to have a 'progressive' character to it. It
posed in an acute way the usefulness of the end product - GMav may have been a high-tech
company, but high-tech for what? This is not to claim that the workforce were inherently or
consciously anti-militaristic, although a small number undoubtedly were. It was well known
that 'a spate of people left during the Falklands conflict and again during our time in bed with
ISC, who were known to deal in cluster bombs'. The company also made strenuous efforts to
conceal their involvement in the Trident programme from the workforce. When it was
discovered that a navigation systems project, codenamed Draper, was in fact equipment
(accelorometers) for Trident, the Ferranti management were forced to reverse their declared
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policy of not doing any work for Trident. Ferranti's technologism and the technical division of
labour helped to obscure a more militaristic identification with the product.
Most people do not concern themselves with the end use of the product. The immediate
technical problem is probably more of a motivating factor for our engineers.
(Production engineer)
We do not see ourselves as primarily military, although the end product serves a military
purpose. Under Ferranti we were a centre of engineering excellence ... We are not in the
attack business but in the defence of the country business. We see ourselves at the clean
end of the business, having no involvement in nuclear work for instance ... Because we
operate at the front end of technology people tend to view the work in a disembodied way.
Few people actually see the finished article, especially where military secrecy is involved.
(Personnel manager)
Diversification campaigns apart, even the left-leaning MSF shop stewards committee had no
answer to the business 'realism' of management in 'adjusting' the workforce to levels that the
market would tolerate. As one manager put it,
The reason that the recent changes have been relatively peaceful is that the unions
recognise that we were well over-capacity and that the work is not there to sustain past
employment levels.
Besides the changed market conditions, there was also the way that the external political and
legal environment seemed to have tilted decisively against trade unions by the early 1990s.
The other factor making the unions more co-operative is that they were devastated during
the 1980s through changes in the law. They are now more likely to consider the effects of
their actions on the company and their union's purses more carefully than at any time
previously.
Bereft of their wage bargaining function the unions may be down but it is too early to count
them out. It would be an exaggeration to suggest that the unions have been reduced to a cowed
and demoralised rump organisation. The trade unions continue to have a loyal, if passive,
membership base, continue to be recognised, still have time and facilities to conduct the
business of representing the workforce and, most importantly, have a layer of committed
activists who have basically held union organisation together in trying circumstances. The
divisions meet formally once a month and the unions in the Edinburgh group meet every three
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months. In this the unions merely reflect the continuing centralisation of the Edinburgh
personnel management system who meet once a month to decide policy, or more regularly if
the situation demands it. Although badly damaged by the 1993 settlement, the trade unions
continue to function and as restructuring continues to store up worker grievances which have
fewer channels of legitimate expression, the possibility of trade union revival cannot be
discounted. In the absence of such a revival, workers will become increasingly recalcitrant,
workplace participation will be undertaken grudgingly and resistance will take 'illegitimate'
forms over which the company will have little forewarning and exercise even less control. Any-
hardening of dumb resentment among the workforce will act as a further brake on initiative,
involvement and flexibility in the labour process. These are precisely the specialised
characteristics which make highly-qualified labour so important to high tech development
processes and which figure so largely in the company's public utterances.
Reasonsfor the contraction
In Scotland, GEC were widely castigated for the scale of the job contraction in Edinburgh.
Alistair Darling, Labour MP, for example, attributed the 350 job losses to 'an inevitable result
of the take-over by GEC' (Evening News 2 February 1991). When the next tranche of 800
redundancies were announced Darling shifted the blame to the government for two key
contracts not being awarded to British companies. These were when the MOD made the US
company, IBM, prime contractor for the Royal Navy's new anti-submarine helicopter, EH101
Merlin. Darling said, "What makes me really angry is that the Government awarded the Merlin
helicopter contract to the Americans, despite all of the warnings which our own defence
industry and my own Party gave at the time' (Evening News 14 September 1991). However,
Darling's nationalist anger was misplaced. GEC Ferranti already had the radar development
contract for Merlin and had just been awarded the production contract and were hopeful of
getting long term support work for the life of the helicopter, expected to last for 20 to 30 years
(Evening News 22 July 1991; Scotsman 12 September 1991).
Within the company different stresses were put on the main reasons for the contraction.
Neither GEC nor the government were held directly responsible for the need for redundancies
by managers, trade unions or workers I spoke to. The most common response was that GEC
were responding to the reduction in defence spending, leading to declining orders. In 1991, for
I
example the AEU claimed that the loss of 1500 jobs, from 6700 workers to 5250, since 1989
was due to two main reasons: first, a decline in orders, and second, rationalisation after GEC's
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operational review (Scotsman 2 February 1991). While the first could be accepted as
necessary because it was beyond the company's control, the second suggested some culpability
on GEC's part, who were putting local management under pressure to reduce costs. Even here
however GEC were not primarily held to blame. GEC managers and even Ferranti people
invariably blamed the scale of the contraction on labour hoarding and underemployment under
the old Ferranti regime.
Because of the excess capacity which was stored up under Ferranti, GEC inevitably got
blamed for the lay-offs that had to eventually come. (GEC manager)
The main reasons are the excess capacity accumulated over the last ten years and the
changing nature of technology so that machines replace people. (Ferranti trade unionist)
The massive expansion of the 1980s had made Ferranti International too fat. This was
compounded with the ending of the big defence contracts like Tornado. The problem for
us with fixed price development contracts was how do you accurately cost ideas in the
development and design engineer's heads? So far there have been eight waves of
redundancies. The first two were before GEC took over. So there was already a
recognition that we had surplus labour. (Ferranti manager)
The changing character of procurement and technology were therefore also part of the wider
constellation that compelled GEC to squeeze costs ever tighter. One example of this was the
failure of Ferranti to get the order for the navigation system FIN 1155 for the Challenger 2
tank order, with the US GPS system preferred. In a letter to Lord James Douglas-Hamilton.
Scottish Office Minister, Alan Clark, the Procurement Minister, said 'Experience in the Gulf
conflict showed that equipment as sophisticated as the GEC Ferranti FIN1155 would exceed
our essential technological needs, and could not be justified on cost grounds' and finished by
reminding the trade unions of the changed balance of forces in the industry, 'I recognise that
this will be disappointing news for the workforce at GEC Ferranti ... The management of
GEC Ferranti are aware of the decision not to proceed [and] in the circumstances I see no
point in my meeting representatives of MSF' (in Evening News 24 August 1991). While GEC
managers said they had not yet been officially informed the trade unions argued that the
decision could not be justified on cost grounds and ran counter to previous assurances that
British troops would be provided with the best available equipment. This left the trade unions
arguing from an old technological-fix position in support of Britain's Imperial role, while at
the same time demanding government action on diversification. Yet the politics and economics
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of procurement and occasionally of technology policy, such as it existed, militated against a
simple 'technology in command' approach.
Edinburgh: disadvantaged by place?
As a large diversified conglomerate, it is clear from even a cursory glance at patterns of GEC
restructuring that they have little in the way of sentimental attachment to particular places.
The care and skill Ferranti invested in developing institutional links and constructing a strong
Scottish identity would therefore seem to be at odds with the GEC style. However, as we have
already noted GEC take considerable care in cultivating ministers, politicians and
departmental officials at the level of the nation-state. Something similar might have been
expected at the Scottish sub-state level and among Scottish MPs. Where this has happened it
has largely been to placate and reassure that GEC will continue development and production
of 'leading edge' electronics in Edinburgh. Thus after a round of redundancies in 1991,
Weinstock met with a group of Scottish Labour MPs. The MP's were reportedly 'delighted'
with the meeting (Evening News 2 May 1991). Gavin Strang, who was close to the previous
Ferranti regime, concurred, adding that Weinstock was hopeful that there should be no need
for any further rounds of redundancies on the scale which had taken place last year. Indeed,
Weinstock indicated that Ferranti's performance had been better than expected and paid
particular tribute to the high quality management and workforce in Edinburgh (Scotsman 2
May 1991). Again in 1993, Labour MPs met with the Chief Executive of GEC-Marconi,
Derek Dickinson, on the commitment of GEC to Edinburgh after the reorganisation. Strang
said, 'We were pleased with his comments about employment and the firm's commitment to the
city. We came away heartened and fairly encouraged' (Evening News 21 May 1993).
After nine waves of redundancy in five years, Ferranti workers had good reason to be less
pleased with the commitments given by GEC. Instead, for some workers the possible
relocation of operations south hangs over Edinburgh,
GEC are not interested in the national dimension except where it means cash. Their
managers would rather be back in the 'golden triangle' in the south of England. There is a
bit of a fear that either capacity will drain away southwards or GEC will use the national
question as an excuse to shift the operations lock, stock and barrel. When massive new
capacity was added at Milton Keynes rumours started up here that it was being designated




Some managers see in GEC's overriding concern with economy that ECR-90 will act as a
guarantee for Edinburgh
The suspicion that the new facilities built by GEC at Milton Keynes is for a possible
transfer of the EFA radar production doesn't hold water. In all its dealings GEC makes
cost-efficiency decisive in allocating costs. It is therefore extremely doubtful if EFA will
move to Milton Keynes because of the cost burden of setting up production from scratch
when it makes far more economic sense to bed production into the site where it was
developed in the first place. EFA will guarantee the radar divisions.
(Chief Production engineer)
With the declining influence of the 'Scottish Mafia' at the state level, GEC no longer need to
be as centrally involved as Ferranti were. In any case some sections of the erstwhile Mafia,
like Strang, became increasingly hostile to GEC. As a long-serving Ferranti manager noted.
There seems to be a distinct lack of desire by the Scottish Mafia to act as it did in the
past. People like Gavin Strang and the local MP Lord James Douglas Hamilton blame
GEC for the contraction in employment. Anyway the Scottish Mafia is less relevant now,
since GEC do not understand them and care even less about them.
Where participating in the institutional structures in Scotland was almost akin to a civic
responsibility for Ferranti managers, GEC managers stress its voluntary, individual nature.
... we make a positive contribution to the local economy and Scottish society through
voluntarily doing good work with Lothian and Edinburgh councils, Scottish Enterprise
and various bodies like that.
In terms of the role GEC Marconi people play in local business and public organisations,
then again there is no company directive on participating. It is left up to individuals to
judge the kind of contributions that they can make. The individuals at Marconi are
motivated and experienced enough to work this out for themselves. Perhaps one of the
biggest factors is that participation is part of the identity of what being Scottish means -
you get on with it and you make your contribution.
Some managers who arrived in Edinburgh from GEC's English plants noticed a greater
willingness on the part of MPs, officials and ministers in Scotland to play an active role in
supporting GEC locally,
We really need more active government, getting involved in helping firms to learn about
marketing to their best advantage, backing investments and clearing political obstacles out
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of the way of businesses. We are better placed in Scotland in terms of institutional
support than elsewhere in the UK. It is much easier to get people to the Display plants in
Edinburgh than it is for the same plant in Rochester down south.
There continued to be an unresolved tension between Edinburgh and Rochester in Kent, where
the headquarters for GMav was based. For one shop steward it seemed as if Edinburgh
became 'GEC's 'new colony' but that they hadn't yet wanted to 'go native', the implication
being that GEC did not want to adapt to the seemingly distinctive practices and attitudes that
operating in Scottish locations entailed.3 Instead the Edinburgh operations were expected to
adapt to the GEC approach to business practices and corporate identities.
It seems a harder culture and more unionised which some English people don't quite know
how to handle. Now however we must integrate into the GEC culture, regardless of local
cultural differences.
3 In part the setting up of GEC (Scotland) after an industrial dispute at Yarrow in 1993 by Bob
Easton, Murray Easton, Ron Dunn, and Gavin Laird was an attempt to meet the demands of the
'Scottish dimension'. Basically it functions in the same manner as a quango playing an important
political and promotion role, lobbying in Scotland and England on behalf of GEC. Although the
composition of the board has since changed GEC (Scotland) remains a creature of GEC and retains
little of the explicit national identity that the Scottish Group of Ferranti created over four decades of
being at the centre of institutional relations in Scotland.
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PART THREE
THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS OF RESTRUCTURING
The sources flow to one's hearts content, and there they converge to form the
stream of tradition; this stream flows along as far as the eye can reach between well
laid-out slopes. Historical materialism is not diverted by this spectacle. It does not
seek the reflection of the clouds in this stream, but it also does not turn away from
the stream to drink 'from the source' and pursue the 'matter itself behind men's
backs. Whose mills does this stream activate? Who is utilizing its power? Who
damned it? These are the questions which historical materialism asks, and it changes
the picture of the landscape by naming the forces which have been operative in it.
Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire
Chapter 11
Dimensions of restructuring 1:
Public and private
Analytical pre-occupations
This study has examined historical continuities and discontinuities involving two key arms
producers in Scotland. From the case studies it has been established that such firms cannot be
understood empirically as atomised 'things-in-themselves'. In this final part, it will be argued
that even less can they be understood theoretically as isolated capitals. If empirically the
historical development of such capitals has been thickly layered no less can theory attempt to
reconstruct the many-sided determinants of restructuring. It may seem obvious to begin a
layered analysis of the restructuring of military industry from the world-historic events
surrounding the end of the Cold War, disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the
Berlin Wall. This approach to layering would cement the separate bricks of organizations,
conjunctures, events and agents, into a solid, reliable wall of 'factual' evidence. Piling the
'factual' bricks on top of each other, defence industry restructuring would be treated as a
synchronized hierarchical series of responses to changed market conditions. Following global
political change a circular episodic process seems to operate ad infinitum: firms react -
markets compel - firms react, and so on. Here, a dominating external event, the global
significance of the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, causes changed national defence
procurement priorities, which in turn causes the restructuring of the social relations of
production at all levels of national systems of arms production, with unavoidable
consequences for the internal relations of the individual capitals that compose it. In this
perspective, organizational change is functional and uni-directional, leading automatically
from the global to the local. As global demand contracts and competition intensifies it is
supposed that external necessity imposes upon firms a uniform internal structure better suited
to the shifting environment.
Indeed, the analysis developed here retains the notion of silent (and noisy) compulsion acting
on firms. Yet a simple formulation of blind 'market' pressures and firm responses is hardly
sufficient. A checklist ticking-off parallel market changes and organizational shifts tells us
little about the inter-relationships between the state 'market' and military firms and still less
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about internal divisions and processes within such finns. between labour and managers or
even within management or labour. Certainly, incidents, events and conjunctures indelibly
mark the process of structural change all the way down from the world-historic end to the
bureaucratic regimes of the Warsaw Pact to the struggles for control of time and space on the
shopfloors at Rosyth and Ferranti. Such an approach would seem to have the merit of
connecting in a concrete way local to global processes. Yet to begin an analysis from discrete
conjunctures and work back to individual capitals would be to assume precisely that which
needs to be explained. Instead of treating concrete social forms as a process combining many
determinants a unilinear process of causality would already be presumed. Such a procedure
would run the risk of presenting a 'chaotic conception of the whole' arising from a misplaced
concreteness of the two particular firms under discussion. If the defence market is a special
case of capitalist production and accumulation, which I want argue it is, then a sense of the
dialectics of restructuring, of the objective and subjective conditions internal to the
restructuring process, needs to be rendered.
A major theme of the case study chapters was historical continuity and change. Mainly this
took the form of reportage without making underlying theoretical assumptions explicit. The
aim of the final three chapters is to elaborate a substantive theory of restructuring. This is not
without some obvious pitfalls. On the one side, empiricism lurks and, on the other, formalism.
A substantive theory of restructuring need not be taken to imply a 'straightforward' reading-off
of restructuring directly from the case studies. It is not a question of identifying some
universal, undifferentiated linear process of causation nor of isolating generalisable statistical
variables and regularities. In a certain sense, each and every social change is unique in that it
will never be replicated exactly as it happened. But, in a more profound sense, each case of
restructuring renders something of much wider processes in concentrated form. Form and
content may be separable analytically but concretely they are always indissoluble. Case
studies cannot, in other words, be treated as isolated, self-contained fields of study nor as the
mere epiphenomenal expression of a deeper, real content.
Instead, here the case study approach can act like a prism through which, at various degrees
of analysis, the light of structural change is refracted to reveal the many-sided complexity of
restructuring. As Elger (1990: 85) notes, 'case studies offer unrivaled insight into the
processes and trajectories of restructuring and, while they do not lend themselves to
straightforward generalization, they can throw particular light upon pioneering, but as yet
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unusual, innovations'. While case studies may be interesting in their own right for studying
pioneering or unusual innovations they can also generate deeper insights into the shift from a
relatively settled patterning of social relations and institutions to the more agitated state of
structural change, perhaps coming to rest with the creation of a new patterning. An alternative
reading, however, is that the relative stability and predictability over three decades of the
permanent arms economy has already become a novel historical fact and contemporary
restructuring marks a return to constant uneven structural change and upheaval to meet short-
run exigencies in the state mediation of local-national-global tensions. Structural change is not
therefore a shift from some fixed point to some new static structural condition
Beneath the seeming solidity of the structures of the permanent arms economy lay a complex
totality of social relations. At least one significant cause of global restructuring was the use of
the arms race by competing military blocs to break and subordinate rival economies through
ever escalating the cost of military preparedness (Kidron, 1967; Harman, 1984). The
production and reproduction of structure in the arms industry was not then a singular effect of
the Cold War raging outside its boundaries. In other words, structure cannot be simply
counterposed to social processes and relations. It is in the nature of the restructuring process
that agents, within definite limits, initiate structural change and that the terms of such change
are subject to contestation and negotiation. In the case of the arms industry, restructuring
attempts to reorder two sets of relations in particular: first, state/capital relations and, second,
capital/labour relations. Both were to become subject to the semblance of various 'market'
mechanisms which attempted to place money in command through private property rights,
commodification and management prerogatives. I say 'semblance' because the process of
marketisation was conditioned by two forms of politics, a politics of state and a politics of
production, which prevented 'normal' ideal market relations from functioning. The two forms
of politics are not conceived here as external and only contingently related but as dialectical
moments of the same process through which exploitation, the appropriation of unpaid or
surplus labour, takes place.
In chapter 1 it was argued that restructuring represents attempts in varied forms to arrest or at
least alter the terms of crisis. In the absence of a systemic solution, restructuring was premised
upon the possibility of resolving organizational contradictions. Restructuring, understood as a
broad process, connects up the general and the particular across a strategic temporal and
spatial intersection. This study of structural change affecting two firms in a distinctive sector
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concerned change of a modest kind. At Rosyth and Ferranti a problem of organization ran
through state-capital-labour relations in an acute way. In order to grasp the special problem of
organization it was necessary to historicise the concrete organizational forms taken over time
by the two cases examined. This was done by outlining the historical accretion of political
obstacles to organizational reform. The range of barriers included state-sectoral, corporate,
management, labour and work organization, which, when combined, inhibited thoroughgoing
restructuring. The context of this was the seeming permanence of the Cold War arms
economy. Incremental decisions affecting Rosyth and Ferranti to expand employment, fixed
capital and productive activities were taken pragmatically, based on a rational assessment of
foreseeable risks.
Even when organizational crises made themselves felt at certain moments, for example at
points of armament demand contraction, project cancellations, officially-sponsored studies or
heavy financial losses, founding organizational structures, ideologies and cultures persisted.
Since the state viewed Rosyth and Ferranti as 'strategic' to its need for accumulating
armaments it took a decisive interest in preserving them. In other words, no external,
disinterested method of market sanction operated to impose restructuring. In the absence of
this, from the late 1950s until the early 1970s a kind of organizational equipoise settled over
firms like Ferranti and Rosyth. Restructuring, when it came, would be 'extra-economic', a
negotiated outcome ofwillful political decision-making. However, the two key points here are,
first, that the self-imposed limits to the restructuring process inhibited a resolution of the
structural contradictions which gave rise to it and, secondly, that each 'solution' advanced at
various levels contained within it its own contradictions (Gough, 1992).
At the risk of merely restating well known ground I want therefore to present a case for
locating workplace restructuring within a wider political economy of restructuring. In doing so
I want to correct for the recent trend which takes the industrial restructuring of the past three
decades as something which happens to labour. Here restructuring appears as an irresistible,
immanent force outside of human action. This has had the lamentable consequence of clearing
the process of industrial change of active agents, as with 'capital-logic' versions of the
globalization and regulation schools or, at best, of adopting a managerial imperative as the
sole locus of agency. In the case of top-down studies the contradictory dynamic of
management and labour under capitalism vanishes behind historically and socially barren
structural forms. This will be made evident in the critique below of a Human Resource
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Management approach, which accepts managerial self-images of labour as a largely docile
mass to be enrolled behind a phony rhetoric of participation, partnership and profits. By
chance just such an account has been given for one of the case studies examined here. Ros\th
dockyard, in a series of papers covering the commercial management period (Gennard and
Kelly, 1991; 1992; Kelly and Gennard. 1996). A radically different interpretation will be
offered of changing workplace relations.
In presenting a political economy of arms production account needs to be taken of relations
between the state and capital. In contrast to atomistic approaches which close-off the separate
'logics' of state and capital, here capitalism will be argued to exercise a totalising presence
which presses down on the state's ability competitively to accumulate armaments on a
national basis. A crucial, but neglected, aspect of the "privatisation' of state activity is to
restore private sovereignty over the relations of production and to redefine public power as a
narrow field for ideological and political struggle. After briefly discussing radical sociologists
on state and society, an alternative approach, based on the Marxist theory of state capitalism,
will be outlined to account for shifts in the public and private forms of ownership of arms
production. Here individual capitals will be located within a national industrial complex,
within which 'strategic' sectors and firms were, and are. maintained by the 'techno-nationaf
demands of the state for advanced weapons equipment. The process of technical-
organizational restructuring of the industrial complex on the basis of 'the market' is thus
highly contradictory since public power continues to be exercised at all levels to protect
strategic capitals (and electoral advantage).
Restructuring the public and private
Local restructuring cannot be presented then as some transparent, unmediated expression of
the decay of bipolar global rivalries. Yet one thing seems to universally characterise
contemporary restructuring: a shift from 'public' forms of control and ownership to some
variant of the 'private'. 'Privatization' became a global leitmotif of the 1980s and 1990s, from
Thatcherism in the west through to perestroika and market socialism in the east. However, an
exclusive focus on the public and private dimensions of restructuring through detailed
accounts of the transfer of state to private ownership will fail to penetrate the secret purpose
of privatisation. To treat 'the ensemble of social relations' simply as a chronicle of discrete
situations or to reify and divide categories into separable public and private spheres, sanctions
a lapse into empiricism, on the one side, and an arid formalism, on the other.
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The eventual form restructuring took could not be indifferen to the different ownership
patterns of the two firms. In the Ferranti case, movement oscillated between private family
ownership, to public control after financial failure, and back again, with the government sale
of its stakeholding. Rosyth, under state control from the start, moved initially to the half-way
house compromise of commercial management due to the political calculations of officials and
government ministers and only belatedly to complete private ownership ten years later. Yet,
despite stamping the change process with peculiarities, juridical relations of ownership can
only be considered of secondary importance. The significance of the public/private distinction
rests more in what it means for the particular form in which surplus labour gets extracted, or
not, in the accumulation of armaments by the state than its meaning for legal or juridical
property rights per se.
In making this judgment about the relative significance of ownership the usual way of
applying public/private distinctions becomes inadequate in accounting for the restructuring of
state activity of the past two decades through processes of privatization and marketisation.
Naturally, in a study focusing on specific examples of restructuring, a lengthy historical
excursus on the relationship between state and society is precluded. Some preliminary
discussion is required, however, to map out how restructuring dissolves like acid boundaries
between public and private. In order to illustrate how the account offered here differs from
conventional approaches, I want to consider some of the implications of these for the
public/private segregation in understanding 'anomalous' firms like Ferranti and Rosyth.
Much recent historical sociology and social theory separates out the economy as a private
sphere of capitalist accumulation from the state (and military) as analytically autonomous
public spheres (cfi, Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1987; Skocpol, 1979; Hobson, 1997). Marxism, in
particular, is found to be lacking the theoretical means to account for the essentially public
spheres of the polity or militarism as developing independently, at least in principle, from the
laws of motion of an essentially 'private' capitalism. Skocpol (1979: 27), for instance, claims
that Marxism neglects the autonomous structures of the state, 'a structure with a logic and
interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to, or fused with, the interests of the dominant
class in society or the full set of member groups in the polity'. A categorical imperative thus
exists to split a priori an external, public state sphere of politics from an internal, private civil
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society sphere. As an external, hermetically-sealed phenomenon 'the state' is re-connected back
to society only contiguously.
Here I will merely touch briefly on two aspects of atomised dualities in Giddens (1985): the
separation of state and capitalism and the theory of structuration. Giddens identifies three
distinct organizational forms or institutional 'clusters', industrialism, capitalism and the state
form itself. As societies become 'stretched' over time and space, 'time-space distanciation'.
face-to-face contact, 'high presence-availability', becomes progressively lost. Two ways of re¬
integrating agents become necessary : societal integration at the level of individuals, system
integration at the level of wider communities and collectivities. This is couched in terms of
authoritative and allocative resources. Authoritative resources roughly correspond to the state
form, defined by those resources which are a means to dominion over human beings: military,
surveillance, administration and ideological powers. Allocative resources, technology, raw
materials, instruments of labour and end goods, roughly correspond to the 'economic' form,
industrial capitalism, in which power is bound-up with the productive transformation of nature
into useful objects. Authoritative resources exercise primacy over allocative resources in the
rise of modernity; indeed, military technology is given primacy over production technologies
(1985: 255). As the economy and the polity become increasingly insulated from each other,
internally the state 'pacifies' society through 'surveillance' technologies and externally
prepares armament technologies for inter-state violence.
The social/polity, economy/state duality is thus established on the basis of using different
types of media. Giddens' atomistic approach to the public and private rests on a utilitarian
theory of action where structural resources become the media through which knowing agents
mstrumentally pursue ends. Knowledgeable agents utilize resources as something external to
their being in the same way, perhaps, that capital employs labour and labour consumes the
instruments of labour. Agents are constantly called upon to work with externally available
resource media, allocative or authoritative, to either reproduce or change structures. Giddens'
formalism avoids setting out concrete conditions for preferring structural change to
reproduction, the forms of media use needed, and flattens-out 'the different modalities of
resistance in different social formations'(Callinicos, 1989: 117).
In the end, the result is a re-emphasis on agency over structure (Wright, 1983; Callinicos,
1985). What is lost here is that the collective capacities of agents are structured above all by
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their position within the social relations of production. The inadequacies of 'structuration'
theory for dealing with substantive areas of restructuring rest in seeing structural change and
reproduction as unspecified choices founded upon observable processes where agents select
appropriate media to fashion structures. Agents cannot have an external relationship to
relations of production which they can knowingly choose to enter or exit to access resource
media.1 Here it is sufficient to note Giddens' institutional clustering of state and capitalism as
distinct entities premised upon access, command and exercise of scarce authoritative and
allocative resources as forming an inadequate basis with which to grasp the modalities of
restructuring of public and private in the arms industry. Rather, the internal structure of
capitalist social forms are the necessary, objective but insufficient condition upon which
organizational capacities, including the state form, are created, maintained or lost.
Within Marxism a similar dualism between state and capital has developed, primarily between
functionalist and instrumental approaches (Held, 1983). Milliband (1983:65), for example, in
seeking to avoid 'class reductionism' draws up 'an accurate and realistic 'model' of the
relationship between the dominant class in advanced capitalist societies and the state [based
on] partnership between two different, separate forces ...' Kaldor (1982) stretches an analogy
with modes of production to indicate separate 'modes of warfare' with corresponding 'means'
and 'relations' of warfare. Shaw (1991; 1994), who has been discussing the problem of the
state and the military in Marxist theory since the early 1970s, has moved from a functional
'class reductionist' view of the state to an autonomist view, where the state and the military
possess their own discrete logic. Giddens' pacific internal society/violent external state-system
presents for Shaw (1991:18) 'an extremely useful thesis, which expresses both the tension
between and the combination of the logics of capitalism, industrialism and warfare'.2
Nevertheless, the distinction between socio-economic and geo-political logics remains. For
Shaw (1985: 253), 'never more vividly than in modem times, is that however much states need
1 The agency-structure discourse, and derivatives like structure/strategy in organisation theory, in
positing social reality in dualist terms is not simply a convenient academic myth. Instead, it can be
understood as a one-sided, naturalisation of actual fetishistic social relations under capitalism. As
noxious emissions from the decomposing organic matter of commodified social life it is not wrong. It
simply repeats in ideas the antinomic split where it exists as 'a definite social relation between men
[ie agency, subjectivity], which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between
things [ie, structure, objectivity]' Marx (1976: 165).
2 Although Shaw qualifies the precise form of their interaction when civilians are mass mobilised for
warfare and wars create pre-conditions for socio-economic revolution.
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economic resources to set them in motion, once this has happened the logic of competitive
violence is stronger than any economic logic' (emphasis added). By the early 1990s this is
reversed. Shaw locates a private sphere of 'civil society' uncritically in Gramsci's formal
distinction as lying somewhere 'between the economic structure and the state with its
legislation and coercion" (quoted by Shaw, 1994: 647). As 'a defining characteristic' of the
end of the twentieth century, 'post-militarism' results from the 'logic' of high technology war
preparation in reducing the demands the state makes on society and. as individuals and groups
develop spaces and interests free from the nation-state, militarism is consigned to a nostalgic
"armamenf element in popular culture (Shaw, 1991: 184-190). 'Society has developed beyond
the military and militarism as they have been understood in most of the twentieth century'
(1991 :viii). On the back of technological advance warmaking nation-states silently tiptoe away
from imposing themselves upon essentially pacific domestic civil society. A presumed
dependency of the economy and culture on state power has now been reversed. Society thus
becomes less militarized because of the increasing independence of economy and culture from
the demands of the nation-state. Militarism, assumed as an alien imposition of the public onto
the private, withers as a social power as civil society asserts its own indubitable technical
logic.
Where then does military industry sit within the rigid bifurcation of the public and private into
distinct and, at best, externally-related logics of capital and state? In conventional accounts, as
chapter 1 showed, military industry is ascribed mutant status, contorting the neat
public/private separation into a deformed social form. Mesmerized by the self-images of the
Cold War, the arms industry in liberal democracies appeared as a hydra-headed monster
encroaching illegitimately on democratic politics on the one hand and the free market on the
other. Because of the close integration of their peak organizations into the state, arms
producers could not be considered 'private'; this despite a dependence on wage labour and the
wider circulation of commodities in the economy, and state appropriation of surpluses. But, as
legally private firms, nor were they considered 'public" despite being called into existence by
state demands for armament technologies. Therefore military industry must take some other
autonomous form.
Although such perspectives claim they are 'modeling' the observable behaviours of institutions
and agents, in fact real historical processes of concrete human beings constitutive of and
constituted by determinate circumstances are eschewed in favour of reified categories: state,
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economy and 'civil society". The effect is to empty the private of the political 'moment of
coercion' and the public of the economic 'moment of appropriation'. Without troubling the
formal public/private separation the way is cleared for mystifying substantive changes to
social relations, processes and structures. Conventional notions of the arms industry as a
surplus-devouring, parasitic social formation thus neatly express in ideas existing alienated
social forms.
State capitalism: transcending the public/private divide
By counterposing the public to the private in this way the specifically capitalist nature of
military industry is occluded. Shaw's argument about 'post-military' society is, of course, part
of a general celebration of what Wood (1995) calls 'the cult of civil society' to be found in
'post-modernism', 'post-Marxism', 'post-Fordism', 'post-industrialism', and so on. The
concept of civil society rests on two related dichotomies: one, state-civil society, where civil
society includes all social relations outside the state; two, more narrowly, civil society includes
relations and institutions outside the state and the capitalist economy. The former is more
commonly employed to set-up the public/private distinction. Here the standard opposition is
established between vertical state violence, coercion and hierarchy and horizontal civil society
pluralism, autonomy and freedom. Yet the coercive logic of accumulation and the
subordination of wage labour is located precisely in the private sphere, where effective
possession of the means of production 'privatises' public power in the command structure of
capital (Wood, 1995:36-44) creating an internal 'politics of production'. The coercive
imperative to accumulate and internal relations of domination are thus integral to the private
sphere, although obscured by the seemingly separate public power of the 'politics of state'.
Capital and state do not merely interpenetrate externally as independent objects or levels. It is
the nature of the public/private split itself within which the capitalist arms industry must be
understood. This involves taking four steps. At the most general level, states in class-divided
societies reflect the relationship between the organization of labour and political domination.
Combined these determine the specific form in which surplus is extracted from the direct
producers (Burnham, 1990, 1995).3 Second, where social power within capitalist productive
3 As Marx (1967: 791) famously put it,
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers,
determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in
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relations takes the unique form of an impersonal external necessity acting on legal equals, and
not fundamentally on personalised political coercion, only then does the sovereign character of
public state power over civil society emerge. Physical compulsion is replaced by an
association of formally free producers who have an urgent need to access the means of
production and reproduction through the successful sale of labour power in the marketplace.
The commodification of labour power results for the first time in a subordination of the direct
producers without recourse to an extra-economic threat of direct force. Labour is therefore
both free and dependent; free from public compulsion, dependent upon private association.
'Politics' and coercion are expelled from private associations based upon market contracts
between legal equals, 'in a society of equivalents relating to each other through contract,
politics is abstracted out of the relations of production and order becomes the task of a
specialised body - the state' (Kay and Mott, 1982: 83, quoted by Burnham, 1995: 101). The
'secret origin' of the internal authority of independent states, what Rosenberg (1994) calls the
'empire of civil society', is thus located within the evacuation of 'politics' from the 'private
economics' of capitalist social relations of production with the rise of wage labour.4 Within
the private realm of the organization of production the labour process is inseparable from the
internal 'political' management of the antagonistic relations of production (Wood, 1995: 45)
Third, the specific form national states take as territorially-bounded units of jurisdiction is
contradicted by the global basis of accumulation. As such, states compete and collaborate to
turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation
of the economic community which grows up out of the production relations themselves, thereby
simultaneously its specific political form. It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the
conditions of production to the direct producers - a relation always naturally corresponding to a
definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and therby its social productivity -
which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it the
political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific
form of the state.
Lest this be misconstrued as implying functionalist support for a 'base/superstructure' approach Marx (791-
2) continues.
This does not prevent the same economic basis - the same from the standpoint of its main
conditions - due to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, racial
relations, external historical influences, etc., from showing infinite variation and gradations in
appearance, which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances.
4 Unfortunately Rosenberg does not make the most of this insight and leaves the public/private split largely
intact, although now unmasked as a reification of reality, instead of reconstructing their contradictory inner-
connections. His claim for totality in overcoming the dualism of state and market is therefore less than
convincing. More satisfactory is his more recent re-working of Trotsky's theory of combined and uneven
development into an account of the rise of the inter-state system (Rosenberg, 1996).
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mediate the national-global tension within the inter-state system to secure the most
advantageous national means of accumulation. Rosenberg (1994: 143) calls attention to the
'remarkable parallels between the condition of states and the condition of firms". Here he
follows what Marx had to say in Capital, 'anarchy in the social division of labour and
despotism in the manufacturing division of labour mutually condition each other'. Rosenberg
thus argues for seeing anarchy at the level of the world state-system and the internal domestic
state authority as mutually conditioning each other. Only here, it can be added, the
relationship between despotism in the workplace and anarchy in the marketplace is replaced
by state administration and the perils of diplomatic alliances and warfare.5
Four, the specific relation between the estranged social forms of public and private is
contingent upon national institutional structures of state, capital and labour and the way these
combine to mediate the national-global tension. In contrast to the formalism of Shaw and
Giddens, Marx,6 but more particularly Engels, noted the mutual interdependence of military
5 This is similar to the process which Bukharin (1972), drew attention to in 1915. Bukharin however, took
the further necessary (although at that time premature) step of identifying the fusion of the state and capital
at the national level into 'state capitalist trusts' which displaced anarchy from the national economy to a
higher and more terrible form, imperialist competition. What Bukharin called 'complex competition' comes
close to the notion of nationally-based industrial complexes developed below. See Chapter 1 above.
6 Marx regularly drew parallels between military organisation and technology and the relations and forces
of production.
The history of the army brings out more clearly than anything else the correctness of our
conception of the connection between the economic forces and social relations. In general the army
is important for economic development. For instance, it was in the army that the ancients first
developed a complete wages system ... So also the guild-system among the corporation of fabri
[smiths]. Here too the first use of machinery on a large scale. Even the special value ofmetals and
their use of money appears to have been originally based ... on their military significance. The
division of labour within one branch was also first carried out in the army. The whole history of the
forms of bourgeois society is very strikingly epitomised here' (Marx to Engels, 25 September 1857.
inTorr, 1940: 111, n2).
But this point can also be made negatively, as Weber did, in that the necessaiy supply of landless labourers
for the rise of industrial capitalism to take place was made possible, at least in part, by the lack of a large,
peasant-based army in England and the existence of a small, highly trained and equipped professional army.
See also Brewer, (1989). In Wage Labour and Capital Marx (1847) describes class struggle as battle of two
contending armies, one of which wants to expel as many 'soldiers' from its ranks as possible. Engels, of
course, was more concerned with military developments than Marx. Engels' (nd, 1878) materialist account
of militarism is spelled out in Anti-Duhring. Against Herr Duhring's 'force theory', Engels (nd: 190)
describes the direct dependency of force on 'economic' conditions and not at all on the individual genius of
generals "but the invention of better weapons and changes in the human material, the soldiers; at the very
most, the part played by generals of genius is limited to adapting methods of fighting to the new weapons
and combatants ...'
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and 'economic' power, or authoritative and allocative resources, as reciprocally conditioning.
For Engels (no date: 189-90) military power
requires very real preliminary conditions before it can come into operation - that is to say.
instruments, the more perfect of which vanquish the less perfect; moreover, these
instruments have to be produced, which also implies that the producer of more perfect
instmments of force, vulgo arms, vanquishes the less perfect instrument, and that, in a
word, the triumph of force is based on the production of arms, and this in turn on
production in general - therefore on 'economic power', on the 'economic order', on the
material means which force has at its disposal ... Nothing is more dependent on economic
pre-conditions than the army and navy. Their armaments, composition, organization,
tactics and strategy depend above all on the stage reached at that time in production and
communications.
By the late nineteenth century the industrialisation of warfare generalised advanced systems of
production, albeit unevenly, as backward states like Russia attempted to catch up with the
most recent techniques in warfare (Trebilcock, 1981: 281-4). 'From the moment warfare
became a branch of large-scale industry (ironclad ships, rifled artillery, quick-firing and
repeating cannons, repeating rifles, steel-covered bullets, smokeless powder, etc), large-scale
industry, without which all these things cannot be made, become a political necessity ...'
(Engels, 22 September 1892, in Torr, 1940: 112). Although weapon systems may be
technologically more complex today, the point is that the political and industrial 'necessity" for
independent national military capabilities which gives rise to autarchy and dirigisme in
armaments production is countered by technological advances and efficiencies in the
internationalization of production.
From such a high level of generality, however, the precise contours of the arms industry are
difficult to discern. This can only be ascertained at different levels of empirical investigation.
Firms such as Ferranti and Rosyth fonn part of what might be called a 'state capitalist
armament complex". The clumsy nomenclature, 'bureaucratic state capitalism', describes a
stage in the development of capitalism, roughly between the late 1920s and the early 1970s,
when the public and private aligned to bureaucratically regulate national systems of
production.7 At the core of this process stood military competition (Cliff, 1982; Harris, 1983;
7 The most extreme expression of this was the complete domination of the economy and society by the state
in the USSR. However, the USSR was not exceptional. All the antagonist states in the Second World War
developed warfare states which subordinated internal economic activity to supporting military activity. The
important difference from World War One was that the bureaucratic organisation of state capital was
maintained after fighting ceased. This was as true for western capitalism as for the fully-fledged
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Harman. 1984). Bureaucratic state capitals topically form internally-differentiated national
industrial complexes 8 (Harman. 1991). Military industry evolved as a more or less integrated
expression of this heightened state capital identity. The state could simultaneously be the
owner of capital, controller of production, manager of labour, financier of investment, as well
as the sole customer for products. In this sense there was a more or less complete fusion of the
state and capital. In short, the state functioned to all intents as capital (Barker, 1978b). The
state capital armament complex represents a special case of the general contradiction between
socialised (global) forces of production and the fragmented (national-local) units of
appropriation. Before we can descend to the level of firms what needs to be established first is
where and why component parts of state capital complexes (like Rosyth and Ferranti)
negotiate organizational boundaries within the social division of labour.
An industrial complex can be taken to be more than simply a relatively homogeneous network
of political and economic agents collaborating to maintain a special interest. This is closer to
the traditional usage of the term 'military-industrial complex' (Berghan, 1981; Sen, 1986). The
concept of industrial complex has been more precisely defined as an internally differentiated
bargaining arena composed of six key agents: a core firm, supplying firms, dealers and
distributors,9 workers within a core firm, financiers, and governments (Ruigrok and van
Tudler, 1995: 8).10 A state capital complex then refers to social and political bargaining,
collaboration and competition within a national system of production.
bureaucratic state capitalism of the east. The state capitalist perspective is identified politically with the
Socialist Workers Party in Britain. It is also important to note that state capitalism can never be a complete
or finished process. It is always subject to 'forces of repulsion' where centralisation of productive activity is
countered in part by the disengagement of independent capitals and states. At a global level both Germany
and Japan disengaged from the Cold War arms race and concentrated on competing in the 'civilian
economy', stimulated, of course, by the US rearmament for Korea and Vietnam.
8 The market model of classical and neo-classical economics portray capitals as isolated atoms which
engage in blind competition with other capitals ... [But] any productive capital grows up within the confines
of a particular territory, alongside other sibling capitals ... They are mutually dependent on each other for
resources, finances and markets. And they act together to shape the social and political conditions in that
territory to suit their own purposes ... The groups of capitals and the state with which they are associated
form a system, in which each affects the others. The specific character of each capital is influenced by its
interaction with the other capitals and the state' (Harman, 1991: 18-9).
9 Because of the lack of a commercial marketing function and the central role of the state as the broker for
prime contracts the question of dealers and distributors can be ignored. For arms firms with a strategic focus
on exports the role of dealers and distributors is of course crucial. Subject to 'national interest' restrictions
the arms trade is often clandestinely conducted but it is clear that dealers and distributors are a key part of
the arms industry complex (Sampson, 1977).
10 Industrial complexes represent for Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995:7-8, 164) 'the centres of gravity in the
international restructuring race'.
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In the context of the British economy the amis industry forms such a highly distinctive
industrial complex.'1 For some armaments is the UK technological-manufacturing complex or
at least its dominant element.12 However, this does not imply that it was rationally integrated
or planned. Only in the late nineteenth century1 did private manufacturers displace state
arsenals as the leading producers of armaments. After World War Two the Labour Part}' and
trade unions saw less of a need to nationalise what were called the 'merchants of death' in the
1930s and accepted the argument for a privately-owned but fragmented industrial structure to
competitively stimulate innovation in armament technologies. Thus the Labour government of
1945-51 embarked on a massive sell-off of state-owned industrial capacity (Edgerton, 1995:
183), in what was the first significant privatization programme (although almost all attention
has since focused on the nationalisations of rail, coal and steel). Ownership patterns varied
according to the historical development of sectors: for example, the most modem, the military
aircraft sector, was largely private until 1977; naval shipbuilding became increasingly private
as the southern dockyards abandoned building and concentrated on refitting.
1' In this Britain is not unique. As a recent comprehensive survey of the Fortune 100 argues, 'at least
seventy-five of today's 100 leading companies [in the world] at some point in their history profited from a
war' (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995: 220). This extends beyond traditional arms sectors such as guns,
explosives, aeroplanes or vehicles to evaporated milk manufacturers (Nestle, number 23) and cigarettes
(Philip Morris, number 17). Even the number 5 industrial firm in the world, Toyota, which gives its name
to a new post-Fordist paradigm, 'Toyotism', for Ruigrok and van Tudler, and Nissan, number 16, were
decisively rescued along with the Japanese economy by US orders during the Korean War. Ruigrok and van
Tudler (1995: 221) note, 'Altogether, ... (supra) national government policies, in particular defence
programmes, have been an overwhelming force in shaping the strategies and competitiveness of the world's
largest firms'. The importance of the defence market on the development of the modern industrial enterprise
was also noted by Alfred Chandler (1962: 384), 'Government action such as defense or countercyclical
spending that directly affected the market by increasing the national income or by making the government
itself a large customer has had a significant effect on the growth of the large enterprise. The changing
munitions market was of far more importance, for example, to the history of the du Pont Company than
anti-trust action'. It is the specific weight of defence procurement and its dependent producers in the
economy which is crucial. For the UK economy, there can be little doubt by now that defence production has
been at the core of indigenous manufacturing capacity, locking in second and third tier suppliers to the
interests of the dominant military contractor complex (Hislop 1997). This was a process strengthened
throughout the 1980s when manufacturing was weakened considerably and its effects continued to be felt
throughout the 1990s as the complex re-adjusted to a new concentration and centralisation of the industry
around a feeble Europeanisation strategy.
12 EP Thompson (1982:22) went further than most when he argued 'The USA and the USSR do not have
military-industrial complexes: they are such complexes ... it stamps its priorities on the society as a whole'.
Clearly, Thompson subscribed to the view that militaiy logic at the height of the second Cold War was
overwhelming society. See Mike Davis (1982) and Fred Halliday (1982) for historical critiques of
Thompson.
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The role of the state in arms manufacture had important implications for organisational
structure. After 1945 social democratic ideology combined with the techno-nationalism of
successive governments to frame a kind of military corporatism. This ranged from those
organizations who always were directly under centralised state control, such as dockyards and
ordnance factories, to the shipbuilding and aerospace firms nationalised in the 1970s, and the
declining band of privately-owned armament firms. In contrast to nationalized industries, the
state made far fewer demands on military industry to behave like private commercial firms.
Public ownership in the 1970s of much of the arms complex was only a brief, belated flourish
for direct, centralised control (Dillon, 1977). Even this failed to reach into the immediate day-
to-day affairs of equipment producers like Ferranti, except insofar as financing technological
programmes allowed. As a method of preventing incremental managerial and organizational
deviations state influence over the private detail control of the means of production was
indirect and weak. Building on Harris's (1972) distinction between 'pluralist' and 'etatiste'
forms of corporatism, Lovering (1986) argues that until the early 1970s the relationship
between the state and arms firms was closer to pluralist corporatism, that is 'hands-off state
funding coupled with protection for a set of independent, decentralised capitals.
Ferranti and Rosyth were integral parts of the UK military state capital complex. At Rosyth
state and capital were completely fused, at Ferranti the boundaries were much looser. When
the latter became publicly-owned little was done by the state to transform its fragmented
structure. Even after the Ferranti bail-out and the wider nationalisations in the 1970s of two
major defence industries, aerospace and shipbuilding, little headway was made by the Labour
government in introducing a modernising, rationalising type of etatiste corporatism. Instead,
the arms complex continued to be highly internally differentiated by product and function
(Hartley, 1996). For example, public control at Ferranti ushered in little integration of the
largely self-sufficient Scottish Group into wider Ferranti structures. Individual sites, like
Crewe Toll, retained powerfully independent and distinct identities. The Scottish Group, after
some initial changes at the level of senior management, was left to conduct business largely as
it wished. Nevertheless, the fact that the state took financial responsibility to underwrite
Ferranti's existence indicates that even a state as firmly imbued with the liberal spirit of
capitalism as the British state, remained deeply committed to securing Ferranti's technological
capabilities. Entire divisions of privately-owned firms, like Ferranti's Scottish Group, were
dependent on state funding for design and development capital, state research centres for
intellectual capital, and state procurement for profitable contracts. Although formally private,
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Ferranti were locked into the state complex through overlapping dependencies on the state for
orders, finance, technology and labour
Within the British dockyard structure, where centralised bureaucratic control and planned
workload allocation systems existed since the nineteenth century, a greater degree of
integration was possible with labour, materials and work moved, within certain political,
physical and technical limits, between the yards. But as demand and technologies changed
organizational structures remained moribund. For example, from the mid to late 1970s the
number ofmajor and normal refits completed at British dockyards fell from 72 to 46 but total
dockyard employment fell only slightly, from 36,000 to 34,00013 (Cmnd. 7826-11, 1980).
Until the early 1980s, further rationalisation of dockyard capacity was continually deferred
and the proposals for organizational restructuring on commercial lines through a trading fund
shelved.
Sectoral restructuring
Instead of thinking of the firm as some hermetically-sealed unit acting with a single
organizational will or logic the industrial complex approach to firm boundaries and the social
division of labour can be refined further by a focus on sectors. Sectors, as relatively
homogeneous groupings of firms producing or supplying inputs to similar end-products, in our
cases warship refitting and advanced radar design and manufacture, are broader than product
markets but more coherent than industrial complexes, themselves criss-crossed by various
sectors. A firm is supplied from a range of capital and consumer goods sectors, say, turbine
manufacturers supporting warship refits or a microchip manufacturer supplying components
for ECR90. Firms are not then in competition with every single firm contributing towards the
final product but only with other firms sharing the sector. Much depends on the complexity of
the end product and just how extensive in-house manufacturing capabilities are. To say that
socio-political bargaining takes place within the industrial complex is merely to identify
sectors as a moment in the social division of labour.
'3 Absolute numbers of refits, however, tell us little about the increase in their technical complexity and the
greater levels of sunk costs in supporting, refurbishing and repairing nuclear-powered warships. This is
reflected in the effects of the public sector pay policies of the Labour government on dockyard workers' pay.
Labour costs as a percentage of total costs fell from 24 per cent to 18 per cent between 1975 and 1979,
indicating dockyard labour's declining cash value compared to the rising value of constant capital (Cmnd.
7826-11, 1980).
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An approach which focuses on the sectoral context of firms is John Child's 'strategic choice'14
(Child, 1972; 1997; Smith and Child, 1987; Smith, Child and Rowlinson, 1990) around the
idea of the industrial complex allows for shifting levels of analysis from the micro-dynamics
of organizational change to the meso-level of industrial restructuring.15 In contrast to
functionalist approaches where environmental determinants are stressed, strategic choice
perspectives also emphasise the active shaping of both internal organization structures and
external environments through a dynamic political process. Child (1997) has adapted the
original strategic choice framework (Child, 1972) to distinguish 'action determinism' from
'environmental determinism'. In 'action determinism' choice is already constrained by prior
management ideologies, competencies, past experience, embedded organizational routines and
psychological aspects of manager cognition. These internal limitations for agency are
compounded by intra-organisational political processes and flawed information. External
environments exist for organizations in two senses. Most fundamentally, environments impose
objective conditions on organizational survival. First, 'each sector has a structure in the sense
of a set of objective conditions which can create pressures for transformation in so far as a
firm's viability depends upon the extent to which its behaviour is appropriate to those
14 This approach has been used to explain workplace change at Cadbury's, the chocolate manufacturers
(Smith, Child and Rowlinson, 1990). At first glance, this seems far removed from the sectors under
discussion here, military electronics and warship refitting. While there are a few overlapping aspects
between the cases, especially Cadbury's Quaker-inspired paternalism and welfarism and the family-owner
status of the firm, on most counts they diverge sharply. Above all, Cadbury mass manufacture for an
international consumer market, while Ferranti produce small batches in a number of leading technologies
and Rosyth refurbish engineeringly complex one-off warships, and both are niche players in a highly
developed and protected state market. The relevance of Smith et al's approach thus has little to do with the
precise character of the firm or market but with their overall focus on structure and ideology.
15 Indeed, some striking parallels exist between the analyses developed by Child and Ruigrok and van
Tudler. Both employ an idea of strategic objectives which link the internal and external organization of the
firm. Both develop a sense of competing paradigms, or 'concepts of control' for Ruigrok and van Tudler,
which can co-exist until one becomes hegemonic. Both stress social bargaining networks or complexes
which takes proper account of the relative power and dependency of actors. The difference in levels of
analysis reflect different theoretical and research priorities. Ruigrok and van Tudler find meta levels of
analysis of industrial restructuring too deterministically concerned with evolutionary trajectories which
play down the role of governments and shifts in the production process, macro-level analysis as overly
concerned with national politics and over-general categories of production regimes, micro-level at the level
of intra-organisational change neglects wider effects within an industrial complex, and, lastly, meso-
analysis, although the least developed promises to put interdependence between firms within the context of
the (trans)national institutional environment and of relations within firms. A meso-focus on complexes does
not therefore preclude relations between firms (horizontal), within (vertical) and without. My objection to
their overall approach is that in constructing a general model of dependency and control within national
industrial complexes in order to understand international restructuring they show a general disdain for a
case study approach. An adequate meso-theory can only be developed which goes beyond ideal-type
aggregations and rises up to the level of living social agents as they encounter reality. In this sense Child
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environmental conditions' (Smith et al. 1990: 310). Subjectively, however, environments are
enacted, that is. firms are environmentally selective, entering, remaining in and exiting some
particular environment.
A sector is thus a field of ideology and actions, a cognitive area of exemplary ideas and
practices, of 'sectoral recipes', by which firms compare benchmark strategies and structures.
Environments are not then formed solely through the social constructions of actors. Agency is
always constrained externally by countervailing institutions like competitors, the state and
customer organizations. The last two of these amount to much the same thing in the arms
industry. Beside internal and external constraints on agency Child also draws attention to
social networks created between organizations and external contacts. Boundaries between
firms and environments are negotiated through collaborative and competitive relationships,
giving the firm-environment complex an institutional character. What Child (1997:55) says of
institutionalised boundaries has obvious resonance for the arms industry, "... organizational
actors do not necessarily, or even typically, deal with an 'environment' at arm's length through
the impersonal transactions of classical market analysis, but, on the contrary, often engage in
relationships with external parties that are sufficiently close and long-standing as to lend a
mutually pervasive character to organization and environment'.
When combined structure, cognitive area, (or the 'sectoral imagination'), and networks
overcome one-sided accounts of environmental determinism, for example as in some accounts
of contingency based upon Burns and Stalker's (1961) 'organic' or 'mechanistic' organizations,
or, at the other extreme, unrestrained volition, as in much of the popular business literature.
Looked at from the level of the firm, the relationship to the state, as purchaser, can seem like a
purely external one where organization is determined by environment in a one-way process.
As a senior GEC-Marconi manager put it:
Defence companies have an unchallengable capability to 'react' to a complex specification
on technical performance, timescales, reliability, ruggedness and quality by producing
convincing proposals, schedules and by redirecting well-organised, highly competent
technical development teams. One must recognise, however, that the Market-place,
Customer Requirements and Product Definition are 'givens' in this whole military scenario'
(Colston, 1991: 131).
offers greater scope for a nuanced account which is enhanced, I think, if the notion of industrial complex is
deployed instead of the vaguely voluntarist idea of network.
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In this account firms 'react' to 'givens'. The relationship is. however, a more complex one of
dependency and autonomy. Firms and sectors both make and are made (and unmade) by the
state complex. The 'firm-in-sector' perspective helps in an understanding of organizational
change at Ferranti and Rosyth by examining, first, the objective structural forces within the
sector, second, how these are re-cognized by the firms and, third, the degree of collaboration
and competition across the sector. Within the arms economy the objective structural feature
confronting firms is the state definition of what counts at any point in time as 'strategic'
industrial capability.
Strategic capitals and the industrial complex
At the heart of the military state capital complex then are firms and sectors deemed as
technologically 'strategic'. State support for the technological capabilities represented by these
organizations carried what Winner (1977: 259) called 'an aura of indelible pragmatic
necessity'. Rosyth, with expertise in nuclear refitting, and Ferranti, with advanced electronics
capabilities, were blessed by being viewed by state planners as indispensable for the UK
military-technology apparatus.
It is one thing to be aware of a sector as objective structure. It is another thing to reorganize
strategically to mediate sectoral structures. At both Rosyth and Ferranti repeated attempts to
radically re-order organizational structures foundered. For Rosyth, numerous studies
recommended reorganizing customer/producer relations, inherited civil service culture and
introducing commercial practices into the dockyard. These were clear attempts to re-orient
dockyard structures and cultures to what were thought to be exemplary practices and ideas of
private industry outside the state warship refit sector. But even with the concept of
commercial management the government pragmatically resisted a fully-fledged version of the
private model for the dockyards, ensuring organizational continuity as well as change. Policy
planners attempted to limit disruption caused by any future changeover of management
contractors at the end of the first term contract by building in four specific areas of continuity:
first, the concept of a 'labour-only' Employing Company would provide employment
continuity between different management contractors (DPT, 1986b: 4/3); second, the pension
fund would be administered by an independent Board of Trustees; third, the government would
retain ownership of the assets; and fourth, the government would monitor strategic capacity
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and sub-contracting and would retain a golden share in the company with special powers of
re-acquisition (MOD. 1986. para 22). Thus structured the sector could undergo the radical
change from public to private control, from non-profit-making to profit-making, from non-
comparative measures of performance to quantifiable indicators, while preserving intact
ultimate state ownership, work organization and the existing division of labour.
But a problem persisted of defining precisely what a 'strategic dockyard' or a 'strategic
electronics firm' might actually consist. So although the planners of commercial management
made retention of strategic dockyard capacity a 'primary responsibility' of the customer
organization, in DGSR's terms of reference explicit definition of what counted as 'strategic' in
terms of labour or capital was not found to be 'practicable or of any value ... at any time'
(DPTa. 5 September 1986). DGSR thus had responsibility for the continuity of something
which could not be defined. Instead a 'flexible approach' to strategic capacity was preferred,
with the notion of 'strategic' subject to alteration and modification as wider technological,
political and economic shifts occurred. What this spells out is that previous rounds of
investment cannot simply be torn-up to stimulate organizational change. As the Defence
Secretary noted of nuclear submarine refitting at Rosyth, 'Rosyth has recently begun twin-
stream refitting and this is planned to continue so that the best use is made of the expensive
nuclear refitting resources all the way through to and into the Trident programme' (MOD,
1986: para: 53)
The flexible approach to strategic capacity was also evident at Ferranti. Public control in the
1970s ended the family ownership and control pattern. Yet, the dominance of the technology-
chase paradigm and capital-widening strategy of firm development remained as firmly
embedded in Ferranti ideology as ever, even after privatization exposed the firm to the risk of
a predatory takeover. Ferranti remained a multi-divisional firm with constituent parts like the
Scottish Group enjoying considerable strategic and operational autonomy from the centre.
Objective conditions within defence electronics sectors, however, showed a strong trend
towards centralisation and concentration by a process of merging, collaborating or being taken
over by a still more powerful rival, usually GEC. It therefore made sense for Ferranti to seek
protection from this threat to autonomy and to re-shape the sector from behind the shield of
what was perceived as ISC's complimentary, but ultimately fictitious, sectoral recipe of global
reach. Although the restructuring of defence electronics was understood more or less
adequately Ferranti failed to re-cognize the sector strategically and, in a desperate gambit to
318
avoid the clammy grip of GEC. became the willing dupe of an ISC constructed fiction of
heightened sectoral power. Ferranti's de jure sovereignty with ISC only delayed temporarily
recognition of the de facto sectoral power of GEC's greater autonomy. Like the continuities at
Rosyth, Ferranti's fate, post-ISC, was similarly bound up with the idea of strategic capacity,
this time of state access to leading-edge electronic technology. Again, the defence electronics
sector was structured above all by government action and the ideology of strategic techno-
nationalism. In this case the British government orchestrated trans-national collaboration
around the Eurofighter project, patronized firms like Ferranti as nationally-based technology
leaders in the project, rescued both the project and Ferranti from oblivion by initially
underwriting financial risk before passing the liability on to the suitor, GEC, which the
government had arranged as its core national-strategic firm to take-over Ferranti.
As a medium-sized, multi-divisional firm within the UK aerospace-electronics nexus, Ferranti
was undoubtedly favoured by technocratic militarism. Ferranti's privileged status as a
strategic firm within an internally differentiated armaments complex was further made clear
by the crisis brought about by the ISC fiasco and the different treatments of firms on the
margins of the complex with the 'arms-to-Iraq' affair of the early 1990s. As marginal 'non-
strategic' firms on the outer rim of the armaments complex, Matrix Churchill, Ordtec, Astra,
Euromac and Atlantic Commercial, were prosecuted for supplying Iraq with military-related
capabilities. What James (1993: 133-4) calls the defence establishment 'cabal' of'permanent
government' protected senior Ferranti managers from any public accountability for Ferranti's
part in the ISC farce.16 Unlike the more ambiguous relationship of peripheral firms supplying
less specialised equipment to the arms complex, as managers of a strategic firm the role of
Ferranti directors in the ISC debacle was secluded from public scrutiny. This was not simply
an outcome of the relative sociability of established inter-personal networks, although
biographical accounts indicate the importance of this. Rather, it reflects state dependency on
16 Despite ISC's record of sanction-breaking contracts with South Africa and the granting of export licenses
for precision-guided missiles compatible with nuclear or chemical warheads believed to be destined for both
Iraq (via the United Arab Emirates) and Iran (via China) who were then at war when ISC precipitated the
collapse of Ferranti in 1989 no official action was taken by the government except, that is, to rescue the
ECR90 radar for the Eurofighter project by brokering a GEC takeover. James quotes (1995: 134-5) a letter
to the Prime Minister, John Major, from Labour MP Michael Meacher asking why for six weeks before the
ISC affair became public knowledge ISC were free to remove secret records from its West London
headquarters and '... why there was no official inquiry and no report to Parliament on the complete
destruction of the country's third largest defence contractor'.
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the relative technological exclusiveness of the capabilities represented by a strategic firm like
Ferranti.
Institutionalised bargaining is central to any restructuring of the UK arms economy. Although
inefficient compared to the centralisation and concentration enjoyed by the US aerospace
industry, semi-integrated European collaborations are the only viable accumulation strategy
open to medium-level states like the UK who wish to avoid becoming completely dependent on
technologies available only through an Atlantic arms economy.17 In trans-national
collaborations like EFA, juste retour principles resulted in a patently inefficient division of
labour designed politically by national governments collaborating to retain European capacity
independent of the US aerospace industry (Walker and Willett, 1993). Within Europe,
however, collaborating nation-states remain competitors. At the same time as collaboration,
nationally-based strategic armament firms and their governments constantly lobby for
improving their national shares of the development and production contracts. Looked at from
this perspective, the politico-strategic advantages of EFA for the UK state overrode other
concerns about bureaucratic inefficiency, duplication and waste.
State capitals and private property rights
How does the idea of strategic capitals within a state capitalist complex help to account for
the restructuring of state/capital boundaries and the apparent reversal within the arms industry
of the domination of 'the private' by the authority of 'the public'? The national basis of
extensive accumulation of armaments by state capitalist forms of organisation was clearly
faltering by the late 1970s. 'Politically' the public authority of the state found itself
undermined where it engaged directly in organising and mediating the contradictions of
armaments production. 'Economic' issues at Ferranti and Rosyth, say wage rises or
investment programmes, simultaneously became 'political' ones. For example, in the cases of
17Between 1993 and 1997 the US anns industry underwent an intensive process of mergers and takeovers
after the government made it clear that they would not intervene to support failing capitals in the
competition for declining arms contracts. This culminated with Lockheed Martin's $11.2bn takeover of
Northrop Grumman giving it a turnover of $37bn, more than the combined turnover of British Aerospace
and GEC-Marconi of the UK, Aerospatiale and Thomson-CSF of France and Daimler Benz of Germany.
Even though the total European defence spending, $130bn annually, was less than half of that of the US, the
national fragmentation of European procurement programmes and the political disputes of collaborative
projects like Eurofighter, the Horizon frigate and the Future Large Aircraft, meant that the economies of
integrated development, production and procurement had to be foregone. To compete with the US leading
aerospace capitalists are demanding that a European armaments complex must succeed nationally-based
complexes (Landberg, 1997).
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the Ferranti bailout or the disruption to nuclear refitting caused by the 1972 strike at Ros\th
the state was subject to the conflicting demands to maintain productive continuities but also to
maintain controls over labour. How the balance between disruption caused by managerial
controls and continuities in production was arrived at varied according to how existing
relations in particular workplaces coped with conjunctural moments of crisis.
The tension between national state capitals and internationalised private capitals created a new
crisis of organizational forms. As the 1980s progressed the Thatcher governments sought
increasingly to unleash competitive 'market forces', entrepreneurial managements and private
ownership of the means of production as the way to resolve what was seen as the problem of
productive inefficiency.18 This set of marketisation policies meant that 'for the first time in
history nearly all armament production was in the hands of the private sector' (Edgerton,
1995: 184). But however synonymous special sales of assets may have become with the term
'privatization' they do not adequately cover the 'remixing' of the public and private between the
mid-1980s and mid-1990s. Political account needs to be taken of the specific sectoral
characteristics that the privatising model takes, engaging what Ramanadham (1993: 527)
called a 'rich repertoire of modalities and techniques'.19 The very malleability of the
Thatcherite concept of privatization allowed an ideological flexibility where tactical
digressions based on political expediency reshaped overall goals. In short, the seemingly
hegemonic sway of privatization was more apparent than real. It did not step into the light of
day dens ex machina. In short, privatization had to be struggled for, lending itself ad hoc to
such shifts in emphasis as immediate conjunctures permitted.
Ferranti was one of the earliest privatisations of the 1980s, although even then political
bargaining and compromises ensured that protective mechanisms were put in place before the
sale to prevent a swift, hostile GEC take-over. After the Falklands War temporarily suspended
re-organization of the arms industry the 'further and faster' turn to the private model of the
18 Thus the main finns within the industrial-military complex which were privatised had never been in
private hands previously. These included asset sales, Amersham, BNFL, UKAEA, Royal Ordnance and, of
course, private management of the Royal dockyards and AWRE, Aldermaston. Sales of fonnerly private
firms included for military aircraft, Rolls Royce, Ferranti, British Aerospace, and for warship building.
Yarrow, VSEL, Cammell-Laird, Swan Hunter, (cf, Edgerton, 1995: 184).
19 Some of this 'rich repertoire' of privatization was rehearsed in the arms industry. Wartime 'shadow'
factories, owned by the state but under the control of private firms, and the intricate mosaic of private arms
producers in the 1950s and 1960s indicate the continuing role of private control of arms firms before the
wave of nationalizations in the 1970s (Edgerton, 1995).
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second term Conservative government restored the impetus. The reorganisation of defence
management undertaken by Michael Heseltine as Defence Secretary between January1 1983
and January 1986. relied on a redefinition of efficiency and managerial accountability on more
distinctively commercial, rather than administrative lines. As the 1984 Defence Estimates
summarised this approach:
Generally, ...the only work carried out within our own defence support organization should
be that which is essential for clearly proven operational reasons or where there is financial
advantage for the tax payer. The Department is thus seeking to improve competition in a
number of ways: through privatization, contracting out, hiving off or partnership with
private enterprise. (Cmnd. 9227-1 :para. 241)
The actual application of the private model depended on a rationale of technical, 'generic'
qualities applicable across sectoral boundaries. This reformulation of the public/private
relationship was typically couched in terms reminiscent of the rhetoric of economic rationality,
'economy, efficiency and effectiveness", employed by nineteenth century liberal critics of state
dockyards like Barry (see Haas, 1994). Wherever state assets could not be directly sold off to
private capital, the state increasingly began to act as brokers of contracts and purchasers of
equipment. In this way responsibility for day-to-day management of production, of living
labour, could be evaded.
Privatisations have as their main aim then the restoration of the formal separation between a
private sphere of surplus extraction and a public sphere of sovereign statehood. One of the key
ways in which state power can be strengthened is by withdrawing 'politics' away from any
explicit entanglement with productive relations. As such privatisations were not only about
rolling back the national state from production but also implied abolishing or curtailing
'internal states within states'. Viewed in this way privatization represent merely the torn half of
a ripped page: the private half that wants to consume labour power directly without waste.
The other half, the public half which wants to 'purify' political power, is set aside. The so-
called 'tail' ofmilitary industry is restored wherever feasible as the legitimate sphere of private
interests, while the state 'body', and its military 'teeth', become exclusively public. Rather than
seeing the 'strong state' (public) and the 'free-economy' (private) as antinomies, they are better
understood as differentiated moments in the restructuring of surplus appropriation (Gamble,
1979; 1981).
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With the emergence of the contract state, the twin processes of marketisation and
managerialism had as their central aim to the dissolution of bureaucratisated employment
relations, to loosen the social obligations imposed upon state employers by earlier
capital/labour compromises around the internal state. Managerialism was assumed to be a set
of techniques which could be applied generically across the public/private divide and provide a
solution to political problems where the possibility of a once and for all rupture from the state
was excluded (Pollitt, 1993; Cutler and Waine, 1994; Clarke and Newman, 1997). This view-
was clearly expressed, for example, by Levene and Heseltine in preparing contractorisation
for the dockyards and later by Alan Clark in brokering GEC's takeover of Ferranti.
Managerialism was favoured because if held out a promise of raising productivity, of reducing
the costs and times of labour, but from within a safe, neutral-sounding discourse of 'better
management', 'efficiency', 'value-for-money' and effectiveness. Behind this stood a barely
concealed hostility to organized labour and the rights enshrined by internal bureaucratic
employment relations. Marketisation was intended to discipline labour and its organizations
and foster worker anxieties through the semblance of competitive accumulation.
Where the state restructured the boundaries between the public and private its immediate
trigger was political and only indirectly economic (Ferner, 1988; Fairbrother, 1994. Pollitt.
1993; Cutler and Waine, 1994). To be sure, in advancing an all-embracing panacea of
contract, market and management ministers and officials made economic rationality central
while its opponents, principally the Labour Party and the trade unions, stressed its ideological,
irrational character. Above all, the repertoire of contract and market mechanisms were
intended to impose allocative command on individual capitals, albeit regulated by public
bodies committed to driving down costs, while productive command was passed to
management teams positioned between a profit-seeking corporate centre and the regulatory
authority. A range of immediate goals thus overlapped which included reducing state spending
and giving private firms profit-making opportunities, premised upon disciplining labour better
by passing on labour problems to contractors. It should be clear, however, that 'the state'
cannot be simply juxtaposed to 'the market' in this way. In the cases of Ferranti and Rosyth
reality made a mockery of attempts to 'purify' the public and the private.
The attempt to increase managerial control at Rosyth by introducing commercial management
threatened productive continuities by heightening workplace unrest. Guarantees from national
trade union leaders that productive continuities would not be put at risk by the anti-
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privatisation campaign meant that managerial control would be contested at the level of the
institutions of public power. House of Commons, House of Lords, and the High Court.
Despite this, locally the unions organised the disruption of production on a frequent basis, as
Chapter 4 shows. Where Ministers and Officials were prepared to risk some disruption at
Rosyth to install a managerial prerogative, in the case of GEC saving EFA by taking over
Ferranti continuity was paramount. Thereafter, direct managerial control assumed a greater
priority for GEC, to the extent that it provoked an unexpectedly militant response from
sections of the workforce jeopardising the continuity that the GEC takeover was supposed to
ensure
Value and the social division of labour
So far, the focus has been on technical-organizational problems and solutions. Restructuring
might seem to be simply a response to observably deficient forms of social organization. On
the basis of private control of production and the marketisation of consumption, restructured
state capital would become more organizationally efficient at accumulating surplus labour.
But what underlay the imperative to restructure in the first place, which, after all, had been
avoided for nearly four decades?
For Marxism the law of value must play some part of any understanding of restructuring. But
taken as a discrete sector, in the arms industry the law of value clearly does not operate in the
way Marx specified. Since its output is consumed directly by the state armaments do not re¬
enter into general circulation as either production or consumption goods and thereby submit to
the discipline of abstract exchange values. No independent measurement of socially-necessary
labour exists. As Kaldor (1982: 271) put it: 'Clearly more labour goes into the production of
arms than the wage equivalent paid to those who perform the labour; but this is not reflected
in the profit, since the price of armaments is an arbitrary political decision'. Any profits made
within arms production are paid out of surplus value created elsewhere which the state
appropriates as general taxation and borrowing and spends as state revenue on armaments.20
Economically, this functions as waste since arms are either consumed in the act of destruction
20 As Engels (no date: 189) put it in Anti-Duhring, 'Force, nowadays, is the army and navy, and both, as we
know to our cost, are "devilishly expensive". Force, however cannot make money; ... money must be
provided through the medium of economic production; and so in yet another way force is conditioned by the
economic order, which furnishes resources for the equipment in maintenance of the instruments of force'.
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or are stockpiled in readiness for the act or threat of destruction until obsolescence. The labour
process is organised instead around the production of use values in the form of enabling the
state access to the technical means of destruction. Relations are not therefore regulated by
spontaneous market mechanisms but by administration and bureaucracy. In this sense the
labour process within Ferranti and Rosyth. and within the arms industry generally, is
unproductive.
However, the partial negation of the law of value in arms production does not at the same time
mean its complete abolition (Harman, 1984; Howl, 1991). To suggest that this is the case is to
adopt a static 'ideal-type' for capital with arms producers entirely isolated from the process of
the circuit of the self-expansion of capital.21 Such isolation means that only use values created
by concrete labour are produced by Ferranti. GEC, BAe, dockyards, and the like. Yet this
relies on an idealised or reified view of 'pure' market relations.22 Certain formal categories,
state, market, commodities, wage labour, exchange value, profit, are employed as abstract
measures of neat, isolable variables. Idealised classificatory models fix in time and space
concrete social relations within a complex, many-sided process of restructuring.
Instead of employing ideal classificatory models, how the social relations of arms firms, or
any other organization, become materially subordinate to the circuit of capital needs to be
examined (Haynes, 1983). Regardless of whether arms producers are in the public or private
sector the state regularly compares the cost of arms production with abstract labour. That is
why cost-plus contracting was limited by perceptions of an acceptable rate of return, or
appropriation of surplus, based on wider capital formations. Official accounting methods and
a formulaic rate of return could always be contrasted negatively to the disciplines of idealised
market relations (Kennedy, 1983). Fixed price contracting merely altered the terms of state
21 Competitive accumulation drives capital to innovate and so reduce the amount of labour time spent
producing commodities. In this way pressure exists to raise labour productivity by comparing different
concrete labours through an exchange measure for abstract labour, prices. 'Socially necessary' labour time
is thus detennined after production, a posteriori, in the market. However, the dynamism of competitive
accumulation centralises and concentrates capital. The result is increasingly fewer but larger capitals. An
influence over price-setting is exerted by the largest capitals. Prices become no longer subject to an
objective, independent measure of socially necessary labour time post-production but are consciously formed
in or before the production process takes place. The law of value is therefore partly negated as a silent
compulsion acting on capital and labour.
22 Even in the civilian economy all sorts of mediations or distortions to the law of value mask concrete
levels of relative productivity. For example, as capital becomes more centralised price competition in some
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contracting in an attempt by the state to economise. Again, as in the case of the dockyards, the
state was impelled to enter close regulatory relations to validate the claims of dockyard
management that all the work they were charging for was being performed efficiently.
Moreover, an assumption of rising labour productivity was built into the customer's pricing
system. And due to unforeseen changes in 'product market' conditions, when nuclear
submarines due to enter Rosyth's programme of work were scrapped, Rosyth claimed and
received compensation from the MOD.
Arbitrary price-setting carries with it a danger of viewing the valorisation process as narrowly
bound-up with isolated individual capitals. Valorisation is a social process. For firms like
Rosyth and Ferranti valorisation is driven by the competitive accumulation of armaments by
states. But even this level of concretisation is too one-sided. States do not accumulate
armaments without regard to wider developments in the economy. More generally, Marx
(1973: 106) argued that, once established, capital as economic power predominates over all
other forms of industrial organization, conditioning all forms of productive activity as a
'general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity'. The
state is thus constantly concerned to compare levels of productivity with 'civilian' industry
and the arms industries of competitors as measures of abstract labour. Even the notorious
cost-plus contracts were attempts to set minimum costs of necessary labour and maximum
rates of profitability compared to civil industry. Fixed-price contracts attempted to set this
comparison even more rigidly but could be defied by imperfect knowledge on the part of the
buyer (also common to so-called free 'market' relations) and unanticipated productivity
increases. Even fixed-price contracting, which sets an explicit sum at which the purchaser is
willing to buy, does not resolve this as the Ferranti Bloodhound scandal of the 1960s
indicated. Privileged internal knowledge of production costs and the difficulty of state officials
administering prices and profitability externally and bureaucratically ensure that price-
bargaining is an unequal process. Where internally a sector was relatively undifferentiated and
enclosed, such as the naval dockyards, studies at regular decennial intervals attempted to
compare productivity levels to dissimilar private repair or construction yards. Moreover, even
after commercial costing practices were introduced by the MOD, as in the move to risk-
pricing in the late 1980s at Rosyth, by its own admission accurate information on real prices,
productivity and labour costs continued to be unobtainable. MOD judgments were often little
civilian sectors has been replaced with product competition in the form of brand loyalty, quality, design,
packaging, service.
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more than informed guesstimates with the initiative resting with the contractor to take
advantage of labour/price ambiguities to claim enhanced performance (HC 39. 1993; HC 829.
1993).
Attempts to create market relations based on exchange value were largely contractual fictions.
On the one side, the state wanted to drive down the cost of arms production and maintenance
but, on the other, needed to preserve such productive capacity as it deemed 'strategic'. An
impersonal disciplining force could not be brought to bear and an 'impure' state capital
formation persisted.23 Where the state continued to define capitals as 'strategic', profitability
was designed to ensure firm survival through a process of political bargaining. Military
capitals, post-privatization, needed to be rendered profitable otherwise company boards might
well exit from unprofitable lines. However, the terms of the bargain became tougher for
individual capitals as competitive uncertainty in the sector threatened accumulation strategies
through the falling demand, loss of core contracts, takeovers and mergers. For instance, with
government backing GEC assumed sovereignty over the productive capacity represented by
Ferranti in Edinburgh but only as part of a wider political relationship dedicated to sustaining
organizational interdependencies around EFA: only those parts of Ferranti engaged in the
'strategic' EFA project were originally taken over by GEC. An albeit fragmented and fragile
trans-national European aerospace complex, constructed through careful techno-diplomacy,
threatened to collapse with the removal of one key piece, Ferranti. Once built the coalition of
support for EFA needed to be maintained. In contrast, Rosyth became much less strategically
important to the state in the first half of the 1990s, outflanked by an aggressive sectoral rival,
DML. After DML successfully built an alternative political coalition to challenge Rosyth"s
core status within the dockyard sector Rosyth was no longer subject to the advantages of
reverse adaptation for Trident refitting. Only the mobilisation of Scottish political support
prevented closure and enabled it to play a subsidiary role around surface warship refitting
within the dockyard complex.24
22 In this arms production has much in common with the privatised utilities. Similar problems of incentives
and discipline led to the setting up of regulatory authorities. Profit formulae were a political response to the
absence of exchange value. What O'Connell Davidson (1993: 39) says of the regulation of privatised water
has always applied to the arms industry. There the price limitation formula 'K' appears as 'a precise and
scientific instrument which takes into account a host of objective economic criteria' when, ultimately, it is
in fact the outcome of a social bargaining process between the company and the government.
24 Rosyth's fortunes may well revive with the election of a Labour government in April 1997. The first
Labour Cabinet found the so-called 'Iron Chancellor'. Gordon Brown, MP for Dunfermline West, releasing
£207 million for a submarine refit at Rosyth almost immediately on taking office. The new Defence
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As a result, then, of differing historic relations between state and capital in the two cases the
state was able to extricate itself from financial and managerial responsibilities in different
ways. The organised political capacity of the Scottish lobby bequeathed to the contractors at
Rosyth were able to stall the immanent rationalisation of British dockyard capacity in the first
half of the 1990s. In the second half the sale of the dockyard assets at Rosyth to Babcock in
1997 recast planned rationalisation not as a social and political problem to be managed by the
central state but as exclusively one for a sovereign private capital. Yet this is belied by the
bargaining over the sale of the assets which hinged on how redundancy pay liabilities would
be funded. The state assumed responsibility for financing the buy-out of severance
entitlements held by the workforce, minimising the economic cost to the private owners and
the political cost to the state of dismantling the internal state. In contrast, lacking this kind of
direct subsidy GEC moved with haste to reduce redundancy entitlements at Ferranti to
statutory minimum levels. Indeed, while GEC acquired Ferranti (and the EFA contract)
relatively cheaply it inherited liability for the performance, cost and delivery.
Conclusion
The argument of this chapter has been that global, national and local restructuring be grasped
dialectically as fragmented and contradictory moments within a dynamic, unified process. As
such, each solution re-establishes contradictory forms anew: there is no final restructured state
to be attained. It was argued that the inner-connections and complexity of restructuring can
only be known adequately through the specific form that surplus labour and political
domination takes. Attempts by the state to contain and regulate the 'uninterrupted disturbance
of social relations' and the uneven development of the forces of production within the national
form seemed to fix the boundaries between the public and private for an eternity.
Contradictory demands on states to mediate national-global tensions, particularly those
Minister, George Robertson, formerly campaigned on Rosyth's behalf during the Trident competition when
shadow Scottish spokesperson. Although probably apocryphal, reports indicate the changed political
geography of military privilege: 'within minutes of his appointment Mr Robertson was presented a cheque
made out for £207m, and asked for a signature. The new minister stalled, consulting Gordon Brown. The
"Iron Chancellor" was initially reluctant to part with the cash, but relented immediately when he learned
that the money would be spent on a submarine refit at Rosyth. Rosyth lies in Mr Brown's constituency'
(Castle, 1997). The politics of locating defence employment and contracts are expected to differ from those
of the Major government to the extent that defence workplaces and workforces in Scotland will be able to
exercise more leverage than before the end of the Cold War. Although how far 'marketisation' will be rolled
back remains to be seen with a new state-sponsored Defence Diversification Agency being proposed to
encourage civil uses of military technologies.
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between the relative mobility of capital and a relatively immobile nation-state, through the
extended accumulation of armaments resulted in the state becoming deeply entangled in the
appropriation and re-direction of surplus labour. Managerialism. privatisation and
marketisation attempted to restore command to the pure, neutral discipline of competitive
private capitals. However, within the armaments complex, Ferranti and Rosvth were protected
as 'strategic' because of the state interest in accumulating armaments. A dialectic of state
capitalist dependency and autonomy mediated global-national-local tensions As such,
solutions based on sovereign, private command over production were self-contradictory. It is
to this 'privatised" sphere of production that the next chapter turns.
329
Chapter 12
Dimensions of Restructuring 2:
The Firm
Is our theory that the organization of labour is determined by the means ofproduction
anywhere more brilliantly confirmed than in the human slaughter industry?
Marx to Engels, 7 July 1866
Against atomistic views of the state, economy and 'civil society', the previous chapter
attempted to specify the institutional specificity of strategic firms within the arms industry
complex. Inter- and intra-complex competition and collaboration was understood dialectically,
as an internally differentiated process operating across global-national-local frontiers. Within
an expanded Cold War arms complex, productive relations were regulated in detail in all its
manifestations. This gave the complex the appearance of an autonomous techno-national
phenomena, isolated from various other 'logics' of the state, 'civil society' and the economy.
This chapter will draw on evidence from the case studies to make a general case for locating
both subjective and objective elements as mutually conditioning within the process of
restructuring. Far from being an automatic unfolding of objective structures dictated by
external forces or the expression of a single organisational will, restructuring attempts to
reconcile contradictions between the forces and relations of production. External stimuli for
change needs to be related to processes internal to the workplace. Internal change is
conditioned by differentiated organisational capacities accruing to state, capital and labour.
Already in the 1960s, Kidron (1967: 12) had summarised the general nature of the inter¬
connections between state, capital and labour under a permanent arms economy:
The permanent arms economy tends to make labour scarce and skills expensive for an
individual capital, while simultaneously enlarging the size of the typical capital and
concentrating power in a few mighty, predominately industrial, complexes. These firms are
forced to consider likely reforms - material concessions to workers - well before they make
them, when considering their own long-term plans. At the same time, the state is forced into
active management of the economy and into large-scale productive employment. Its
apparent political neutrality wears increasingly thin, its policies become increasingly
manifest as capitalist policies ...
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This is the general context within which the pressures for restructuring the permanent arms
economy were stored up. For the state, welfare functions were being lost to industry, (such as
occupational pensions, sickness pay. workplace surgeries, company housing), and it found
itself acting increasingly in the role of capital; for large, private capitals, company strategy
included adopting a welfare function as an indispensable tool for enrolling labour; and. for
labour, conflicting loyalties existed between localised occupational and company identity and
self-sufficient shop steward organisation. The following two chapters will enlarge on the basic
outline of Kidrons' seminal analysis. Various attempts to restructure the arms complex
foundered. Crises were met by short-term solutions, a productivity deal here, a re-financing
there, public pay freeze here, an internal re-organisation there. No planned, coordinated means
of raising the rate of surplus value for the state capital complex existed. Instead, it was riven
by contradiction.
This chapter will suggest that at the heart of firm restructuring is a contradictory process of
labour redundancy, that is, the various ways in which living, social labour is expelled from the
internal labour process. To avoid any misunderstanding, this argument does not imply an
automatic process of capital substitution and labour de-skilling. That option was curtailed by
technical complexity and the jobbing and batch nature of the production process in the two
firms studied. Instead, it will be proposed that relative preferences were exercised by capitals
for internal, detail or technical division of labour and external, social division of labour. Other
options, apart from de-skilling, exist to create worker redundancy. One is to displace labour
by buying-in semi-finished and intermediate goods from the market. Another is to dismiss
workers and extend the versatility of remaining workers, functional flexibility. Still another is
to hire labour only when required to meet workload fluctuations, numerical flexibility.
Nonetheless, however much capital would like to expel living labour by technical or social
means, it remains dependent on its active creativity in the production process. Small or single
unit production of the kind undertaken in defence electronics and warship refitting, depends on
an extended, technical division of labour (Meegan, 1988). Firm choices are limited by this
dependency and, in general, seek to eliminate or control market uncertainties affecting work
organisation internally.
Some consideration will first be given to competing views of the firm and the possibilities for
exercising 'strategic choice' assessed. Then it will be suggested that restructuring is an attempt
to make the cash nexus determinate for productive and allocative efficiencies. This is done
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through an accountancy-driven organisational regime supplanting the previously dominant
technical-administrative regime. The latter regime gave rise to an expansive accumulation
strategy. So long as absolute levels of output were a more important consideration in firm
calculations than productive efficiency, as they were when value criteria was suspended under
the permanent arms economy, the cumulative adding-on of productive capacity proved a
rational accumulation strategy. In contrast, the accumulation strategy pursued through an
accountancy regime is based on reducing the level of sunk investment costs through 'capital-
narrowing' and only rarely modernising the means of production through a radical 'capital-
deepening' strategy. Management is considered next, but not as a fully unified agent. Within
management, competing functional specialisms, with corresponding and conflicting ideologies
about living labour, threaten to pull apart. A state capital labour process is identified, where a
technical-administrative regime attempted to hold management together around a coherent
view of labour but at the expense of hardening productive inefficiencies. The 'internal state'
partly de-commodified labour. The administrative regulation of social need by the 'internal
state' weakened the disciplinary mechanisms of 'latent destitution' acting on commodified
labour. Attempts to restore such disciplines through the re-commodification of labour power
continue to be limited, insofar as firms remain 'strategic' within the state capital complex and
dependent internally on the specialised versatility of living labour. As a contrast to this broad
brush approach three alternative views of relative firm autonomy and dependency will be
considered next.
Three views of the firm
At least three basic approaches to answering questions of agency and determinism at the level
of the firm can be identified: internal incoherence, environmental adaptation and institutional.
First, some recent labour process and radical organisational theorists alike claim that the
separation of corporate ownership from control severs, or at least seriously weakens, the
exogenous pressure of accumulation on the internal structures of work organisation (Cohen,
1987; Rowlinson and Hassard, 1992). The internal organisation of firms is one of atomised,
competing management agents, indeterminately constructing identities or 'subjectivities'
around the exercise of control. An almost infinite variety of organisational forms become
possible as the unintended consequence of a spontaneously created negotiated order between
competing professional identities and the anxieties of individuals. Taxonomies of power,
domination and control begin to replace relations of exploitation, class struggle and profits as
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the central focus of workplace restructuring. Alongside this, central concepts of Marx's
political economy, such as the labour theory of value, are passed over as outdated
embarrassments to the more serious stuff of model-building and complex Apologies. As
Rowlinson and Hassard (1992: 79) argue. 'The diversity of labour process strategies pursued
by management is seen by labour process theorists as support for a mangerialist position,
confirming that corporate management enjoys considerable autonomy and is able to pursue its
own interests independently from the requirements of capital'.
A second approach, that of neo-classical derived business studies, treats the firm as a species
of sub-Darwinian environmental adaptationism. The unitary agent of the firm adapts freely to
its changing environment or faces extinction. Campbell and Goold (1987; 1993), for example,
tightly fit firm strategy and organisational form to market conditions. For example, financial
control companies, such as GEC, operate in relatively stable markets through strong central
control over financial performance and devolved operational autonomy to divisions and, within
them, stand-alone business units. Strategy and corporate structure is determined by clearly
available preferences for optimising firm efficiency. Contingency theory is, perhaps, the best
known form of environmental adaptationism within mainstream organisational studies
(Donaldson, 1985). This approach selects one or two key variables, such as market,
technology, size, products, which determine the relationship between environment and the firm
(Hales, 1993). Even from within the more critical 'restructuring school' similar assumptions
operate. For example, Lovering argues that 'companies restructure production to adapt, in a
manner of their choosing, to competition in the product market' (Lovering, 1989: 215). This
gives rise to a 'managerialist' perspective, which explains restructuring primarily by earlier
organisational deficiencies to be corrected by more efficient organisational forms. At least five
options are open: rationalization, intensification, technical change, merger and the
fragmentation or further integration of production. Here, at least, the firm is not free-floating.
But variation in work organisation gets reduced to a matter of choosing, from among different
permutations, a correct and necessary firm-survival strategy.
A further, more sociologically-inclined approach is that of radical institutional economics.
Here the idea of a state capital complex, as against a spontaneously ordered 'market', is
compatible with the institutionalist emphasis on inter-firm networks. Unequal relations
between firms, say between small sub-contractors and large prime contractors, are partly
ameliorated by establishing durable relationships based on trust and loyalty. Close, 'preferred
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supplier' arrangements in the armaments complex institutionalises such non-market exchanges.
Within the firm, a similar stress is put on non-contractual elements, especially the evolution of
a stable set of relations based as much on internal cooperation, tmst and loyalty as on
atomisation and competitive self-seeking. Firms are not simply 'islands of planned co¬
ordination in a sea of market relations' (Richardson, quoted by Hodgson, 1988: 209). Rightly,
neo-classical appeals to 'survival of the fittest' types of firm 'efficiency' are rejected as
depending on a naturalistic process of random selection or mutation towards the efficient
form.
Child (1997) has recently indicated the compatibility of an institutional approach with the idea
of 'strategic choice'. Although Child is critical of the kind of formalistic, organisational
reification also being challenged here, he wishes to employ Giddens' notion of structuration to
overcome the lacunae in institutional approaches. Structuration processes mean simply that
actors and structures evolve through an adaptive learning process. Unfortunately, this move
merely duplicates the formalism of the structure/agency dichotomy, with agency ultimately
accorded primacy despite the frequent appeals to 'objective', limiting conditions. Vaguely,
structural change is posed as a 'matter of degree' between the subjective and objective
structural dualities of enactment and constraint (Child and Smith, 1987:570). Both 'strategic
choice' and institutional approaches share some of the same general problems. First, the firm
is 'over-socialised'. Capitalist firms are not merely institutions of trust overcoming self-seeking
'opportunism', or of sectors being more or less adequately 'cognized'. Capitalist organisations,
instead, reflect the structured antagonism between wage labour and capital (Thompson and
McHugh, 1995: 75-6), where opportunism and trust or, in labour process theory terms,
despotism and hegemony, are in creative tension. Second, 'dominant coalitions' in capitalist
firms are given analytical centrality and subordinates' own interpretations and actions are
relegated in the process. Third, organisational change is downplayed in favour of the
persistence of stable organisational forms in a given environment. Firms develop a protective
function which store and reproduce a large number of 'gene-like' habits and routines and leam
incrementally through 'structurated' activity.
Organisational crisis is, therefore, distinct from market crisis: "Whilst the firm too will change
and evolve, sometimes with rapidity, internally it is not subject to the buffeting waves of
sometimes inexplicable speculation which are characteristics of volatile markets where agents
relate to each other with more tenuous and short-term commitments' (Hodgson, 1988: 208).
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Here the relationship between the 'stable firm/volatile market', or what Marx called 'anarchy in
the market and despotism in the workplace', is reified with unmediated facticity by Hodgson.
First, in a state capital complex it is not always clear where firm/market boundaries should be
drawn. Indeed agonising over firm boundaries is a central feature of marketising armament
production and consumption. Second, while the 'de-naturing' of the 'market' and the firm as
historically-specific institutions is welcome, the institutional impetus for market and firm
restructuring becomes less evident once the silent compulsion of accumulation and the value
form are placed out of bounds. Third, management attempted to introduce 'market' processes
inside the firm with 'stand alone' business units, internal markets, competitive bidding for
resources, cost centre profit and loss accounts, and so on. Related to this, during the 1980s
and 1990s the state has been seeking to transform all public sector complexes more closely
along the lines ofmarket exchange (Pollit, 1993; Stewart and Walsh, 1992; Le Grand, 1991).
Hodgson (1988) might cope with this by invoking 'dominance' and 'impurity' principles.
'Impure' organisational 'variety' is created to deal with exogenous shocks, with one structure
clearly dominating other 'impurities'. Finally, organisational change at Ferranti and Rosyth
was in fact initiated by agents with 'short-term commitments' to local workplaces, government
Ministers and Officials. Senior managers share an interest with company owners in
accumulation. They are committed to a multi-divisional corporation, especially evident at
GEC, and, unlike labour, only contingently to locally-based divisions. In both cases, workers
endured 'buffietting waves of (only too explicable) speculation' within a volatile organisational
setting.
Superficially, restructuring can therefore be grasped as the coming to institutional supremacy
of 'pure' market exchange, although always reliant on 'impure' non-contractual elements to
function. Similarly, chapter 11 warned against any ideal-purist use of the term 'market' when
considering a state capitalist complex like armaments. Invoking an 'impurity' principle suffers
from the same kind of defects as the ideal-models of distinct capital and state logics.
Specifically, the specialized nature of exclusive state demand for armaments internalises
'impure' production and purchasing arrangements. Market mechanisms are largely expelled in
favour of administrative institutions to allocate resources. But, as Chapter 11 further
attempted to show, this has the effect of intensifying competitive pressures to a higher level of
inter-state competition. Even where the law of value had little direct purchase for strategic
firms within the complex the compulsion to reduce labour times to some measure of average
social times could not be suspended indefinitely. When value claims were powerfully felt, as in
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both cases of financial crisis at Ferranti. the state bailed the company out. or at least its
'strategic' parts, through direct ownership (1974) and. later, by brokering a private takeover
(1990). The latter event signalled the ending of extensive accumulation and capital-widening
as a viable corporate strategy for appropriating absolute surplus value. Subsequently. GEC
have attempted to shift Ferranti to a finance-driven strategy around intensive accumulation
and capital-narrowing by raising surplus value relatively.
These three conventional approaches to organisations assume in advance a radical firm/market
distinction. Whether the firm is understood as an atomised aggregation of competing
management agents, or as adapting to an external environment through a unified
organizational will, or as a socialised institution based on trust and loyalty within the firm and
across a sectoral network, the environment tends to be counterposed to the firm as an enabling
'opportunity'. These are not incorrect views of empirical reality, but each one-sidedly isolates
variables in order to reflect empirical 'complexity'. The compelling force of competitive
accumulation, acting through firms but seemingly outside of their control, needs to be re-
emphasised.
A more rounded approach, I think, focuses on the organisational capacities of firms.
Organisational capacities are conditioned by the two dimensions of capitalist relations of
production. A 'vertical' dimension of hierarchical management-worker relations is founded
upon worker's legal separation from the means of production. But since capitals are also
legally separated from each other a 'horizontal' dimension based on capital-capital and capital-
state relations also exists. As Nichols (1986: 143) argues, any adequate analysis of the
restructuring of particular capitals 'has to take into account not only possible differences in
organisational capacities on the side of wage labour (in particular, different trade union
structures and strategies) but [also] differential organisational capacities and qualities on the
capital side as well'. The 'labour side' will be dealt with in more depth in chapter 13. On the
'capital side' such capacities include organisational structures, the integration and co¬
ordination of the division of labour and the physical means of production. The organisation of
production in this view is a political and social accomplishment and not principally the
technical one that technical-organisational perspectives claim. Moreover, capital's
organisational capacities must be viewed as extending beyond any narrow concern with direct
controls over labour, although at the heart of any understanding of capitalist management of
production stands the problem for capital of the refractory material of labour.
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Sector and strategy
What are the 'differential organisational capacities and qualities on the capital side"? As
concrete historical phenomena, organisational capacities cannot be merely read off directly
from structural powers derived from effective possession of the means of production.
Historical relations of dependency and autonomy condition organisational change within firms.
With Child (1972; Smith et al, 1990) we can agree that firms possess an internal structure, a
dominant corporate ideology and differentiated power relationships within management. This
grounds firms historically. They are encumbered and enabled by founding ideologies and
productive practices. As we saw with the case studies of Rosyth and Ferranti 'this suggests
that the legacy of a firm's history will bear heavily upon its ability to effect a present
transformation and that the change will co-exist with strands of continuity ...' (Smith et al,
1990: 313).
Until 1990 both sectors examined here were marked by strong continuities. Defence
electronics and warship refitting continued to be shaped by ideas about firms like Ferranti and
Ros)th as 'strategic'. Despite seemingly stable objective conditions uncertainty was built into
both sectors in the various ways in which they were imagined. What was considered 'strategic'
and attracted government support was ill-defined and liable to change. Nevertheless, Rosyth
and Ferranti enjoyed fairly stable workloads down to 1990. Although the volume of refit work
had been declining throughout the 1980s, Rosyth's special position as the lead nuclear refit
yard protected it from closure in the first half of the decade and, also, from the kind of steep
employment decline which took place at Devonport in the second half. Ferranti, meanwhile,
positioned itself as a technological leader in a number of avionics technologies. Success in
winning the contract for the Eurofighter radar confirmed 'technology-chase' as the
paradigmatic sectoral survival path.
After 1990 the objective structural conditions of both sectors were irrevocably altered by the
collapse in Eastern Europe of the Stalinist bureaucracies and the Warsaw Pact. While
restructuring began in the mid-1980s with the marketisation reforms of Heseltine and Levene,
new levels of uncertainty took hold of the arms complex. The new instability created risks and
opportunities for some firms. Government stepped aside, at least formally, from direct
interference in the processes of capital centralisation and concentration, as a few giant firms
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came to dominate entire sectors. Competition for fewer contracts became fiercer at the prime
contractor level, with the award of each contract assuming huge significance for firm surv ival.
Yet, it would be wrong to conclude that firms passively reacted to environmental change. At
specific conjunctures firms marketised themselves and, in the process, marketised their
sectors, as 'warring brothers" engaged in a competitive struggle for survival and advantage.
For the first time, large budgets and resources began to be lavished on marketing and lobbying
for contracts. At Rosyth, Babcock diversified into a number of markets unrelated to warship
refitting, most spectacularly in the case of London Underground carriage refurbishing. But
Babcock failed to anticipate a new cognition of the sector and a reshaped political
configuration being established by Devonport Management Limited, (DML), over the Trident
contract. Seemingly secure with the inheritance of Polaris refits and, ultimately, Trident,
Babcock viewed the sector as relatively stable and predictable. But, in the absence of such
large, lucrative and lengthy workloads, and following a series of mass redundancies, DML
moved to destabilise the dominant sectoral paradigm. An unsolicited proposal to undertake
Trident refits more cheaply than Rosyth revised the MOD's own cognitive approach to the
sector. Babcock responded in kind, setting off a competitive train of cost-cutting proposals
and counter-proposals. A new competitive ferocity engulfed the sector, stimulated by a 'hands-
off MOD, as Babcock and DML struggled for survival.
The relative ability to tap into local and national constituencies to form political alliances
determined the outcome. Tied physically to specific locations, which had conferred advantages
for so long, both firms attempted to employ the objective conditions of British electoral
geography in the early 1990s to their benefit. Babcock's turn to the 'Scottish lobby' for
backing merely reinforced how closely Scotland had come to be identified with the Labour
Party and political opposition to Westminster government. Successive plant closures
weakened the 'Scottish lobby's' influence at the political centre and highlighted the reactive and
defensive nature of industrial campaigning in Scotland (Moore and Booth, 1989). On the other
hand, DML could count on a vociferous and belligerently anglocentric political alliance of
local Conservative MPs and naval interests urging the closure of Rosyth on the government.
Although pressure from the Scottish lobby reprieved Rosyth, DML successfully restructured
the sectoral settlement between 1991 and 1993. Rosyth was promised a ten year programme
of surface ship refits, while DML took the lucrative contract for refitting nuclear submarines
to Plymouth.
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Just as Babcock trailed behind DML in re-imagining the sector, so Ferranti. in its dealings
with ISC misjudged its response to the threat of a GEC takeover. GEC had been steadily-
acquiring defence electronics and warshipbuilding firms until it had established near-monopoly
status in both sectors. Concentration and centralization in its sectors gives GEC a powerful
role both structurally and in the sectoral imagination. A conservative corporate strategy of
financial-centralisation was aided by relaxed political controls over capital centralisation
through mergers and takeover. GEC both deepened its interests in military electronics and
diversified into warshipbuilding and nuclear submarines.' Alongside legal ownership and
operational control, however, an undaunted GEC was made financially liable for the ECR90
contract. Nevertheless, this was part of a general GEC retreat from contested markets,
innovative technologies and manufacturing, and sheltering behind a substantial cash mountain,
fairly secure defence acquisitions and alliances and stringent centralised, financial controls. By
the early 1990s, Williams et al (1990: 469) could justifiably argue that 'GEC is becoming a
rentier capitalist firm whose profits increasingly come from short-term investment and
shareholding in electrical businesses which somebody else manages'. As a strategic 'national
champion', with a long history of close relations with officials and politicians, GEC, from
Weinstock down, built and maintained political coalitions.2 As one of a handful of British
defence 'national champions', GEC can employ oligoplostic power to remake sectors actively,
if not quite in its own image then at least by purposefully mediating the wider state capital
complex. Although GEC enjoyed greater sovereignty over the means of production in
Edinburgh than Babcock at Rosyth, the centre is less interested in the affairs of management
than in financial results. Following the ISC debacle Ferranti became merely another piece in
the GEC jigsaw, subject to GEC's centroclinal structure. However, the well-known emphasis
on the operational autonomy of stand-alone GEC divisions obscured constraints imposed by
1 In July 1997, GEC also acquired the former Portsmouth dockyard, outbidding Babcock in the
process.
2 Former Conservative Ministers were appointed to the GEC Board. Lord Prior, former Conservative
Employment Secretary, became Chairman of GEC in 1984. Richard Needham, a former Trade and
Northern Ireland Minister, became a Director in 1995. Michael Heseltine was tipped to replace Lord
Prior as Chairman in 1997 (The Times, 1 May 1997). Currently, Weinstock's replacement as Chief
Executive, George Simpson, seems set to re-focus GEC as a European military firm. Mergers and
alliances have been proposed with the defence interests of Siemens (Germany), Finmeccanica (Italy)
and Thomson-CSF (France). A GEC takeover bid for Thomson was vetoed by the French
government for reasons of 'national security', indicating the continuing fragmentation of the
European defence industry may persist even while the concentration of the US industry reaches new
proportions, with the Boeing/MacDonnell Douglas merger (Skapinker and Gray, 1996). Opposition
to the merger by the EU on anti-competition grounds seems certain to be defied in the US.
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central financial control (Williams, et al. 1985; 1990)."' Within this, the Edinburgh factories
have become subordinate units to Rochester (Kent). Stanmore (Middlesex) and Stanhope Gate
(London). While the Edinburgh factories continued planning for product innovation this was
at a considerable remove from the strategic discretion enjoyed under the old Ferranti set-up. In
short, organisationally GEC shifted Ferranti from a relatively autonomous technicist-
administrative paradigm to a heavily constrained accountancy paradigm combining local
operational autonomy with centralised financial control.
Organisational capacities of the two firms were thus shaped by a range of dynamically inter¬
related, objective and subjective factors to do with government policy, sectoral conditions,
electoral and industrial politics, and internal management regimes. Here I want merely to
summarise the main objective and subjective shifts of the two firms within their sectoral
contexts. Objective structural continuities and changes within the sectors Ferranti and Rosyth
inhabited can be roughly summarized thus: state markets continued to connect both firms to
global, national and local political and economic processes; oligopolistic nationally-based
competition between Babcock and DML for Trident refits and transnational competition
between GEC and Hughes for Eurofighter radar continued to be guided by the principle of
political allocation and strategic capabilities; fewer, but larger, firms, now privately-
controlled, compete for smaller workloads; and greater pressure exists to lower costs and pass
more financial risk onto contractors through new state pricing regimes, tendering procedures,
and self-funded R&D and marketing.
Subjectively, sectors were understood as follows: pragmatic, incremental change before 1990
gave way to radical shifts thereafter; both firms acquired new owners or controllers, involving
a move away from traditional views of the sector as secure, predictable and cosy; new
personnel were parachuted in at senior decision-making levels, GEC people in Edinburgh,
Babcock at Rosyth; in one case, GEC provided the exemplary model for their sector of a
finance-driven, multi-divisional firm, in the other, Babcock was forced to react to its sole
3 How far this will change under Weinstock's replacement, George Simpson, is unclear at the
moment. Simpson instituted a strategic review on replacing Weinstock, whose presence lingered as
'Chairman Emeritus'. Simpson's strategy seems to be to sell-off smaller GEC businesses, such as
Avery weighing machines, and businesses in which GEC do not have global reach, such as
telecommunications and household appliances, reduce the number ofjoint ventures where GEC is a
junior partner, and to invest GEC's finance capital of some £6 billion selectively to become a major
international defence firm (Garfield, 1997). With the imminent replacement of the GEC Chairman
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rival. DML's. aggressive entrepeneunalism in re-defining possible outcomes for allocating the
Trident contract; this required a new mobilisation of political forces, which ultimately
favoured DML over Babcock. GEC. on the other hand, retained favourable political relations
with state officials, although many in the 'Scottish lobby' blamed GEC for the scale of labour
redundancy in Edinburgh after 1990. How organisational capacities are embedded within
strategies for capital accumulation is considered next.
Accumulation: widening, deepening, narrowing
Strategies for accumulation are developed and fought out in concrete historical conditions. In
the competitive struggle for capital accumulation firms both manage and are managed by the
pressure to accumulate. To be sure, organisational forms persist over time. But the quest for
competitive accumulation ensures that the regular patterning of organisational relations, albeit
modified by incremental changes, is punctuated by phases ofmore or less radical restructuring
both within industrial complexes and individual capitals. Disruptions of this nature are highly
uneven with continuities and discontinuities co-existing in an uncertain blend. The melding of
old and new organisational forms permits and constrains the mediation of the market by
individual capitals on a new basis. After a time a new paradigmatic way of viewing the sector
emerges and establishes itself as the dominant managerial perspective. There is no reason to
suggest that the more recent form of accumulation will overcome contradictions any better
than previous strategies.
In the accumulation of the physical means of production three options present themselves.
First, 'capital-widening', or what Aglietta (1979) called 'extensive accumulation', expands
productive capacity cumulatively through organic growth. In conditions where demand is
expected to grow steadily, new capital is employed alongside obsolete or underused, aging
capital stock (Perelman, 1987, 1996). This need not always raise the technical composition of
capital, or in value terms, the organic composition of capital, since the employment of labour
power also grows more or less in line with capital. Second, 'capital-deepening' occurs where
an expected or actual severe downturn in demand competitively enforces a qualitative,
discontinuous, radical replacement strategy to modernize and integrate the capital stock,
increasing the technical composition of capital. Third, 'capital-narrowing' occurs where future
demand becomes increasingly uncertain and total capital stock is reduced quantitatively as
and Finance Director, Simpson hopes to reduce the continuing influence of the Weinstock legacy at
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part of a drive to lower overhead costs, though w ithout necessarily modernising the remaining
constant capital. Systemically. one of the principal contradictions here is that between the
socialisation of the forces of production, on the one hand, and the simultaneous fragmentation
of the relations of production, on the other. Capital becomes concentrated, although not
centralised, as increasing amounts of the means of production are accumulated by investment
strategies. Up to a certain point, the adding-on of physical capital proceeds without any-
corresponding centralisation of ownership. That point is reached in the ending of capital-
widening as an accumulation strategy and the attempt to introduce a more intensive
accumulation strategy.
The first strategy, that of capital-widening, typified strategic firms under an expanding,
seemingly permanent arms economy. At moments of technological 'step-up', tooling to
accommodate the latest product innovations saw new constant capital deployed in an ad hoc
way, without systematically scrapping older, inefficient capital stocks. Plant layouts evolved a
chaotic and poorly integrated patchwork of buildings and machinery. The lack of a scrapping
policy meant that phantom capacity of earlier, long-forgotten investment rounds was preserved
in a dispersed physical layout of buildings and plant. New capacity was simply added-on,
fitted around a ramshackle collection of infrastructure, machinery and work processes. This
was particularly evident at Ferranti. There a capital-widening strategy spread increasing
amounts of the physical means of production across the city and in a handful of other east-
central Scottish locations. This was accompanied by repeated re-organisations for design,
production and support functions. At Rosyth, major additions to the capital stock, such as
buildings and plant for nuclear refitting, were simply added-on to existing facilities. For both
constant and variable forms, capital use was 'sub-optimal'.
Productive inefficiency was the price of extensive military preparedness, for the predominance
of use value of armament over any exchange value. The industrial capacity accumulated by
uneven processes of capital-widening was based on a 'just-in-case' principle of readiness for
varied and sudden fluctuations in demand for any particular combination of labour,
instruments and material. Where the customer, the Ministry of Defence, did not supply
materiel internally through its own supply organisations it contracted dedicated equipment
manufacturers, 'makers', to procure finished sub-assemblies and components. Finding where
Board level
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the competitive limits to use-directed, capital-widening lay was not directly available to the
firm. Neither firm conformed to the ideal-type of an independent producer engaged in atomised
accumulation, unambiguously reacting to environmental pressures. Only the state, through its
mediation of the national-global tension, rubbed-up against the competitive limits to capital
widening.
Within the military state capital complex a social division of labour based on commodity
exchange was severely curtailed. Internal resource allocation and prices were not set a
posteriori by free (perfect) competition but administratively by a priori bureaucratic
command and social bargaining. During the expansive phase of the permanent arms economy,
state capitals demanded an uninterrupted reliable supply of labour, raw materials and
components. Allied to the diseconomies of scope inherent in a capital-widening model of
investment was a labour process developed principally around the extraction of absolute
surplus value by extending the working day through overtime and shiftwork and the use of
productivity deals to intensify effort. Despite Ferranti's use of automated draughting and
machine tools, technical limits existed to raising productivity and reducing socially necessary
labour times. At both Ferranti and Rosyth heterogeneous types of work were carried out, with
each individual warship refit and successive generations of radar having unique
characteristics. Complex technologies such as these cannot have fully explicit, stable and
limited product specifications, or have the intensity of labour effort pre-determined
technically. Instead, internal control systems were adopted to make labour internally variable.
This task fell to a management itself subject to conflicting demands.
Here the internal control model of the detailed division of labour in production predominated
over the social division of labour in exchange. Socialised labour weakened the disciplining
effect of market mechanisms for regulating social need. To reverse this even partly involves
establishing a social division of labour around commodity exchange, a re-commodification of
production relations. Marketisation, in its various manifestations, attempts to give exchange
relations a silent, compelling force. But as moments in an industrial complex, GEC and
Babcock remain dependent on a dense web of socialised interdependencies, within the
workplace and the corporation, with other organisations, and within the relations of state
consumption.
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Internal control extended beyond the workplace and into the local economy. As major, local
industrial complexes in their own right, such firms could stimulate or inhibit the related
productive activities of other capitals while strengthening its own local hegemony. Ferranti
involvement in Scotland's institutional structures, for example, the (unsuccessful) Scottish
Electronics Scheme of the 1960s, is one indication of this. A central role was also played in
constructing local labour markets, where none existed before, through labour migration and
training and its subsequent domination through benefit packages. This was particularly true
where competition locally for skilled labour was weak, as at Rosyth (until the diversification
of the west Fife economy from coalmining in the 1960s and 1970s), and for Ferranti, for
whom holding onto highly trained labour was a perennial problem. Labour was hoarded in
both cases to maintain a reliable labour supply in a context of rising problems of worker
turnover, a sure sign of underlying discontent.
Restructuring is largely premised on a capital-narrowing strategy of accumulation. The
routine re-investment of surpluses in the absolute expansion of capacity no longer applies.
Ageing and phantom capital is being scrapped or rundown, with labour processes concentrated
around a smaller and more intensively used stock of capital. Babcock and GEC vacated older
buildings, scrapped outdated layouts, tools and machinery, cutback on auxiliary and
maintenance functions, and ran down material stockholdings. Few firms in the arms complex
elected for a radical form of scrap-and-modemise, a capital-deepening approach, although a
rare example of 'business process re-engineering' will be discussed below. To deepen and
upgrade the capital stock when demand may be suddenly cut-off through disarmament or
government spending controls presents far too grave a risk. One result of the reluctance to
modernise through a radical replacement strategy by the state capital complex, for example,
was capital-narrowing types of cost-cutting in the competition for the contract to refit Trident
submarines. Here the construction of the expensive purpose-built docking facilities at Rosyth,
RD57, was abandoned and a patchwork of upgraded facilities accepted by the MOD. The
dominant conservative tone of refusing to creatively destroy existing capital values in the
overall interests of productive efficiency is a reflection of post-Cold War pessimism in future
demand and profitable opportunities, allied to fiscal rectitude. The opportunism represented by
capital-narrowing, on the one hand, mediates external pressures for productive efficiency, and
therefore the modernisation of capital, while on the other, internal depression at the prospects
for future demand, and therefore the obsolescence of capital. The result is an ad hoc,
'satisficing' part-modern, part-obsolete compromise.
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Management
So far. changes and continuities within sectors have been discussed as uneven and
differentiated while firms and management have been pictured as relatively unified, acting
with a single organisational will. Firms, however, do not simply mediate external conditions
through anything like a single, coherent strategy. Strategy, in the sense of a long-term, pre¬
planned set of organisational practices and ideologies, conceals the often short-term,
pragmatic and opportunistic content of management functions. From corporate boardrooms to
first-line supervision, management decision-making is rent with contradiction. Hyman (1987:
34-5, 30) points out the contradictory character of management,
Any worthwhile analysis of the management function within capitalism must start by
recognising the vital distinction between labour power and labour; the inescapable
compulsion to produce surplus value; the resulting antagonism between the functions of
capital and of labour, resulting in the need for managerial mechanisms of discipline and
surveillance ... The contradictory role of management as both co-ordinator of a complex
and often baffling productive operation, and simultaneously a vehicle of discipline and
disruption, is almost inevitably reflected in consequential contradictions both between and
within the various managerial specialisms ... For individual capitals - as for capital in
general - there is no 'one best way' of managing these contradictions, only different routes
to partial failure.
Management, on the one hand, integrate, oversee, plan and co-ordinate production. But, on the
other hand, management fragment production both vertically, through hierarchy, and
horizontally, through functional specialisation. Clearly, different specialisms within
management operate at different stages in the valorisation process, mobilise competing
professional ideologies and relate to direct productive labour in various ways. Contradictions
within the firm are managed to minimise internal centrifugal forces. Consequently an ongoing
struggle ensues to establish a hegemonic managerial ideology about labour and profit, over
where precisely the balance between control and consent should be drawn. Braverman (1974:
67) drew the analogy with war. Management 'shared from the first the characterization which
Clausewitz assigned to war; it is movement in a resistant medium because it involves the
control of refractory masses'.
Internally, 'the control of refractory masses' involved an attempted shift from one hegemonic
management regime, 'technical-administrative', to another, 'accountancy'. Capital-widening
paralleled rigidly divided, hierarchical management functions built upon bureaucratic
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organisational structures. This consisted of relatively closed entry to occupational disciplines,
narrow, specialised functional competencies and qualifications, and strong professional
identities. There was still not a single managerial profession as such, generalisable enough to
encompass the gamut of technical-administrative practices, merely technical and industry
specific gradations of control (Pollard. 1965). Nichols (1969:31-3) found that in the 1960s
senior managers were gradually becoming better qualified, with the most common
qualification of directors those of accountancy and the arts. However, even where former
accountants became senior managers, as in the case ofToothill at Ferranti, the cash nexus was
an insufficient condition of organisational form. Organisational capacities were acquired
culturally by new managers, developed ad hoc over long years into a technical-administrative
sedimentation. Insofar as the conditions for 'capital-widening' prevailed, the Edinburgh
factories were guided by a technical-administrative approach, even under a Toothill,
combining hierarchy with technology. Similarly, within the dockyards, the fusion of naval
command and the body of the leading technical discipline, the Royal Corps of Naval
Constructors, ensured that cost considerations remained subordinate to naval-technical ones.
In contrast, an accountancy regime is epitomised by the supposedly generic competence of
entrepreneurial solutions to organisational problems and, in particular, their reduction to the
cash nexus. Organisationally, stand-alone business units attempt to simulate the anarchy of
the market internally. In this way 'wasteful' practices can be disciplined without the
encumbrance of excessive rules and procedures. Services are bought and sold internally within
allocated budgets and centres maintain profit and loss accounts. Pricing regimes within
individual units should mean that average social labour times will be more keenly felt as a
necessary, impartial force, thereby raising labour productivity. Cost centres are designed to
make managers more commercially aware of costs through a system of personalised incentives
and sanctions. Yet again, restructuring attempts to reconcile contradictory demands. The
autonomy of cost centre managers to behave as sovereign, indifferent capitals in pursuit of
their own individuated interests is negated by financial dependencies, political bargaining for
resources and reporting performance back to the centre.
Organisational capacities are thus shaped by the tension between sovereign ownership, or
effective possession, of the means of production and the illusion of financial autonomy.
Financial controls tend to be located remotely within multi-divisional firms while operational
controls tend to be proximate. The internal marketisation of organisational structures attempts
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to resolve the remote/proximate contradiction. The attempts to replicate 'markets' within firm
boundaries and to make managers more 'entrepreneurial' results in a peculiar mix of quasi-
exchange relations, strongly tempered by hierarchical relations. Labour is not employed by an
individual cost centre but by a division or subsidiary of the parent company and can be
transferred within the workplace between cost centres as required. De facto dependencies on
centralised financial control, fixed capital stocks and limited internal scope for altering any
particular division of labour thus negate the de jure sovereignty of cost centre management.
Operational de-centralisation and financial re-centralisation reduce business unit management
to the question of disciplining labour as the only key variable over which proximate controls
can be exercised (O'Connell Davidson, 1993: 54). This is to be achieved by making social
need conditional on the semblance of market forces and re-commodified labour power,
atomising further the socialised labour process, to drive down costs of labour power
(exchange) and raise the rate at which labour consumes fixed capital (use).
A discussion of GEC would add little that is new here, since they have come to exemplify
strong central control over budgets and conservative growth strategies (see Williams, et al,
1985). Although Babcock International moved towards financial centralisation in the early
1980s, considerable autonomy was sanctioned for the management team in charge at Rosyth.
Internally, however, the Rosyth Directors retained strong financial controls over Divisional
Managers. Only towards the end of its decade in charge at Rosyth did Babcock advance more
fully towards an internal accountancy regime. Until then, cost accounting had been used as a
basis for the monitoring of performance. For internal 'allocative' and productive efficiency the
accountancy paradigm remained under-developed. One Divisional Manager indicated the way
in which cost centre budgets attempt to impose average times and costs in contrast to previous
practices.
I now get fifty hours to make a pyrotechnic locker. I look at that before I take the job on.
Can I do that in fifty hours? Answer: yeah, just about. They don't give you money. Every
hour is twenty-five quid to me, twenty-five bucks. So if I look at it its fifty hours times
twenty-five quid. That's an amount of money. Can I do it in that time? Answer: yes. If I
give it to you to do knowing that fifty hours is about the going rate for one of these and you
take sixty, I've got to say to you, 'look you've taken sixty. Next time, you need to be aware
that this is a fifty hour job. The other guys do it in fifty hours'. Now it didn't matter in days
gone by whether he took fifty hours or two hundred and fifty hours as long as the job got
completed. Because we weren't talking budgets and restraints. Now its clearly budgetary. I
get an amount of money and I equate that into hours or I get an amount of hours which I
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equate into money. Nobody ever said to me. 'there's a job and it costs X amount ofmoney
and its got to be done'. What they said was.
'can you work overtime three nights a week and do you fancy a nightshifit?'.
'Aye. what job am I on"7,
'I don't know yet but you'll be on something'.
Totally the reverse.
As chapter 5 showed, the customer organisation was still intimately involved in monitoring
and recording productive activities. Babcock were also bound to the terms of the management
contract for acceptable levels of performance, commercially-won contracts and diversification.
The shift to a separate customer/producer relationship from a 'one arm' organisation unifying
the Navy and the dockyard did not lead to a complete unlocking. Rosyth dockyard remains
almost completely dependent on the Navy for its workload and, down to the sale of dockyard
land and fixed assets in 1997, for access to the means of production through a leasing
arrangement. The MOD relinquished direct control over dockyard operations in 1987 but not
ownership of the means of production. Only in 1997 were dockyard assets sold-off. The
diversification strategy at Rosyth,4 formerly viewed as important though marginal to the main
activity of nuclear submarine refitting, and given a fresh impetus from the early 1990s on. was
subject to cross-subsidy for initial capital outlays and used labour flexibly from elsewhere in
the dockyard.5 All this administrative 'interference' inhibited giving full rein to an accountancy
regime.
4
Forming the core of the Facilities Management Division of Babcock International, BRDL by the
mid-1990s also managed Auckland dockyard for the New Zealand Ministry of Defence and had part-
diversified into new product markets at Rosyth. While the diversification strategy suffered a major
reverse with the loss of the London Underground carriage refurbishment contract in 1995, the logic
of setting up independent cost centres for refitting granted a certain autonomy for Divisions to
compete for non-traditional commercial work. Two entirely new 'business units' dedicated to winning
non-MOD work were formed in 1991: the Rail Projects Division built on early incursions into rail
carriage refurbishments, and entered into a joint venture with Siemens, Railcare, in 1995, while the
Commercial Projects Division deepened the diversification strategy by focusing initially on core
joinery and fabricating capabilities, which became Rosyth Joinery Products in 1994 and Babcock
Rosyth Fabricators in 1995, and formed a North Sea venture, Babcock OGL, in 1992. This strategy
led to the eventual purchase of the dockyard assets in 1997 and the formation of the Rosyth 2000
joint venture to commercially develop the vacant adjacent Rosyth Naval Base estate. Always intended
as a fill-up to MOD work, by the mid-1990s diversification, although still subordinate to MOD
contracts, had assumed a previously unexpected centrality to where Babcock saw themselves going.
5 This parallels O'Connell Davidson's (1993:52-3) findings in the water industry, that fairly small
cost centres are compelled to operate existing fixed capital and to shoulder some of the wider
overhead costs associated with large scale activities.
348
One reason for this is that management itself is a collective labour process: management
functions have to be produced and reproduced over time and space (Armstrong. 1989; Hales.
1993). Management control is inherently relational. Under the technical-administrative
paradigm managers could be enrolled behind organisational goals by the opportunities opened
up by a bureaucratic career structure based on the seniority principle and standardised
employment relations. Long-serving senior, middle and first line managers at both Ferranti and
Rosyth expressed gratitude that personal advancement was made possible under the old
paradigm. Within the accountancy paradigm, careers become based less on steady progression
and rule-following and more on financial results, cost-controls and meeting payment
milestones. Risks, rewards and sanctions form the 'entrepreneurial' worldview. The new-
internal structures of 'market opportunity' are at once more volatile and insecure and also less
attainable.
For some, the new emphasis on financial performance seemed to break the old, implicit bond
of trust between management agents and overall organisational goals. Instead of particularist
kinds of technical-administrative conscientiousness and reliability, universal controls were
imposed over management through the short-term expediency of the cash nexus. A cruel,
public descent was the destiny of some older managers who found the demands of the new
paradigm difficult to handle. On the other hand, younger managers who owed their rapid rise
to the new paradigm found the 'dynamism' and 'independence' required 'challenging'. Thus the
problem identified by Armstrong (1989) of how capital enrolls the loyalty and trust of
management is resolved through fear of failure and personalised rewards in the new paradigm
instead of the old, ponderous service ethos. By a slow process of attrition new, younger
managers, some coming from outside industry, began to replace older, traditional dockyard
managers. At Ferranti, senior and middle management quickly found their status and
autonomy diminished significantly. Entrenched senior managers were either removed, starting
with the Managing Director, or compelled to adapt to GEC's financial control management
style. As one put it, 'you need to bend with the wind'. The management employment relation
became more individualised, with pay related to various quantitative measures of
'performance'.
Notwithstanding current enthusiasms for a new inclusive Human Resource Management and
the supposed 'professionalisation' of British management, enrolling management behind
organisational goals now becomes a matter of embracing alienation instead of compensating
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for it. The elaborate administrative systems left over from earlier phases of development lent
Ferranti and Rosyth management a quixotic character. Previous management incompetence
was readily pointed to by new managers from GEC and Babcock. Nor was criticism confined
to incoming managers. Workers' lack of co-operation in overcoming productive inefficencies
in part stems from a perceived lack of management professionalism and purposefiilness
(Nichols, 1986). As Nichols' (1986: 218-9) argued, in conditions of 'casualism and job
insecurity' worker resentment was channeled into sullen, non-co-operation with management.
Badly designed jobs and products, and poor workflows and factory layouts, make those
who have to produce under such conditions less than enthusiastic. Laissez-faire
management has as its complement a greater reliance on workers themselves, in order to
get the job out. Workers' whose experience leads them to think that 'management does not
know what it's doing' may be less than keen to make good for management what they think
management should have done already.
However, where job security was high, as at Ferranti and Rosyth, workers with long service
reported resenting the amateurishness and high-handedness of how production was organised
before restructuring. For example, demands in the 1970s to nationalise Ferranti were viewed
by the unions as a way of ending the lingering personal control of the Ferranti family and
modernising what was perceived as a shambolic management structure, operated as virtual
fiefdoms of the divisional 'barons', a view also shared by the Industry Minister, Tony Benn.
The perceived shortcomings of technical-administrative regimes allowed the new ideology of
entrepeneurialism and its primary carriers a sense of cohesion and mission. Recent
management incumbents now inhabit organisations where stories about bad practice are legion
among longer-serving managers and workers. Contrasts and discontinuities are likely to be
amplified if this is the sole source of evidence. Significantly, when the 'de-layering' of middle
management grades became a general path to corporate salvation in the 1990s, at Rosyth and
Ferranti middle management were not nearly as adversely affected by rationalisation as
manual workers. Qualitatively, however, the impact on managers differed in the two cases.
Senior managers at Rosyth bemoaned the continuing hold of the Civil Service service ethos
over non-industrial grades who, far from relinquishing their status and conditions of
employment, found them enhanced under contractorisation. Paradoxically, the preservation of
employment relations at Rosyth was guaranteed by the militancy of the industrial trade union
campaign against agency management. Formal legislation, TUPE 81, preserved conditions
until they were altered through mutual negotiation. Self-limiting practices of both management
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and unions prohibited a radical rupture with the past. At Ferranti, in contrast, employee
atomisation and division allowed GEC greater authority in disposing of and re-constituting
managerial labour. GEC were prepared to act unilaterally to transform the employment
relation, especially for managerial grades they held to be responsible for past inefficiencies.
Management ideologies range from seeing labour through the lens of passive quiescence, at
one end. to active purposefulness, at the other (Smith et al. 1990: 346-51). At Rosyth, for
instance, five levels of management reporting and command existed. First line supervisors,
physically close to living labour, embodied the contradictions between exercising control and
generating consent most sharply of all managers. They had to co-operate with and mobilise
workers but also initiate disciplinary proceedings against recalcitrant members of work
groups. At a further remove, dockyard Inspectors and Foremen, though symbolically close to
concrete labour, had their contact mediated by supervisory and worker representative
accounts. Even more thoroughly mediated was the control of the Divisional Manager,
accounting to the Board of Directors for the performance of aggregate abstract labour. In the
absence of labour transparency, upper managers attempt to generate veracity in the reporting
ofmanagerial subordinates through a descending climate of trust, creating fractious points of
tension at each stage in the command and reporting structure. Ultimately, concrete labour took
the form of abstract quantities on spreadsheets, highlighting various factors of performance,
like 'utilisation rates', to senior managers. A whole battery of management support functions
connected to productive activity exist for warship refitting, from time-recorders to the
Drawing Office and Planning Departments. Beyond production functions, Training and
Personnel specialists were also involved in generating worker consent and control but at a
further remove, the former with imbuing young apprentices with 'correct' attitudinal qualities
and the latter with labour relations and welfare. Thereafter, management specialists tend to see
labour as a fairly passive factor in the accumulation process. Industrial Engineering and
Resource Management view labour as a technical variable to be allocated according to the
self-evident needs of fixed capital and the job-in-hand. Labour is more fully objectified by
Finance and Marketing professionals, who are more completely divorced from the immediate
demands of productive activity than either the technical planners or supervisors of labour
power.
Management, then, is centrally concerned with controlling labour. However, labour control
functions in British industry have been traditionally accorded low status behind more
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technicist functions. At Ros\th labour was accorded a greater role as an active subject than at
GEC. In the first four years of the term contract, management strategy at Ros\th began from
seeing labour as an active subject from which all other considerations derived. Babcock
entered a heavily-organised workforce with a reputation for militant action. Labour control
and consent thus became the single key function in management strategy. An industrial
relations specialist, highly rated by trade union officials, was drafted in with an independent
remit to create a new labour relations climate in the dockyard. In the early years of the tender
contract, indeed right up until the industrial relations specialist died unexpectedly, industrial
relations were given the highest priority, eclipsing engineering and finance functions. But the
new set of objective conditions in the sector after 1991, the demise of the position of power
and influence of the personnel specialist and the sectoral exemplar established by rivals DML,
shifted socialised labour control considerations to the fetishised form of stricter cost and
efficiency criteria as the accountancy paradigm became ascendant.
Yet this was not so much a strategic shift in management thinking but a reaction to crisis.
Prompted by crisis a new hegemonic vision of the contradiction between capital and labour,
with labour increasingly assigned the status of an inert, passive object, was generated through
conflict and competition within management. The elaborate and well resourced Industrial
Relations Department, so carefully built during the phase of labour control hegemony, was
gradually dismantled and the remnants filed into the Human Resource Department. Those
specialisms closest to concrete labour, particularly supervisory and middle ranking production
grades, began to feel undervalued and neglected, if still rewarded adequately, as the
professional interests and world views of finance and technicist specialisms forged ahead.
Instead of operating as a seamless unity management tended to pull apart.
A state capital labour process
In keeping with the conventional separation of state and economy, labour process and
industrial relations theorists identify a qualitatively distinct state labour process from that of
private capitals (Batstone et al, 1984; Ferner, 1988; Fairbrother, 1989; 1994; 1996). Where
living labour can neither be disciplined by exposure to 'market' forces nor dominated by
technology in the production process, social capital needs to generate its active consent. For
capitals where valorisation was only a relatively weak imperative, as in the Cold War arms
industry, socialised capital based upon co-operation with labour weighed more heavily than
the domination by capital of simple, commodified labour. Internally, the state acted as a
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'model employer1 to win worker consent. Here, however, the contradiction between abstract
and concrete labour, between market exchange and socialised use, took a sharp form. As state
workers identification with a 'service ethos' of loyalty to a state employer was encouraged. The
'service ethos' turned on the view that the state employer acted impartially and fairly for the
public good and was committed to uniform and standard employment relations. Yet, as waged
state workers employees were subject to control by centralised, hierarchical forms of
management.
Labour control strategies of Babcock and GEC are thus rooted in the historical evolution of
Ferranti and the dockyards within the state capital complex. What Burawoy (1979: 109-120)
called an 'internal state'6 attempted to absorb and flatten out quantitative and qualitative
uncertainties of the external market in labour and regularise the internal labour process. For
Burawoy (1979: 198), 'the internal state and the internal labour market imposed constraints on
managerial discretion, institutionalized the granting of concessions constituted workers as
industrial citizens with rights and obligations; and fostered competition, individualism, and
mobility'. Moreover, the institutions of the 'internal state', departments of Personnel, Industrial
Relations and Welfare, became, over time, disentangled from the managerial prerogative over
the labour process.
'Industrial citizenship' has some direct relevance to Rosyth and Ferranti. The dockyard
'establishment' system pioneered an early form of the internal state for male workers through
the 'competitive individualism' of the promotion system, welfare services, even extending to
housing for Rosyth workers and funding relocation costs. Traditional forms of naval command
and autocratic management in the dockyards gave way reluctantly in the 1940s to full trade
union recognition and Whitley forms of institutionalised bargaining and procedures. Even
here, however, wartime experiments in industrial participation at Rosyth were opposed by
management. By the 1950s, functional management developed a specialised Personnel
function and broke the overseer mentality of discipline-based Superintendents. Similarly, as
Ferranti expanded after World War One a delegated system for personnel policies evolved out
6 The term 'internal state' was developed by Burawoy (1979:110) to refer to 'the set of institutions
that organize, transform or repress struggles over relations of production at the level of the
enterprise'. As such, the analogy with the nation-state is imprecise. For example, citizens of nation-
states are not nearly as mobile between states as labour is between, and even outside, individual
capitals. Neither do industrial citizens exert democratic control over office-holders of firms. Burawoy
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of the pre-war direct personal control regime. From taking an intransigent stance during the
1897 engineers' lock-out. Sebastian de Ferranti retained a personal antipathy towards trade
unions and an\-thing smacking of 'socialism', such as employer paternalism and collective
bargaining.7 Nonetheless, functional specialisation moderated the 'fierce individualism' of the
Ferranti family. A family friend of the Ferrantis. Olivia Forbes, was appointed in 1915 as
'Lady Supervisor' for the welfare of unskilled female workers, a Welfare Department was
established in 1917, and a Works Manager appointed in 1925 to deal with labour relations
(Wilson, 1988: 153). Even more than at Rosyth, the separation of the personnel function was
made subordinate to scientific-technical functions. Edinburgh's geographical distance from the
main centre of Ferranti operations made it exempt from the centralisation of administrative
functions at Manchester (Wilson, 1980: 334-5).
Ferranti and the dockyards tended towards what Burawoy (1985) calls a more 'hegemonic
regime'.8 More authoritarian forms of managerialism were replaced with Whitley-based
procedures and joint committees, union recognition and stable bargaining, checking arbitrary,
personalised management sanctions. An internal legal code set down rights and responsibilities
around the notion of 'industrial service', with promotion, holidays, pension, sickness, and
rights accruing over time and equality before the internal legality and 'industrial judiciary' of
also tends to equate the 'internal' state to the expanded welfare states based on social citizenship of
liberal democracies when this is only one form the state can take.
7
Sebastian de Ferranti complained that the setting up of a Works Committee in 1917 to improve
communications between management and the rapidly expanding workforce was a waste of working
time. And, in response to labour militancy during the war, Ferranti stated, 'I look upon the labour
position as the most serious as if we win the present war we have a worse enemy to fight in the shape
of a misled lower class who want to nationalise everything and tax people who have or are capable of
making anything out of existence', (in Wilson, 1988: 152). The dislike of paternalism by Ferranti
among Manchester's employers is ironic given the reputation that Ferranti in Edinburgh would
acquire in the 1950s and 1960s for paternalist practices.
8
Burawoy (1985) identifies two basic types of control organised by 'factory regimes'. The first,
'market despotic' follows closely Marx's observations on unregulated nineteenth century factory life.
'Anarchy in the market leads to despotism in production', where workers are helpless against the
arbitrary rule of a management itself driven blindly by fierce competitive markets (1985: 89). The
other regime type, 'hegemonic', occur where state regulation of the effort bargain erodes managerial
sovereignty, with worker consent being generated externally, by the institutions of civil society and
the state, and, crucially for Burawoy (1979), within production itself. Labour may be granted control
in production but never over production. 'Despotic' and 'hegemonic' regimes are rarely present in
pure form. Burawoy identifies a more recent synthesis, 'hegemonic despotism', arising from the
threat of firm relocation within the new international division of labour, labour's declining power to
resist management demands for rationalisation, technical change and work intensification resulting
in trade-offs in employment relations. For Burawoy, however, the precise combination of hegemony
and despotism always seems to secure surplus value for capital, with even labour resistance, in the
form of'making out', incorporating workers still further (Clawson and Fantasia, 1983).
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grievance and disciplinary procedures.9 In both workplaces 'paternalism' was the shorthand
used to describe the hegemonic system of industrial citizenship.
The 'internal state' is not, therefore, simply a functional expression of tendencies immanent in
the unfolding structural logic of (state/monopoly) capital, as Burawoy tends to assume
(Gartman, 1983). It is closely related to neutralising worker discontent and containing class
struggle within safe limits. Nevertheless, the hegemonic struggle by capital to obscure
relations of exploitation has contradictory effects for securing surplus value. With labour no
longer subject to the absolutes of authoritarian management power, as a solution to the
problem of variable labour power it is doomed to failure. Each stylistic solution of
management contains other, emergent obstacles. The internal state, as an impartial arbiter,
subjected management to a formal social contract. Control through standardised employment
relations, centrally determined rules and regulations, and paternal welfarism, also 'controlled
the controllers', supervisors and managers, as well as workers. The soft underbelly of
standardised employment relations, relatively generous benefit packages, guaranteed job
continuity implicit in the service ethos, and a fairly relaxed labour process, inhibited
managerial authority to raise labour productivity and constrained any direct use of coercive
sanctions to impose its will. At Ferranti, the dominant technical-administrative paradigm
simply assumed that scientific-technical labour would be self-directed anyway. Restructuring
aims to break through the blockages to productive efficiency that are created wherever a
dependent management becomes beholden to living, social labour. The tension contained in
management dependency on and autonomy from living labour points to a further contradiction
within the capital-labour relation.
Escaping and controlling living labour
Unable to eliminate this dependency, capital is simultaneously repelled and attracted to living
labour. This creates a material tension between labour redundancy and enrollment.
Contemporary restructuring marks a stage at which living labour is expelled, displaced,
9 Here the analogy with wider state citizenship has a further usefulness. TH Marshall's (1950) classic
reformist essay on social citizenship was explicit about ameliorating class struggle. Whitleyism
attempted a similar exercise, at the more concrete level of employer sovereignty. Industrial citizens
acquired certain social, civil and political rights so long as centralised industrial rule was accepted,
conflict was expressed institutionally, and that formal equalities did not extend to the overall control
and purpose of industrial organisation. Institutionalising class conflict, internal labour markets and
indulgent employment practices, socialised labour controls in a partly de-commodified field of
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substituted, stored and objectified as 'dead' labour in greater quantities than it is when
consumed as sentient, embodied, proximate, indeterminate and refractors'. The former relies on
a social division of labour, premised upon exchange between capitals, while the latter marks a
technical division of labour, founded upon use within a particular production process. The
latter, technical division, presupposes capital-widening by positing centralising processes,
which diminish the external authority of exchange relations. The former, social division,
presupposes capital-narrowing or deepening, positing de-centralising processes, which
diminish internal control over production.10 A decision to buy-in a finished product from a
supplier means acquiring 'dead' labour, past work which has previously been performed and
stored in commodity form, made possible by an existing external, impersonal social division of
labour of independent producers. Acquiring use values through a social division of labour
carries necessary circulation expenses associated with contracts, incomplete knowledge and
transportation. A decision to make an article in-house means managing an internal, detailed
division of labour of proximate, living social labour, future work which has yet to be
accomplished. Within the differentiated unity of the state capital arms complex, such choices
for individual capitals rest on relative preferences for managing or avoiding living labour,
through either internal control or external displacement strategies.
The balance between the social and technical division of labour thus represents contradictory
choices for states and capitals. Either relinquish direct control over the production process and
pass on the task and risk of productive efficiency to some other capital. Or, alternatively,
absorb the expense and risks of retaining control of production and autonomy to fit labour to
the desired work organisation. In electing for an external displacement strategy, overhead and
control costs may be minimised. On the other hand, internal control permits variability in the
productive consumption of labour. Cost criteria alone are therefore insufficient for explaining
the contours of socially divided, collective labour. In particular, transaction cost analysis
struggle, attempted to address the problem of scarcity of certain kinds of labour; at Ferranti and
Rosyth labour recruitment and labour retention was a recurring problem, as we have seen.
10 Marx pointed to three essential distinctions. First, commodity exchange connected the various
activities of independent producers, while the diverse labours of individual detail workers do not
produce a commodity. Secondly, while the division of labour disperses the means of production
under many independent commodity producers, the technical division of labour concentrates
production under a single capital. Thirdly, independent commodity producers are subject only to the
pressure of competition, interdependent detail workers are subject to co-operation under the sole
authority of the capitalist employer. Marx mocks the bourgeois ideology which celebrates and
defends the anarchy of the social division of labour against regulation and planning but, the same
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(Williamson. 1985), where the firm is seen as analogous to the market, is seriously deficient as
a guide to actual practices. Rooted in crude neo-classical assumptions, it fails to account for
social and political bargaining in enforcing and maintaining relations within firms and
industrial complexes. Specifically, the firm is not simply a minimiser of transaction costs.
Primarily, it is an ensemble of social relations whose existence is a social and political
accomplishment. As the rational kernel of institutional approaches acknowledges, albeit one-
sidedly, firms internally suppress market uncertainties, creating and maintaining durable
structures, embedding skills and knowledge in routines, and nurturing technological
development and innovation. Contractual ambiguities, on the other hand, result in a constant
material tension between use and exchange value. Written 'market' contracts, including
employment contracts, are always incomplete and dependent upon extra-contractual, tacit
understandings and relationships built up over time. Scope exists for contesting and
renegotiating their terms (Baldamus, 1961; O'Connell Davidson, 1990; 1993). Moreover, the
relative preference between market or hierarchical relations depends contingently on the
character of the particular firm and industrial complex, such as the relative power of labour
and capital, the state of demand, product and process evolution, strategy and organisational
structure, as well as the wider political economy, including unemployment levels, legal
frameworks, policy processes, and so on.
A key outcome of the restructuring process has been to shift the emphasis from managing an
internal detail division of labour to market exchange through the social division of labour. The
first stage, as we have seen, was to effect a more complete separation of the public and the
private within terms of the state capital complex. This meant state divestment of control over
living labour, pushing technological, political and financial uncertainties onto private capital.
The reshaping of organisational boundaries of, now private, capitals was further inhibited,
however, by a contractual obligation to use MOD test equipment, stores and supplies and
MOD-nominated 'maker's labour' for assembling, integrating and servicing sub-systems. So
although monetary values were exchanged, the dockyard and Ferranti remained locked into a
technical-administrative complex of industrial organisation. Crucially, the redrawing of
firm/client boundaries institutionalised socio-political bargaining. The formal and informal
socio-political bargaining over license fees, work content and remuneration before, during and
after work enters the firm, assumed a regularised basis, incurring considerable costs
capitalists claim, would condemn society to an immense factory-like existence, similar to the
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associated with recording, accounting, reporting and negotiating, on both the customer and
producer sides. In these ways, externalising activities formerly performed in-house may in fact
increase costs within the complex.
This verisimilitude quality of marketised exchange formalises arbitrarily constructed pricing
regimes. In the early years of dockyard contractorisation. the MOD continued to draw up
detailed work specifications as an aid to cost the actual price of work more precisely. By the
early 1990s, with escalating cost and time investment in this practice due to the emergent and
ambiguous character of work definition in refitting, it was abandoned. Instead, more loosely
defined contract specifications relied on firm-specific expertise to execute work packages,
guided by the arbitrary setting of payment milestones to mark the 'efficient' progress of work.
At Rosyth. the customer organisation attempted to exert monopsony customer power but was,
nevertheless, compelled to guarantee the contractor sufficient profitability over the first term
contract to remain in the sector. Babcock, for example, was compensated for cancelled refits
and the MOD underwrote redundancy programmes. The contractor, tied to specific
contractual obligations for levels of naval workload, competitive contracts and diversification,
attempted to balance this with satisfying shareholder interest in profit-maximisation. Attempts
by the state to shift the balance within the complex to a market-based social division of labour
were therefore limited by the lack of alternative suppliers, the formalisation of social and
political bargaining and, crucially, strategic dependencies on securing certain combinations of
firm-specific labour. Within the firm, the ascendancy of the accountancy paradigm ultimately
depended on a marketised fiction. Resources are still centrally allocated through bureaucratic
mechanisms. Only the very faintest whisper of 'market' signals internal to the firm can be
heard.
The use of the social division of labour to re-commodify the state capital nexus has been a
blunt instrument. Wielded opportunistically, vertical disintegration disassembles the detail
division of labour and increasingly pushes living labour out of the charmed, inner circle of
strategic capitals. Four methods of expelling living labour are available: internally, within the
technical division of labour, capital substitution and functional flexibility; externally, buying-
in labour and material goods when required as marketed commodities. The choice is a relative
one between internal control or external displacement. Managing the refractory material of
despotic technical division of labour organised in their own factories. (Marx, 1976; Beamish, 1992).
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living labour is displaced externally, outside of firm boundaries and onto sub-contractors and
component suppliers. Some functions, such as the capabilities of the dockyard foundry or
Ferranti's Printed Circuit Board section, were scrapped altogether, with materials bought in
from 'the market' as required. Labour is therefore already 'dead', so to speak, when it arrives
through the gates, tied-up in a product available for exchange. Other internal capabilities, like
machine shops, were rundown in both cases, albeit with some residual capacity retained. Local
engineering workshops possessed manufacturing capabilities for the batch production of
components, satisfying stringent MOD quality-assured specifications. For these supposedly
more generic products and processes, internal extra capacity, retained for sudden surges in
demand, like the Falklands or Gulf wars, is surrendered to the vicissitudes of contractual
arrangements and market exchange. Internal tautness in labour supply and capital-narrowing
are premised upon low expectations and a refusal to bear the cost or discipline-weakening
effects of present labour 'idleness'.
More specialised capabilities, less readily available for short-term exchange, are more fully
retained. Supplies of heterogeneous kinds of labour, with highly-specific knowledge and skills,
'specialised versatility', are not left to be determined by an external 'market' in labour, goods or
services. Instead, internal controls are pursued. Here, attempts to expel living labour from the
production process occurs through technical substitution and functional flexibility. At
Ferranti, as Chapter 9 described, electronically-integrated design-to-production systems were
designed to proletarianise white-collar labour, but this continued to be mediated by labour
versatility. Shiprefititting, by its nature, allows of little scope for capital substitution.
Production and support functions at Rosyth were vulnerable to electronic controls, with, for
example, bar-coded work packages of SFCS eliminating labour-intensive recording by white
collar staff of manual worker's job allocation and time. Technical substitution and market
exchange have had a limited impact on the nature of the labour process. Restructuring has
placed a premium on functional 'flexibilities' of living labour, shaped by the apparently
determining technical contours of the work programme. Marx (1976: 617) argued that the
constant revolutionising of the technical basis of production necessitated 'variation of labour,
fluidity of function and mobility of the worker in all directions'. In its capitalist form, however,
the positive, life-affirming aspect of varied productive activity is constantly threatened by the
negative, disruptive aspect of labour redundancy, by suppressing specialisation and removing
labour from the instruments of production. It will be argued more fully in the following
chapter that functional flexibility, rather than producing highly skilled, well trained labour, is
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little more than an opportunistic tactic to intensify labour effort through task enlargement, for
example, by adding general labouring duties, sweeping, painting, scrap disposal, and so on.
onto craft workers' existing tasks.
Collective labour was reconstituted so that workers with high 'asset specificity', that is firm-
specific skills and knowledge, were retained internally while those with low specificity were
expelled to the vagaries of the external labour market. Prior to restructuring, the priority given
to minimising the length of time ships spent undergoing refit in the dockyards, the physical
confines of ship refitting and craft job controls led to the extensive use of a three shift system
and overtime. As part of a dockyard moral economy of long hours, low basic pay and a
subdued work effort, working-time was prolonged. To improve earnings dockyard workers
worked evenings, night, mornings and weekends. A tacit pact existed between management
and the workforce in striking an effort-bargain, in the light of low pay offset by working long
and unsociable hours, that so long as some mutually acceptable quantity of work could be
seen to have been carried out everybody benefitted. Babcock attempted to intensify working
time by undermining the dockyard moral economy. By simplifying the wage structure,
improving basic rates of pay and curtailing overtime it was hoped that the conditions would be
created for a fuller use of the working day, the adoption of more efficient work methods and
accurate management recording and accounting for time. Afloat work was reorganized into
multi-disciplinary teams under generalist supervision, covering a specified zone, rather than
traditional, discipline-specific gangs under trade-specific supervision. Management hoped that
the team rather than the trade would become the new source of workplace identities, with
rudimentary ways of doing acquired from different disciplines. Zone management would seal-
up both formal and informal time porosities of social labour by drastically reducing official
waiting time created by work discontinuities and trade demarcations and idle, socialised time
leakages.
A similar process occurred in even more drastic form at Ferranti, where a concerted effort was
made to substitute capital for living labour. Labour was to be employed more intensively and
extensively to block-up socialised leakages in the working day and de-skill technical labour.
For both craft workers at Rosyth and technical workers at Ferranti labour versatility was
demanded in the limiting form of task enlargement. But this also co-existed alongside a
dependency on existing specialised versatility acquired from years of training, education,
learning-by-doing firm-, process- and product-specific knowledge (Smith, 1987). Technical
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workers by training were assumed to be self-directed, due to creative and challenging work
where technical skills and knowledge could be put to good use. As one Ferranti engineer said.
'I have found that good responsible engineers do not need guidance, except on general policy,
and this is the main reason to try and get them wherever and whenever they can be located'
(MK Taylor, 1974: 6, cited by Wilson, 1980: 361). A GEC-Marconi Personnel Manager at
Edinburgh, in recruiting 'quality engineers' for the Eurofighter project, promised that,
The jobs offer good rewards and long-term prospects in a very sound business in one of
Europe's finest cities. There is scope for engineers to switch to other programmes to suit
their long-term development in GEC-Marconi. They will move between projects as demand
for their skills arises. It's unlikely they will be working only on the Eurofighter contract' (in
Lochead, 1997; see also Shennan and Lochead, 1997).
This is a clear statement on the continuing need for technical labour's specialised versatility.
The self-development of technical labour and the internal control over their allocation between
projects are assumed to be co-terminus.
Labour redundancy, through the expulsion of living labour, stands in constant tension with
labour enrollment in the service of productive activity. Work was performed through an
interdependent, graduated, heterogeneous labour process where the spatial separation between
various kinds of labour was overcome infrastructurally through communication and
coordination networks, such as regular bus services between work sites. Previously dispersed
'thin agglomerations of labour' were to be thickened-up by internally concentrating smaller
amounts of labour together in close proximity and, externally, through the social division of
labour and market exchange. External 'buffeting waves' of market relations were to be
transplanted within the firm as the most effective mechanism to generate productive efficiency.
However, it is important to qualify the extent of this. There has indeed been a marked shift in
emphasis but this has had uneven effects, with identifiable continuities preserved to meet
immediate exigencies and the lingering effects of past practices and ideologies. The
combination of versatile and dead labour is therefore reconstituted expediently to minimise
that refractory part which can never be finally expelled.
Two additional examples
Capital narrowing and labour expulsion at Ferranti and Rosyth were not the only options
available to capitals in the complex. Two examples of defence firms in Scotland will indicate
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variety in the different forms of restructuring work organisation. In extreme cases, some firms
took up a capital-deepening strategy, deciding to abandon their collection of aging or obsolete
capital stock and physically re-build the labour process anew from first principles. In
Scotland, the military electro-optronics firm Pilkington Optronics, formerly Barr and Stroud,
has been celebrated as an exemplary case of 'business process re-engineering' and 'Computer
Integrated Manufacture'. Pilkington moved from a sprawling cluster of inter-connected
factories to a sparkling, custom-built factory on the River Clyde (IRRS, 1993). Pilkington
simultaneously attempted to escape from living labour through redundancy and investment in
greater levels of technical control. At the same time, management also wanted to engage what
was left of the beleaguered workforce as high-skill, creative, problem-solving teams.
Functional specialisation was to be replaced by a product-based cellular production process
around highly specialised assembly work. Contradictions contained in the company's belief in
a decisive technical-organisational solution to an 'inefficient' labour process soon became
apparent. Attempts were made to construct company identities to supplant occupational
identities. But this was done in hostile conditions of rising levels of work intensification and
mass redundancy. Between 1990 and 1993 the workforce was cut from 2,500 to 750.
Evidence from a similar case at DefCo (Blair, et al, 1997) indicates that despite the heavy
investments demanded by re-engineering, the aim of building a culture of organisational
commitment is contradicted by the demoralising impact of mass redundancy on the remaining
workers.
More usually, weaker forms of restructuring attempt to rework existing capital. At GEC-
Yarrow, for example, a more limited technical-organisational restructuring of the labour
process, 'modularisation', was undertaken (Walker and McCluskey, 1996). The options for
spatial mobility were not available to Yarrow. Instead, modularisation integrated design and
build methodologies, from static forms of berth building to more spatially and temporally
dynamic and flexible modular construction techniques and labour supply. Better work co¬
ordination reduced time porosities, required less labour and consumed less constant capital.
'The basic aims were, and remain, simple: the achievement of optimum productivity through
effective design, planning and the movement of outfitting work to earlier, and inherently less
costly, stages of build' (Walker and McCluskey, 1996: 125). Instead of physically moving
labour to the workpiece, wherever feasible smaller, modular ship sections moved to labour.
Labour time was thus saved by increasing work continuity and reducing fluctuating demands
for various trades through greater use of workshops rather than the constrictive berth space,
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increased unit assembly, which allowed many individual units to be built simultaneously and a
reduction of post-launch outfitting from 80 to 20 per cent. Traditional build methods relied
'heavily on the experience and knowledge of the workforce to create a finished vessel' (ibid.,
129) but now fully detailed work packages were designed to remove discretion from the
workforce and eliminate piecemeal work. With composite, multi-discipline squads, under a
single foreman for each work module, job demarcations apparently became 'a relic of the past'.
All this was 'achieved with the full co-operation of the workforce, creating a good team spirit
...' (ibid., 130). Similar claims for flexible working and partnership were encountered for
Rosyth but at Yarrow there seems perhaps even less grounds for accepting them. McKinlay
and Taylor (1994) have documented the belligerent, macho management style of Managing
Director, Murray Easton and the deep worker discontent at Yarrow, culminating in blue and
white collar strikes.
Underlying restructured work organisation then were contradictory demands for worker
commitment and worker redundancy. Both Pilkington and Yarrow's escapes from refractory,
living labour through rationalisation were contradicted by the need to continually re-engage
labour. Ferranti, under a GEC regime like Yarrow, dealt with living labour using a similar
regime of aggressive 'macho-management'. Continued dependency on the specialised
versatility of technical labour restricted the degree to which technical control was a viable
alternative to enrolling workers hegemonically. At Rosyth a more consensual approach to
living labour was struck. Babcock's 'soft' Human Resource strategy for ensuring labour
control and productive continuities had much to do with the way in which Rosyth remained a
strategic dockyard until 1991 and the recent record of worker militancy By the late 1990s,
however, Babcock seemed set to emulate Yarrow, not only in the concept of zone management
but in the whole tenor of labour relations. First, a redundancy programme is currently being
prepared, with the relatively generous redundancy entitlements for the dockyard workforce
being bought out in 1997, gradually reducing the financial burden of redundancy as the
surface ship refit programme begins to taper-off. Second, the former Managing Director at
GEC-Yarrow, Murray Easton, was recruited to manage Rosyth. Third, is Rosyth's waning
strategic status was confirmed by the tapering-off of guaranteed work, with plans to establish
a more competitive environment for surface ship refits (although not nuclear submarines).
This adds up to an imminent change in the style of management. An early indication of the
changing tempo came as the period covered by this study ended, with demands for a 'self-
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financing' 2 per cent pay deal in 1997 pay negotiations, including 'bell-to-bell' working, the
issue which sparked discontent at Yarrow (McKinlay and Taylor. 1994). As Easton sees it.
In the past most of the negotiation was between the customer and the company. In the near
future we will be competitively quoting for surface warship refit contracts as well as
having to diversify. We have to change the way we do business at all levels and continue to
strive for higher productivity and cost reduction. (Dunfermline Press, 1997)
Whether achieved through internal technical, hegemonic or despotic controls or external
displacement strategies, 'higher productivity and cost reduction' are management euphemisms
for labour redundancy. Reducing the dependency on living labour has now become an explicit
objective in itself and not simply a temporary 'alignment' of labour to workload. However, this
is contradicted by an array of internal controls for intensifying and extending the use of labour
time, tightening the labour-capital relationship on a more narrow basis.
Conclusion
At both Ferranti and Rosyth there was a break materially and ideologically with embedded
practices after 1991. through wage freezes, redundancies and attacks on company welfarism.
Incoming 'outsiders' were the main sources of the new outlook. GEC and Babcock managers
were on a mission to change indulgent practices of the past. Both had prior experiences of
organisational change, at Babcock in the 1970s and early 1980s, and the continual re¬
organisations of GEC, as factories and divisions were sloughed off after merger or takeover.
They were the main advocates and carriers of the ideology of change. Nevertheless, the
complex landscape of historically-evolved workplace relations, product demand and profits,
and management styles ensured that the form and tempo of restructuring differed in each case.
The implications of extensive accumulation prohibited the regulation of productive efficiency
by 'market' mechanisms. 'Strategic' capitals restructured both detail and social divisions of
labour as part of a changed balance between living and dead labour. Internally, living labour
became subject to a re-organisation of work based on increased time continuities. Externally,
greater use was made of outside agents, suppliers of components and intermediate goods and
sub-contract labour. Even in cases of 'total solutions', where firms attempted to 're-engineer'
the labour process completely, tensions between discharging and enrolling labour, between the
socialisation of team working and the fragmentation of external displacement, between
discipline and creative problem-solving, served to limit efficiency gains. Problems persisted
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for individual capitals: of making concrete labour abstract, of making absolute surplus value
relative, of making labour's formal subordination real The question of subordinating living
labour is the theme of the next chapter, specifically, the unique capacity of living labour to
resist and comply with restructuring. If. as Hyman (1987) claims, restructuring implies that
individual capitals set out on 'different routes to partial failure', locating labour's part in
restructuring is an essential dimension for mapping the relative failure and self-contradictory
character of the restructuring process.
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Chapter 13
Dimensions of Restructuring III:
Worker Resistance
Chapters 11 and 12 argued that the restructuring process at both state and capital levels is
fraught with tension. In particular, restructuring military industry poses a special set of
problems for state capitals to mediate. Strategic firms within the state capital complex cannot
simply turn concrete labours accumulated on an absolute basis into abstract labour
accumulated relatively. Moreover, attempts to commodify the social relations of production
in the arms economy can only ever be partially successful. By reducing the employment
relation more starkly in exchange terms re-commodification threatens to negate the
specialised versatility of residual workforces while redundancy strategies, on the other hand,
create even greater management dependencies on smaller groups of key workers. As a
solution to the efficiency dilemma of defence firms, partial vertical disintegration shifts the
emphasis from the internal controls of capital-labour relations to a greater reliance on
external ones through capital-capital relations. One sort of uncertainty, the indeterminacy of
the employment relation, appears to be reduced only for other kinds, to do with diseconomies
of scale and scope and external dependencies on suppliers of goods and services, to become
more pronounced. In practice, however, even 'total' management solutions can never
eliminate dependencies on living labour. Alongside external displacement strategies, internal
'flexibilities' have been touted as a mutually beneficial 'efficiency gain', although this often
amounted to little more than building additional, generic tasks onto craft and technical
labour's existing duties (see also Elger and Fairbrother, 1992). Allied to formal, collectively
negotiated flexibility deals, internal enrollment strategies of Total Quality Management
(TQM) for production and Human Resource Management (HRM) strategies for personnel
attempted to less formally produce self-disciplined living labour. The uses, and abuses, of
HRM in the case ofRosyth will be considered below.
The main argument of this chapter is to view the restructured capital-labour relation as being
one founded on the contradiction between the forces and relations of production. Worker
subordination to some pre-given technical requirement of the labour process which demands
'flexibility' may, or may not, be immanent to the 'logic' of accumulation. Yet, at least in the
case of Rosyth, the slight and tentative nature of much heralded 'flexibilities' suggest
avoidance of an open confrontation with labour and, at the same time, a preparedness by
366
labour to accept negotiated change which does not yet encroach on core capacities. Within
the social relations of capitalist production human labour is simultaneously a creative force
for and an obstacle to accumulation. In the interstices of the employment relation capacity
exists for limiting the extent of real subordination. This, it will be proposed, can be
understood substantively by developing perspectives from the heritage of classical Marxism.
Recent critiques of labour process theory (Salaman, 1986; Wilmott, 1997) detect in Marxism
the reduction of human subjectivities to 'personifications of economic categories, the bearers
of particular class-relations and interests' (Marx, 1976: 92). This is precisely what numerous
critiques have argued that Braverman's (1974) seminal analysis of the capitalist labour
process does (for rebuttals see Thompson, 1989; Meiksens, 1996). 'Subjectivities', however,
are not simply constructed by discourse or ideology but are rooted in a structured material
process. To account for worker identity, however, need not imply a narrow focus on the
details of occupational change, deskilling and production techniques. Too often such
narrowness wrenches the labour process from its rootedness in a wider political economy. A
spurious and ahistorical technical neutrality of control in the labour process is identified as
the locus of all other aspects of capitalist employment relations. Technical narrowness of this
kind makes any wider restructuring or variability of employment relations difficult to
understand.
As O'Connell Davidson (1993) argues, this ignores the sources and determinants of
employment relations. Employment relations have a two-fold character. First, there is the
terms of the sale of labour power, roughly based on a market definition of labour's exchange
value. Second, there is the nature of the work tasks, a workplace definition based on labour's
use value. Employment relations therefore constitute, 'the web of tacit and explicit bargains
struck between a unit of capital and the labour it uses over a range of issues concerning what
work is to be done and how, and what payments and benefits will be ceded in exchange'
(O'Connell Davidson, 1993: 7). Against the widespread view that job content is the primary
determinant of employment relations, O'Connell Davidson (1993: 19) argues that this fails to
explain cases where either job content is maintained even as employment relations change or
where job content changes while employment relations are maintained, 'the variability of
employment relations does not stem primarily from skill, job content or features intrinsic to
the production process, but has to be explained in relation to wider political, institutional and
economic factors'. Clearly the rise of internal states in the 1940s at Ferranti and Rosyth
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standardised employment practices in the context of a national labour/capital settlement.
With the rise of the national welfare state market disciplines acting to subordinate labour as a
commodity were ameliorated.1 Within the workplace the internal state confirmed the formal
separation of internal legal and social codes from the vicissitudes of the production process.
Labour, in self-organising as a collectivity, begins to overcome atomisation and its corollary,
latent destitution, weakening, although not abolishing, the disciplining impact of the
commodity status ofwage dependency.
Leaving aside the erroneous notion that Marx held to a radical form of structural-
functionalism, a key concern of this chapter revolves around how Marxism might explain
collective forms of resistance or account for its apparent absence. The classical Marxist
focus on class struggle must presumably form part of a response to the charge of structural-
functionalism. Just as capital takes a dual form, constant and variable, so also does labour:
abstract and useful, or concrete, labour.2 It is the second aspect, labour as useful labour,
which has tended to be lost sight of. Understandably much work in the Marxist tradition has
been preoccupied with labour as abstract labour. In neglecting useful labour 'in a particular
form and with a definite aim' much research informed by a labour process perspective has
focused on control and deskilling and less frequently at the dual nature of labour domination
by capital. Here I want to make the dual nature of labour, as value and as utility, key to the
study of compliance and resistance in the processes of state capital restructuring.
The idea of praxis holds out more of a prospect for a dialectical engagement with action and
structure in the restructuring process than either the idealism of 'subjectivities' or one-sided
production control logics of structuralism. Praxis refers to sensuous, creative activity and the
ways in which human practice is comprehended. In a striking passage, Walter Benjamin
(1970: 256) maintained that class struggle is always 'a fight for the crude and material
1 TH Marshall's (1951) classic case that the granting of 'social rights' would 'abate' class struggle
thus proved mistaken. Instead, full employment, economic boom and the legitimation of organised
labour partly de-commodified the employment relation but also strengthened workplace shop
stewards' organisation, creating informal local centres of power to contest the terms of the
employment contract and managerial prerogatives. The employers' response locally was a spate of
productivity deals and nationally incomes policies were designed to stem wage 'drift' (Cliff, 1970).
2 On the one hand, all labour is an expenditure of human labour power, in the physiological sense,
and it is in this quality of being equal, or abstract, human labour that it forms the value of
commodities. On the other hand, all labour is an expenditure of human labour power 'in a particular
form and with a definite aim', and it is this quality of being definite useful labour that it produces use
values.
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things, without which no refined and spiritual things could exist' In counterposing crude,
material things to refined, spiritual things. Benjamin viewed the latter as a "retroactive force'
consisting of 'courage, humour, cunning and fortitude". As the "most inconspicuous of all
transformations" such resistance may neither be immediately observable nor determined in
advance by 'structural forces'. Every seizure of society's surplus product by a non-producing
class is thus constantly put in jeopardy by the active resilience and wit of the dominated,
what Benjamin called the 'secret heliotropism' of the historical process. Domination and
dependency relations between the contending classes are therefore subject to a collective
socio-psychology of resistance. Against the inexorable objective laws posed by crude
mechanical materialism, Benjamin captures something of the irreducibly subjective character
of social action. An adequate understanding of industrial change integrates praxis within an
historically-informed political economy of restructuring.
The social organization of labour - subordination and resistance
Marx's (1973; 1976) distinction between the formal and real subordination of labour3 is a
useful starting point for understanding issues of labour resistance and compliance. On the one
hand, the formal subordination of labour roughly corresponds to the market side of the
employment contract and concerns the sovereign right of capital to appropriate the social
product of labour through prior labour market contracts.4 While this entitles capital to the
legal consumption of labour power over a given period of time in return for a wage as yet no
distinctively capitalist control of the labour process is implied. Absolute surplus value is
generated by greater economy in the consumption of the means of labour, extending the
length of the working day or intensifying it by reducing labour 'porosity', the 'petty pilfering
ofminutes' during 'idle time' where gaps in productive activity appear. Real subordination of
labour, on the other hand, concerns the extent to which productivity increases to create
relative surplus value. This is made possible by shortening socially necessary labour time in
production through reorganising production into larger units around a more complex
3 Marx uses the phrase 'subsumption of labour'. 'Subordination' is used here for consistency. The
most systematic statement by Marx (1976: 1019-1038) is given in the 'missing' chapter or part 7 of
Capital volume 1, the Resultate, ('Resultate des unmittelbarren Produktionsprozesses'; 'Results of
the Immediate Process of Production').
4 The typical example of purely formal subordination was the outworking system of domestic or
cottage industry which relied on inherited practices of traditional labour processes but became tied to
a system of merchant control, themselves under competitive pressure to accumulate greater stores of
capital.
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technical division of labour and the introduction of time-saving technologies.5 Instead of
simple co-operation and formal subordination, which only exceptionally and temporarily re-
oganises the basis of production, real subordination places 'labour under foreign command
and foreign supervision1 (Marx, 1861-2, in Beamish. 1992: 76). Labour's use of the
instruments of production thereafter is dependent on variations in capital's dissolution and
reconstitution of combined dead and living labour. Formal subordination is extrinsic to the
labour process while real subordination is intrinsic. Capitalist control of the labour process
marks out its territory within 'the hidden abode" of production as the sole 'political' authority
in the workplace, systematising the division of labour in society and in production. Capital
consumes living labour obtained beforehand through market exchange by uniting it with the
instruments of production. Living labour is thus subordinated by management both
extensively and intensively in the labour process and its subjective will harnessed creatively
to the overall goal of accumulation.
What implications does the real and formal distinction have for relations between
superordinates and subordinates? Cressey and Maclnnes (1980: 14) argue that this has
directly contradictory consequences for capital and labour which 'represent the working out
of the contradictions between the forces and the relations of production at the level of the
workplace itself. For capital, the necessity of dominating labour as a commodity comes up
against the necessity of consuming labour through the co-operative socialisation of
production to create surplus value; value is contradicted by use. Capital thus has 'an active
interest in suppressing its own dominance in the workplace to the extent that dominance flows
purely from the social form of the relations of production and not from the [technical]
requirements of production itself (Cressey and Maclnnes, 1980: 15). In order for exploitation
5 While this has sometimes been taken to imply that real subordination can be equated with the
grafting of machinery onto pre-existing industrial organization, with the relations of production
collapsed into the forces of production (Cressey and Maclnnes, 1980), Marx (1976: 1024; see also,
Beamish, 1992: 127-8; Elger, 1979: 90-1, nil) stressed the ways in which real subordination took
the form of the collective worker.
The social productive forces of labour, or the productive forces of directly social, socialised
(collective labour) come into being through co-operation, division of labour within the
workshop, the use of machinery, and in general the transformation of the production by the
conscious use of the sciences, of machines, chemistry, etc. for specific ends, technology
etc., and similarly, through the enormous increase in scale corresponding to such
developments.
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to take place capital's domination must be (partly) sacrificed. Famously, control is shared the
better to retain it. For labour's part, resistance is embedded in exchange relations against
attempts to reduce it to a pure commodity. Yet this comes up against labour's use value
which can only be actualised once access to the means of production has been granted and the
instruments of labour subsequently taken hold of.6 Labour thus has a contradictory interest in
the development of the forces of production which is at the same time negated by exploitative
relations of production.
Far from obeying some blind logic of total domination and control the capitalist labour
process is a 'joint creation' fashioned through the collision and collaboration of contradictory
interests, class struggle in other words.7 Restructuring marks a point at which capital's
repressed domination returns to refashion the joint creation in a more singular way.
This is not simply dead labour dominating living labour under conditions of total valorisation but the
mutual conditioning of the forces and relations of production.
6 However, labour's use of the instruments of production is always policed by an army of supervisors
and overseers, which Cressey and Maclnnes tend to ignore. This allows them to make labour's
interest in the development of the forces of production arising from its use as equally significant as
labour's interest in resisting exploitation arising from the relations of production. In fact it could just
as easily be claimed that any interest labour has in the productive forces of a particular capital arises
from its dependency on continually realising exchange value for its labour power. This is not the
same as some immanent drive of labour utility to become increasingly productively efficient.
7 Class struggle is broadly understood to be intrinsic to relations of exploitation in production.
Because it is relational struggle is conducted by both capital and labour; it is not only present when
labour resists. The equation of class struggle only with labour's resistance seems to be the implication
of Callinicos1 (1989: 51) rejection of de Ste. Croix' identification of exploitation with class struggle.
Callinicos argues that.
Exploitation does not take place automatically, and it will tend to evoke resistance, if only in
such molecular forms as sabotage and ca' canny, but it does not follow we should therefore
say that exploitation is class struggle. There may be some situations where the balance of
forces is so favourable to the exploiters that surplus-extraction is a routine process and
resistance minimal or non-existent. It would seem better to say that exploitation explains
class struggle, where the latter consists in some actual conflict, even if the combatants lack
class consciousness.
This seems to restrict class struggle one-sidedly to overt acts of resistance on the part of labour or
coercion on the part of capital. If class relations are inherently antagonistic struggle, 'now hiddden,
now seen', is a structural condition of exploitation. A false dichotomy between struggle and
accomodation fails to grasp the dialectic of a two-sided process. Struggle at the point of production is
always molecular, if by that is meant an ever-shifting but ever-present process of refractory activity,
but which at a certain conjuncture goes through a qualitative transformation when action tends
towards zero-sum solutions or decisive shifts in the relative degree of subordination for an extended
duration. This is what distinguishes periods of downturn and upturn in labour and capital
combativity. Periods of restructuring can therefore be characterised as an upturn in capital's
willingness, for whatever reason, to risk upsetting the institutionalisation of class conflict, at a
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The social organization of labour - organizational capacities
In order to move beyond formalist accounts of subordination a substantive theory of
resistance can be developed around the idea of organizational capacities (Wright, 1978). An
organizational capacities approach begins from the structures of asymmetrical power at the
command of capital and labour within the relations of production. In their enabling form
labour's structural capacities rest, as indicated in the discussion of subordination, upon the
pervasive dependency of capital on collectivising concrete labours for purposeful activity. In
their constraining form living labour remains dependent on individual sales of labour power.
But this relation does not at all entail an even distribution of power and dependency. Capital
can be sustained by one-dimensional, 'monological' organizational forms since its resources
can be concentrated and stored in impersonal forms, stocks, commodities, money, fixed
capital and its interests more readily understood without the same need for consciously
organised dialogue.8 Capital's sanction over labour is already centralised and concentrated.
Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) argue that capital's prior dominance as a relatively unified social
force, its unequal market and technical power over labour, and its privileged relationship to
the state, reduce capital's activity to a seemingly overriding necessity of calculating costs and
benefits. In short, accumulation is in unassailable command in self-organising capital.
However, the domestication and institutionalisation of organizational capacities can be
represented too one-dimensionally. Clearly capital does not possess clearly-defined ends-
means as unproblematically as Offe and Wiesenthal assume. Neither is it so disembodied as
to function in a wholly unitary way. Capital is always relational, to other capitals, as market
competitors and collaborators, to the state, and, of course, to collective labour itself whether
organised for production in the labour process or for curbing management autonomy in the
conjunctural moment designed, however opportunistically, to re-order the relations of exploitation on
a more favourable basis to capital.
8 As Alfred Marshall put it, 'labour is often sold under special disadvantages, arising from the
closely connected group of facts that labour power is 'perishable', that the sellers of it are commonly
poor and have no reserve fund, and that they cannot easily withhold it from the market' (cited by
Hyman and Fryer, 1977: 154). Even James Prior as the Secretary of State for Employment in
introducing the Employment Act of 1979 recognised the inherently unequal power relations of
unorganised workers, 'The law should always give full recognition to the inherent weakness of the
individual worker vis a vis his employer, to the need for him [sic] to be organised in a union and to
the need for his union to have such exceptional liberties as may be necessary to redress the balance'
(quoted by Wedderbum, 1989: 3). Lash and Urry (1984) put it, 'The power of capital exists without
[dialogical] organisation, the power of labour only exists with organisation, but it is an organisation
which is precariously balanced'.
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form of trade unions. This, after all. is what the discussion of subordination and resistance is
all about. The idea of organizational capacities is a way to move beyond both pessimistic and
optimistic versions of economism, which posit automatic labour responses to the 'logic' of
capital. In the context of the arms industry, where there is no rigid division between state and
capital, a unilinear 'market pressure-adaptation of capital-response of labour' approach is
woefully inadequate. An organisational capacities approach still requires, I think, retaining
some sense of the unequal powers of capital and labour not as some absolute pre-determining
law but as constantly in the process of development. Capital is ultimately compelled to
confront labour in the 'contested terrain' of production (Edwards, 1979). And. whether
consciously or not, workers are compelled to both resist and to co-operate in different
measure. Edwards (1986) calls this the 'structured antagonism',9 although this can be put
more strongly where the dual market/production relations of subordination is seen to rest on
structural contradictions.
Contradictory capacities and interests notwithstanding, the 'logic' of workers' self-
organization differs markedly from capital's. In contrast to capital's self-organizational
capacities labour is always embodied, always a personal capacity of individual workers. As
Marx (in Draper, 1978: 99-100) put it,
Capital is concentrated social force, while the workman has only to dispose of his working
force | labour power]. The contract can therefore never be struck on equitable terms,
equitable even in the sense of a society which places the ownership of the material means
of life and labour on one side and the vital productive energies on the opposite side. The
only social power of the workmen is their number. The force of numbers, however, is
broken by disunion. The disunion of the workmen is created and perpetuated by their
unavoidable competition among themselves.
9 Edwards (1986), in seeking to avoid teleological processes and iron laws, culminating in a
revolutionary transformation of capitalism, severs the structural antagonism from interests'. This
echoes Therborn's (1980: 5) objection that interests' are 'an utilitarian residue in Marxism'.
Callinicos (1989) answers this by invoking the idea of structural capacities to connect interests to
wants. Agents wants are constituted by their capacity to realise underlying wants through powers,
latent and manifest, in the relations of production, broadly understood. Instead of universal wants the
concept of social need might offer a better non-utilitarian link to interests. Here labour, in common
with the dispossessed, clearly has an interest in challenging the commodification of meeting social
needs. Only labour possesses the structural capacity to pose a revolutionary challenge to capitalism.
This need not imply that structural capacities will be exercised. For that organisational capacities,
unions and political parties, are required.
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Workers may be collectivised by capital within the labour process but individual employment
contracts and the detailed division of labour counteracts labour unification and cohesion.10
Edwards (1979). for example, argues that disunion between workers grew further as the size
of the firm grew in the twentieth century. A dual system of job and wage hierarchies and
bureaucratic control over the labour process was designed to assuage and prevent labour
forming itself as an active collectivity by competitively fragmenting the workforce with a
corresponding unequal distribution of rewards. Clearly, at one level, this model fits the
historical development of dockyard management from the eighteenth century down to the
1970s. Yet, like Burawoy's 'factory regimes', such schematism is profoundly ahistorical since
it fails to locate class capacities as relational, processual. contradictory and liable to change.
Dockyard management were faced with contradictory choices in subordinating labour. As
some of the largest, most concentrated industrial organizations of the eighteenth and
nineteenth century, the naval dockyards relied largely on a formal subordination. The labour
process was left under independent craft control, above all in the hands of the dockyard
shipwright.11 But even under naval command dockyard labour was subject to repeated
stratagems to make work more intense.
Insofar as labour atomisation is overcome as a source of weakness it is achieved through self-
organization into an independent, concentrated counter-force. Offe and Wiesenthal (1980)
argue that labour can only counteract the domination of capital organisationally through
what they call a 'dialogical' form of associative collective identity and action. The basic
sanction of workers' organization is the embodied possession and collective control of labour
power and the basic organisational form is the trade union. The effectiveness of labour's
sanction over capital depends upon unions finding appropriate forms for institutionalising
and representing membership ideology and activity. In this sense, collective agency made its
10 Anderson (1967: 265. 268) thus goes too far in identifying trade union control over labour power
as 'a singularly rigid and limited power' because of its initial rootedness in the 'natural organisation
of capitalism itself - the labour market', claiming that 'Trade unions, then, take on the natural hue of
the closed, capital-dominated environment of the factory itself. They are a passive reflection of the
organization of the workforce'. Trade union organizational capacities may indeed be limited but
these cannot be read off directly from capital's organization of the workforce, except in a broad brush
way, before empirical investigation. To do so denies the process of organization in the workplace its
three-fold dynamic, between labour, unions and employers, within distinct relationships to the means
of production, and conflates the market basis of the employment relation with its useful productive
side, within "the environment of the factory'.
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presence felt at both Rosvth and Ferranti. modifying and moderating management practices
in the decades before restructuring and conditioning the scope and tempo in various ways
during the restructuring process.
An example from Rosyth during the anti-privatization campaign highlights something of the
difference of capital and labour organization. In 1985 manual unions at Rosyth blacked
remedial work coming into Rosyth which had been done previously by private repair yards.
Members of the engineering union, AUEW, refused a management instruction to repair the
propeller of HMS Redpole which had previously been repaired at a private shiprepair yard.
Each individual worker was verbally instructed by management to report to the ship or face
suspension following a one hour 'cooling-off period. Despite the individualised nature of the
order and the threatened use of suspension not a single one of the 800 members of the AUEW
reported for duty at the ship until a compromise was reached days later. Clearly, at each level
a unitary management implemented a standard order across the breadth of the dockyard. The
difference was that management exercised vertical hierarchical authority through a small
number of agents while eight hundred union members shared a horizontal obligation to act on
the principle of opposing incipient privatization. That each individual union member
identified themselves as part of a labour collectivity rather than being bound by
management's sovereign right to consume labour power as it saw fit was a social and political
accomplishment of the dialogical structures of representative shop stewards' organization.
Within the workplace shop stewards built and maintained opposition to privatisation by
working with and redefining pre-existing membership material interests, identities and
ideologies. For the dockyard management, whose right to manage was embedded in the
bureaucratic procedures and rules of the MOD Manuals, implementing policies designed as
part of the privatization process badly undermined their traditional claim to the technical
neutrality of the labour process. In this politically contested environment shop stewards
worked for a dialogical form of association and proved more successful at appealing for the
allegiance of dockyard workers' interests against the hierarchical authority of management.
Where latent structural capacities take manifest organisational forms they do so within a
particular constellation of conditions. Four seem particularly important: work, labour,
'' Even as the dockyards began to build steel ships, shipwrights managed to maintain their
traditional dominance and status by acquiring the right to work in metal, which was done by
boilerinakers in smaller private shipyards.
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institutionalisation and effort values. First, the social organization of work includes firm,
workplace and workgroup size, scale and location, and the technical and social divisions of
labour. Second, the social organization of labour, which includes shared traditions, history
and ideology. Third, the social organization of the capital/labour relation and their relative
institutionalisation. And finally, what might be called, following Thompson (1971; 1993) and
Baldamus (1961) a 'moral economy of effort'. These are not fixed as eternal verities but are
variable and changeable in different contexts. Such contexts include the wider legal
framework and political economy, product sector conditions, technical change, ownership
forms and management strategy.
The voluntary, horizontal nature of labour organization and its dependence on members who
must acquire access to the production process in the first place gives it a precarious
existence. Organizational vulnerability can be masked during stable, institutionalised phases
of extensive accumulation, such as happened during the dogdays of the permanent arms
economy. In conditions of industrial citizenship, bureaucratised and centralised bargaining,
orderly and uninterrupted relations of production, and the stress on the quantitative
dimensions of organization, above all increasing dues-paying membership numbers, labour
organization possessed the semblance of a fixed (and fair) share of power in determining the
form of the employment relation. 'Representation' becomes dissociated from collective action,
implied or actual. Threats of disruption and the qualitative dimension of oppositional
associative collective identity and activity were disavowed. Thus, 'the distinctive logic of
working-class collectivism atrophies, and union organization, losing its power base in
(potential) membership mobilisation, becomes increasingly dependent on the support and
goodwill of those external agencies it was created to combat' (Hyman. 1989: 114). At both
Rosyth and Ferranti during the 1950s and 1960s institutionalised bargaining provided a
similar stress on quantitative, collaborative relations and dependencies. In changed
conditions, trade unions appear even more dependent on external agencies for reaching a
modus vivendi with a hostile employer or, as in the 1980s and 1990s, hostile governments.12
12 Brenner (1985: 47) describes similar processes affecting labour organisation in the US as the
classic paradox of reformism.
... although union officialdom may rise to great heights during the boom on the basis of its
ability to secure labor peace and the apparent well-being of workers, it does so at the
expense of the workers' self-organization and thus of its own power and position in the
long term. As the expansion gives way to contraction, the officials are less and less able to
make collective bargaining work for their constituencies or themselves: the employers break
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In Scotland, these external agencies include a national institutional framework, 'the Scottish
lobby", which the labour movement, locally and nationally, through the STUC and the
Labour Party, is plugged into alongside business and sub-state agencies. Both at Rosyth.
especially during the Trident competition, and. more regularly, at Ferranti trade unionists
turn to this external crutch for legitimacy and support, just as they also gravitate towards the
agencies of the British state at moments of perceived danger.
Politically, however, labour in the arms industry has had an ambiguous relationship to the
wider labour movement. Once the initial wartime fervour dimmed and disarmament was
taken up by sections of the labour movement in the late 1950s a mutual suspicion, if not
hostility, existed. Workers in the arms industry were often viewed by 'progressives' and peace
activists as morally tainted and politically unreliable, bought off by easy comforts and
complicit in the state's relentless drive for armaments. Partly, this was to do with suspected
'feather-bedding' and nepotism, the greater job security and benefit packages which helped
foster an inward-looking mentality and the ways in which internal labour 'markets' based on
seniority opened up promotional prospects on an individualised basis. As indicated above,
management in core arms firms were subject to the claims of industrial citizenship. Civil
rights carried over into equal employment rights, at least for male workers, in the form of
standardised contracts and constitutional entitlements for industrial civil servants, enshrined,
for example, in intricate detail in the voluminous MOD Manuals. Within Ferranti and Rosyth
in the 1950s and 1960s, union demands were indeed satisfied internally through constitutional
channels and external institutions, such as the STUC, were seen as having little immediate
relevance. Indeed as the antipathy towards arms producers resurfaced with the onset of the
Cold War and demands for unilateral nuclear disarmament became widely supported within
the labour movement, jobs and conditions in such workplaces seemed to be threatened.
However such accounts leave out of the picture political and ideological struggles within
Rosyth and Ferranti. Following the more famous Lucas example (Wainwright and Elliot,
1982), in both workplaces demands were made for reducing the dependency on arms
the deal and unleash their offensive; the workers see fewer reasons to support either the
officials or their reformist strategies; the officials watch their organizations erode and their
whole world view lose its credibility'.
There is no need to share Brenner's apocalyptic vision to agree that this paradox is at the heart of
reformism.
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production through diversification and conversion. These tended to coincide with moments of
crisis, at Rosyth in the early 1980s when uncertainty was created by dockyard reviews and
disarmament politics, and at Ferranti during the final years of the Cold War. the ISC crisis
and the GEC takeover. A rapprochement between dockyard unions and the STUC became
possible, when the danger became represented as a national-populist one to Scottish jobs and
industry, first over commercial management in the mid-1980s and, in the early 1990s, around
the Trident contract. At Ferranti the official union position was one of retaining sufficient
industrial capacity from which to ultimately diversify. Paradoxically, this meant practical
support for lobbying for arms contracts like Eurofighter coming to Edinburgh in the short-
term and, in the longer term, hopefully leading to the setting-up of a funded diversification
programme under a Labour government (Hardie. 1992). A class-based 'politics of state'
invariably gave way to a pragmatic local 'politics of production'. Only very rarely were these
fused, such as collective action by TGWU shop stewards at Rosyth to black parts for a
Chilean submarine in the 1970s.
But in the 1970s the settlement began to break down, first at Rosyth with the 1972 strike and,
to a lesser extent, at Ferranti with a wave of white-collar unionisation and the blue-collar
strike in 1979. What did the move to relatively open conflict reveal about the organised
relations of production in these workplaces? A greater role for the state in owning and
overseeing arms production consolidated the workplace 'state within the state'. As
productivity deals were failing to deliver rising output within production government incomes
policies attempted to trade industrial welfare for cheapening the market price of labour. At
Rosyth the result was rising worker militancy. At Ferranti, however, the state bail-out
initially raised expectations and ushered in a wave of unionisation among white collar
workers. State ownership was expected to mark an improved material difference. When this
was frustrated by wage controls claims were pursued either constitutionally, which scarce
white-collar workers won due to labour market conditions, or through an unsuccessful blue-
collar strike.
The social organization of labour - a moral economy of effort
A more ineffable quality pervaded key firms in the arms complex, something which
respondents sometimes discussed as a 'service ethos'. This alluded to an unwritten trade-off
contained in the employment relation: wages might not be that competitive but job security,
benefits, promotion prospects, a relatively comfortable effort bargain, and the cultivation of
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occupational, site, locality, and firm-wide identities helped to give use value a moral basis.
Informal boundaries were policed vigilantly, with any contravention certain to bring a
stinging response. This may be termed, following EP Thompson (1971; 1993: 259-351), a
moral economy of effort\13 To talk about 'a moral economy1 in this sense does not imply
endorsing as "good" or virtuous the practical morality of effort. At its most paternalistic and
patriarchal it supported a stifling conformity and legitimised a fossilised gender division of
labour. On the other hand, in the absence of local control over key bargaining issues, the
moral economy of effort was the pivot around which the relative strengths of management
and labour contended.
Analysis of the moral economy of effort can begin with Baldamus (1961). Baldamus turned
the then (and resurgent) orthodox concern with labour markets and the ill-defined notion of
'efficiency' on its head. Instead the focus was placed on the administrative process of
managerial controls over labour effort. A relationship between wages and effort was posited
analytically in two ways. First, the relation of effort to wages could be maintained by
constructing and reproducing administrative controls founded upon effort value stability.
Secondly, and more relevant to a discussion of restructuring, labour effort is raised to an
already given wage level by means of intensity control. Stability controls arc thus based on
custom and practice of prevailing standards of effort. Intensity controls are founded on
administrative judgments which articulate expectations of a 'right' level of effort.
Administrative controls attempt to harness existing deep-rooted obligations to work in society
and. more pertinently, the ways in which effort values become standardised according to their
relationship to earnings. As Baldamus puts it, 'This standardization of effort values, then, is
the institutional basis that so effectively facilitates predictability and control of the wage
earner's effort. It reveals a strange world of intricately mixed, highly organized, and yet
morally compulsive expectations ...' (125).
13 Thompson (1993: 340) described the moral economy of the Eighteenth century crowd as "a tissue
of customs and wages until they are threatened by monetary rationalizations and are made 'self-
conscious as a "moral economy". In this sense, the moral economy is summoned into being in
resistance to the economy of the "free market".' Although Thompson warns against over-extending
its usage, the idea of a moral economy of the workplace clearly has some relevance, particularly
where the tissue' of workplace life is threatened by restructuring. Implicitly, the moral economy in
the sense developed above can be regarded as 'continuously regenerating itself as anti-capitalist
critique, as a resistance movement' (Thompson, 1993: 342).
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Where the level of administrative effort values shifts under the impetus of the external social,
economic or political environments, wages and effort expectations held by labour also shift.
Due to their greater structural and relatively unified powers employers are positioned to reap
advantages due to intensification controls. Advantages accrue where wage-effort disparities
are created at a given margin, not wide enough to provoke instability in the production
process but sufficiently wide for capital to benefit from lowered effort values. Labour, in
contrast, have an interest in re-establishing wage-effort parity at higher effort values.
Where intensity controls usurp stability controls during rapid industrial re-organization
marginal effort values become fluid and variable. Variability in effort values is, however, not
simply a function internal to the management of a particular workplace, as Baldamus seems
to suggest. Variability is contingent on a wider political economy, nature of the sector, spatial
divisions of labour and the labour process. Besides the narrowly bounded conception of effort
values three further problems exist with Baldamus' approach. First, intensity of effort cannot
be divorced from the social organization of work. Considerable physical exertion may be
expended during working time but with poor work organization it may greatly exceed
comparable times performed elsewhere. Second, labour tends to be treated as an
undifferentiated unified agent with a skewed focus on hierarchical control over horizontal
competition and collaboration. 'Crucial and unsolved problems of industrial organization and
disorganization are connected only with employer-employee relations' (ibid. 9, my emphasis).
Even within the same workplace labour does not face capital as an already formed
homogenous agent. Third, Baldamus concentrates on what he calls 'employment' costs as
distinct from 'occupational' costs. The latter is expressed in inherently determinate skill
differentials leading to essentially harmonious, stable and co-operative effects (ibid. 10). It is
variation in the distribution of effort and compensation which leads to recurrent
disorganization and conflict. Employment costs, expressed as compensation for 'effort',
cannot be so easily defined or measured. With the post-Braverman focus on skill and the
flexibility onslaught of employers it has become clear that skill differentials are not merely
unmediated reflections of experience, training and education. Skill is socially, politically and
culturally constructed and contested. In short, 'skill' is a source of conflict in ways in which
Baldamus precludes, as the following example from Rosyth shows.
As late as the mid-1980s, 'semi-skilled' machinists were being trained and employed within
the Mechanical factory at Rosyth to set-up and operate automatic turret lathes. Having their
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roots in the wartime concession to use 'diluttee' labour, machinists were subject to strict
negative demarcation controls by craft unions. Only time-served fitter/turners could work
certain machines, centre lathes and horizontal boring machines, fitted with a leadscrew for
cutting screw threads with a single point tool. Yet this forty year demarcation and
corresponding, albeit slight, wage differential could not have been the sole result of the
'occupational costs' of training and experience since machinists underwent four years
training in all non-craft areas of workshop machinery. Dockyard-trained craft fitter/turners,
in contrast, spent only the briefest phase of their apprenticeship in the machine shop since
they were mainly pre-occupied with acquiring the skills for mechanical fitting. Craft and non-
craft workers within the machine shop were thus divided despite the nominal unity implied by
both belonging to the engineering union. Far from being a straightforward technical division
which could be overcome by some further training for machinists to operate a leadscrew,
fitter/turners put craft loyalty above workplace unity. Access to these machines was reserved
for nationally-recognised indentured members of the craft and trained 'dilutee' workers, who
daily worked only a few feet away, were systematically excluded.14 This was not based on
some easily measurable amount of skill content leading to labour unity as Baldamus assumes.
Instead, negative demarcations were increasingly contested, both informally and formally, by
machinists, and only latterly management, leading to intra-labour friction and division until
machinist training was recognised, albeit reluctantly, as a craft credential in 1985. This was
not about normatively bringing reward and effort into line but rather the ways in which the
external labour market for craft workers was regulated by the internal labour controls and the
internal state to secure certain combinations of labour through negotiated concessions on
training and upgrading.
As the Rosyth example shows, Baldamus' assumptions about an exclusive focus on
employment relations internal to an organization between employer-employee as the sole
source of 'disorganization' is far too one-sided. In challenging consensual assumptions of
harmonious work relations and therefore 'dysfunctional' conflict Baldamus simply assumes
conflict as expressing underlying structures of differentiated power without denoting the
historical specificity of the capitalist labour process (Burawoy, 1979:12). Nevertheless,
Baldamus properly draws attention to important features of organizational restructuring,
14 Craft workers felt their skills to be more generic than machinists, who were trained on an eclectic
assemblage of machines, and in resisting management control over the deployment of labour kept
open employment opportunities for outside unemployed workers in the trade.
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above all the ways in which effort-value disparity is created and maintained. To make the
most of this insight requires deepening and rounding it by returning to indeterminacy in the
employment contract and the actual use made of labour in the employment relation.
The social organization of labour - desubordination and insubordination
At the further risk of compounding the formalism of the dual nature of labour, as value and
utility, two consequences emerge for labour resistance. These can be called labour
insubordination and desubordination (Milliband, 1978). Together they mark a limiting point
to restructuring as a project to more fully subordinate living labour. Insubordination can be
taken to refer to forms of non-submission, dissent and protest against the terms and
conditions of the exchange under which labour is employed by capital; what may be termed
the 'market' definition of the employment relation. These are the ways in which labour's
formal subordination to the terms of the employment relation, its exchange value, is itself
contested through strategies of disruption, strikes, work-to-rules, overtime bans and so on.
Desubordination refers to the internal resistance of labour to its consumption by capital;
what may be termed the 'production' definition. These are the ways in which labour's policed
access to and possession of the instruments of production, its use value, enable labour to
creatively render its real subordination to the managerial imperative incomplete within the
terms of the employment relation.
Desubordination can be taken to refer to labour's ongoing part in jointly making and
reproducing tacitly, informally and culturally a definite but ultimately indeterminate effort
bargain over the work process. Insubordination meanwhile is closer to more traditional
concerns within the misnamed field of'industrial relations' (Hyman, 1989), where workers
embark upon open collective action in support of an always temporary refusal to accept the
explicit terms of the employment relation. This is to say little of how asymmetrical relations
of dependency and autonomy in the restructuring process interact dynamically. Clearly,
labour insubordination and desubordination do not weigh equally as forms of resistance.
Desubordination, for example play, gossip and other kinds of 'consumatory' sociability for
its own sake (Roy, 1960), may cause problems of discontinuity, time porosity or undermine
supervisory authority in subordinating labour. But insofar as these are the actions of
atomised workers the distinctive power of labour as shared class identity and collective
agency is diminished. As Karsh (1958: 6, cited by Hyman, 1989: 111) put it: 'unrest is not
social until it is organized'. For intentionally-directed collective action some form of
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organization is required, enduring over time through established procedures and structures.
Only the regularised practices of collective agents in the pursuit of shared goals exhibit
organizational capacities.
This is not to discount weaker, relatively decollectivised forms of resistance. These are never
entirely spontaneous anyway since some agents need to agree, however tacitly and
informally, to accept and act on certain assumptions, formulated previously. It merely points
up their limited efficacy in resisting the more centralised power held by capitalist sovereignty
over the means of production. Nevertheless, on occasions where desubordination practices
take less atomised forms, such as output restrictions, 'organised time wasting' and workgroup
cultures, they can become deep, almost invisible, reservoirs of day to day strength. Sullen
resentment, game playing and sheer bloodymindedness as stores of resistance may prove
difficult for the remote controls of capital to penetrate or even detect, especially when on the
surface labour appears subdued and subject to figurative manipulation. At Rosyth workers
faced the empirical fact of commercial management after a fierce and lengthy struggle and at
Ferranti GEC's centralised power prevailed through the 1993 one-day strikes. In these
workplaces labour despondency, demoralisation and fatalism seemed to predominate in the
face of the greater concentrated force ofmanagement.
In practice there is no rigid divide between de- and in-subordination. Tacit recalcitrance
within the labour process often hardens into outright, albeit momentary, rejection of the terms
of the wage relation. Blocking-off formal expressions of worker grievances can lead to
unpredicted revolts. In the first three years under GEC, for example, the ballot for strike
action by Ferranti workers was lost by increasingly smaller majorities until 1993, when GEC
arrogance enabled an embedded group of workplace militants to give expression to
simmering resentment leading to strike action. Conversely, it is well known that when worker
grievances fail to find institutional expression strategies of de-subordination such as
sabotage, informal work norms, gossip, absenteeism, labour turnover, withdrawal of consent,
and various other kinds of 'misbehaviour' and profane cultures are played out (Thompson and
Ackroyd, 1995; Edwards, et al, 1995). Gramsci (1971: 336-7, emphasis added) argues that
even when the initiative is lost and 'the struggle comes to be identified with a series of defeats'
fatalism can itself become
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a tremendous force of moral resistance, of cohesion and of patient and obstinate
perseverance ... Indeed, one should emphasise how fatalism is nothing other than the
clothing worn by real and active will when in a weak position ... [since] some part ofeven
a subaltern is always directive and responsible'.
In contrast, where bargaining arrangements codify what was previously seen as custom and
practice any future contestation of their terms shifts from de- to insubordination. Moreover,
resistance to subordination is always contingent upon the ways in which labour's
organizational capacities reciprocally interact with the wider political economy, labour
movement, management and state strategies, product sector, firm size, geographical location
and technical change.
Workers' organizations dialogically engage in 'collective problem-solving activity' through
the practical self-evaluation of organizational capacities and goals and of those of their
antagonists. Organizational capacities are developed within the densely-woven fabric of daily
experience and practices which inform and are informed by contending ideologies and
politics. As Barker (1986: 86) put it, this is 'not merely a matter of a simple clash of already
developed forces, but is a complex intellectual and affective process. Ideas and aspirations,
confidence and fear, clarity and determination all play a critical part in the development of
contending movements'. Capital's dependency on indeterminate labour power always permits
living labour some degree of autonomy for contention. Resistance cannot be pathologised as
the random acts of maladjusted workers. Instead, as rational and partial refusals of
exploitation and domination, however inconspicuous, resistance takes the dual form of labour
insubordination and desubordination. Such tensions are always present within capitalist
production. During restructuring they are simply made more explicit.
This way of accounting for resistance avoids the formalism of theories based on cost-benefit
analysis such as the resource mobilization approach (Baldamus, 1961; Olson, 1965). Where
likely costs of action are low and incentives high collective action will have wide appeal.
Conversely where costs are high or incentives low action is likely to be foregone. The
problems identified earlier with structuration theory re-surface here. While rational
evaluation on the part of agents is allowed for, agency is confined to a narrow instrumental
conception ofmotivation, taking hold of external media to prosecute ends, with action always
initiated by strong, calculating evaluators. In the example of blackings at Rosyth during the
anti-privatization campaign, for instance, the costs of insubordination were potentially high,
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suspension leading to more severe charges, possibly dismissal, while the vague threat of
privatization was a seemingly low incentive. The active mediation of shop steward's
organisation was critical to turning the indeterminacy of the employment relation into an
explicit, collectively-felt refusal of the managerial prerogative.
In other words, labour identity and opposition gets formed through organizational praxis.
Here the interaction of the traditional organizational capacities of antagonists and the degree
of variation in the ideological and psychological dispositions of individuals within
organizations shape how interests are perceived and the willingness to act on them. Following
suggestions by Barker (1996), three dimensions to organisational capacities can be outlined.
First, 'self-identity", or what Barker calls 'we-for-ourselves', the lived experience and
internal self-understanding of an organization. Second, 'self-other', or 'we-for-them', the
lived experience and practical achievements in opposition to what is outside and against an
organization. Finally, 'other-identity', 'them-for-us ', as the theoretical understanding and
comprehension of how the antagonist functions, 'their motives and intentions, their powers
and capacities, their unity and division, their inevitability and eternity or mere temporality'
(1996: 25). Each dimension mutually conditions the others. Since shop stewards occupy a
strategic position of mediation between union members, full-time union officials and
management, they embody the general contradiction of self-organising to counter the
concentrated force of capital. Generally speaking, this is done within a self-limiting praxis.
To the typology of organisational capacities Darlington's (1993; 1992) three-fold framework
for understanding the detail of workplace unionism can be adapted. First, corresponding to
'self-identity', shop steward's relationship to members is characterised by a tension between
democracy and bureaucracy. The democratic face-to-face relationship of stewards to those
they immediately represent, their 'high-presence availability' if you like, is tempered by the
bureaucratisation of steward's organization, as senior stewards and conveners begin to
organise administratively at a spatial and temporal remove from the shopfloor. Second,
roughly corresponding to 'self-other', are shop steward relationships to full-time union
officers, who mediate the formal relationship to management, characterised by independence
and dependence. As professionally-employed mediators full-time officers acquire distinct
material privileges, enhanced earnings and working conditions, and have a 'low-presence
availability' for union members which stewards must fill. Third, 'other-identity' corresponds
to steward relations to management, characterised by conflict and accommodation. Here
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contradictor}' pressures are greatest, in normal conditions resulting in a self-limiting praxis of
collective bargaining. The problem for dialogical associations within the changed conditions
of restructuring is how to transcend the self-limiting capacities of dependency, bureaucracy
and accommodation. Open-endedness to the question of resistance and compliance marks any
process of restructuring. It is clearly more difficult to marshal and mobilize dialogical
organization than monological. Antagonists' three-fold self-understandings are thus
conditioned by the relative ease of self-organization.
This framework for understanding the relation between organizational capacities and
resistance can be illustrated by the formation of union opposition to contractorisation at
Rosyth and for combating aggressive management at GEC. While the costs of
contractorisation at Rosyth were expected to be high in the form of redundancy, loss of
benefit packages and work intensification, the incentive to act was also high. Worker
grievances and action could be directed at three antagonists simultaneously, a dockyard
management perceived as inept, prospective contractors perceived as voracious incomers and
a politically hostile Conservative government. Added to this was the affective drama of the
1984 miner's strike unfolding nationally and proximately in the Fife coalfields. Demands for
increased democratic control of the anti-privatization campaign by shop stewards at Rosyth
were repeatedly deflected by local and national union officials. Individual militants tried and
failed to develop a counter-network within and without the institutional apparatus bestowed
on the official leadership. Bureaucratic union structures and dependency on a centralised,
national leadership meant that despite a heightened sense of 'other-identity' and a propensity
to militant de- and insubordination weak democratic and independent capacities obscured
where the limits to resistance lay.
The legacy of organizational elitism among local conveners and officials, their 'low-presence
availability' to the members, later found a natural home in Babcock's industrial relations
system around the pseudo-democratic phrase-mongering of HRM 'mutuality', 'togetherness',
'consultation', 'communication', 'change'.15 Yet it was the degree ofmilitancy demonstrated
15 There are parallels here to realist theory in international relations. The ritualised (realist)
invocations of cooperation, collaboration and compromise in HRM theory as the necessary counter¬
weights to conflict, opposition and resistance are refusals to examine how power is situated within
the relations of production and instead focus exclusively on the unexamined exercise of it. For
instance, imagine attributing conflict, opposition and resistance to capital exclusively and that any
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by shop stewards and members that enacted a reality for Babcock and the MOD of having to
defuse collective hostility and win workforce compliance. Only the high profitability of MOD
work permitted an initially indulgent strategy for securing worker compliance. By the time
that world-historic events in the USSR and its satellites altered things after 1990. the
depressive effect of the Babcock-union honeymoon on oppositional capacities at the expense
of pragmatism, accommodation and elitism had enacted a new reality of passive fatalism
among shop stewards and members. Having lost on the empirical fact of contractorisation
full-time workplace conveners settled initially for a new, 'professionalised' role in 'working
together', and later, after surrendering on anomalies and ambiguities in the formal
employment relation and accepting the rhetorical force of management efficiency and
competitiveness claims under the accountancy paradigm, saw their 'other-identity' fade as a
recalcitrant factor of reality confronting management.
So what is the nature of union adaptation? Kelly (1996) sets out a typology for assessing the
aims, means and effectiveness of militant or moderate workplace organization. This has five
dimensions: goals, methods, institutional resources, membership resources and ideology. On
the one hand, moderation means concessionary accommodation with management as a goal;
subordination of union regulation to the operation of non-bargaining institutions;
demobilisation of membership and dependency on the goodwill of external bodies such as
employers, state and law; a passive quiescence, eschewing the use of industrial action, and
incorporation through an ideology of partnership over antagonistic interests with employers.
On these formal counts union organization at Rosyth has moved away from the militancy of
the 1980s, that is, the defence and extension of the interests of labour over state employers
through the frequent recourse to industrial action, to one of restrained moderation and
partnership. Yet the picture is not black and white enough to be plotted typologically. While
accommodation, subordination, demobilisation, quiescence and incorporation do represent
indicators of change, the pragmatic nature of the 'compromise with reality' suggests that
partnership is strongly conditional and that the weakening of these pre-conditions, say mass
compulsory redundancy or an open employer offensive on pay and conditions, could see
workplace renewal in which all the old tensions would break water quickly and forcefully.16
dissension on its part should be enrolled behind a new consensus based on a new partnership and
consultation defined entirely by organised labour.
I6 As mentioned earlier in chapter 12, one indication that this is coming onto the horizon at Rosyth
is the appointment in June 1997 of the former Managing Director of GEC-Yarrow, Murray Easton,
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Where organizational capacities come up against a reality which seems harsh and unyielding,
pragmatic compromise, however reluctantly undertaken, will seem to offer better prospects
for organizational survival even if initial goals need to be surrendered or modified. At the
time ofGEC's offensive on pay and conditions pragmatic adaptation informed the outlook of
senior shop stewards at Ferranti. This was contested by a smaller but significant group of
union militants who argued that GEC would be vulnerable to collective action. The latter
group actively energised the practical evaluation process and succeeded in winning majority
workforce support for open insubordination in the form of weekly one-day strikes. Again a
strong 'other-identity', GEC's belligerent hostility to trade unions at Edinburgh, was evident.
Furthermore, a strong 'self-identity', centred on the Crewe Toll site, was developed. In the
process of preparing, acting and reflecting, the affective nature of collective action was
spread to further sites, groups and individuals. GEC, in contrast, were temporarily
incapacitated and demonstrably unsure how to respond. In time, GEC's own practical
evaluation process tended towards a zero-sum solution with the preparation ofmass dismissal
notices. Collective action, which had required a demanding initial phase of persuasive
argumentation to generate, created a new situation favourable to enlarging militant
organizational capacities. In short, collective action within the dynamics of organizational
praxis enacted a new reality. As the dispute approached zero-sum proportions, however,
labour disunion across the city-wide sites afforded trade union officials sufficient ideological
space to prepare and acquire consent to demobilize. Thus the existing repertoires for militant
collective action were too weakly developed to be sustained against those of an intransigent
antagonist and the 'self-other' dependency on the pragmatic mediation authority of the trade
union bureaucracy. As an exercise in practical evaluation labour's capacity to self-organise
was badly damaged, its collective energy dispersed and the harsh and unyielding reality of
GEC despotism confirmed. Where short term prospects for further insubordination were
dimmed, abrasive management triumphalism guaranteed resistance in the much lower register
ofworker desubordination.
So in the one case, Rosyth, militant collective action framed an accommodating response by
the new management while in the other case, Ferranti, moderate pragmatic adaptation framed
an aggressive management offensive. These were conditioned by wider contextual factors of
as Managing Director at Babcock, identified as a source of employer militancy in restructuring the
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where and how the respective firms were located within a restructuring of the political
economy of a military state capital complex in terms of profitability, product markets and
corporate systems, and of existing and emergent organizational capacities of capital and
labour. At GEC a 'them-for-us' dread settled upon the trade union mediators. At Rosvth
'them-for-us' concerns were held initially by the MOD and the contractors. Despite efforts to
re-construct the 'self-identity' and 'self-other' dimensions on a more militant basis, internal
challenges to the traditional leaders and established procedures could not be sustained at
either Rosyth or Ferranti.
A sense of the invincibility of an antagonist such as GEC or the vulnerability of, say, the
MOD to collective action will be mirrored in organizational self-understanding and practice.
At the same time the self-perception of organizational limitations or boundedness will confine
action to within certain parameters. And yet excitement generated by acts of resistance or
demoralization by acts of passivity sometimes open up unexpected vistas of possibility to
hitherto passive agents or constrain hitherto active agents. The excitement and enthusiasms
generated by collective action itself has an affective character in developing emergent forces.
Within existing organizations, however, militants come directly into conflict with the pre¬
existing authoritative resources of the bureaucratic layer of full-time officials (Kelly, 1988;
Cliff and Gluckstein, 1986; Hyman, 1972). Union officials are Janus-faced, mediating
between members and employers, and committed to preserving organizational life through the
routines of procedure and bargaining accommodation. The already secure institutional
implantation of union officials endows them with certain advantages in expressing the
contradiction between the dialogical organization of labour and the monological organization
of capital in that'... they possess resources, they are known, they can make various claims to
loyalty, their representational mechanisms provide a bridge between the most militant and the
less militant within the same movement' (Barker, 1996: 27). At Rosyth, union conveners
remained in thrall to the centralised authority of national negotiators in preparing anti-
commercial management strategies. Decades of bureaucratic dependency on national officials
pressed down on the conveners to both encourage and depress local initiatives within tightly
circumscribed limits set nationally. Sections of the shop steward's organization took official
oppositional rhetoric as legitimating disruptive tactics. Yet nationally this was always seen as
Glasgow warshipbuilders during the 1980s and 1990s (McKinlay and Taylor, 1994).
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subordinate to building broad cross-class alliances and lobby politics. At Ferranti. unlike
Rosvth. worker insubordination was built from the bottom up by a layer of militant shop
stewards in their immediate constituencies and on the shop steward committees. Incentives to
act were high, given GEC management's belligerent posture, but the costs also seemed to be
daunting. Senior stewards tended to accept GEC's invulnerability more fatalistically than
younger, more active stewards, although this varied by site and section. After looking into the
abyss of GEC threats of mass dismissal notices, local officials and senior stewards managed
to secure an end to strike action by dividing striking workers by grade and site, with the
lingering after effect of deepened disunion and a rift between official union organisation and
their worker constituencies.
Collective action, or its latent threat, is the source of trade union power. Such powers are
ultimately conferred only to the extent that inclusive organization, identity and action compels
capital to abandon any claim to unilaterally define the employment relation. The creation,
maintenance and erosion of labour collectivities are determined by their life-histories of
organising. In the phase of an organisation's basic accumulation of members and resources
the imparting of its core identity is highly contingent upon the general conditions established
by wider political and economic forces. This much was evident in the management/labour
clashes at Rosyth and Ferranti during and after the Second World War. Even though the state
sought to introduce participatory workplace practices these were resisted by a dockyard
management imbued with the outlook of the naval officer caste and at Ferranti by dynastic
owners hostile to interference by organised labour.
Once collective bargaining became institutionalised unions in these firms employed a
repertoire of coercion, threat, negotiation and agreement. Institutionalisation meant a dual
role for union officials. On the one hand, latent collectivities must be able to become manifest
as the ultimate display of labours' self-organization. In this union power is always precarious.
On the other hand, where collective action does become manifest in the form of strikes,
overtime bans, boycotts, and so on, union leaders must be able to restore social order and
peace. Clearly, this is what both the dockyard unions and management failed to do after the
strike at Rosyth in 1972, with discontent rumbling on into the early 1980s. In contrast,
harmonious bargaining was restored jointly between management and unions at Ferranti after
the manual workers' strike in 1979, which only reinforced the fallacy of disruptive action in
the eyes of union officials. In such situations bargaining normality can be extended by
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winning support from non-labour sources. From employers such support exists as
recognition, facilities and procedural agreements; from the state, legal protection and a policy
of respecting voluntary bargaining between employers and unions (Brenner. 1985; Offe and
Wiesenthal. 1980; Kelly, 1988). In the arms industry' political bargaining for contracts
affords unions a supportive, lobbying role to secure jobs locally. As Galbraith (1967: 278-9)
noted for the US "technostructure".
In seeking [defence] contracts, the technostructure cannot publicly plead the pressure of
its own convenience, necessity or earnings. But it can with more decency plead the
adverse effect of contract termination, or failure to win renewal, or denial of a new
contract on its workers or the community. Here the union can be a valuable seconding
voice.
Organisational reproduction relies on union members maintaining their access to the means of
production which can, say over ECR90 radar for Ferranti or Trident at Rosyth, sanction
trans-class partnership claims over class struggle oppositional ones. Alliances with the
employer make rational sense where use value assumes an overriding concern for labour.
But, as argued above in terms of the resource mobilisation model, this is an insufficient guide
to action. Use value does not exist in isolation from exchange, and neither exist apart from
subordination and its discontents, de- and insubordination. Here it is instructive to consider
one form of the argument that labour is a willing accomplice in its own restructuring when
under the guidance of an enlightened management team. This will put into relief the
distinctive interpretation of capital-labour restructuring advanced above.
Restructuring the 'human resource'
The orthodox, uncritical reporting of top-down accounts of HRM strategies at Rosyth
undertaken by Gennard and Kelly (1991; 1992; Kelly and Gennard, 1996) represents a clear
case of blindness to asymmetrical power within the capitalist employment relation. Their
analysis of restructuring of employment relations at Rosyth fits well Thompson and
Ackroyd's (1995: 620) critique of recent industrial sociology where the 'overall theme is that
the removal of [worker] misbehaviour is evidence for the success of a totalizing project of
regulation which is at work in corporations and society'. Management claims for a new,
participatory and inclusive workplace culture are taken at face value (Legge, 1997). The
voice and standpoint of labour is emptied out of the process of industrial change, with socio-
technical systems ofmanagement regulation assumed to have both an a priori legitimacy and
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a comprehensive effectiveness in incorporating labour. While for their earlier studies covering
the 'honeymoon' period. 1987 to 1990. union conveners were interviewed, by 1996 only the
authoritative voice of management is heard any longer. Much of what they report supports
the empirical material covered here in Chapters 5 and 6. with some relatively minor factual
errors and interpretive disagreements. However, in common with much HRM. business and
management theory it is cast as anodyne and 'value-free', disinterested in anything save
organizational efficiency. Their technologist methodology and presentation, however, betray
symbolically what Gouldner (1969) named the Minotaur in sociology, that half-man, half-
beast dualism of timorous professional autonomy coupled with estranged dependencies on the
powerful. The academic resolution of fundamental antagonisms and conflicts issues in
pragmatic compromise and political quiescence with a critical stance debarred.17 With some
notable exceptions (Legge, 1992; Storey, 1995; Martinez-Lucio and Weston, 1992; Kelly
1996) academic HRM discourses serve to smother critical reasoning and obscure more
fundamental processes and struggles. Here, by way of winding up the analytical dimensions
of restructuring and move beyond the pre-dominant one-sidedness, I will confine myself to
just a few areas from Kelly and Gennard's (1996) later study of Rosyth to make key
objections evident.
Kelly and Gennard's basic claim is that within a heavily unionised environment commercial
managers introduced a programme of change in working practices, training and decentralised
bargaining which has succeeded in enrolling workers to break willingly from inherited Civil
Service conditions, standardised employment relations and traditional forms of craft-based
work organization. Not surprisingly, workers, shop stewards and even some managers are
less sanguine then Gennard and Kelly. Although basing themselves on one of the same
workplaces as this study Gennard and Kelly arrive at very different conclusions. Throughout
their analysis an uncritical stance is taken towards the self-images held by the commercial
managers, frequently employing similarly neutral-sounding business rhetoric18 and
celebrating the pseudo-democratic claims for worker participation and collaboration.
17 Gouldner (1969: 612) notes that this higher professional good in deflecting social criticism often
conceals the special defence of some private interest, however unwittingly, 'Persuade all that no one
must bell the cat, then none of the mice need feel like a rat'.
18 A typical example of Gennard and Kelly's use of pseudo-objective business jargon, which could
have been lifted directly from Babcock's own publicity literature, is 'This proactive business strategy
of growing the business through product diversification and cost reduction was based on producing
high-quality products which provided a high added value on a low volume of output' (1996: 437).
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For Kelly and Gennard (1996:432) the application of HRM policies at Rosvth carried an air
of necessity, designed to realise 'business strategy and objectives', 'to secure organizational
survival and growth through increased competitiveness'. The problems associated with
treating firm strategy as a coherent response to external stimuli instead of flawed choices
towards ameliorating the contradictions of organising production for accumulation are
noticeably absent from their account. For them the contribution made by HRM at Rosvth,
'designed to achieve cost reduction through the achievement of a smaller workforce', is
unproblematically given as: 'a more efficient use of labour, a reduction in the loss ofworking
time from absence, grievance and industrial disputes, and so on, the stricter control of
overtime working, a change in shift patterns and record systems and an increasing focus on
management development through team-building techniques' (1996: 438). In this a greater
use of functional rather than numerical flexibility is reported.19 Craft workers' jobs have been
'widened' by taking on additional craft and non-craft duties, 'with little or no resistance from
the various manual trades' (1996: 440). The assertion of managerial authority to act and for
subordinates to follow and assent through enhanced communications, 'flexibilities' and
empowerment rhetoric simply assumes that control is a managerial gift over the employment
relation to be handed out at its discretion (Fairbrother, 1994). None of the myriad forms of
micro-politics which mediate task-widening on the shopfloor nor the severe spatial and time
(let alone economic) limitations for functional flexibility in warship refitting, as reported by
workers, shop stewards and managers in this study, are discussed by Kelly and Gennard.
Kelly and Gennard (1996: 442) find the concept of 'employability' especially praiseworthy.
'Employability', 'depended on employees being willing to learn new and updated skills so
This simply means that Babcock focused non-naval profitable opportunities using skilled dockyard
labour available at low cost. Even though this 'strategy' remained subordinate to highly profitable
naval work it allowed both the Navy and the contractor to opportunistically drive labour costs down.
However, later on Kelly and Gennard admit, without further comment, a central role for
numerical flexibility. 'A reduction in labour costs, however, has been achieved by employing sub¬
contractors on site to complete work which otherwise might have been undertaken by the Dockyard's
own labour force. This has also had a learning effect in that Dockyard employees have seen at first
hand that employees with the same skills as theirs are employed by companies in competition with
the Dockyard on inferior terms and conditions of employment' (1996:441). Again a management
perspective is simply assumed. Sub-contract firms and labour have been used to displace 'core'
labour. But even though direct contact with sub-contractors increased it did not have a
straightforward 'learning' or 'disciplining' effect. Instead, dockyard workers could become even more
determined to defend jobs and conditions, especially pay and benefits. Many respondents contrasted
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that they could secure work both inside the Dockyard and outside, should they have to leave.
In this way internal dockyard functional flexibility is extended to encompass the external
labour market", and within the yard.
'Employability' opens up the opportunity for workers to gain access to craft and
supervisor}' jobs previously denied to them because they did not serve an indentured
apprenticeship at the appropriate age or left school too early with inadequate
qualifications. In this way employment is to be found by removing the barriers that have
previously obstructed certain employees'.
Here Kelly and Gennard celebrate the erosion of craft control and the weakening of craft
workers' power over internal work organisation and external labour markets. In any case, the
concept of 'employability' as a strategic bargain struck by management with employees after
1990 is vastly overstated. For example, trade union criticisms of the narrow, ad hoc and
limited nature of such training as has been provided belies Kelly and Gennard's rosy picture
of a mutually acceptable trade-off between the end of lifelong employment and training to
enhance non-dockyard 'employability'. Such training as did take place was largely confined to
craft workers acquiring 'semi-skilled' tasks such as slinging and the more basic and generic
tasks already closely related to particular trade families such as fabrication. Instead of a new
world of upward dockyard mobility, where inter-trade training did take place it was at the
margins of the highly specialised nature of the skills involved in warship refitting.
By understating the extent of the use and the problems of contract labour on projects like
RFA Sir Bedivere Kelly and Gennard show a susceptibility to freeze the dynamics of diverse
employment relations in time and neglect the qualitative issues surrounding non-standard
employment relations. More importantly, the stress in this study on the dual nature of labour
means that resistance to restructuring cannot be merely conceived one-dimensionally;
functional flexibility is open to many forms of labour desubordination, including penalties of
non-specialisation and the inappropriate use of expensively acquired skills on routine tasks.
In terms of numerical flexibility, despite their market vulnerability labour insubordination
and desubordination remains open to sub-contracted wage labour. For instance, several
hundred workers employed on Sir Bedivere by a major contractor, Consave, walked out on
strike in April 1995 after four workers were dismissed on the spot for being absent from their
dockyard health and safety standards to the shortcuts taken by 'subbies'. Conversely, sub-contract
workers could be affected by the higher dockyard work standards and employment relations.
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place of work, quickly winning their reinstatement. Desubordination is also amenable to sub¬
contract labour with little commitment to any particular workplace contractor, product or
process.20
In repeating management's stress on 'employability' the dual nature of labour is obscured
further. Functional flexibility was not accepted by the unions primarily to bolster ex-
dockyard labour in the external labour market but because it was believed that firm survival,
hence ongoing access to the means of production and reproduction, depended on it and that
core trade identities would be preserved. Likewise the relatively peaceable nature of mass
redundancy between 1990 and 1995 owed as much to MoD subsidising the redundancy
package and management reluctance to impose compulsory redundancies, save at the
margins. All the time this was contingent on the wider state of national politics and industrial
relations. With the election of a Labour government in May 1997 Babcock suddenly found
itself in a favourable political position with close allies as Minister of Defence and
Chancellor of the Exchequer.21
There can be no denying a general retreat by unions at Rosyth from positions which once
seemed unassailable. One example, also reported by Kelly and Gennard, is that until the early
1990s any change to the labour process which was contested by the unions became subject to
a 'status quo' clause in the disputes procedure. No change could be unilaterally imposed and
custom and practice took precedence until resolution by negotiation, arbitration at a
'demarcation court' or industrial action. However, this was surrendered by the unions in the
early 1990s in a reversal of the status quo to the effect that changes in working practices are
put immediately into effect until the disputes procedure becomes exhausted. Management
thus appear to have the initiative; action, in the sense of willed outcomes, appears solely
within the ambit of management. Kelly and Gennard point to a range of areas where
performance has been improved by returning prerogatives of this kind to management.
However, they are forced to concede that actually measuring performance in terms of output,
20 In the month following the Consave strike rumours of sabotage circulated the dockyard after a
leak from a large tank of highly inflammable gas onboard Sir Bedivere was discovered which would
have killed over a hundred worker had it exploded.
21 The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, used the occasion of his first budget, 2 July
1997, to underline Rosyth's new political capital when Babcock apprentices were shown outside
Number 11 Downing Street parading the new red Treasury box manufactured at Rosyth to replace
the battered Gladstone box. (see also Chapter 11, note 22).
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cash or efficiency remains as elusive as ever and that the nature of naval work still demands
labour hoarding, hence underemployment, hence subsidies from the MOD
Why then, if the prerogative had been restored to management, did they not impose more
radical restructuring in the early 1990s and sideline the unions? After all. conclude Kelly and
Gennard (1996: 450), 'it is too early to judge whether the influence of trade unions has been
weakened at Rosvth'. It cannot be simply that external conditions of state subsidy coupled
with the relatively marginal forays into other product markets alleviated the need. This,
however, is Kelly and Gennard's explanation. Having 'no commercial advantage' in de-
recognising or by-passing the unions, management have had no need to become 'aggressive'.
What this pre-supposes is management potential to become 'aggressive' remains while its
actuality has merely been suspended for the time being. Rather the specific ways in which
workplace restructuring at Rosyth mediated the state capital relation depended on judgments
about the dual nature of labour, value and utility, and the uncertain politics of declining
strategic status within the industrial complex. But, above all, accommodative trade union
organisation endured as actuality, while militant organisational potentialities were suspended.
Neither the trade unions nor management desired a disorderly restructuring. Both were
captivated by the notion of firm autonomy, which was being assailed in the early 1990s by
the national political alliance clustered around rival, DML. At this moment of acute danger
for workplace survival persuasion, collaboration and consent was needed to keep the Rosyth
alliance unified. In Scotland, trade unions meant access to national political representation
through Labour MPs and the Scottish lobby coalition. In the workplace, a tougher
management regime emerged around an ascendant accountancy paradigm bringing pay
freezes, redundancies and a greater use of non-dockyard labour. With workplace survival
assured after 1993, the personnel regime shifted yet again to generate collaboration in the
run-up to the sale of dockyard assets. Here, bargaining between Babcock and the MOD and
Babcock and the unions took place to reduce future redundancy costs for the next phase of
workforce cutbacks when the programme ofwork was planned to taper off after 2002. Thus
a series of short term responses based on expediency continually undercut longer term
strategic planning for competitive accumulation. In this the politics of state and the politics of
production synthesised to enable and constrain firm autonomy.
Much discussion of union responses to HRM is reduced to technical-organizational issues.
There is no suggestion that this is not important. Clearly a range of responses are possible.
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from wholehearted endorsement to outright rejection. However, this obscures the prior dual
nature of labour in restructuring and the continual need for access to the means of
(re)production. In cases where absolute membership numbers are falling due to redundancy,
organizational survival may result in a pragmatic response. The pragmatism of the Roscth
unions is accounted for by Kelly and Gennard (1996: 451) by a similar strand of
environmental adaptationism. 'Like any organization [sic], [Rosyth unions] have seen that
survival and continuing influence requires adaptation and a flexible response, not a principled
and inflexible ideological stand'. But, to the extent that the politics of production remain
separate from the politics of state or only come into relation externally, trade unions are
always pragmatic. Where this began to be transcended in the struggle against agency
management in the 1980s presumably it represented 'a principled and inflexible stand' in
contrast to later pragmatism in the light of strong management agency. Then, the strong sense
of labour agency, self-identity, materially altered its environment, conditioning the
introduction of contractorisation and subsequent management practices. Yet even here,
pragmatism prevailed over militancy, or rather militancy was pragmatic.
Given the potentialities, diversity and variation at each conjuncture in restructuring, the
notion of organizational adaptation merely serves every eventuality and outcome rendering
any explanatory purchase meaningless. 'Pragmatic adaptationism' suggests a malleable,
evolutionary process that always tends towards a final shaping by a greater external force.
What is intrinsic to labour's nature under capitalism is hypostatised, with labour
organizational praxis merely passed over as a recalcitrant fact needing management attention.
Unions are defined as a secondary problem, whose potential for obstruction is to be dealt
with by special invitation to address the primary problem of'competitive efficiency'. Babcock
are congratulated for having done this more or less successfully.
What exactly all this means from the point of view of workplace unionism is ignored. In
1988, the second year of the 'honeymoon', craft workers in particular showed a hostility to
the emerging managerial regime and the rationalisation of the wage structure when they voted
to reject the comprehensive pay and conditions package against union recommendations. Yet,
by the early 1990s, that is after 'the honeymoon', craft workers accepted pay freezes.
Moreover, the non-industrial union, IPMS, seem to have negotiated restructuring more
effectively than industrial unions. IPMS remain committed to defending conditions inherited
from the Civil Service and have been less severely affected by the flight from living labour
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than industrial unions. Although some functions have been eliminated, such as time
recorders, they have been more than compensated by a growing need for technical, market,
finance and other functions. That a 'delayering' of non-industrial workers has not proved
feasible thus far at Rosyth strengthens white-collar unionism. Non-industrials have also been
readier to take industrial action to defend pay and conditions, operating a three week work-to-
rule and overtime ban in November 1994.
Finally, at Rosyth there is little evidence of a change of heart from the general, long standing
hostility of British management to worker participation in decision-making (Nichols, 1986).
What Braverman (1974: 39) identified in the US 'work reform' movement of the 1960s
captures well the conflation of modest shifts in management style, and parallel academic
concerns with subjectivities and identity construction, with deep-rooted structural change:
They represent a style of management rather than a genuine change in the position of the
worker. They are characterized by a studied pretense of worker 'participation', a gracious
liberality in allowing the worker to adjust a machine, replace a light bulb, move from one
fractional job to another, and to have the illusion of making decisions by choosing among
fixed and limited alternatives designed by a management which deliberately leaves
insignificant matters open to choice.
How well this sums up the grandiloquent claims for 'employability' and job enrichment at
Rosyth. As Fairbrother (1994: 166, 193) notes, bureaucratically-led Civil Service unions as
at Rosyth were 'ciphers for policy from above". Member passivity was encouraged due to the
formal strength of high member density, official recognition, bargaining procedures and
confronting a 'model employer". It may be going too far to argue that restructured work
relations pressed unresponsive and centralised labour organisation into 'sad union forms
bypassed by history' (Fairbrother, 1994: 193). Nevertheless, the potentiality remains, at
Rosyth (and Ferranti) as for public sector unionism 'to rebuild accountable and responsive
levels of organisation within structures which do not lend themselves to ready reorganisation'.
Despite high labour redundancy and external displacement strategies, in re-commodifying
and de-centralising the employment relation its joint creation is brought home closer to the
'hidden abode' of production. Restructuring makes possible a renewal of 'high presence




This thesis set out to understand something of the dynamics of the restructuring process. As a
study of two key firms in the defence industry in Scotland it provides good evidence of. first,
the historical problems encountered in restructuring core 'strategic' defence sectors, firms and
workplaces and, secondly, the strongly mediated character of more recent restructuring. The
historical and comparative aspects of the study give due recognition to the contingent and
uneven character of restructuring. Evidence presented here undermines accounts which
assume uni-linear 'logics' of capital and uniform outcomes, almost always implying a
weakening of the position of labour with increased advantages flowing to capital. My findings
point to the fact that restructuring is by nature a self-limiting process, confined to re-ordering
the basis of existing relations of production. Capitalist accumulation implies a structural
dependency on living labour to carry out useful work. This compels capital to limit, indeed
repress, its domination over subordinates. So, despite capital's greater structural power,
labour's capacity to self-organise and the dependency on living labour frustrate the unilateral
will of capital.
Too often studies of industrial change are informed by the assumption that decision-makers,
managers and trade union officials hold the key to the 'hidden abode'. Undoubtedly, such
people do occupy distinct positions of power. However, the mediated character of
restructuring is too subtle to be approached solely through the accents and self-images of
leaders. Alternatively, research conducted by students of the 'impact' of industrial change on
the working class often assume that workers' resistance and compliance operate like clashing
balls on a billiard table. For them the key focus is to observe the moment that the cue ball
strikes the passive mass of static balls (labour) forcing them to break in so many directions,
falling into pockets (compliance) or rebounding from cushions (resistance) before coming to
rest. In the first case, the meanings and activities of subordinates are neglected while, in the
second case, (in)actions are viewed as reactive to the superior force of superordinates,
themselves acting upon a supposedly objective will-to-restructure. Something of the
irreducibly refractory material of human labour, the reciprocity of the employment relation,
the incompleteness of the work contract and workers' structural and organisational capacities
provides a more rounded sense of the relations between subordinates and superordinates
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within the restructuring process. The claim of this study is that in developing a substantive
theory, it historicises the mutual conditioning of state, capital and labour and leaves outcomes
w ith some degree of open-endedness.
When firms in the defence industry restructured, weakly after the mid-1980s and more
conceitedly in the first half of the 1990s, they were guided as much by arbitrary, short-run
expedients and opportunism as by "strategic" and rational management planning. Three main
shifts were initiated: job loss, vertical disintegration and time intensification. Reductions in
absolute levels of employment occurred in both companies. Shrunken workforces lower base
wage costs and create enough slack for introducing 'non-standard' employment relations.
Workers are recruited less through traditional avenues and reward packages and increasingly-
contracted as individual 'casuals' for a set length of time, either from management's own
database of ex-employees or brokered through the local Job Centre or through the widespread
use of parasitic "employment agencies" who can supply most forms of labour from general
labourers to software engineers. Within the full-time workforce the employment relation was
redrawn falteringly around 'functional" flexibilities. Yet the nature of the labour process in
warship refitting and military electronics, in part, places technical limits on the application of
supposedly generic skills to reintegrate divided labour, although the introduction of 'zone
management" at Rosyth clearly intended to use labour more flexibly between tasks. Here,
'employee-centred' discourses exhort workers to more exacting performances, which merely
masked how the employment relation was being refocused around a new calculating
management gaze.
Job losses, time intensification, flexibilities and vertical disintegration represent alternatives to
what Lovering (1990: 464) predicted when he said that managers in defence firms were
moving to the 'forefront of the confrontation with organised labour". As management became
pessimistic about future prospects for accumulation the specialised versatility of collective
labour power offered capital a temporal suppleness for shifting uncertainty onto living labour.
Where management considered that living labour could be avoided it was; where it remained
central to valorisation then it could not be so readily displaced from production. In initiating
structural change state and capital are compelled to contain risks and uncertainties, above all
those concerning living labour, but still tilt the balance of power sufficiently in capital's
favour.
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Restructuring is therefore an inherently self-limiting and contradictory process. As if caught in
the unending panic of a waking nightmare, management find that their repressed domination of
living labour cannot be overcome. Instead, self-repression is reinforced by the contradictory
dynamic of restructuring; restructuring does not so much bury the dead as breathe life into
undead labour, hitherto restfully entombed within the 'hidden abode' of arms production.
Living labour is now compelled to wander the world of commodity exchange looking for a
purpose within production; dead labour meanwhile arrives at the scene of production as a
semi-finished thing.
As this labour is displaced onto the market, within production management become addicted
to the idea of simultaneously specialised and versatile labour under their command. Yet
capital itself was now to organise its activities as if the monetised authority of the ascendant
accountancy paradigm signalled disinterested commands for it to follow. In supplanting the
previous technical-administrative paradigm, the monetised values of accountancy offered an
illusion of hard and fast fixity and certainty. Standard employment relations, involving
relatively secure, full-time work attracting a package of social benefits, would now have less
purchase in securing workers to specific work performances. Instead, management decision¬
making would increasingly call upon the authority of budgets, payment milestones and internal
transactions. Allied to weakly developed horizontal 're-integration' within production through
functional flexibility, vertical disintegration pushed the technical division of labour outside the
firm's boundaries with materials, instruments and semi- and finished components becoming
available as commodities through the social division of labour.
Yet the case studies show that for mainline military technology projects, such as warship
refitting or advanced radar, more recent shifts to 'competitive' procurement arrangements and
'real' or 'risk' prices are largely fictions. Prices are set by political bargaining and not by
some naturalistic, disinterested signal hailing buyers and sellers. That this arbitrary price-
setting wilfully seeks reified authority to dominate and discipline living labour might seem an
obvious conclusion to draw; that the appeal to this contrived authority can never be finally
successful and stands in constant risk of exposure and failure may be less obvious. How far
labour is subordinated by the grotesque authority of politically-constructed monetised values
depends on the relative combativeness of the antagonists.
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The extent of this reciprocity is brought out by the comparative aspects of the thesis. In the
case of Ferranti in Edinburgh, the 'strategic" autonomy established by company
divisionalisation allowed for continual expansion, accumulation through capital widening,
individual advancement through promotional opportunities, paternalistic employment
relations, and a self-image for the Scottish division which employed identities of family, nation
and technology. Similar accumulation strategies and worker enrolment practices were also
evident at Rosyth. As the sole Scottish dockyard within the British naval-industrial complex,
the arrival of nuclear submarine refitting in the late 1960s provided a sense of a modernising
paternalism at work comparable to that of Ferranti. So, although operating within different
sectors, technologies and labour processes, and exhibiting different ownership patterns,
similar ideas about standard employment relations, bureaucratic paternalism and a serviceable
moral economy of labour prevailed.
When it came to restructuring, however, quite different trajectories were followed. The
introduction of commercial management as an organisational form at Rosyth in the mid-1980s
was viewed as a radical departure from previous re-organisations. Ten years later it seemed
unduly cautious. Only belatedly were dockyard assets handed over to the private managers,
Babcock, to manage the gradual rundown of the yard's fixed and variable capital as naval
work tapered-off over the next few years. Commercial management was based on a pragmatic
judgement made by Conservative Ministers and their advisors, taking into political
expectations which correctly anticipated worker hostility and resistance. While this thesis has
identified dockyard trade unionism as excessively centralised and bureaucratised, a tradition
of workplace activism and, at times, of politically conscious militancy was established at
Rosyth during the 1970s. As worker opposition intensified, commercial management seemed
to offer an astute compromise solution to dockyard organisational malaise.
In short, politicians, policy makers and managers take prior account of likely worker
opposition to restructuring. This is demonstrated, albeit negatively, in the case of Ferranti. In
contrast to Rosyth, trade unionism at Ferranti took a more subdued, moderate countenance.
The main blue collar union were considered to be a bastion of right wing politics within the
engineering union, AEU, on the east coast of Scotland. The first major blue-collar strike at
Ferranti happened thirty-six years after Crewe Toll opened and proved an abject failure. But
something else was happening at Ferranti. White collar unionism grew in the aftermath of
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state bail-out in the mid-1970s on the basis of younger, highly trained and politically left-
leaning union activists. By the time of the GEC takeover, the eclipse of blue collar unionism
by white collar organisation. MSF. was well advanced. Initially. GEC were able to press its
own designs onto a blue collar union organisation badly corroded by bureaucratisation and
craftist arrogance. In contrast, white collar shop stewards were taking political initiatives, first
exposing the coming ISC scandal before the GEC takeover and, after 1990, actively
campaigning for a government-sponsored Diversification Agency to ease the transition to a
post-Cold War arms industry. And, in 1993, as GEC revoked standard employment relations,
MSF activists galvanised support for a series of strikes against GEC. Again, as at Rosyth,
activism was confined to the workplaces directly affected and resistance could not be pushed
beyond certain limits enforced by union officials.
Different modalities of struggle at Ferranti and Rosyth, then, conditioned the practices of the
respective management teams. Instead of the coercive abrasiveness ofGEC, Babcock adopted
a more conciliatory, benign, 'employee-centred' approach, underwritten by the guaranteed
profits for minimal investment of the Ministry of Defence programme of nuclear work. When
this began to be challenged by its sole competitor, DML, and work cancelled as nuclear
submarines were paid-off, a harsher management regime operated. Yet, Babcock did not
venture nearly as far as GEC in shaking-off the repressed will-to-dominate. Workers'
organisational capacities were intact. Although militant action was virtually non-existent and
union officials also desired an orderly rundown, confrontation at Rosyth did not lead to a
debilitating defeat. Meanwhile, after the strikes in Edinburgh GEC attempted to re-conquer a
demoralised workforce. To a greater extent than Babcock, GEC's overriding obsession with
monetised values compelled managers to move further in confronting labour. That it seemed to
pay-off, at least short term, indicates a weakening of labour's organisational capacities. That
a demoralised but indispensable workforce will still resist in the subterranean depths of
production to de-subordinate the labour process indicates a potential for future re¬
organisation.
With cost considerations beginning to more fully define the employment relation many
workers could feel cheated. Promises made over the decades of the permanent arms economy
about the long-term rewards for loyalty and service in return for foregoing better wage rates
being paid in the civilian economy were reneged upon at the same time as the time intensity of
the working day was being jacked-up. A 'moral economy of effort', the long established daily
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rhythm of alternating occupied and porous working time as against relatively meagre
monetary rewards, was disrupted as managements made strenuous efforts to fill-in "lost" time
and re-align more completely the working day with productive activity. A sense of loss and
betrayal became evident, that something implicitly known and felt about the employment
relation had been battered and belittled, that useful labour began to feel more like used labour.
Some workers simply became incredulous that a tolerable moral economy of effort could
continue to be justified and defended against the harsher reality of political economy outside
the so-called 'islands of prosperity' in the arms industry. The corollary of such fatalism was
that restructuring somehow became both inevitable and necessary. These depths can only be
plumbed by research interested in the meanings of the dominated and understood within the
contradictions contained in the overall relations of production and the circuiting of state
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